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Executive summary 
As the national corporate, markets and financial services regulator, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is involved in most areas of 
Australia's commercial world. With the limited resources available to it, ASIC should 
be commended for how it performs certain functions and many of the outcomes it has 
achieved. ASIC will never be able to do everything the community may expect of it. 
In some respects, nor should it. It would be unrealistic to expect that ASIC could be 
funded at a level where all breaches or allegations of misconduct were pursued. 
Despite this, the size and growth of Australia's financial sector and the fact that 
millions of Australians are involved in it, not least because of compulsory 
superannuation, makes it essential that modern and adaptable regulations are in place 
and regulators such as ASIC are at the top of their game. ASIC needs to ensure it sets 
appropriate priorities and that its actions encourage widespread compliance. 
This report underlines the critical importance of ensuring that Australia has a robust 
corporate regulatory system under the stewardship of a strong and effective regulator.  
The committee examined many aspects of ASIC's work, but two case studies in 
particular assisted it to assess ASIC's performance. The first looked at consumer credit 
since 2002, which set the groundwork for the report. It introduced a number of key 
findings that surface and resurface in different contexts throughout this work. 
They include that: 
 ASIC has limited powers and resources but even so appears to miss or ignore 
clear and persistent early warning signs of corporate wrongdoing or troubling 
trends that pose a risk to consumers;  
 the financial services industry is dynamic with new products and business 
models emerging, which requires ASIC to be alert to the changes and any risk 
they pose to consumers or investors; 
 there are always people looking to find ways to circumvent the law—ASIC 
needs to have the skills and industry experience to be able to match their 
ingenuity;  
 consumers trust their advisers/brokers/financial institutions to do the right 
thing by them to the extent that they may sign incomplete or blank documents, 
do not ask questions and do not seek second opinions—importantly such trust 
is open to abuse; 
 consumers have unrealistic expectations of what ASIC can do and the extent 
to which the regulator is able to protect their interests or investigate their 
complaints;  
 ASIC's communication with retail investors and consumers needs to improve 
significantly;  
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 participants in the financial services industry can have an important role in 
assisting ASIC to fulfil its responsibilities, which then allows the regulator 
to concentrate its limited resources on serious and systemic matters; and 
 between 2002 and 2010, some financial advisers, brokers and lenders 
systematically targeted more vulnerable members of the community, 
especially older Australians with assets but without high levels of financial 
literacy. 
The second case study reinforced these findings but in greater detail and with sharper 
focus. In particular, it showed ASIC as a timid, hesitant regulator, too ready and 
willing to accept uncritically the assurances of a large institution that there were no 
grounds for ASIC's concerns or intervention. ASIC concedes that its trust in this 
institution was misplaced. 
In this case study, the committee examined misconduct that occurred between 2006 
and 2010 by financial advisers and other staff at Commonwealth Financial Planning 
Limited (CFPL), part of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group (CBA). 
Advisers deliberately neglected their duties and placed their personal interests far 
above the interests of their clients. The assets of clients with conservative risk 
positions, such as retirees, were allocated into high-risk products without their 
knowledge to the financial benefit of the adviser, who received significant bonuses 
and recognition within CFPL as a 'high performer'. There was forgery and dishonest 
concealment of material facts. Clients lost substantial amounts of their savings when 
the global financial crisis hit; the crisis was also used to explain away the poor 
performance of portfolios. Meanwhile, it is alleged that within CFPL there was a 
management conspiracy that, perversely, resulted in one of the most serious offenders, 
Mr Don Nguyen, being promoted.  
Initially the committee found: 
 the conduct of a number of rogue advisers working in CFPL was unethical, 
dishonest, well below professional standards and a grievous breach of their 
duties—in particular the advisers targeted vulnerable, trusting people; 
 both ASIC and the CBA seemed to place reports of fraud in the 'too hard 
basket', ensuring the malfeasance escaped scrutiny and hence no one was held 
to account; 
 the CBA's compliance regime failed, which not only allowed unscrupulous 
advisers to continue operating but also saw the promotion of one adviser, thus 
exposing unsuspecting clients to further losses; 
 there was an inordinate delay in CFPL recognising that advisers were 
providing bad advice or acting improperly and in CFPL acting on that 
knowledge and informing clients and ASIC; 
 ASIC was too slow in realising the seriousness of the problems in CFPL, 
instead allowing itself to be lulled into complacency and placing too much 
trust in an institution that sought to gloss over its problems; 
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 ASIC did not pay sufficient attention to the whistleblowers who raised serious 
concerns about the conduct of Mr Nguyen and the actions of CFPL. 
As the committee gathered more and more evidence, however, lingering doubts began 
to grow about the robustness and fairness of the ASIC-sanctioned compensation 
process for CFPL clients who had suffered losses because of adviser misconduct. 
The committee could see major flaws in the process being implemented by CFPL, 
in particular: 
 the manner in which information about adviser misconduct was conveyed 
to clients, which rather than reassure clients tended in some cases to 
intimidate and confuse them; 
 CFPL's obfuscation when clients sought information on their investments or 
adviser;  
 a strong reluctance on the part of CFPL to provide files to clients who 
requested them; 
 no allowance made for the power asymmetry between unsophisticated, and 
in many cases older and vulnerable clients, and CFPL; 
 no client representative or advocate present during the early stages of the 
investigation to safeguard the clients' interests when files were being checked 
and in many cases reconstructed; 
 numerous allegations of missing files and key records, of fabricated 
documents and forged signatures that do not seem to have been investigated;  
 the CFPL's initial offer of compensation was manifestly inadequate in many 
instances; and 
 the offer of $5,000 to clients to pay the costs of an expert to assess the 
compensation offer was made available only after the CFPL had determined 
that compensation was payable and an offer had been made. 
Recent developments, whereby both ASIC and the CBA have corrected their 
testimony about the compensation process, have only deepened the committee's 
misgivings about the integrity and fairness of the process. The committee is now 
of the view that the CBA deliberately played down the seriousness and extent of 
problems in CFPL in an attempt to avoid ASIC's scrutiny, contain adverse publicity 
and minimise compensation payments. In effect, the CBA managed, for some 
considerable time, to keep the committee, ASIC and its clients in the dark. The time is 
well overdue for full, frank and open disclosure on the CFPL matter. 
The committee is concerned that there are potentially many more affected clients that 
have not been fairly compensated. The clients that gave evidence at a public hearing 
were exceptional in that they were willing to voice their concerns publicly and were 
able to fight for compensation because of their circumstances. They were fortunate 
because they had a family member determined to assist them, were able to obtain 
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independent expert advice, or were able to obtain a copy of their original file from one 
of the whistleblowers. 
At this stage, the committee's confidence in ASIC's ability to monitor the CBA's 
implementation of its new undertaking regarding the compensation process is severely 
undermined. Furthermore, the CBA's credibility in the CFPL matter is so 
compromised that responsibility for the compensation process should be taken away 
from the bank. The committee considered five options to finally resolve the CFPL 
matter. But, given the seriousness of the misconduct and the need for all client files 
to be reviewed, the committee believes that an inquiry with sufficient investigative 
and discovery powers should be established by the government to undertake this 
work. To resolve this matter conclusively and satisfactorily, the inquiry would need 
the powers to compel relevant people to give evidence and to produce information 
or documents.  
The committee is of the view that a royal commission into these matters is warranted. 
The CFPL scandal needs to stand as a lesson for the entire financial services sector. 
Firms should understand that they cannot turn a blind eye to unprincipled employees 
who do whatever it takes to make profits at the expense of vulnerable investors. 
If this matter is not pursued thoroughly, there will be little incentive for Australia's 
major financial institutions to take compliance seriously.  
The examination of CFPL, however, was just one aspect of this inquiry. Many issues 
and cases that encompass ASIC's broad responsibilities and regulatory roles were also 
considered. The committee's additional findings build on those resulting from the 
case studies, emphasising the importance of ASIC becoming a self-evaluating and 
self-correcting organisation.  
The committee's recommendations recognise the good work that ASIC has done in 
a challenging environment. Even so, the committee identified the need for ASIC 
to become a far more proactive regulator ready to act promptly but fairly. ASIC also 
needs to be a harsh critic of its own performance with the drive to identify and 
implement improvements. With this aim in mind, the committee's recommendations 
are intended to strengthen ASIC in several key ways. 
A main objective is to improve ASIC's understanding and appreciation of Australia's 
corporate environment and those it regulates, and to ensure that ASIC has access to 
independent, external expertise. ASIC needs to be alert to emerging business models 
or new financial products and to match the inventiveness and resourcefulness of those 
in the industry who seek to circumvent the law. In this regard, the committee 
considers that ASIC should more effectively tap into the experience, knowledge and 
insight of retired and highly respected business people, legal professionals, academics 
and former senior public servants to help it identify and minimise risks that have the 
potential to cause significant investor or consumer harm.  
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Recommendations are also aimed at encouraging better quality reporting to ASIC, and 
for the regulator to use this information more effectively. Building the analytical and 
investigative skills within ASIC necessary to discern early warning signs of unhealthy 
trends or troubling behaviour is a key goal. Australia needs a corporate and financial 
services regulator that has these skills in order to identify and act on problems early 
and decisively. ASIC should develop an internal management system that fosters 
a receptive culture that would ensure that misconduct reports or complaints indicative 
of a serious problem lodged with ASIC are elevated to the appropriate level and 
receive due attention. The committee also believes that the corporate whistleblowing 
regime needs to be strengthened to encourage whistleblowers to come forward. 
Informed individuals need to be confident that they can report alleged misconduct, 
potentially unsafe products or dubious practices in Australia's corporate world and for 
their reports to be taken seriously and dealt with accordingly.  
Given the resource constraints and knowledge gaps that a body like ASIC will always 
encounter, the committee has also designed recommendations intended to make the 
regulatory system more self-enforcing, allowing ASIC to concentrate on key priorities 
and trouble areas. To achieve this, ASIC needs to work effectively with other industry 
and professional bodies that share ASIC's goals. In particular, ASIC needs 
to ensure it has strong, constructive and cooperative relationships with all of the 
financial system gatekeepers, such as professional associations. ASIC could also work 
with companies to strengthen their internal compliance regimes and their systems for 
reporting non-compliance to ASIC. Finally, ASIC should be primarily funded through 
a user-pays system of industry levies designed to reflect the cost associated with 
regulation and to incentivise sectors to minimise the attention the regulator needs to 
devote to them. Again, more effective self-regulation will allow ASIC to focus on and 
more effectively deal with egregious misconduct. 
ASIC's communication with members of the community needs to improve. 
In particular, ASIC must be more responsive and sensitive to the concerns of retail 
investors and consumers. Expectations about what ASIC can do also need to be 
appropriately managed. In this regard, steps to improve the level of financial literacy 
in Australia will, in the long-term, help to limit the number of people that encounter 
difficulties and turn to ASIC. The committee acknowledges ASIC's existing work in 
this area and urges ASIC to intensify its efforts.  
ASIC's enforcement role is one of its most important functions. ASIC needs to be 
respected and feared. It needs to send a clear and unmistakeable message, backed-up 
and continually reinforced by actions, that ASIC has the necessary enforcement tools 
and resources and is ready to use them to uphold accepted standards of conduct and 
the integrity of the markets. To assist ASIC with this, the penalties currently available 
for contraventions of the legislation ASIC administers should be reviewed to ensure 
they are set at appropriate levels. Monetary penalties may also need to become more 
responsive to misconduct, with multiple of gain penalties or penalties combined with 
disgorgement considered. The resolution of a particular matter through enforcement 
action, however, is not the end of the process—ASIC needs to ensure that a culture of 
compliance results from the enforcement action. For example, when ASIC accepts an 
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enforceable undertaking, it needs to have a mechanism in place that will provide 
assurances to the public that the desired changes have indeed taken place and that the 
entity has introduced safeguards that would prevent similar misconduct from 
recurring. The transparency associated with enforceable undertakings should also 
be enhanced; in particular, the report of an independent expert appointed as a result of 
an undertaking should be made public. On the other hand, when ASIC is unsuccessful 
in enforcement action it needs to reflect and learn what it can from the experience.  
The cases of misconduct in the financial advice industry and ASIC's evidence 
regarding the regulatory gaps in that industry have convinced the committee that 
various changes need to occur. The committee's recommendations in this area seek 
to improve the overall standards in the sector and provide ASIC with greater 
information and powers regarding problem advisers. For example, ASIC should 
be able to ban someone from managing a financial services business if ASIC has 
already banned them from directly providing financial services.  
The committee also considered ways for ASIC to become more accountable and 
transparent. Increased transparency of its operations and how its functions are 
performed would be appropriate and may counter perceptions of the regulator being 
captured by big business. Some of the changes are straightforward, such as ASIC 
publishing more of its internal policies. ASIC also should keep the business and 
academic worlds better informed about developments and trends in corporate 
Australia by providing and disseminating information it receives from a range of 
sources, as well as ASIC's analysis of this information. 
Finally, the range of tasks ASIC performs was considered. ASIC is overburdened and 
charged with tasks that do not assist its other regulatory roles. The committee is of the 
view that ASIC's registry function should be transferred elsewhere to allow ASIC to 
concentrate on its core functions. 
The committee's recommendations are intended to address gaps in the corporations 
and financial services legislative and regulatory frameworks and to encourage ASIC 
to consider how its performance can be improved. These recommendations will enable 
ASIC to fulfil its responsibilities and obligations more effectively. However, many of 
the issues with ASIC's performance cannot be addressed by anyone other than ASIC. 
In the committee's opinion, ASIC has been in the spotlight far too frequently for the 
wrong reasons. It is acknowledged that not all of the criticisms levelled at ASIC are 
justified; ASIC is required to perform much of its work confidentially and in a way 
that ensures natural justice. It is also constrained by the legislation it administers and 
the resources given to it for this purpose. Nevertheless, the credibility of the regulator 
is important for encouraging a culture of compliance. That ASIC is consistently 
described as being slow to act or as a watchdog with no teeth is troubling. 
The committee knows, however, that ASIC has dedicated and talented employees that 
want to rectify the agency's reputation. 
This inquiry has been a wake-up call for ASIC. The committee looks forward to 
seeing how ASIC changes as a result. 
  
 
List of recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1 
5.80 The committee recommends that ASIC develop a multi-pronged campaign 
to educate retail customers about the care they need to take when entering into a 
financial transaction and where they can find affordable and independent advice or 
assistance when they find themselves in difficulties because of that transaction. 
Recommendation 2 
6.39 As part of the multi-pronged campaign (see Recommendation 1), the 
committee recommends that ASIC actively encourage consumers to report any 
suspected unscrupulous conduct related to consumer credit. 
Recommendation 3 
6.40 The committee recommends that as the national credit reforms introduced in 
2010 bed down, ASIC should: 
 carefully monitor the implementation of the new laws giving particular 
attention to activities that may fall outside the legislation but which pose risks 
to consumer interests; 
 ensure that it acts quickly to alert consumers to likely dangers and the 
government to any problems that need to be addressed; and 
 build capacity to monitor and research lending practices and to be prepared 
to launch marketing and education strategies should poor practices begin to 
creep back into the industry. 
Recommendation 4 
7.39 The committee recommends that ASIC devote a section of its annual report to 
the work of the financial services and consumer credit external dispute resolution 
(EDR) schemes, accompanied by ASIC's assessment of the systemic and significant 
issues the EDR schemes have raised in their reports to ASIC. Further, the committee 
recommends that ASIC include in this commentary information on any action taken in 
response to the matters raised in these reports. 
Recommendation 5 
7.82 The committee recommends that the Financial Ombudsman Service and the 
Credit Ombudsman Service set key performance indicators (KPIs) for meeting 
milestones in their management of a complaint, publish these milestones and KPIs on 
their website and report their performance against these KPIs in their annual reports. 
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Recommendation 6 
7.83 The committee recommends that ASIC, in consultation with the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) and the Credit Ombudsman Service (COSL): 
 consider amending the terms of reference for FOS and COSL so that the caps 
on the maximum value of a claim that the EDR schemes may consider and the 
maximum amount that can be awarded are increased and indexed to the 
consumer price index; 
 examine the processes for reporting to ASIC matters of significance and 
emerging systemic issues with a view to improving the reporting regime; 
 establish protocols for managing allegations of less serious fraud to ensure 
that such complaints do not get lost in the system and are recorded properly 
on ASIC's databases; 
 improve the guidance provided to complainants so they fully understand that 
FOS and COSL are dispute resolution bodies and that complainants must 
prepare their own cases; and 
 consider establishing special divisions in FOS and COSL to deal with small 
business complaints. 
Recommendation 7 
12.28 The committee recommends that the government establish an independent 
inquiry, possibly in the form of a judicial inquiry or Royal Commission, to: 
 thoroughly examine the actions of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(CBA) in relation to the misconduct of advisers and planners within the 
CBA's financial planning businesses and the allegations of a cover up; 
 identify any conduct that may amount to a breach of any law or professional 
standard; 
 review all files of clients affected or likely to be affected by the misconduct 
and assess the appropriateness of the compensation processes and amounts of 
compensation offered and provided by the CBA to these clients; and 
 make recommendations about ASIC and any regulatory or legislative reforms 
that may be required. 
Recommendation 8 
13.33 The committee recommends that ASIC establish a pool of approved 
independent experts (retired experienced and hardened business people with extensive 
knowledge of compliance) from which to draw when concerns emerge about a poor 
compliance culture in a particular company. The special expert would review and 
report to the company and ASIC on suspected compliance failings with the process 
funded by the company in question. 
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Recommendation 9 
13.34 The committee recommends that the government consider increased penalties 
and alternatives to court action, such as infringement notices, for Australian financial 
services licensees that fail to lodge reports of significant breaches to ASIC within the 
required time. 
Recommendation 10 
13.35 The committee recommends that ASIC review its surveillance activity with a 
view to making it more effective in detecting deficiencies in internal compliance 
arrangements. 
Recommendation 11 
13.36 In light of the Commonwealth Financial Planning matter, the committee 
recommends that ASIC undertakes intensive surveillance of other financial advice 
businesses that have recently been a source of concern, such as Macquarie Private 
Wealth, to ensure that ASIC's previous concerns are being addressed and that there are 
no other compliance deficiencies. ASIC should make the findings of its surveillance 
public and, in due course, provide a report to this committee. 
Recommendation 12 
14.112 The committee recommends that, consistent with the recommendations made 
by ASIC, the government develop legislative amendments to: 
 expand the definition of a whistleblower in Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations 
Act 2001 to include a company's former employees, financial services 
providers, accountants and auditors, unpaid workers and business partners; 
 expand the scope of information protected by the whistleblower protections 
to cover any misconduct that ASIC may investigate; and 
 provide that ASIC cannot be required to produce a document revealing a 
whistleblower's identity unless ordered by a court or tribunal, following 
certain criteria. 
Recommendation 13 
14.113 The committee recommends that an 'Office of the Whistleblower' be 
established within ASIC. 
Recommendation 14 
14.114 The committee recommends that the government initiate a review of the 
adequacy of Australia's current framework for protecting corporate whistleblowers, 
drawing as appropriate on Treasury's 2009 Options Paper on the issue and the 
subsequent consultation process. 
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Recommendation 15 
14.115 The committee recommends that, subject to the findings of the broader review 
called for in Recommendation 14, protections for corporate whistleblowers be updated 
so that they are generally consistent with and complement the protections afforded to 
public sector whistleblowers under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. 
Specifically, the corporate whistleblower framework should be updated so that: 
 anonymous disclosures are protected; 
 the requirement that a whistleblower must be acting in 'good faith' in 
disclosing information is removed, and replaced with a requirement that a 
disclosure: 
 is based on an honest belief, on reasonable grounds, that the information 
disclosed shows or tends to show wrongdoing; or 
 shows or tends to show wrongdoing, on an objective test, regardless of 
what the whistleblower believes; 
 remedies available to whistleblowers if they are disadvantaged as a result of 
making a disclosure are clearly set out in legislation, as are the processes 
through which a whistleblower might seek such remedy; 
 it is a criminal offence to take or threaten to take a reprisal against a person 
(such as discriminatory treatment, termination of employment or injury) 
because they have made or propose to make a disclosure; and 
 in limited circumstances, protections are extended to cover external 
disclosures to a third parties, such as the media. 
Recommendation 16 
14.116 The committee recommends that, as part of the broader review called for in 
Recommendation 14, the government explore options for reward-based incentives for 
corporate whistleblowers, including qui tam arrangements. 
Recommendation 17 
15.66 The committee recommends that ASIC, in collaboration with the Australian 
Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association and accounting bodies, develop 
a self-rating system, or similar mechanism, for statutory reports lodged by insolvency 
practitioners and auditors under the Corporations Act 2001 to assist ASIC identify 
reports that require the most urgent attention and investigation. 
Recommendation 18 
16.42 The committee recommends that ASIC establish a dedicated channel for 
complaints from certain key professional bodies, industry bodies and consumer 
groups, as well as for accountants and financial advisers/planners. 
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Recommendation 19 
16.43 The committee recommends that ASIC examine carefully: 
 its triage system to ensure that the officers managing this process have the 
skills and experience required to identify complaints and reports of a serious 
nature requiring attention; 
 its misconduct reports management system to ensure that once identified, a 
serious misconduct report is elevated and more senior people are available 
to deal with the issue; and 
 its culture to ensure that those managing complaints and reports who wish to 
draw to the attention of senior officers what they perceive as a potentially 
serious matter are encouraged to do so; that is, for ASIC to foster an open and 
receptive culture within the organisation so that critical information is not 
siloed. 
Recommendation 20 
16.44 The committee recommends that ASIC look at the skills it needs to 
forensically and effectively interrogate its databases and other sources of information 
it collates and stores, with a view to ensuring that it is well-placed to identify and 
respond to early warning signs of corporate wrongdoing or troubling trends in 
Australia's corporate world. 
Recommendation 21 
16.45 The committee recommends that ASIC put in place a system whereby, after 
gross malfeasance is exposed, a review of ASIC's performance is undertaken to 
determine whether or how it could have minimised or prevented investor losses or 
consumer damage. Spearheaded by a small panel of independent, experienced and 
highly regarded people (with business/legal/ academic/public sector and/or consumer 
advocacy backgrounds), together with all ASIC commissioners, this investigation 
would identify lessons for ASIC to learn and how to incorporate them into ASIC's 
mode of operation. The committee recommends further that their findings be 
published including details of any measures ASIC should implement. 
Recommendation 22 
17.49 The committee recommends that the balance of ASIC's enforcement special 
account be increased significantly. 
Recommendation 23 
17.51 The committee recommends that the Attorney-General refer to the Australian 
Law Reform Commission an inquiry into the operation and efficacy of the civil 
penalty provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 that relate to breaches of directors' 
duties. 
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Recommendation 24 
17.54 As enforceable undertakings can be used as an alternative to court 
proceedings, the committee recommends that when considering whether to accept an 
enforceable undertaking, ASIC: 
 require stronger terms, particularly regarding the remedial action that should 
be taken to ensure that compliance with these terms can be enforced in court; 
 require a clearer acknowledgement in the undertaking of what the misconduct 
was; 
 as its default position, require that an independent expert be appointed to 
supervise the implementation of the terms of the undertaking; and 
 consider ways to make the monitoring of ongoing compliance with the 
undertaking more transparent, such as requiring that reports on the progress of 
achieving the undertaking's objectives are, to the extent possible, made public. 
Recommendation 25 
17.55 The committee recommends that ASIC should more vigilantly monitor 
compliance with enforceable undertakings with a view to enforcing compliance with 
the undertaking in court if necessary. 
Recommendation 26 
17.56 The committee requests that the Auditor-General consider conducting a 
performance audit of ASIC's use of enforceable undertakings, including: 
 the consistency of ASIC's approach to enforceable undertakings across its 
various stakeholder and enforcement teams; and 
 the arrangements in place for monitoring compliance with enforceable 
undertakings that ASIC has accepted. 
Recommendation 27 
17.57 The committee recommends that ASIC include in its annual report additional 
commentary on: 
 ASIC's activities related to monitoring compliance with enforceable 
undertakings; and 
 how the undertakings have led to improved compliance with the law and 
encouraged a culture of compliance. 
Recommendation 28 
17.58 The committee recommends that ASIC develop a code of conduct for 
independent experts appointed as a requirement of an enforceable undertaking. In 
particular, the code of conduct should address the management of conflicts of interest. 
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Recommendation 29 
18.22 The committee recommends that ASIC improve its procedures for updating 
past online media releases and statements to reflect recent court developments, such as 
the outcome of an appeal or when proceedings are discontinued. ASIC should ensure 
that these updates are made in a timely manner and published in a more prominent 
position than what currently occurs. 
Recommendation 30 
18.46 The committee recommends that when ASIC has been unsuccessful in court 
proceedings both an internal review and an independent review of the initial 
investigation and case must be undertaken. 
Recommendation 31 
19.50 The committee recommends that the accounting bodies and ASIC work to 
repair their relationship and commit to a more constructive approach to discussing 
regulatory issues. The committee requests that ASIC provide a written report to the 
committee in six months' time informing the committee of progress achieved in 
strengthening this relationship. 
Recommendation 32 
19.53 The committee recommends that ASIC publish on its website information 
about its secondment programs and the policies and safeguards in place that relate to 
these programs. 
Recommendation 33 
19.56 The committee requests that the Commonwealth Ombudsman consider 
undertaking an own-motion investigation into the allegations related to the process 
that resulted in ASIC granting regulatory relief for generic online calculators in 2005. 
An investigation undertaken by the Ombudsman should, in particular, consider 
whether the process was undermined because ASIC did not adequately manage a 
conflict of interest identified by a person on secondment from a financial services 
firm. 
Recommendation 34 
19.59 The committee recommends that after exercising its discretionary powers to 
grant relief from provisions of the legislation it administers, ASIC should ensure that 
it puts in place a program for monitoring and assessing compliance with the 
conditions of the relief. 
Recommendation 35 
20.33 The committee recommends that ASIC include on all registry search results 
and extracts a prominent statement explaining ASIC's role and advising that ASIC 
does not approve particular business models. 
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Recommendation 36 
20.34 The committee recommends that in bringing together the multi-pronged 
campaign to educate retail customers outlined in Recommendation 1, ASIC have 
regard to the fact that: 
 many retail investors and consumers have unrealistic expectations of ASIC's 
role in protecting their interests; and 
 financial literacy is more than financial knowledge but also incorporates the 
skills, attitudes and behaviours necessary to make sound financial decisions. 
Recommendation 37 
20.41 Recognising the importance of giving priority to the needs of consumers when 
ASIC develops regulatory guidance and provides advice to government, the 
committee recommends that ASIC should consider whether its Consumer Advisory 
Panel could be enhanced by the introduction of some of the features of the United 
Kingdom's Financial Services Consumer Panel. 
Recommendation 38 
21.33 The committee recommends that ASIC undertake an internal review of the 
way in which it manages complaints from retail investors and consumers with the aim 
of developing training and professional development courses designed to: 
 have ASIC officers more attuned to the needs of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged consumers and to enhance ASIC's consumer advisory role; 
 devise strategies and protocols for responding to retail investors and 
consumers registering a complaint, many of whom are at their wits end and in 
desperate need of help; 
 ensure that ASIC officers, when advising a consumer to transfer their 
complaint to the relevant external dispute resolution scheme, make that 
transfer as seamless and worry-free as possible while conveying the sense that 
ASIC is not discarding their complaint; and 
 acknowledge the advantages of making a return call to the complainant and 
provide guidance for ASIC officers on the times when making a return call 
would be appropriate. 
Recommendation 39 
22.28 The committee recommends that ASIC promote 'informed participation' in the 
market by making information more accessible and presented in an informative way. 
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Recommendation 40 
22.38 The committee recommends that ASIC consider the aims and purposes of its 
website and redesign its website so that these aims and purposes are achieved. 
Particular consideration should be given to: 
 explaining ASIC's role clearly on the website's homepage; 
 providing a 'for consumers' category of information; and 
 redesigning the homepage to give greater prominence to key information and 
services and less prominence to recent media releases. 
Recommendation 41 
23.13 The committee recommends that the government commission an inquiry into 
the current criminal and civil penalties available across the legislation ASIC 
administers. The inquiry should consider: 
 the consistency of criminal penalties, and whether some comparable offences 
currently attract inconsistent penalties; 
 the range of civil penalty provisions available in the legislation ASIC 
administers and whether they are consistent with other civil penalties for 
corporations; and 
 the level of civil penalty amounts, and whether the legislation should provide 
for the removal of any financial benefit. 
Recommendation 42 
24.57 The committee recommends that financial advisers and planners be required 
to: 
 successfully pass a national examination developed and conducted by relevant 
industry associations before being able to give personal advice on Tier 1 
products; 
 hold minimum education standards of a relevant university degree, and three 
years' experience over a five year period; and 
 meet minimum continuing professional development requirements. 
Recommendation 43 
24.58 The committee recommends that a requirement for mandatory reference 
checking procedures in the financial advice/planning industry be introduced. 
Recommendation 44 
24.59 The committee recommends that a register of employee representatives 
providing personal advice on Tier 1 products be established. 
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Recommendation 45 
24.60 The committee recommends that the Corporations Act 2001 be amended to 
require: 
 that a person must not use the terms 'financial adviser', 'financial planner' or 
terms of like import, in relation to a financial services business or a financial 
service, unless the person is able under the licence regime to provide personal 
financial advice on designated financial products; and 
 financial advisers and financial planners to adhere to professional obligations 
by requiring financial advisers and financial planners to be members of a 
regulator-prescribed professional association. 
Recommendation 46 
24.61 The committee recommends that the government consider whether section 
913 of the Corporations Act 2001 and section 37 of the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 should be amended to ensure that ASIC can take all relevant 
factors into account in making a licensing decision. 
Recommendation 47 
24.62 The committee recommends that the government consider the banning 
provisions in the licence regimes with a view to ensuring that a banned person cannot 
be a director, manager or hold a position of influence in a company providing a 
financial service or credit business. 
Recommendation 48 
24.63 The committee recommends that the government consider legislative 
amendments that would give ASIC the power to immediately suspend a financial 
adviser or planner when ASIC suspects that the adviser or planner has engaged in 
egregious misconduct causing widespread harm to clients, subject to the principles of 
natural justice. 
Recommendation 49 
25.57 The committee recommends that the scoping study examining future 
ownership options for ASIC's registry function take account of the evidence that has 
been presented to the committee. 
Recommendation 50 
25.61 The committee recommends that the current arrangements for funding ASIC 
be replaced by a 'user-pays' model. Under the new framework, different levies should 
be imposed on the various regulated populations ASIC oversees, with the size of each 
levy related to the amount of ASIC's resources allocated to regulating each population. 
The levies should be reviewed on a periodic basis through a public consultation 
process. 
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25.62 The government should commence a consultation process on the design of the 
new funding model as soon as possible. 
Recommendation 51 
25.63 Following the removal of ASIC's registry responsibilities and the introduction 
of a user-pays model for funding ASIC outlined in Recommendations 49 and 50, the 
committee recommends that the government reduce the fees prescribed for chargeable 
matters under the Corporations (Fees) Act 2001 with a view to bringing the fees 
charged in Australia in line with the fees charged in other jurisdictions. 
Recommendation 52 
26.24 The committee notes that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services could be well-placed to monitor ASIC's performance against 
the government's statement of expectations and ASIC's statement of intent. The 
committee recommends that the Parliamentary Joint Committee consider this as part 
of its statutory ASIC oversight function. 
Recommendation 53 
26.25 The committee recommends that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services consider how it could undertake its statutory 
duties in a way that places a greater emphasis on emerging issues and how action 
could be taken to pre-empt widespread investor losses or major frauds. As a first step 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee could, on an annual basis, reserve a public hearing 
to emerging issues, taking evidence from both ASIC and relevant experts. 
Recommendation 54 
26.26 The committee recommends that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services inquire into the various proposals which call for a 
lifting of professional, ethical and educational standards in the financial services 
industry. 
Recommendation 55 
26.46 The committee recommends that at the end of two years, the government 
undertake a review of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 
that would consider ASIC's governance arrangements, including whether ASIC should 
be governed by a board comprised of executive and non-executive members. 
Recommendation 56 
26.49 The committee recommends that ASIC publish a code of conduct for its 
statutory office-holders. 
Recommendation 57 
27.30 The committee recommends that the government give urgent consideration to 
expanding ASIC's regulatory toolkit so that it is equipped to prevent the marketing of 
unsafe products to retail investors. 
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Recommendation 58 
27.32 The committee recommends that the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) carefully 
consider the adequacy of Australia's conduct and disclosure approach to the regulation 
of financial product issuers as a means of protecting consumers. In particular, the FSI 
should: 
 consider the implementation of measures designed to protect unsophisticated 
investors from unsafe products, including matters such as: 
 subjecting the product issuer to more positive obligations in regard to the 
suitability of their product; 
 requiring the product issuer to state the particular classes of consumers 
for whom the product is suitable and the potential risks of investing in 
the product; 
 standardised product labelling; 
 restricting the range of investment choices to unsophisticated investors; 
 allowing ASIC to intervene and prohibit the issue of certain products in 
retail markets; and 
 assess the merits of the United Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority model 
which allows the Authority to suspend or ban potentially harmful products. 
Recommendation 59 
27.36 The committee recommends that the government clarify the definitions of 
retail and wholesale investors. 
Recommendation 60 
27.37 The committee recommends that the government consider measures that 
would ensure investors are informed of their assessment as a retail or wholesale 
investor and the consumer protections that accompany the classification. This would 
require financial advisers to ensure that such information is displayed prominently, 
initialled by the client and retained on file. 
Recommendation 61 
27.52 The committee recommends that the government commission a review of 
Australia's corporate insolvency laws to consider amendments intended to encourage 
and facilitate corporate turnarounds. The review should consider features of the 
chapter 11 regime in place in the United States of America that could be adopted in 
Australia. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 On 20 June 2013, the Senate referred the performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to the Economics References 
Committee for inquiry and report by 31 March 2014. The committee was to give 
particular reference to: 
(a) ASIC's enabling legislation, and whether there are any barriers 
preventing ASIC from fulfilling its legislative responsibilities and 
obligations; 
(b) the accountability framework to which ASIC is subject, and whether this 
needs to be strengthened; 
(c) the workings of ASIC's collaboration, and working relationships, with 
other regulators and law enforcement bodies; 
(d) ASIC's complaints management policies and practices; 
(e) the protections afforded by ASIC to corporate and private 
whistleblowers; and 
(f) any related matters.1 
1.2 On 5 August 2013, the then Governor-General prorogued the 43rd Parliament 
and a general election was held on 7 September 2013. The 44th Parliament 
commenced on 12 November 2013. Two days later, the Senate agreed to the 
committee's recommendation that this inquiry into ASIC's performance be re-adopted 
with a reporting date of 30 May 2014. The Senate also agreed to the recommendation 
that the committee have the power to consider and use the records of the Economics 
References Committee appointed in the previous parliament that related to this 
inquiry. At the commencement of the 44th Parliament, the committee had already 
published over 250 submissions with another 70 or so waiting for the committee's 
consideration.  
1.3 Initially, the committee called for submissions to be lodged by 
21 October 2013, but, in light of the election and the start of a new parliament, 
the committee resolved to continue to receive submissions with a closing date of 
10 January 2014. 
1.4 On 28 May 2014, the committee tabled an interim report requesting an 
extension to present the final report by 26 June 2014. 
                                              
1  Journals of the Senate, 2010–13, no. 150 (20 June 2013), p. 4110. 
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Conduct of the inquiry 
1.5 The committee advertised the inquiry on its website calling for written 
submissions. The committee also wrote directly to a range of government departments 
and agencies, organisations, academics and other people known to be interested in the 
performance of ASIC, drawing their attention to the inquiry and inviting them to make 
written submissions.  
1.6 The committee received 474 submissions and a further 104 supplementary 
submissions, as well as additional information including answers to a series of 
questions taken on notice by witnesses. These documents are listed at Appendices 1 
and 2. The committee held five public hearings: two in Sydney 
(19 and 20 February 2014) and three in Canberra (21 February 2014 and 
2 and 10 April 2014). A list of the hearings and the names of witnesses who appeared 
before the committee is at Appendix 3. In addition to its appearances before this 
committee on 19 February 2014 and 10 April 2014, while this inquiry was underway 
ASIC gave evidence at three estimates hearings held by the Economics Legislation 
Committee (20 November 2013, 26 February 2014 and 4 June 2014). Members of this 
committee questioned ASIC's chairman, commissioners and other officers at those 
hearings and this evidence has been taken into account for this report. 
Background to the inquiry 
1.7 Throughout 2012 and 2013, media reports raised serious concerns about the 
practices of financial advisers in Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL), 
part of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group. ASIC was also issuing 
notifications regarding actions it had taken on this matter. On 4 June 2013, the 
Economics Legislation Committee questioned ASIC about the CFPL matter and was 
clearly dissatisfied with ASIC's response. Within weeks, the Senate referred the 
inquiry on ASIC's performance to this committee.  
1.8 The emerging revelations about the misconduct of financial advisers in CFPL 
and ASIC's failure to provide satisfactory answers in relation to this matter to the 
Economics Legislation Committee was the main catalyst for the inquiry. But it was 
not the only driver. A number of previous inquiries and other information in the public 
domain had exposed serious shortcomings in corporate conduct in Australia and 
ASIC's response to them. Thus, the committee's terms of reference reflect this broader 
context and, indeed, the submissions traverse a wide range of concerns about ASIC's 
performance. 
Submissions  
1.9 The majority of the submissions came from individuals or groups of 
concerned investors or consumers who wanted to draw the committee's attention to 
their specific grievance. Often their case involved allegations of corporate misconduct 
that had resulted in significant personal financial loss and sometimes financial ruin. 
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Individual grievances 
1.10 Unfortunately, the committee was not able to investigate every individual 
matter that was raised in submissions. Clearly from the contents of some submissions, 
people had expectations that the committee could in some way assist them to resolve 
their difficulties. This was not the committee's role. The committee, however, gave 
great weight to their accounts and experiences; this evidence helped inform the 
committee's deliberations and assisted the committee in formulating 
recommendations.  
Confidential material 
1.11 The committee prefers to take evidence in public. With this inquiry, however, 
a number of submitters requested the committee to receive their submission in 
confidence or to withhold the publication of their names. Even with the protection of 
parliamentary privilege, some submitters were not willing to place their criticisms 
of ASIC on the public record because ASIC makes decisions that may affect their 
business. Also, in some cases, and without the submitters' request, the committee itself 
resolved to receive submissions in camera or to withhold sections from publication. 
Such decisions were based on a variety of reasons including: 
 the matter was still under investigation or consideration by a court or tribunal; 
 concern over publicising a person's private circumstances; and 
 reluctance to allow a person to be publicly traduced or embarrassed where 
their involvement in an alleged offence appeared to be incidental or not 
relevant to the committee's inquiry.    
1.12 The committee also declined to receive several submissions or sections of 
submissions. The overriding reason in most instances stemmed from the submissions' 
failure to address the committee's terms of reference. Some submitters were clearly 
disappointed with the committee's decision either to not receive their submission or 
to remove names or sections of their submission before publication. Where such 
information was deemed to be irrelevant to the committee's inquiry, however, it could 
not be accepted as evidence. 
1.13 Where the committee did include evidence received on an in camera basis in 
this report, it was careful to ensure that such information was used to support 
information that was already publicly available or where it had sought verification 
from other sources. 
ASIC's submissions 
1.14 ASIC provided the committee with nine submissions in total. Three 
submissions addressed the CFPL matter (Submissions 45, 45.3 and 45.6). ASIC's first 
supplementary submission (Submission 45.1) related to reforms to the credit industry 
and low doc loans, and was provided in response to the significant number of 
submissions the committee received on these topics. In October 2013, ASIC provided 
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its second supplementary submission: a 196 page document that addressed all of the 
inquiry's terms of reference (Submission 45.2). ASIC and the committee have referred 
to this submission as ASIC's 'main submission'. The remaining submissions from 
ASIC dealt with particular issues or cases and were provided in response to evidence 
the committee received, lines of questioning or developments that occurred as the 
inquiry was underway. For example, in May 2014 ASIC provided Submission 45.7 on 
a proposed alternative model for funding ASIC. 
Scope and structure of the report 
1.15 During this inquiry the committee has studied some enforcement actions or 
allegations of misconduct in detail. These cases have assisted the committee to 
consider the broad questions that the Senate has asked it to focus on (that is, the 
specific clauses of the inquiry's terms of reference). One example is the CFPL matter, 
which provided the committee with key insights into ASIC's approach to misconduct 
and enforcement action but also informed the committee's analysis of Australia's 
corporate whistleblower protections. 
1.16 Many different and varied issues were raised during the course of the inquiry. 
Nevertheless, some common themes emerged that linked these disparate matters. 
This report is divided into the following five parts: 
 Part I (Introduction): This part outlines recent developments and growth in 
Australia's financial services industry to provide some context about the 
environment in which ASIC operates (Chapter 2). It then describes ASIC's 
current role and functions (Chapter 3) and its approach to regulation 
(Chapter 4). 
 Part II (Case studies): In this part, the committee examines two case studies 
where retail investors or financial consumers found themselves in dire 
financial difficulties because of bad financial advice and unethical and 
irresponsible practices. The first relates to consumer credit and poor lending 
practices between 2002 and 2010. The second case study relates to the CFPL 
matter. The chapters included in this part examine: 
 the lending practices between 2002 and 2010 based on the experiences 
of over 160 people who made submissions to the inquiry, and ASIC's 
response to these practices (Chapter 5); 
 the effectiveness of Australia's new credit laws in redressing some of the 
problems identified during this period (Chapter 6);  
 the two external dispute resolutions schemes approved by ASIC for 
financial services and credit—the Financial Ombudsman Service and the 
Credit Ombudsman Service (Chapter 7); 
 what went wrong at CFPL and why, including how an aggressive 
sales-based culture fostered an environment where advisers were able 
to circumvent compliance requirements and take advantage of investors 
(Chapter 8); 
 Page 7 
 
 ASIC's investigation of misconduct at CFPL, and its handling of 
information from CFPL whistleblowers and other sources regarding that 
misconduct (Chapter 9); 
 the adequacy and efficacy of ASIC's enforcement actions relating to the 
CFPL matter, and the integrity of the arrangements put in place 
to compensate CFPL clients (Chapters 10, 11 and 12); 
 the internal compliance regimes of Australian companies, using the 
Commonwealth Bank and Macquarie Bank as recent examples where 
ASIC raised serious concerns about a culture of non-compliance 
(Chapter 13). 
 Part III (Investigations and enforcement): This part examines ASIC's 
investigative and enforcement function. The chapters in this part of the report 
cover: 
 Australia's corporate whistleblowing framework, and how that 
framework might be improved (Chapter 14); 
 ASIC's procedures for receiving complaints and reports of corporate 
wrongdoing including the processes for the preliminary assessment and 
investigation of such reports (Chapter 15); 
 factors influencing ASIC's responsiveness to complaints and reports of 
corporate wrongdoing (Chapter 16); 
 ASIC's approach to enforcement and factors that may influence the 
remedy it decides to pursue (Chapter 17); 
 ASIC's handling of enforcement matters (Chapter 18). 
 Part IV (Communication and engagement): In this part of the report, the 
committee analyses ASIC's engagement and communication with professional 
bodies in the financial services industry and with retail investors and 
consumers. It also examines community expectations about ASIC's role, 
financial literacy and the way the regulator communicates with concerned 
industry bodies and members of the public. The chapters in this part address: 
 ASIC's relationship with key industry stakeholders (Chapter 19); 
 community expectations of the extent to which ASIC can protect 
investors and consumers from corporate collapses, substandard financial 
advice and unsafe financial products and, in this context, the current 
licensing tests and the importance of financial literacy and education 
(Chapter 20); 
 ASIC's relationship and communication with people seeking assistance 
from the regulator (Chapter 21); and 
 how ASIC provides services and publishes information (Chapter 22). 
 Part V (Directions for the future): The final part of the report evaluates 
options for enhancing ASIC's ability to fulfil its obligations. It examines 
possible ways to encourage better enforcement outcomes (Chapter 23) and 
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options to address concerns about the quality of financial advice given to 
consumers and improve the professional standing of the financial advice 
industry (Chapter 24). It also scrutinises ASIC's resources, governance 
structure and capacity to meet the challenges presented by a dynamic industry 
where new business models and financial products are constantly emerging 
(Chapters 25 and 26). This final part of the report will also consider areas that 
may need to be reformed or where significant legislative changes may be 
required (Chapter 27) and contains the committee's final conclusions and 
observations about ASIC (Chapter 28).  
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Chapter 2 
ASIC's role in context 
2.1 Australia's population of 23.2 million1 represents only around 0.03 per cent of 
the world's estimated population of 7.1 billion people. Despite this, Australia is the 
world's 12th largest economy.
2
 The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) has a total 
market capitalisation of around $1.5 trillion.
3
 In 2012–13, the total annual turnover on 
Australia's financial markets was $135 trillion.
4
 The superannuation system now 
represents the fourth largest pool of superannuation savings in the world; as at 
December 2013, Australia's superannuation assets were estimated to total 
$1.8 trillion.
5
 
2.2 ASIC's role and its performance needs to be considered in the context of the 
growing importance of Australia's financial sector. This chapter outlines some key 
developments and likely future directions for the sector. The remainder of this chapter 
is principally based on research undertaken for the committee by the Parliamentary 
Library. The committee is grateful to the Library for this assistance. 
Relative size and growth of the financial services industry 
2.3 The financial services industry as a share of the Australian economy has 
grown significantly since the introduction of the superannuation guarantee in 1992, 
rising from around six per cent to eight per cent by 2012 (Figure 2.1). However, this 
growth was preceded by growth in the industry from around the mid-1980s in 
response to a range of deregulation measures including the floating of the Australian 
dollar, the entry of foreign banks, removal of controls on bank deposits and the 
introduction of dividend imputation.
6
 
                                              
1  Estimated resident population as at 30 September 2013. ABS, cat. 3101.0. 
2  Based on 2012 gross domestic product. See http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-
ranking-table. 
3  ASX, 'Corporate Overview', www.asx.com.au/about/corporate-overview.htm (accessed 
13 May 2014). 
4  Australian Financial Markets Association, 2013 Australian Financial Markets Report, p. 2. 
5  APRA, Statistics: Quarterly Superannuation Performance, December 2013 
(issued 20 February 2014). 
6  Diana Beal, 'Overview of financial services post-deregulation', 
www.reconciliation.org.au/getfile?id=81&file=diana_beal.doc (accessed 2 May 2014). 
Page 10  
 
Figure 2.1: Financial services industry as a share of the economy (1975 to 2012) 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts: National Income, 
Expenditure and Product, cat. 5206.0, Table 33, December 2013 and March 2014. 
2.4 Contributing to this growth has been the expansion of the global presence of 
Australia's financial services industry and a rise in services exports from the industry. 
Although Australian financial services businesses are concentrated in the Asia Pacific 
region, they also have a presence in Europe and the Americas (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Australian financial services global footprint, 2009 
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Source: Innovation & Business Skills Australia, Environment Scan 2013: Financial 
Services Industry, p. 13 (accessed 8 May 2014). 
Expansion in retail investors 
2.5 Government privatisations during the 1990s (including the Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia (CBA), Telstra, various state banks and Qantas) and 
demutualisation of a number of financial services providers and other entities (AMP, 
National Mutual and the NRMA) provided opportunities for household investors 
to participate in the ownership of equities.
7
 
2.6 Regular surveys of share ownership in Australia by the ASX since 1991 show 
the considerable growth in the number and proportion of people investing directly and 
indirectly (via superannuation for example) in shares. In 1991, only 1.8 million 
(15 per cent) of Australian adults directly or indirectly held shares (Figure 2.3). 
By 2012, 6.7 million (38 per cent) of Australian adults directly or indirectly held 
shares. While there has been some decline in share ownership since the peak of 
2004—this has been attributed to the repayment of debt, the exit of 'passive' investors 
and a shift to property investment
8—the level of share ownership in Australia remains 
high compared to other developed countries.
9
 
                                              
7  Demutualisations and privatisations in the 1990s were summarised in: Reserve Bank of 
Australia, 'Demutualisation in Australia', RBA Bulletin, January 1999, www.rba.gov.au/ 
publications/bulletin/1999/jan/pdf/bu-0199-1.pdf (accessed 30 April 2014). 
8  ASX, 2006 Australian Share Ownership Study, 2007, www.asx.com.au (accessed 1 May 2014), 
p. 7. 
9  ASX, 2012 Australian Share Ownership Study, May 2013, www.asx.com.au (accessed 
1 May 2014), p. 29. 
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Figure 2.3: Share ownership in Australia, 1991 to 2012 
 
Source: ASX, 2012 Australian Share Ownership Study, May 2013, www.asx.com.au  
(accessed 1 May 2014) and previous issues. 
Overall significance of Australia's capital markets 
2.7 Capital markets comprise a range of financial products including loans, 
equities, bonds and other financial instruments. In 2012, Australia had the eighth 
highest equity market capitalisation of global equity markets by value (Figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.4: Market capitalisation of equity markets, 2012 ($US billion) 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014, 9 April 2014. 
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Overall significance of large financial sector firms to the Australian 
economy 
2.8 Of the top 20 companies by market capitalisation listed on the ASX, half are 
classified as being in the 'financials' sector. These include companies such as the big 
four banks (CBA, NAB, Westpac and ANZ) and insurance providers AMP, QBE, 
Suncorp and Insurance Australia. Fund managers Macquarie Group and Westfield 
were also part of the sector.
10
 At the end of April 2014, these ten companies accounted 
for around one-third of total ASX market capitalisation.
11
 For these ten companies, 
share prices are generally still below peaks experienced prior to the global financial 
crisis. However, most shareholders of these companies have enjoyed significant 
increases in share prices in recent years and over the long term (Figure 2.5). 
Figure 2.5: Share price trends, financials sector companies in the top 20 ASX listed 
companies by market capitalisation, 1985 to 2014 (as at April 2014) 
 
                                              
10  As at May 2014. The composition of the S&P 20 index is revised regularly and as a result 
companies can move in and out of the index over time. 
11  ASX 200, www.asx200list.com (accessed 8 May 2014). 
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Source: Datastream. 
Indications of where Australia's financial sector is headed 
2.9 The superannuation industry will continue to benefit from growing 
superannuation contributions. The gradual increase in the superannuation guarantee 
from nine per cent to 12 per cent by 2019–20 and strong positive cashflows into 
superannuation funds will see net superannuation contributions (contributions less 
payments) result in significant additional funds flowing into the financial system. 
One projection has total assets in superannuation funds rising to more than 
$7.6 trillion by 2033.
12
 
2.10 This growth in superannuation funds should provide a solid cornerstone for 
the growth in the financial services industry generally, with a substantial portion of 
these funds to be invested in Australian equities and providing liquidity in cash 
deposits with banks. A growing skilled labour force of advisers, accountants and 
information technology providers will also be required to invest these additional funds 
efficiently. 
2.11 The health of the financial sector in Australia is heavily dependent on general 
economic and financial market conditions. With strong domestic economic growth 
compared to much of the developed world and the growing pool of superannuation 
funds, there appears to be no shortage of available domestic capital and business 
opportunities to grow the sector. 
                                              
12  Deloitte, Dynamics of the Australian Superannuation System—The next 20 years: 2013 – 2033, 
September 2013, www.deloitte.com (accessed 4 June 2014), p. 7. 
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2.12 There will also be a significant rebalancing of the world economy in the next 
40 years, with around half of global economic production expected to take place in 
Asia by 2050 (Figure 2.6). While Australia's traditional merchandise export 
destinations still account for most of Australia's exports of financial services, 
the presence of Australia's financial services companies in the fast growing Asian 
region will support future export opportunities for the industry.  
Figure 2.6: Projected share of world GDP, by specific regions, 1980 to 2050 
 
Source: ANZ Research, 'Caged Tiger: The transformation of the Asian Financial System', 
ANZ Insight, Issue 5, March 2014, www.media.anz.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=248677&p=irol-
insight (accessed 8 May 2014). Based on CEIC and ANZ projections. 
2.13 To position Australia to benefit from this change, successive governments 
have pursued an interest in developing Australia into a regional financial services hub. 
The current government's Financial System Inquiry is another opportunity to look 
again at how Australia's financial services industry can better interact with 
international capital markets and benefit from economic growth in our region. 
That superannuation will be a key consideration of the inquiry is clear: one estimate 
presented to the inquiry was that in 40 years, funds controlled by superannuation will 
exceed that of the banking industry.
13
 Some issues raised in submissions to that 
inquiry have included how to better link superannuation to the economy, the need 
to support technological innovation and consumer protection requirements.
14
 
                                              
13  Rodney Maddock, 'Superannuation asset allocations and growth projections', Paper prepared 
for the Financial Services Council, 17 February 2014, www.fsc.org.au/downloads/uploaded/ 
2014_0226_140226- FSC Maddock- Capital Flows Report FINAL_2d88.pdf  
(accessed 11 May 2014), p. 25. 
14  See, for example, submissions made to the Financial System Inquiry by the Australian Bankers' 
Association, Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia and the Financial Services 
Council: www.fsi.gov.au.  
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Committee comment 
2.14 This inquiry has necessarily required the committee to review ASIC's past 
performance, however, the committee has also been mindful of the likely future 
directions of Australia's financial system and their implications for ASIC's role. 
2.15 The size and growth of Australia's financial sector and the fact that millions of 
Australians are involved in it, not least because of compulsory superannuation, makes 
it essential that modern and adaptable regulations are in place and regulators such as 
ASIC are at the top of their game. Although Australia's experience during the global 
financial crisis demonstrated that the regulation of Australia's financial system is 
fundamentally sound, there cannot be complacency about the effectiveness of 
the regulations in place and the performance of the regulators charged with 
administering them. As a key financial regulator, ASIC's role and performance should 
be of interest to all Australians. 
  
 
Chapter 3 
Overview of ASIC 
3.1 This chapter aims to acquaint readers with the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC). ASIC is the corporate, markets, financial services 
and consumer credit regulator. It has existed as an independent Australian government 
statutory authority
1
 since 1991, when the Australian Securities Commission, as it was 
then known, commenced operation.
2
  
3.2 ASIC has general administration of the Corporations Act 2001, the principal 
legislation governing the affairs of companies in Australia. ASIC oversees company 
registration and notifications, and is tasked with seeking to ensure that companies, 
schemes, directors, company officers, auditors, insolvency practitioners and other 
market participants fulfil their legal obligations. ASIC licenses providers of financial 
services. It also licenses and regulates individuals and businesses that engage in 
consumer credit activities. In addition, ASIC's market regulation role makes it 
responsible for supervising financial market operators and participants, including 
real-time trading on Australia's domestic licensed markets. 
3.3 These responsibilities mean that ASIC's work involves over two million 
companies, 5,000 Australian financial services (AFS) licensees, 5,800 credit 
providers, 4,800 registered company auditors, 680 registered liquidators, 
4,150 registered managed investment schemes and 18 authorised financial markets.
3
  
Illustrating its broad remit, ASIC provided an overview of its activities and outcomes 
achieved. In the last three years to October 2013, ASIC: 
 completed over 4,000 surveillances and 554 investigations with a broad range 
of regulatory outcomes; 
 banned 131 individuals from providing financial services or credit services 
and 228 directors from managing a corporation; 
 completed 73 civil and 79 criminal proceedings; 
 entered into 56 enforceable undertakings with entities, as well as numerous 
other negotiated outcomes; 
 cancelled, suspended or varied 72 AFS licences and credit licences; 
                                              
1  That is, an Australian government body established by legislation and empowered to perform 
its key functions independently of the government. 
2  The Australian Securities Commission was renamed ASIC on 1 July 1998 when it became 
responsible for consumer protection in the areas of superannuation, insurance and deposit 
taking. The Australian Securities Commission's predecessor was the National Companies and 
Securities Commission (with functions also performed by state and territory agencies). 
3  ASIC, Annual Report 2012–13, pp. 152. 
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 obtained over $349 million in compensation for consumers; 
 handled over two million telephone and 200,000 email queries; 
 participated in over 1,500 stakeholder meetings; 
 launched the MoneySmart consumer education website; 
 implemented the new national business names register; 
 granted relief (waivers) from the law to over 3,000 applicants to facilitate 
their business transactions; and 
 handled nearly 40,000 complaints about misconduct.
4
 
ASIC's statutory objectives and functions 
3.4 ASIC has functions under the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act), the Corporations Act and other legislation.
5
 
The ASIC Act requires that, in performing its functions and exercising its powers, 
ASIC must strive to: 
 maintain, facilitate and improve the performance of the financial system and 
the entities within that system in the interests of commercial certainty, 
reducing business costs, and the efficiency and development of the economy; 
 promote the confident and informed participation of investors and consumers 
in the financial system; 
 administer the laws that confer functions and powers on it effectively and with 
a minimum of procedural requirements; 
 receive, process and store, efficiently and quickly, the information given to 
ASIC under the laws that confer functions and powers on it; 
 ensure that information is available as soon as practicable for access by the 
public; and 
 take whatever action it can take, and is necessary, in order to enforce and give 
effect to the laws of the Commonwealth that confer functions and powers on 
it.
6
 
3.5 In its main submission to the committee, ASIC provided the following 
overview of how it sees its role: 
                                              
4  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 9; and ASIC, correspondence dated 23 December 2013, p. 1. 
5  Namely, the Business Names Registration Act 2011, Business Names Registration (Transitional 
and Consequential Provisions) Act 2011, Insurance Contracts Act 1984, Superannuation 
(Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, 
Retirement Savings Accounts Act 1997, Life Insurance Act 1995, National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 and the Medical Indemnity (Prudential Supervision and Product 
Standards) Act 2003. 
6  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, s. 1(2). 
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[ASIC] has a growing regulatory remit and operates in a global 
environment that is both complex and dynamic. 
The forces of market-based financing, financial innovation-driven 
complexity and globalisation that are converging on our financial system 
create opportunities to fund economic growth; however, they also create 
risks. 
Our challenge as a regulator is to respond quickly to the matters that require 
our attention, inform and educate investors and financial consumers so they 
can make confident and informed decisions, and ensure we have the 
capacity to effectively regulate financial markets, financial products and 
financial services providers, within the resources we have.
7
 
3.6 When it was established in 1991, the main stated purpose of the Australian 
Securities Commission, as ASIC was then known, was 'to regulate companies and the 
securities and futures industries in Australia'.
8
 ASIC's responsibilities have increased 
since then following various reforms pursued by successive governments, including as 
a result of intergovernmental agreements that resulted in the Commonwealth taking 
over certain responsibilities from the states and territories. In particular, ASIC gained 
significant new responsibilities between 2009 and 2012. However, as indicated by the 
following observation made in 2004 by ASIC's then acting chairman, ASIC has been 
required to operate in an environment of reform and change for a sustained period: 
The background to all of these activities of ours is one of constant and 
continuous change. You have seen that the evolution of financial and 
corporate regulation in Australia over the last decade has been rapid and 
dramatic. Reform—legislative, common law, self-regulatory, industry-
driven—seems to have been constant and will certainly not stop or really 
even pause in 2004. But that reform has been necessary, simply to try and 
keep pace (if indeed it has done that), with the growth and evolution of the 
markets in Australia that rely on effective regulation.
9
 
3.7 A timeline of key legislative reforms and other developments that are relevant 
to ASIC's responsibilities is at Appendix 4. 
Powers available to ASIC 
3.8 ASIC has the ability to register companies, businesses and managed 
investment schemes; grant AFS licences and Australian credit licences; register 
auditors, self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF) auditors and liquidators; grant 
relief from various legislative requirements; make rules aimed at ensuring the integrity 
                                              
7  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 6. 
8  Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Securities Commission Bill 1988, p. 2. 
9  Jeffrey Lucy AM, Acting Chairman, ASIC, Address to the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia Queensland 2004 CA Business Forum, Sanctuary Cove, Queensland, 13 March 
2004, www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ICAA_speech_130304.pdf/$file/ 
ICAA_speech_130304.pdf (accessed 5 September 2013), p. 2. 
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of financial markets; order the winding up of a company in certain circumstances; and 
impose a stop order if a product disclosure statement is defective. To assist it to carry 
out its functions, ASIC has been granted a variety of investigative and enforcement 
tools under the ASIC Act and the Corporations Act. These include the power to: 
 conduct investigations into suspected contraventions of the ASIC Act and the 
Corporations Act (s. 13 of the ASIC Act); 
 obtain a search warrant to investigate criminal offences (s. 3E of the Crimes 
Act 1914, pursuant to the general investigative power in s. 13 of the ASIC 
Act);
10
 
 require persons to appear and answer questions under oath, and to give all 
reasonable assistance with an investigation (s. 19 of the ASIC Act); 
 conduct hearings related to the performance or exercise of ASIC's functions or 
powers, including the power to summon witnesses to give evidence and 
produce documents (ss. 51 and 58 of the ASIC Act);
11
 
 access telecommunications records (part 4-1 of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979) and make an application for a stored 
communications warrant (s. 110 of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979); 
 inspect the books of a corporation (s. 29 of the ASIC Act), require the 
production of books relating to financial products, futures contracts and 
financial services (ss. 31, 32 and 32A of the ASIC Act); require the 
production by any person of books relating to the affairs of corporations and 
other regulated entities (s. 33 of the ASIC Act); and apply for a warrant 
to seize books not produced (ss. 35 and 36 of the ASIC Act); 
 require a person to identify property of a corporation and explain how the 
corporation has kept account of that property (s. 39 of the ASIC Act); 
 require a financial services business operator to disclose particulars relating to 
the acquisition or disposal of financial products (s. 41 of the ASIC Act) and 
require an officer of a corporation to disclose information relating to dealings 
with financial products (s. 43 of the ASIC Act); 
 make orders in relation to securities, for example restraining persons from 
disposing or acquiring interests or exercising voting rights (ss. 72 and 73 of 
the ASIC Act); 
 prosecute alleged offences against the corporations legislation
12
 (s. 49 of the 
ASIC Act); 
                                              
10  ASIC, ASIC's compulsory information-gathering powers, Information Sheet 145, September 
2011, p. 6. 
11  During the hearing ASIC must observe the rules of natural justice. Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001, s. 59(2)(c). 
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 institute civil proceedings for the recovery of damages or property (s. 50 of 
the ASIC Act); 
 order that a person pay the expenses of an investigation that led to conviction 
or declaration of contravention (s. 91 of the ASIC Act); 
 apply to the court for enforcement of an undertaking given to ASIC (ss. 93A 
and 93AA of the ASIC Act); 
 disqualify a person from managing corporations for up to five years in defined 
circumstances (s. 206F of the Corporations Act); 
 apply for the enforcement of a licensed market's operating rules (s. 793C of 
the Corporations Act); 
 apply for orders freezing assets, appointing receivers, requiring the surrender 
of passports to the court and prohibiting a person from leaving Australia 
(s. 1323 of the Corporations Act); 
 apply for an injunction regarding contraventions or proposed contraventions 
of the Corporations Act (s. 1324 of the Corporations Act); 
 issue an infringement notice for alleged breaches of the provisions of the 
Australian Consumer Law that relate to financial products and services 
(s. 12GXA of the ASIC Act) or the continuous disclosure provisions 
(s. 1317DAC of the Corporations Act); 
 issue a notice requiring claims made regarding financial services to be 
substantiated (s. 12GY of the ASIC Act). 
Governance and organisational structure 
3.9 ASIC is established under the ASIC Act. It comprises a chairperson, a deputy 
chairperson and between one and six other members (the commission).
13
 
ASIC's governance structure is considered in more detail in Chapter 26. 
3.10 ASIC's overall organisational structure separates its operations into three 
broad 'clusters': markets; investors and financial consumers; and registry 
and licensing. Within these broad operations areas are multiple stakeholder and 
enforcement teams. ASIC's organisational structure is depicted at Figure 3.1. 
                                                                                                                                            
12  The corporations legislation consists of the Corporations Act, the ASIC Act and rules of court 
made or applied by specified courts, such as the Federal Court and state supreme courts. See 
Corporations Act 2001, s. 9. 
13  Members of the commission are appointed by the Governor-General acting on the advice of the 
minister. The Commonwealth is also required to consult the Legislative and Governance Forum 
for Corporations (a council of COAG previously known as the Ministerial Council on 
Corporations) on the making of appointments to the commission. See Corporations Agreement 
2002, as amended, 16 November 2005, subclause 601(1). 
  
 
Figure 3.1: ASIC's corporate structure (as at October 2013) 
 
Source: ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 15. 
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ASIC's resources 
3.11 In 2012–13, ASIC received $350 million in appropriation revenue and 
$17 million from other sources. Its operating expenses were approximately 
$411 million. ASIC employed 1,844 staff on a full-time equivalent (FTE) basis.
14
 
3.12 At times, ASIC has been granted additional funding through the Budget 
process either as a result of new responsibilities it has been given or to supplement its 
operations. Some recent examples are listed below: 
 The 2013–14 Budget included around $10 million over the forward estimates 
in additional funding for ASIC's client contact centre (as a result of the 
national business names registration system); over-the-counter derivatives 
market supervision; the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT); and the 
tax agent licensing regime for financial advisers.
15
 
 In the 2012–13 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO), it was 
announced that ASIC would receive additional operating funding of 
$20 million over two years to support its regulation and supervision of 
financial markets. An additional $2.1 million relating to the administration 
of transferring unclaimed monies to ASIC was also announced.
16
  
 In the 2012–13 Budget, an additional $101.9 million over four years for 
ASIC's operational funding was announced. Also allocated was $23.9 million 
to facilitate the implementation of the Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) 
reforms and $43.7 million over four years to enhance ASIC's market 
surveillance system.
17
 
 ASIC received an additional $4.6 million over four years 'for licensing, 
compliance and deterrence activities in relation to [AFS] license holders 
dealing in carbon permits' in the 2011–12 MYEFO.18 
 In the 2011–12 Budget, ASIC received $28.8 million to supplement its 
operating activities.
19
 
 In the 2010–11 Budget, an extra $29.1 million was provided for the national 
business names register. An additional $5.9 million over four years was also 
provided for the SCT.
20
 
                                              
14  ASIC, Annual Report 2012–13, p. 19. 
15  Australian Government, Portfolio Budget Statement: Treasury Portfolio, 2013–14 Budget, 
p. 156. 
16  Australian Government, 2012–13 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook, pp. 276–77. 
17  Australian Government, 2012–13 Budget: Budget Paper No. 2, pp. 277–78. 
18  Australian Government, 2011–12 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook, pp. 287–88. 
19  Australian Government, 2011–12 Budget: Budget Paper No. 2, p. 318. 
20  Australian Government, 2010–11 Budget: Budget Paper No. 2, pp. 276 and 299. 
Page 24  
 
3.13 However, ASIC has also been subject to the efficiency dividend applied to 
government departments and agencies.
21
 ASIC's funding over the forward estimates 
was also reduced as part of the most recent Budget. The amount of funding provided 
to ASIC and the funding model utilised to determine its funding clearly will have 
a significant impact on the agency's performance. These issues are examined in more 
detail in Chapter 25. 
                                              
21  The efficiency dividend is an annual reduction in funding for Commonwealth departments and 
agencies that receive government appropriations. The efficiency dividend generally targets 
departmental appropriations rather than administered appropriations. Since the 2011–12 
Budget, however, the efficiency dividend has been applied at the portfolio level rather than to 
each agency. N Horne, The Commonwealth efficiency dividend: an overview, Background 
Note, Australian Parliamentary Library, 13 December 2012, pp. 8–9, 38. 
  
 
Chapter 4 
Regulatory theories and their application to ASIC 
4.1 The previous chapter outlined ASIC's extensive functions. However, all 
regulators face a multitude of challenges. They can be tasked with a long list of 
responsibilities that involve an enormous regulated population and a staggering 
amount of activity. The expectations about what the regulator is supposed to achieve 
may not be clear or they may not match the community's expectations. They may have 
a role as an arbitrator that works with entities to seek efficient outcomes, while also 
being required to investigate and prosecute entities for contraventions of the law.  
They can be criticised for being inflexible and burdening business when times are 
good, and criticised for not having acted when a crisis occurs.  
4.2 Regulators need to make decisions about how to use their limited resources 
to address conflicting priorities. Many regulated entities will have significantly greater 
resources at their disposal than those available to the regulator. For many reasons a 
regulator may consider that it does not have all the powers necessary for it to perform 
its role, or that its powers have not kept pace with emerging developments. Many of 
the good outcomes they achieve are not made public or are not newsworthy. They can 
be criticised for losing cases while also being criticised for not pursuing certain 
matters.  
4.3 Various theories of regulation consider the challenges that regulators in 
general face and propose techniques that regulators can adopt to carry out their 
functions. This chapter introduces and examines some of the sets of principles on 
which regulation can be based, such as response regulation and risk-based regulation.
1
 
The theories discussed are not mutually exclusive options; elements of each may be 
relied on by policymakers or by ASIC. Specific regulatory ideas that are relevant to 
the financial services sector are outlined at the end of the chapter. 
Fundamentals of regulation 
4.4 Regulation is generally considered in response to a market failure. The 1997 
review of the financial system chaired by Mr Stan Wallis (the Wallis Inquiry) 
observed that regulation can be categorised into the following three broad purposes. 
These purposes, in order of decreasing frequency, are to:  
 ensure that markets work efficiently and competitively—such regulation 
would promote adequate disclosure and target fraud, unfair practices and 
anti-competitive behaviour; 
 prescribe particular standards or service quality, such as food standards; and 
                                              
1  Other strategies such as self-regulation are not examined in this chapter, but are noted 
elsewhere in the report.  
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 achieve social objectives, such as community service obligations.
2
 
4.5 The development and implementation of regulation that achieves its stated 
aims is a difficult challenge and one that is not limited to corporate or financial 
regulation. Professor Julia Black, a researcher at the London School of Economics 
who has written extensively on regulatory regimes, concluded that 'paradoxes abound' 
in regulation, with policymakers and regulators often achieving the opposite outcome 
to that intended: 
This is so regardless of the regulatory techniques adopted. For example 
regulation to reduce risks can inadvertently lead to greater risks, for 
example safety regulation can create moral hazard, increasing risk-taking 
activity. Clean-ups can lead to greater environmental harm. Regulation to 
enhance disclosure can inhibit it. Warnings or bans on activities can 
produce the very conditions that they are designed to prevent: warnings 
about dangerous sports can make them more attractive to risk-seekers; 
conversely warnings that a particular bank is likely to fail can create a run 
on the bank, so precipitating its failure.
3
 
4.6 Policymakers and regulators also have to consider the likely response of the 
regulated entities to any regulation imposed and the regulator that administers it. 
In this regard, a 2007 consultation paper on sanctions for breaches of corporate law 
identified two alternative views on the starting point of a regulatory regime: 
the 'deterrence' model and the 'accommodative' model. These models reflect the 
opposite ways in which the behaviour of individuals and corporations can be 
considered. Proponents of the deterrence model argue that individuals and 
corporations are motivated entirely by profit-seeking and will comply with rules only 
when confronted with suitably severe penalties. The accommodative model takes the 
view that the entities are 'ordinarily inclined to comply with the law, partly because of 
belief in the rule of law, and partly as a matter of long-term self-interest', and that as a 
result regulatory compliance is more likely to be achieved through persuasion and 
cooperation.
4
 However, the consultation paper observed that a regulatory system 
based solely on the deterrence or accommodative model 'is not desirable', as major 
disadvantages arise if one model is adopted exclusively: 
It has been shown that a predominantly punitive policy fosters resistance to 
regulation and may produce a culture that facilitates the sharing of 
knowledge about methods of legal resistance and counter attack. It has been 
suggested that laws that promote a 'tick the box' approach to compliance 
may have the effect of weakening the ethical sinews of society by absolving 
participants of any responsibility for choosing to act in a manner that is 
right. An unintended consequence of a regulatory system designed to 
                                              
2  Financial System Inquiry, Final Report, March 1997, pp. 177–78. 
3  Julia Black, 'Paradoxes and Failures: "New Governance" Techniques and the Financial Crisis', 
Modern Law Review 75:6 (2012), p. 1039 (footnotes omitted). 
4  Australian Government, Review of Sanctions for Breaches of Corporate Law: Consultation 
Paper, March 2007, pp. 4–5. 
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ensure that people cannot choose to do what is wrong is that they can no 
longer choose to do what is right. They no longer choose at all, they merely 
comply. Another concern is that if regulators adopt a purely punitive 
method of regulating, whereby they assume that individuals are solely 
self-interested and motivated by financial gain, this may be perceived as 
unreasonable and will dissipate the will of well-intentioned individuals to 
comply. In addition to the negative psychological effect of an undue focus 
on deterrence, punishment is often time consuming and expensive. 
Adopting a purely accommodative model of regulation, which assumes all 
individuals are honest, would be naïve. This regulatory style fails to 
recognise that there are individuals who may not be honest and who will 
take advantage of being presumed to be so. There are a number of recent 
examples of conduct by corporate actors in Australia that confirm that some 
people will intentionally breach rules to secure an economic benefit.
5
 
4.7 When considering regulation, it is clear that there is also a choice about the 
type of rules to enact. For example, regulation can be drafted starting from either 
a rules-based or a principles-based approach. Rules-based regulation is generally 
characterised by specific provisions and detailed rules, whereas principles-based 
regulation 'involves formulating rules which are broad, general and purposive and 
which may or may not be elaborated in further rules or guidance, for example, "you 
shall act with integrity" or "firms shall act in the best interests of their clients"'.
6
  
4.8 In his evidence to the committee, Professor Justin O'Brien explained that the 
United States of America (US) has predominately taken a rules-based approach to 
financial regulation, while the United Kingdom (UK) has adopted a principles-based 
style. However, the choice between rules-based and principles-based regulation is 
generally not one at the expense of the other; for example, Professor Black noted that 
despite the UK's financial services regulations being designed using a principles-based 
approach, the rulebook of its regulator still comprises several thousand pages.
7
 
4.9 Both rules-based and principles-based approaches also present challenges to 
the regulator. A rules-based approach can result in the rules being 'transacted around'.
8
 
In addition, the managing director of the UK's Financial Conduct Authority has 
observed that historically, systems based on whether particular sets of rules were 
followed to the letter can create 'a cottage industry out of compliance' but 'did not 
                                              
5  Australian Government, Review of Sanctions for Breaches of Corporate Law: Consultation 
Paper, March 2007, p. 5 (footnotes omitted). 
6  Julia Black, 'Paradoxes and Failures', p. 1043. 
7  Julia Black, 'Paradoxes and Failures', p. 1043. 
8  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 54. 
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necessary lead to good outcomes'.
9
 A principles-based approach also presents 
challenges: 
The problems with the principles based approach is sometimes they lack the 
granularity to be enforceable and as [Hector Sants at the Financial Services 
Authority] put it very succinctly, he firmly believed in the value of 
principles based regulation but it does not work with people with no 
principles…10 
Responsive regulation 
4.10 One regulatory theory that has contributed to corporate law in Australia is 
'responsive regulation' (also known as 'strategic regulation theory').
11
 This approach to 
regulation influenced the introduction in 1993 of the civil penalty regime for 
contraventions of the statutory duties of company directors and other officers.
12
 
The theory was articulated and expanded on by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite.
13
 
Responsive regulation 'recognises that it is not possible for any regulatory agency 
to detect and enforce every contravention of the law it administers and provides 
insights into how regulatory compliance can be achieved effectively'.
14
 It is essentially 
a convergence of the 'deterrence' and 'accommodative' models of regulation; 
responsive regulation focuses not on 'whether to punish or persuade, but when 
                                              
9  Martin Wheatley, Financial Conduct Authority, 'The institutionalisation of customer service', 
Address to the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment, 12 March 2013, www.fca.org.uk  
(accessed 4 March 2014). Mr Wheatley also referred to a 2012 report by consulting firm Oliver 
Wyman which discussed 'firms' "obsession" with compliance; their tendency to follow the letter 
of the law rather than its spirit'. 
10  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 54. 
11  As Dr Vicky Comino notes, responsive regulation and strategic regulation theory are terms 
often used interchangeably. These theories are intended to apply to various regulatory 
environments, not just corporate law. See Vicky Comino, 'Towards better corporate regulation 
in Australia', Australian Journal of Corporate Law 26:1 (2011), p. 7. 
12  Vicky Comino, 'Towards better corporate regulation in Australia', p. 7. 
13  The concept of an enforcement pyramid was first outlined in John Braithwaite, To Punish or 
Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1985). Responsive regulation was expanded on in Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992). For an outline of the history of responsive regulation theory, see Vicky Comino, 
'Towards better corporate regulation in Australia', p. 7. 
14  Vicky Comino, 'Towards better corporate regulation in Australia', p. 7. Ayres and Braithwaite 
argued that 'for the responsive regulator, there are no optimal or best regulatory solutions, just 
solutions that respond better than others to the plural configurations of support and opposition 
that exist at a particular moment in history'. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992), p. 5; cited in Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack? Responsive Regulation 
in the Financial Services Sector', University of British Columbia Law Review 44:3 
(September 2011), p. 700. 
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to punish and when to persuade'.
15
 As Aakash Desai and Ian Ramsay note, to achieve 
maximum regulatory compliance the theory promotes 'responsive' or 'strategic' 
supervision by regulators. Methods for promoting voluntary compliance, such as 
persuasion and education, are made more effective as a result of the credible sanctions 
of escalating severity available to the regulator that it can threaten to utilise or pursue. 
This structure of sanctions is generally referred to as the 'enforcement pyramid' or 
'compliance pyramid'; the shape is intended to reflect the theoretical less frequent use 
of the most severe sanctions, which form the apex of the pyramid, compared to the 
persuasion-focused methods of resolution that form the pyramid's base.
16
 
4.11 Responsiveness can also be defined as 'the ability of a regulator to respond 
purposively and effectively to the particular context of regulation, and persuade the 
regulated firm to do so too'.
17
 To achieve this, the theory of responsive regulation 
requires that a combination of punishment and persuasion exists that is premised on 
'minimal sufficiency' and the projection of 'regulatory invincibility'. Professor Dimity 
Kingsford Smith explains these two principles and how they operate according to 
responsive regulation theory: 
[Minimal sufficiency] involves signalling to the organization that the 
regulator will use the least intrusive strategy first (such as asking for a 
defect to be fixed), and only escalate to more formal enforcement if 
minimally sufficient strategies do not work. At the same time, in order to 
make the threat of escalation credible, the regulator has to keep in the 
background the threat of serious enforcement action: prosecution, civil 
penalty sanctions, and license cancellation. Clearly it is easiest to convey an 
intention to intervene minimally if the regulator has powers and resources 
to do so—inspection is an ideal setting for this. Clearly too, it is easiest to 
project invincibility and to keep the threat in the background if the regulator 
has powers and resources for enforcement, and enjoys formal enforcement 
successes. It is in signalling its intention to move between these poles that 
the regulator shapes a responsive regulatory relationship.
18
 
4.12 The sanctions made available to ASIC in legislation, and the enforcement 
policy developed and published by ASIC, reflect many aspects of responsive 
regulation.
19
 ASIC's enforcement pyramid includes: punitive action (prison sentences, 
                                              
15  Australian Government, Review of Sanctions for Breaches of Corporate Law: Consultation 
Paper, March 2007, p. 6. 
16  Aakash Desai and Ian Ramsay, 'The Use of Infringement Notices by ASIC for Alleged 
Continuous Disclosure Contraventions: Trends and Analysis', University of Melbourne Legal 
Studies Research Paper, no. 547 (2011), pp. 22–23 (footnotes omitted); Dr Marina Nehme, 
Submission 140, p. 5. 
17  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack? Responsive Regulation in the Financial 
Services Sector', University of British Columbia Law Review 44:3 (September 2011), p. 711.  
18  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', p. 717. 
19  This approach is not unique to corporations and financial services law; other Australian 
regulators such as the ACCC also have powers based on an enforcement pyramid model. 
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criminal or civil monetary penalties), protective action (such as disqualifying orders), 
preservative action (such as court injunctions), corrective action (such as corrective 
advertising), compensation action and negotiated resolution (such as an enforceable 
undertaking). ASIC can also issue infringement notices for certain alleged 
contraventions, however, in the event that the recipient elects not to pay, this would 
likely need to be followed by court proceedings seeking a civil penalty.
20
 
The application of the enforcement pyramid to ASIC is discussed in Chapter 17. 
4.13 While the responsive regulation model highlights the need to resort to severe 
punishments in some circumstances, in the context of Australia's corporate law it has 
been argued that this 'must be balanced against the potential for severe penalties to 
have a "freezing effect" on responsible risk taking and commercial decision making'.
21
 
Risk-based regulation 
4.14 A regulatory structure based on strategic regulation theory may be 
complemented by a 'risk-based' regulatory approach. Recognising that not all 
contraventions can be detected and addressed, risk-based regulation seeks to inform 
the decisions that a regulator takes when determining its priorities and allocating its 
resources. According to risk-based regulation, a regulator would deploy its inspection 
and enforcement resources in accordance with an assessment of the potential risk that 
particular regulated entities or individuals pose to the regulator's aims.
22
 Julia Black 
and Robert Baldwin explain that risk-based regulatory frameworks 'focus on risks not 
rules', as regulators 'are usually overburdened by rules' and cannot enforce every rule 
at all times. A risk-based framework acknowledges the selections about enforcement 
that regulators have always implicitly made and provides a framework of analysis for 
making those selections.
23
 
4.15 After examining various government regulators across jurisdictions, including 
financial services regulators, Baldwin and Black consider that the frameworks adopted 
have the following five core elements in common: 
First, they require a determination by the organization of its objectives—of 
the risks 'to what' that it is concerned to control. Secondly, they require a 
determination of the regulator's own risk appetite—what type of risks is it 
prepared to tolerate and at what level…Thirdly, risk-based frameworks 
involve an assessment of the hazard or adverse event and the likelihood of 
it occurring…Fourthly, regulators assign scores and/or ranks to firms or 
activities on the basis of these assessments…Fifthly, risk-based frameworks 
provide a means of linking the organization and supervisory, inspection, 
                                              
20  ASIC, 'ASIC's approach to enforcement', Information Sheet 151, September 2013. 
21  Australian Government, Review of Sanctions for Breaches of Corporate Law: Consultation 
Paper, March 2007, p. 9. 
22  Vicky Comino, 'Towards better corporate regulation in Australia', p. 9. 
23  Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, 'Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation', University of 
Denver Law & Policy 32:2 (April 2010), p. 184. 
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and often enforcement resources to the risk scores assigned to individual 
firms or system-wide issues.
24
 
4.16 However, Baldwin and Black have also identified that risk-based approaches 
can present certain challenges, as they may result in an inclination for regulators to: 
 focus on known risks, resulting in new or developing risks going undetected 
(a related issue is that risk-based approaches 'tend to be backward looking and 
"locked in" to an established analytic framework'); 
 neglect areas determined to be of lower risk, which may ultimately result in 
considerable damage; and 
 focus on individual firms rather than on how compliance across regulated 
entities can be improved.
25
 
Formalising the role of non-state bodies: strategies of co-regulation and 
enrolment 
4.17 The possible regulatory strategies available to policymakers and regulators 
can be considered as a spectrum. At one end, representing the form of regulation with 
the most involvement by the government, is command-and-control regulation. At the 
other end of the spectrum is no regulation (or self-regulation if no regulation was 
considered to be an unviable option). Where the state and regulated entities start 
to interact more closely is when strategies such as co-regulation are considered. Under 
a co-regulation strategy, the regulated entities develop and administer the regulatory 
arrangements, which are underpinned by legislation set by the government.
26
  
4.18 Another theory of regulation that has some application to ASIC's work is a 
strategy based on enrolment. This approach relies on others who are 'enrolled' 
to support the regulator. These entities are 'gatekeepers', described by Julia Black as 
those who are 'not directly the subject of regulation, but who have a strategic position 
over those who are'.
27
 In Australia's financial system, directors, company officers, 
auditors and insolvency practitioners are some examples of gatekeepers. These groups 
have professional bodies that can promote better practices through standards, 
education, training and advocacy. The standards or rules adopted by these other bodies 
                                              
24  Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, 'Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation', p. 185. 
25  Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, 'Really Responsive Regulation', Modern Law Review 71:1 
(2008), pp. 59, 66–67; cited in Vicky Comino, 'Towards better corporate regulation in 
Australia', p. 10. 
26  Australian Government, The Australian Government Guide to Regulation, March 2014, p. 28. 
27  Julia Black, 'Paradoxes and Failures', p. 1048. 
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can also be enrolled by regulators or policymakers.
28
 ASIC frequently highlights the 
important role that gatekeepers perform.
29
 
4.19 A strategy based on enrolment can encounter problems. Julia Black argued 
that gatekeepers were not necessarily reliable and may not perform the role that 
regulators assume.
30
 In its examination of the collapse of Trio Capital, the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJCCFS) also 
highlighted expectations gaps between the role of gatekeepers and investors' 
expectations of that role. The PJCCFS formed the view that the current system of 
gatekeepers did not work in relation to Trio Capital and that '[t]here is no reason to 
believe that this system will be any more successful in detecting fraud in the future'.
31
 
Julia Black concluded that enrolment is a 'potentially useful' strategy of regulation, 
however: 
…whether the strategy is successful depends on the motivation, regulatory 
capacity, and most importantly, the broader market context, culture and 
incentives of those being relied upon to act as gatekeepers. Unless these are 
aligned with the goals of the regulatory regime, regulators will find that 
their reliance is dangerously misplaced.
32
 
Effectiveness of the regulatory regime and ASIC's regulatory approach 
4.20 Responsive regulation and risk-based approaches to regulation have 
influenced the development of Australia's corporations law and the approach taken by 
ASIC. The following paragraphs outline general observations about the extent it is 
considered that these theories apply to ASIC. Issues considered by regulatory theory 
have been contemplated when particular aspects of ASIC's work were examined in 
detail, however, to avoid repetition the discussion of regulatory theory is generally 
confined to this chapter. 
ASIC's responsiveness and ability to conduct surveillance 
4.21 Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith has described ASIC's after-the-loss 
approach to enforcement as: 'waiting for complaints, investigating a minute proportion 
                                              
28  For example, international accounting standards developed by the International Accounting 
Standards Board. Julia Black, 'Paradoxes and Failures, pp. 1050–51. 
29  ASIC's chairman, Mr Greg Medcraft, has described gatekeepers as a 'cornerstone' of the 
system, along with ASIC and the Corporations Act. See Senate Economics Legislation 
Committee Hansard, Estimates, 31 May 2011, pp. 83, 96. 
30  Examples cited in support of this argument include auditors in corporate collapses such as 
Enron and what the global financial crisis revealed about credit rating agencies. Julia Black, 
'Paradoxes and Failures', p. 1049. 
31  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Service, Inquiry into the collapse 
of Trio Capital, May 2012, Parliamentary Paper No. 138/2012, pp. 111–12. 
32  Julia Black, 'Paradoxes and Failures, p. 1049. 
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of them, and prosecuting even fewer'.
33
 Dr Vicky Comino has suggested that 'ASIC 
has generally behaved in a reactive rather than a proactive fashion' and that the 
'discovery of corporate breaches is often almost accidental'.
34
  
4.22 A former enforcement adviser at ASIC agreed that regulation cannot eliminate 
all misconduct, but argued ASIC could still be more vigilant at after-the-loss 
enforcement. Transnational crime was an issue he particularly highlighted: 
Things happen, but that does not mean that you put hands in the air and not 
chase people overseas. If people steal from mums and dads in Australia, we 
should pursue those individuals to the end of the earth and tell them, and 
the world, that if you come here you cannot steal from our mums and dads, 
who have worked hard all their lives.
35
 
4.23 In September 2012, ASIC published figures on the number of staff allocated 
to each of its stakeholder teams, the number of regulated entities they oversee and, for 
the first time, the number of years it would theoretically take to conduct surveillance 
on every entity. An updated set of these figures is reproduced in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: ASIC’s surveillance coverage of regulated populations in 2012–13 
ASIC team Staff Key industry statistics and ASIC's surveillance coverage 
Financial advisers 29 3,394 AFS licensees authorised to provide personal advice: 
- Top 20—0.8 years on average 
- Next 30—1.8 years on average 
- Remaining 3,344—primarily reactive surveillances 
1,395 AFS licensees authorised to provide general advice—reactive 
surveillances only 
Two ASIC-approved external dispute resolution schemes—every year 
Investment banks 23 26 investment banks—once a year 
250 hedge fund investment managers/REs—11.3 years on average 
43 retail OTC derivative providers—every year 
Seven credit rating agencies—every year 
Investment 
managers and 
superannuation 
40 483 active responsible entities 
- Top 25—70% of funds under management—every two years 
- Nine identified as most at risk of noncompliance—every year 
- 91 responsible entities in sectors where risks have been identified or 
where ASIC has concerns—varies from year to year 
- Remaining 358—primarily reactive surveillances 
200 super fund trustees 
- Five identified as most at risk of noncompliance—every year 
- Remaining 195—primarily reactive surveillances 
20 major custodians—2.9 years on average 
                                              
33  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', p. 698. 
34  Vicky Comino, 'Towards better corporate regulation in Australia', p. 36. 
35  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 7. 
Page 34  
 
Deposit-takers, 
credit and insurers 
65.5 173 authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) 
- Big four ADIs—every year 
- Remaining 169—13 years on average 
141 insurers—seven years on average 
641 licensed non-cash payment facility providers—primarily reactive 
surveillances 
13 trustee companies—seven years on average 
5,688 non-ADI credit licensees (lenders and intermediaries) with 28,201 
credit representatives—37 years on average 
Corporations 
(including emerging 
mining and 
resources 
companies) 
49 21,690 public companies, including 1,983 listed entities (excludes foreign 
companies) 
- All control transactions for listed entities 
- A significant proportion of prospectuses 
- A small sample of entities in areas of emerging risk—every year 
- Remaining entities—reactive surveillances only 
Financial reporting 
and audit 
38 86 audit firms: 
- the big four audit 95% of listed entities by market capitalisation—
1.5 years on average 
- the next eight audit 4% of listed entities by market capitalisation—
2.5 years on average 
- the remaining 74 audit 1% of listed entities by market capitalisation—
10.3 years on average 
Financial reports of 1,983 listed entities (excludes foreign companies) and 
26,000 unlisted entities: 
- top 500 listed entities – three years on average 
- remaining 1,500 listed entities (excludes foreign companies)—12 years 
on average 
- 300 unlisted entities with larger numbers of users—90 years on average 
supplemented by reactive surveillances 
Insolvency 
practitioners 
23.5 685 registered liquidators—3.6 years on average 
Financial market 
infrastructure 
28 18 authorised financial markets—every year 
Six licensed clearing and settlement facilities—every year 
Market and 
participant 
supervision 
67 Monitoring of the ASX, Chi-X, NSX and ASX24 markets—every day 
136 market participants—3.3 years on average  
800 securities dealers: 
- 100 larger entities (clients and volumes)—four years on average 
- 700 smaller entities—reactive surveillances and targeted reviews of high 
risk entities 
Source: ASIC, Annual Report 2012–13, pp. 16–17. 
Notes: The figures on ASIC's surveillance coverage indicate the number of years it would 
theoretically take to cover the entire regulated population through high intensity 
surveillances, based on the number of surveillances ASIC conducted in the 2012–13 
financial year. ASIC noted that, in practice, its risk-based approach to surveillance means 
that 'some portion of the population would be touched multiple times while others would 
not be touched at all'. Figures on staff numbers are on a full-time equivalent basis. 
4.24 The figures on the number of years it would theoretically take ASIC 
to conduct high intensity surveillance on the entire regulated population indicate that 
relationships between the regulator and many regulated entities could be 
underdeveloped. When its surveillance coverage figures were first released, 
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the chairman of ASIC, Mr Greg Medcraft, outlined how the level of surveillance 
depends on ASIC's resources. In particular, with the resources it has, ASIC undertakes 
a risk-based approach to surveillance that relies on financial system gatekeepers: 
I guess the warning we have to Australians is frankly what we have is a 
system that is based on self-execution and relies on people to do the right 
thing. It is so important—I will not emphasise this more—that it is up to the 
gatekeepers to do the right thing. The amount of surveillance we do is based 
on the resources we have. We try and do risk based surveillance, so we 
target the largest licensees, and for those where we have complaints we go 
reactive. But in terms of proactive surveillance with the resources we have, 
…It is really important that this surveillance coverage that we have released 
publicly for the first time is explaining to Australians that ASIC is not a 
prudential regulator, not a conduct and surveillance regulator…We are not 
resourced to be looking at everybody, and that is a very important message. 
That is why education is really important. Australians are proactive in 
getting educated and understanding what they should be doing.
36
 
4.25 In a 2011 journal article that responded to the 2009–10 surveillance statistics, 
Professor Kingsford Smith observed that the figures reveal 'in very brutal terms of 
resources and enforcement policy, there is at present no realistic prospect of 
developing anything approaching a regular surveillance or inspection program'. 
Although alternative responsive strategies could be considered, 'as things stand it is 
difficult to see how there could be sufficient contact between the financial services 
firms and the regulators for responsive regulation to be a success at the low end of the 
regulatory register'.
37
 With the aim of suggesting ways that financial regulation could 
be encouraged to be more relational which, in her view, would result in more effective 
regulation, Professor Kingsford Smith questioned the current application of responsive 
regulation theory to financial markets. She argued that responsive regulation has been 
successful 'in regulatory contexts where physical inspection of workplaces, mines, 
nursing homes, and so on is undertaken', but it has been less successful in 
environments, such as the financial services sector, that have: 
…large populations of regulatees and insufficient resources for visits, 
inspections, or other regular checks, and where detection of non-compliance 
is difficult. Here the regulatory circumstances do not provide the bridge for 
contact between the regulator and the firm, which allows a relationship to 
develop which can support responsive action.
38
 
4.26 Despite this, Professor Kingsford Smith maintained that inspections in the 
financial sector could still be an effective regulatory technique as they 'remind the 
regulated entity that the regulator is paying attention to what they do, or fail to do': 
                                              
36  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, PJCCFS Hansard, Oversight of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, 12 September 2012, pp. 14–15. 
37  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', p. 724. 
38  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', p. 695. 
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It provides a location for practical, responsive remedial action. In a 
situation where inspection is not a possibility but where the regulator has 
noticed a trend in a particular type of infringement, a letter to all the 
regulated actors doing the same type of business, pointing out the trend and 
asking for details of their compliance, alerts the regulated to the fact the 
regulator is watching. It projects, even at the lower end, an appearance of 
capacity in detection that may be greater than the reality. Depending upon 
the responses received and reviewed, further action in the regulatory 
relationship could be pursued: slating some firms for surveillance, 
reviewing relevant firm disclosure documents, or checking the firm's 
complaints register.
39
 
ASIC's ability to change behaviour 
4.27 An element of effective regulation is how the regulatory environment and the 
regulator's actions and reputation influence the behaviour of regulated entities. 
The chief executive officer of CPA Australia, Mr Alex Malley, questioned whether 
ASIC has exhibited the culture it needs to act in the public interest and argued that 
ASIC had failed to show appropriate leadership.
40
 According to Mr Malley: 
Leadership can be benchmarked against principles of proactivity, capacity 
to positively influence and ability to take stakeholders and the community 
along a journey. Over a long period of observation, with many considered 
public statements made by us, it is our informed view that ASIC has failed 
to exhibit these characteristics. In fact it displays the opposite. It is reactive, 
it is defensive, it is contradictory and it is insecure in its own ability to 
provide solutions.
41
 
4.28 Some witnesses were asked whether ASIC should 'became an agency of fear', 
where significant punishments would be promptly imposed when particular 
contraventions occurred. In his response, Mr Malley expressed support for the overall 
enforcement pyramid approach of escalating penalties and sanctions, although he 
reiterated that there was greater scope for ASIC to show leadership and influence 
behaviour within this framework:  
…I think what people should understand is that there is a process that 
allows them to perform within a marketplace and have the comfort that the 
regulator is willing to work with them to improve the way things work. I 
think it has to have a very, very severe punishment mechanism, but it also 
should be not the starting point of the dialogue of the regulator of the 
                                              
39  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', 735. Professor Kingsford Smith also 
suggested other 'minimally sufficient, but cheap to implement' strategies that ASIC could apply, 
including allocating a key officer to each regulated entity and requiring regulated firms to 
report to ASIC events that are not breaches of the Corporations Act, but which indicate changes 
in the firm's circumstances. See Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', pp. 736–37. 
40  Mr Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 42. 
41  Mr Alex Malley, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 42. 
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market. There should be a very clear message that, should one go past a 
point, there is no doubt that there will be a significant punishment. So I 
believe in that but, from all of my business experience, the only way to lead 
any organisation, whether it be a regulator, a government or a business, is to 
lead by positive influence and by seeking to have the very best outcomes 
and behaviours.
42
 
4.29 Mr Lee White, the chief executive officer of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Australia (ICAA), expressed a similar view. Mr White stated that: 
…the best regulatory outcomes are achieved through effective 
communication and the ability to persuade…The second elements is that we 
need to be very careful around culture. If the culture gets too dominated by, 
'We have all these powers and can exercise them when rightfully so,' it is 
very hard to turn off the mindset that I can now collaborate or work with 
the people. It becomes such a dominant force in how people are 
approached.
43
 
4.30 Many academics recognise that the ethical culture and perception of risk 
within corporations are key factors in regulatory compliance, with the effective 
enforcement of corporate law beginning within the corporation itself.
44
 Dr Comino 
points to HIH Insurance and the action taken by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) against Visy as examples where the culture inside 
organisations can be unreceptive to compliance.
45
 Professor Kingsford Smith has 
suggested that ASIC cannot act effectively as 'a benign big gun' and, therefore, 
it cannot simultaneously project power and use 'minimal sufficiency' techniques as 
suggested by responsive regulation. To support her argument, Professor Kingsford 
Smith noted that while ASIC's powers are great on paper 'it has a track record of 
prosecuting small, rather than large, firms'.
46
 Professor Kingsford Smith also argued 
that while the reputation of financial services regulators generally, including ASIC, 
have suffered as a result of the global financial crisis, ASIC has 'contributed to its own 
lowered regard':  
…by using its enforcement powers in a series of high profile cases which it 
has lost resoundingly, and at very great public expense. So in 
implementation of its high-level enforcement powers, ASIC has had mixed 
success, and this diminishes its ability to project itself as invincible.
47
 
                                              
42  Mr Alex Malley, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 49. 
43  Mr Lee White, Chief Executive Officer, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 49. 
44  For a list of references see Roman Tomasic, 'The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement: 
Future Directions for Corporations Law in Australia', University of Western Sydney Law 
Review 10 (2006), pp. 9, 11. 
45  Vicky Comino, 'Towards better corporate regulation in Australia', p. 18. 
46  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', p. 697 (footnotes omitted). 
47  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', p. 725 (footnotes omitted). 
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4.31 CPA Australia also argued that perceptions about ASIC's effectiveness impact 
its ability to regulate: 
Being regular front-page news on questions of your performance rather than 
your outcome leaves ASIC in a difficult position to influence better 
behaviours of others. No-one wins in this circumstance.
48
 
4.32 Others consider there are wide-spread and established 'dysfunctional elements 
in Australian business culture' that ASIC is unable to counter because of its structure 
and culture: 
ASIC, as with its institutional predecessors, was born with a regulatory 
emphasis on enhancing disclosure and transparency in the financial 
marketplace, and has acquired a dominant culture that underpins that 
emphasis. ASIC has yet to acquire a culture commensurate with the cowboy 
frontier environment that it is expected to regulate.
49
 
4.33 How regulated entities respond to enquiries from or action taken by the 
regulator is also significant. The potential for ASIC to have an adversarial relationship 
with regulated entities is readily apparent. For example, Baldwin and Black, in 
describing the theory of 'really responsive risk-based regulation',
50
 provided the 
following observation about risk-based regulators relationship with the entities they 
regulate: 
[Risk-based] regulators need considerable information from firms to sustain 
their oversight. They may, however, have to use formal enforcement 
actions, such as fines, to change the behaviour of many firms. In such 
circumstances, responding to noncompliance with a deterrence approach 
may cut across the ability to detect that noncompliance in the first place. 
Firms know that any information they give to the regulator may potentially 
be used against them in an enforcement action, and this can have a chilling 
effect on their cooperation with that regulator. A good, albeit anecdotal, 
example is the contrast in enforcement approaches of the two Australian 
financial regulators, APRA and [ASIC]…APRA has a model of intensive 
supervision for its high-risk financial institutions, but this does not involve 
using formal enforcement actions. ASIC, on the other hand, has moved to a 
much more deterrence-based approach. The consequence for their 
respective monitoring functions was noted recently by an Australian 
                                              
48  Mr Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 42. 
49  Evan Jones, 'The Crisis and the Australian Financial Sector', Journal of Australian Political 
Economy no. 64 (Summer 2009), pp. 91, 110. 
50  Really responsive risk-based regulation is 'a strategy of applying a variety of regulatory 
instruments in a manner that is flexible and sensitive to a series of key factors'. The theory 
arises from the need for risk-based regulators to 'attune the logics of risk analyses to the 
complex problems and the dynamics of real-life regulatory scenarios'. See Julia Black and 
Robert Baldwin, 'Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation', p. 182. 
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lawyer, who quipped, "When APRA asks for information, firms give it to 
them; when ASIC asks, they call their lawyers" (Note on file with author).
51
 
Reflection and self-assessment by ASIC 
4.34 A further element of really responsive risk-based regulation is whether the 
regulator assesses their successes and failures and then modifies their approach 
accordingly.
52
 It is considered that: 
Really responsive risk-based regulators will be performance sensitive: they 
will be capable of measuring whether the enforcement tools and strategies 
in current use are proving successful in achieving desired objectives. Such 
regulators will also operate systems that allow them to justify their 
performance to the public and other interested parties. They will also be 
able to adjust their strategies in order to improve on the levels of 
performance that they have assessed.
53
 
4.35 ASIC's actions in response to the misconduct within CFPL, a key reason for 
the referral of this inquiry, are examined in detail in Chapters 8 to 11. Nevertheless, 
at this point it is useful to note that during Senate Estimates in June 2013 ASIC 
focused on the outcome achieved in the CFPL matter, which the deputy chairman 
eagerly outlined. ASIC was less forthright when asked about the investigation and the 
whistleblower.
54
 ASIC's first submission to this inquiry was more reflective and 
acknowledged inadequate aspects of how it handled the investigation.
55
 ASIC also 
advised that it has considered all of the submissions received by the committee 'in an 
effort to learn as much as we can from them and also to enable ASIC to do a better 
job'.
56
 ASIC's main submission also outlined the actions it has taken to improve how it 
deals with whistleblowers.
57
 
                                              
51  Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, 'Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation', p. 199. A similar 
point was made by Professor Kingsford Smith who suggested that '[f]irms turn to their lawyers, 
not to the regulator for a negotiation about how the complaint might be resolved' and that 'the 
ensuing conversation will likely concentrate entirely on the particular complaint and not on 
deeper difficulties—which might be better diagnosed if firms understood that through regular 
visits the regulator intended at least initially to be reasonable, and to persuade and support 
rather than prosecute'. Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'A Harder Nut to Crack?', p. 734. 
52  This is one of the regulatory tasks that Robert Baldwin and Julia Black suggest a really 
responsive regulator would consider. See Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, 'Really Responsive 
Regulation', Modern Law Review 71:1 (2008); cited in Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, 'Really 
Responsive Risk-Based Regulation', p. 183. 
53  Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, 'Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation', p. 200. 
54  Senate Economics Legislation Committee Hansard, Estimates, 4 June 2013, pp. 115–117. 
55  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 16. 
56  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 1. 
57  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 137. 
Page 40  
 
The philosophy underpinning Australia's financial services regulation 
regime 
4.36 The final section of this chapter focuses on one specific and high-profile 
aspect of ASIC's work: its role as a financial services regulator. The bulk of 
submissions received by the committee relate to this function. This section provides 
some background information on the principles that have guided policymakers to date, 
such as those outlined by the 1997 Wallis Inquiry. However, it should be noted that 
the latest review of the financial system that is currently underway, the Financial 
System Inquiry chaired by Mr David Murray AO, has been tasked with refreshing the 
philosophy that underpins Australia's financial system.
58
 
Efficient markets theory 
4.37 The current approach to regulating Australia's financial services industry 
largely stems from the 1981 report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Australian 
Financial System (the Campbell Inquiry) and the Wallis Inquiry of 1997. Both of 
these inquiries were guided by 'efficient markets theory', that is, a belief that 'markets 
operate most efficiently when there is a minimum of regulatory intervention'.
59
 
The Wallis Inquiry maintained the fundamental view that investors have the 
responsibility to make good decisions.
60
 It also observed that 'all markets, financial 
and non-financial, face potential problems associated with the conduct of market 
participants, anti-competitive behaviour and incomplete information'.
61
 Nevertheless, 
the Wallis Inquiry concluded that although the objectives of conduct and disclosure 
regulation in the financial system are similar to those that apply to non-financial 
markets, specialised regulation for the financial services sector is necessary: 
…to ensure that market participants act with integrity and that consumers 
are protected. The financial system warrants specialised regulation due to 
the complexity of financial products, the adverse consequences of 
breaching financial promises and the need for low-cost means to resolve 
disputes.
62
 
4.38 On consumer protection, the Wallis Inquiry observed that information 
asymmetry can arise between consumers and providers of financial products as 
                                              
58  The Hon Joe Hockey MP (Treasurer), 'Financial System Inquiry', Media Release, 
20 December 2013. 
59  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 49. 
60  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'ASIC regulation for the investor as consumer', Company and 
Securities Law Journal 29:5 (2011), p. 334. 
61  Financial System Inquiry, Final Report, March 1997, p. 186. 
62  The Wallis Inquiry also recognised that financial safety regulation, that is, prudential 
regulation, has a role in some areas of the financial system. The Wallis Inquiry concluded that 
this type of regulation 'should be the greatest where the intensity of financial promises and 
hence risks of market failure are greatest'. Financial System Inquiry, Final Report, March 1997, 
p. 175. 
 Page 41 
 
'consumers lack (and cannot efficiently obtain) the knowledge, experience or 
judgment required to make informed decisions…a situation where further disclosure, 
no matter how high quality or comprehensive, cannot overcome market failure'.
63
 
Others have noted that there is 'also a view that consumers need protection from 
themselves, due to their vulnerability to making poor financial decisions, their 
susceptibility to certain sales messages when framed in a particular way, and their 
underestimation of their own lack of financial understanding'.
64
 
4.39 The Wallis Inquiry also distinguished between investments and the 
consumption of other goods and services. It argued that as investments are not based 
on consumption but rather the sharing of risk (and the reward for bearing that risk), 
there should be an appropriate balance between investor protection and market 
efficiency.
65
 Although the Wallis Inquiry envisaged a role for regulation in the 
financial system beyond that applied to markets generally, as the financial system 
fundamentally engages in risk it did not support the elimination of risk by regulation: 
If regulation is pursued to the point of ensuring that promises are kept under 
all circumstances, the burden of honour is effectively shifted from the 
promisor to the regulator. All promisors would become equally risky (or 
risk free) in the eyes of the investing public. Regulation at this intensity 
removes the natural spectrum of risk that is fundamental to financial 
markets. If it were extended widely, the community would be collectively 
underwriting all financial risks through the tax system, and markets would 
cease to work efficiently…Primary responsibility should remain with those 
who make financial promises. It would be inequitable for the government to 
underwrite some financial promises but not other promises made by 
participants in the broader economy.
66
 
4.40 ASIC noted that this philosophy is not only reflected in Australia's financial 
system, but applies to financial regulators in foreign jurisdictions as well: 
…the settings established by the parliament for our financial system are 
such that no financial regulator can prevent all risk of losses from 
occurring. Our system is designed this way because removing the risk of 
loss would substantially reduce economic growth, individual choice and 
return to investors. Preventing all risk of loss from poor products, 
misconduct or criminal activity would involve highly expensive and 
intrusive regulatory intervention. For financial regulators like us—
[securities] regulators around the world—the systems are similarly designed 
to ours. While the risk of loss can never be entirely removed from the 
financial markets, we work hard to enforce the law and to deal with 
misconduct that puts investors at risk. We also work hard to help consumers 
                                              
63  Financial System Inquiry, Final Report, March 1997, p. 191. 
64  Richard Sandlant, 'Consumer financial protection: future directions', Finsia Journal of Applied 
Finance, no. 4 of 2011, p. 42. 
65  Financial System Inquiry, Final Report, March 1997, p. 251. 
66  Financial System Inquiry, Final Report, March 1997, p. 192. 
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and investors make appropriate choices in their dealing with financial 
services providers.
67
 
Developments since the Wallis Inquiry 
4.41 Seventeen years have passed since the Wallis Inquiry finalised its report. 
As this chapter has noted, a new Financial System Inquiry is currently underway 
which has been tasked with refreshing the philosophy that underpins Australia's 
financial system. However, in considering ASIC's performance, it is useful to note 
some of the developments since 1997 that have led to some of the assumptions that 
informed the Wallis Inquiry being questioned or departed from. 
The growth in superannuation 
4.42 Australians are increasingly becoming involved in the financial markets as 
a result of the superannuation system which, because of its compulsory nature, 
is considered to be 'the most significant exception' to efficient markets theory in 
Australia's financial system.
68
 This exposure has been reinforced by the increase in the 
superannuation guarantee over the past two decades and the significant increase in the 
number of SMSFs. More recent government inquiries and reforms to superannuation 
have diverged from certain principles expressed in the Wallis Inquiry report.
69
  
The global financial crisis 
4.43 The global financial crisis that began in 2007 and intensified as a result of 
numerous events in 2008 has, in particular, caused some of the assumptions about 
how financial markets function to be questioned. For example, in 2009 the then ASIC 
chairman Mr Tony D'Aloisio noted that efficient markets theory emphasises the 
importance of disclosure. It also assumes that investors (both retail and institutional) 
have 'the tools to understand what disclosure means'. To illustrate how the global 
financial crisis revealed that this was not always the case, Mr D'Aloisio noted that at 
the institutional level there was widespread disclosure on credit default swaps and 
collateralised debt obligations, however, 'that disclosure did not translate into an 
                                              
67  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 2. 
68  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 51. 
69  The report of the 2010 Review of the Governance, Efficiency, Structure and Operation of 
Australia's Superannuation System (the Super System Review, or Cooper Review) disagreed 
with the Wallis Inquiry's conclusion that superannuation fund members should be treated as 
rational and informed investors protected by disclosure and conduct requirements: Final 
Report, part 1, June 2010, p. 8. One of the review panel members outlined how developments 
in behavioural economics thought have 'pointed to some of the flaws of standard economics in 
modelling behaviour' and reveal that some of the assumed behaviours outlined by the Wallis 
report 'do not apply unequivocally': David Gruen and Tim Wong, 'MySuper—Thinking 
Seriously about the Default Option', Address to the Australian Conference of Economists, 
28 September 2010, www.treasury.gov.au (accessed 26 August 2013). 
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understanding of the risks associated with those products'.
70
 In her submission, 
Professor Kingsford Smith argued that there should be some thought given to how the 
variety of different investors are treated. As an example, she noted the complex 
products offered to local councils as sophisticated investors, when in reality they were 
'very unfamiliar with the products being offered'.
71
 Various other informed observers 
have also commented on regulatory issues that the crisis revealed.
72
 
4.44 In its main submission to this inquiry, ASIC noted that since the global 
financial crisis, regulators internationally 'are looking for a broader toolkit to address 
market problems, moving beyond traditional conduct and disclosure regulation 
to design regulatory interventions that address the types of problems investors and 
financial consumers often experience in financial markets'. ASIC noted the recent 
restructure of financial services regulators in the UK, and in particular the new 
temporary product intervention powers given to the Financial Conduct Authority.
73
 
Implications of the current financial services regulatory system for ASIC 
4.45 The promotion of market integrity and consumer protection is generally 
undertaken through conduct and disclosure regulation, although certain reforms 
enacted in the past five years, such as the national credit regime (which will be 
examined in the following chapters) have diverged from this approach.
74
 This has 
clear implications for the role of ASIC. In its main submission, ASIC presented the 
following argument: 
                                              
70  Tony D'Aloisio, 'Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis', address to the Asia Securities 
Forum, Sydney, 12 October 2009, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 28 August 2013), p. 11. 
71  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith also argued that the Westpoint cases 'showed how relatively 
easy it was in a country with compulsory superannuation, for comparatively modestly wealthy 
clients to be financially eligible for "sophisticated client" products, which they did not 
understand'. Submission 153, p. 18. 
72  During a previous inquiry by this committee Professor Stephen King noted that regulations in 
the financial sector have been built on the assumption that there is no deposit insurance in 
Australia. A deposit guarantee was introduced by the government in response to the global 
financial crisis. See Committee Hansard, Inquiry into competition in the Australian banking 
sector, 21 January 2011, p. 105. In 2010 Professor Ian Harper, one of the members of the 
Wallis Inquiry committee, also suggested that certain assumptions need to be reviewed and 
outcomes revealed by the crisis considered, such as the pervasiveness of systemic risk and how 
it afflicts financial markets. ASIC, Securities and investments regulation beyond the crisis, 
ASIC Summer School 2010 Report, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 27 August 2013) pp. 33–34. 
73  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 55. 
74  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 47. Despite recent developments, however, the Wallis Inquiry 
remains influential. For example, in a 2012 newspaper opinion article Mr Medcraft wrote that 
the Wallis Inquiry discussed 'vital ideas', such as adopting a flexible approach to regulation, 
which remain relevant to ASIC's surveillance and its risk-based regulatory approach'. Greg 
Medcraft, 'Surveillance doesn’t remove the risk factor', Australian Financial Review, 
17 September 2012, www.afr.com (accessed 10 July 2013). 
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Consistent with the underlying philosophy of the financial services 
regulatory regime, ASIC's role is not to control the types of products that 
are available in financial markets, to prevent investments from failing, or to 
place checks on investors' investment decisions. 
We understand that, where investors suffer losses, a natural tendency is to 
question why this has happened, and ask why ASIC has not prevented the 
losses from occurring. Nevertheless, ASIC's performance should be 
assessed in terms of how we fulfil our role in the financial services 
regulatory system, and not against the benchmark of whether we have been 
able to prevent all losses suffered by investors 
…ASIC can, and does, try to minimise the risk of losses occurring. We try 
to help investors and financial consumers to use financial markets 
successfully through our work on financial literacy. We set standards for 
the conduct of industry participants by enforcing compliance with the law. 
We focus on preventing losses arising out of bad advice, addressing 
conflicts of interest that could lead to poor outcomes for investors, and 
detecting and addressing instances of outright fraud and other misconduct.
75
 
4.46 The case studies on lending practices and financial advice contained in the 
following chapters of this report highlight the real implications that the regulatory 
framework can have for consumers. The committee uses these case studies to start its 
examination of how ASIC has fulfilled its role in the financial services regulatory 
system. The committee assesses ASIC's performance against its own stated objectives: 
of trying to minimise the risk of loss occurring; of helping consumers to use financial 
markets successfully through improved financial literacy; and by setting and enforcing 
industry standards.  
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Overview of Part II 
 
At the public hearings and in written questions placed on notice, the committee 
questioned ASIC about many aspects of its regulatory responsibilities and tested ASIC 
on particular investigations or enforcement cases. As ASIC's responsibilities are 
extensive and its enforcement actions involve complexities and nuances that can 
require detailed explanations, the committee has selected two case studies to examine 
in detail and assess ASIC's performance.  
The first case study relates to claims of unethical and irresponsible lending practices 
between 2002 and 2010 that affected vulnerable people. Many people raised this issue 
in their submissions, drawing on their personal experiences to make serious 
allegations of wrongdoing and to highlight concerns about ASIC's inadequate 
response. 
The second case study relates to the catalyst for this inquiry: ASIC's response to 
serious and widespread misconduct within Commonwealth Financial Planning 
Limited.  
  
  
 
Chapter 5 
ASIC's role and credit providers  
5.1 Before July 2010, the states and territories had primary responsibility for 
regulating consumer credit. ASIC, however, did have some involvement. Since 
March 2002, under the ASIC Act, the regulator has had a consumer protection role for 
credit facilities, which included household and investment and small business credit. 
ASIC took over this responsibility from the ACCC as part of the reform of business 
and investment regulation under the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program. 
This Commonwealth level regulatory function for credit in the marketplace was 
limited in scope with ASIC's jurisdiction under part 2 of the ASIC Act confined to 
broad standards of conduct covering unconscionable conduct and misleading or 
deceptive conduct.
1
 ASIC's licensing powers did not extend to brokers who only 
advised on credit products. At that time, as credit was not considered a 'financial 
product' for the purposes of the Corporations Act, brokers were not required to have 
an Australian financial services (AFS) licence. 
5.2 In July 2010, ASIC's responsibilities expanded considerably under the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (National Credit Act) which imposed 
licensing requirements, general conduct obligations and responsible lending 
obligations on credit providers and persons providing credit assistance.  
5.3 In this chapter, the committee's main focus is on ASIC's performance and its 
regulatory role before the National Credit Act came into force. It is concerned with 
allegations of imprudent lending involving unconscionable conduct, misleading and 
deceptive conduct, including possible cases of fraud, that occurred after March 2002 
but before the new legislation came into effect. 
Early indications of irresponsible lending practices 
5.4 The period from the late 1990s through to the first half of the 2000s was 
marked by considerable product innovation in the Australian mortgage market. 
Reflecting on that period, the Assistant Governor (Financial Markets) of the Reserve 
Bank of Australia (RBA) explained that lenders sought to cater for a wider range of 
potential borrowers and found new ways to assess their borrowing capacity. He noted: 
Lenders introduced home-equity loans, redraw facilities and reverse 
mortgages, all of which allowed households to borrow against the equity 
they have built up in their homes. Lenders also introduced interest-only 
                                              
1  See for example, Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, A report to ASIC on the finance 
and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, p. 39; ASIC, Protecting wealth in the family home: 
An examination of refinancing in response to mortgage stress, March 2008, p. 4; and ASIC, 
Submission 45.1, p. 6. 
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loans and shared equity loans, which made it easier for households, 
particularly first home buyers, to purchase their home. 
Loan products that better meet the needs of certain types of borrowers, such 
as those with irregular income streams or those who do not meet the 
standard lending criteria, were also introduced. Low doc loans, for which 
borrowers self-certify their income in the application process, accounted for 
about 10 per cent of newly approved housing loans in 2006 compared with 
less than ½ per cent in 2000.
2
 
5.5 According to the Assistant Governor, while the overwhelming effect of these 
changes had been to widen the range of households who could access finance, some of 
the innovation had resulted in 'an easing in lending standards and an increase in risk 
for both borrowers and lenders'.
3
 
5.6 The Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc (CCLC) also noted the 
emergence of 'non-conforming lending' in the home loan market during the early 
2000s. It stated that 'while some lenders specifically targeted and priced their products 
for marginal borrowers, the trend soon spread into the mainstream, with most 
mainstream lenders including the major banks offering low doc loans'.
4
  
Growing use of mortgage brokers 
5.7 This period also witnessed growth in the use of financial brokers as 
intermediaries between borrowers and lenders, which meant that an increasing number 
of Australians approached mortgage brokers rather than a lender to arrange loans. 
For example, a 2003 survey by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) on broker initiated loans recorded that 56 institutions indicated that they had 
used brokers to originate loans (14 banks, 34 credit unions, and eight building 
societies), which represented approximately 25 per cent of all authorised deposit-
taking institutions (ADIs). The survey also predicted a continuation of this trend in the 
market with 25 institutions indicating at the time that they planned to use brokers for 
the first time in the next 12 months.
5
 
5.8 Based on its results, the survey noted that only a minority of institutions were 
placing too much reliance on brokers to assess loans and inadequately tracking and 
                                              
2  Dr Guy Debelle, 'The State of the Mortgage Market', Address to the Mortgage Innovation 
Conference, Sydney, 30 March 2010, p. 6. 
3  Dr Guy Debelle, 'The State of the Mortgage Market', p. 5. 
4  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Submission 194, p. 13. 
5  Anoulack Chanthivong, Anthony D. F. Coleman and Neil Esho, Report on Broker-originated 
Lending, Results of a survey of authorised deposit-taking intuitions, undertaken by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, January 2003, pp. 4, 5. The survey recorded that 
the total dollar value of broker-originated housing loans was $76.3 billion, which represented 
roughly 23% of all housing loans made by ADIs. Broker-introduced housing loans accounted 
for 23% of banking industry housing loans, 2% of credit union housing loans, and 35% of 
building society housing loans. 
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assessing broker-introduced loans. Even so, it cautioned that independent loan review 
was necessary to ensure an ADI's credit standards were 'being applied to assess and 
approve loans'. It advised that an independent review should be 'a fundamental 
element of risk management'.
6
 
5.9 The survey also covered broker remuneration. It found that over half of the 
institutions (53 per cent) based the broker's remuneration solely on the volume of 
business generated. According to the survey reviewers, this provided brokers with an 
incentive to generate loan volume without appropriate regard for risk. Again, the 
reviewers observed that with such an incentive structure it was critical for ADIs 
to have procedures in place to ensure their own credit assessment standards were 
applied rigorously to broker-introduced loans.
7
 Looking back over this period, the 
CCLC stated that: 
Brokers carried none of the default risk worn by lenders and had a strong 
financial incentive (in the form of commissions) to get as many and as big a 
loans as possible accepted by the financial institutions and other lenders. 
The presence of the 3rd party in the transaction also allowed the lender 
(keen to grab or retain market share) to distance themselves from the 
transaction and to either genuinely miss, or effectively turn a blind eye, to 
irregularities in loan applications.
8
 
5.10 As noted previously, ASIC assumed Commonwealth-level responsibility for 
consumer protection in the credit market in 2002 at a time when the use of mortgage 
brokers was on the rise and lending practices were easing. 
Early warning signs 
5.11 During the early 2000s, community advocates and caseworkers began 
to express concerns about the growing incidence of complaints involving brokers. 
Their experiences led them to conclude that the industry was lightly and unevenly 
unregulated and contained some high-risk players and unfair practices.
9
 In response to 
the increasing number of complaints involving brokers, ASIC, on the recommendation 
of its Consumer Advisory Panel, commissioned the CCLC to examine and report on 
the mortgage and finance broker industry. 
Increasing concerns about broker conduct 
5.12 Consistent with the findings of the 2003 APRA survey, the CCLC also 
registered some troubling trends about this poorly regulated sector of the industry. 
                                              
6  Chanthivong et al, Report on Broker-originated Lending, p. 7. 
7  Chanthivong et al, Report on Broker-originated Lending, p. 9. 
8  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Submission 194, p. 13.  
9  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage 
broker industry, March 2003, www.asic.gov.au, p. 5. 
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Its report identified a number of features that hindered the development and 
maintenance of professional standards for broker conduct, including: 
 minimal or no entry requirements for participants in the industry;  
 the use of commissions as the dominant method of remuneration for brokers;  
 a shift in distribution channels used by lenders from branch networks to 
brokers, with lenders competing against each other to gain access to broker 
client bases, through increasing the commission they were prepared to pay to 
brokers; 
 a consequent shift in the preparation of loan applications from lenders to 
brokers, with some brokers prepared to provide inaccurate information about 
the financial circumstances of their clients, in order to ensure that loan 
applications met the acceptance criteria of the lender; 
 difficulties for lenders seeking to discipline brokers, due to the capacity of 
brokers to switch the lender to whom they directed client applications for 
finance;  
 a lack of accountability of brokers for poor advice due to the inability of 
consumers to access alternative dispute resolution forums; and  
 some brokers not properly promoting the interests of their consumer clients.
10
 
5.13 The report recognised that consumers were relatively inexperienced when 
using brokers and, given the confusing range of loans and providers, could become 
dependent on brokers for advice. Importantly, the report noted that some brokers were 
'prepared to exploit that dependency' and that a number of fringe players in the broker 
industry systematically adopted unfair practices, and pursued 'their own financial 
interests over those of their clients'.
11
 It cited cases involving disputes about the 
quality of advice provided by brokers which included: 
 brokers recommending interest only loans in inappropriate circumstances—
case studies indicated that some brokers were making widespread use of 
'interest only' loans;
12
 
 brokers misrepresenting the savings available from changing a home loan; 
 brokers arranging for borrowers to declare, incorrectly, that a loan was for 
investment rather than personal use (with the result that the consumer lost 
statutory protections provided under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
(UCCC)); 
                                              
10  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, pp. 6–7. 
11  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, pp. 8, 11. 
12  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, p. 30. 
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 brokers charging excessive fees, or fees in circumstances where the broker 
was aware that there was little prospect of the borrower being approved for 
a loan; 
 borrowers being placed into a loan where they could only afford the 
repayments with substantial hardship (81 per cent of the caseworkers 
surveyed by the CCLC who dealt with broker complaints indicated that they 
often saw problems of this type); and 
 brokers arranging finance for an amount less than that requested by the 
customer (particularly where the funds were required to complete a property 
purchase).
13
 
5.14 The report noted that these practices resulted in 'higher costs to consumers, 
an increased risk of default by the borrower, and exposure of their home where this 
was used as security for the debt'.
14
 It also suggested that most consumers would be 
unaware that by signing a declaration that the loan was for investment purposes, and 
therefore outside the UCCC regime, they made it significantly easier for the lender 
to take possession of any security, such as their home, in the event of default'.
15
 
The report drew particular attention to a most troubling practice: 
A significant and, from a regulatory viewpoint, disturbing trend in the 
broker industry is the incidence of fraudulent mortgage applications. The 
shift in responsibility for the preparation of the loan application from 
persons such as bank employees to brokers has seen a shift in the interests 
of that person, from applying proper risk assessment techniques to earning 
commissions through having the loan approved. Increased reliance on 
brokers therefore creates an increased risk of this type of mortgage fraud. 
At the soft end, mortgage fraud can involve the broker misrepresenting the 
consumer's personal or financial information in order for the lender to 
finance a marginal application for credit. Because brokers have ongoing 
contact with a credit provider, they become familiar with its lending criteria 
and can manipulate the content of applications to ensure the loan will be 
approved. There are a number of ways in which the broker can camouflage 
the borrower's circumstances, such as not disclosing all liabilities, reducing 
the number of dependants, or inflating the value of assets.
16
 
5.15 The report recognised the urgent need for the implementation of interim 
measures to protect consumers and improve standards of conduct in the broker 
industry, which included:  
 increased and visible enforcement action by regulatory agencies; 
                                              
13  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, p. 29. 
14  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, p. 29. 
15  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, p. 34. 
16  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, pp. 34–35. 
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 the introduction of improved codes of conduct by industry bodies together 
with greater monitoring and enforcement of their obligations; 
 improved access to industry-based dispute resolution procedures such as the 
Mortgage Industry Ombudsman Scheme, and ASIC approval (pursuant to 
Policy Statement 139) of the operation of such schemes, in order to provide 
greater transparency in the operation and decision-making practices of these 
schemes; and 
 state and territory governments encouraging a greater degree of supervision of 
brokers by lenders…17 
5.16 A 2003 APRA discussion paper also highlighted the increased use of brokers 
and recognised that some ADIs were relying on broker valuations and income 
checking when providing a loan. Instead of verifying the information, certain ADIs 
were placing greater weight on the security underlying the loan than the ability of the 
borrower to repay the loan.
18
 The paper referred to a particular problem with low doc 
loans
19
 where the potential borrower did 'not provide income details', and the lender 
did not 'verify the borrower's self-declared income levels and/or self-declared 
servicing ability'.
20
 
5.17 Clearly, by the close of 2003 some persistent and undeniable alarms were 
warning of dubious lending practices and the potential for them to spread, especially 
with brokers receiving commissioned-based remuneration and with the increasing 
availability of low doc loans. 
5.18 Commentary on, and concerns about, the role and conduct of brokers 
continued for the next few years. According to the RBA's September 2004 Financial 
Stability Review, brokers typically received upfront commissions from lenders for 
each loan they originated. It observed that most lenders also paid brokers ongoing or 
trailing commission over the life of the loan, which were generally 'small relative to 
upfront commissions'. The Review noted that this created some incentive for 
borrowers to periodically refinance with a different lender.
21
  
                                              
17  CCLC, A report to ASIC on the finance and mortgage broker industry, March 2003, p. 66. 
18  APRA, Proposed Changes to the Risk-Weighting of Residential Mortgage lending, Discussion 
paper, November 2003, p. 2. 
19  A loan that requires less financial documentation than that required for other loans. Primarily 
for borrowers who do not meet the standard loan application criteria, such as the self-employed 
and other borrowers whose income could not be readily verified. 
20  APRA, Proposed Changes to the Risk-Weighting of Residential Mortgage lending, p. 4.  
21  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, September 2004, pp. 39–40. 
 Page 55 
 
5.19 In 2007, the RBA reported that mortgage brokers in Australia had been under 
discussion for some time. It explained: 
In part, this reflects concerns that a small number of brokers may have been 
associated with predatory lending practices and that their remuneration 
structures—predominantly high upfront and low trailing commissions—
might have adverse consequences for both borrowers and lenders.
22
  
5.20 In September 2007, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration tabled a report on home loan lending. 
Although the report noted the positive results stemming from changes in the housing 
lending market, it also referred to negative aspects, including instances where lending 
had been inappropriate. The report cited the concerns of the Credit Ombudsman 
Service, which had identified:   
…a disturbing trend among some lenders, normally fringe lenders, to 
refinance home loans in circumstances where the borrower has no capacity 
to repay the loan. These lenders rely solely on the value of the security, not 
the borrower's ability to meet the repayments. The borrower is invariably in 
default of their existing loan and is at risk of losing their home.
23
  
5.21 The House of Representatives' committee recommended that the 
Commonwealth take responsibility for regulating credit including mortgages. 
5.22 By 2008, widespread support for reform was mounting.24 In March 2008, 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed in principle to the 
Commonwealth taking over the role of regulating mortgage credit and advice 
to protect consumers. The states' agreement to refer constitutional powers to the 
Commonwealth paved the way for the introduction of the Consumer Credit Protection 
Reform Package. 
Committee comment 
5.23 Prior to 2008, ASIC had been aware of emerging problems in the mortgage 
brokering industry, including predatory lending and the potential for it to grow. As the 
years passed, the trend continued but the push for reform was not sufficiently strong 
until 2008 when agitation for legislative change gathered the necessary force 
to compel reform. Before the committee considers the effectiveness of the reforms, 
it examines ASIC response to the problem of predatory lending as it crept into 
mainstream lending after 2002. 
                                              
22  Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, September 2004, p. 40. 
23  See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public 
Administration. Home loan lending, Inquiry into home loan lending practices and the processes 
used to deal with people in financial difficulty, September 2007, Parliamentary Paper 
No. 191/2007, p. 24. 
24  Productivity Commission, Review of Australia's Consumer Policy Framework, Vol. 1, No. 45, 
30 April 2008, p. 28.  
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ASIC's response to lending practices 
5.24 In the following section, the committee looks closely at the nature of this 
predatory lending, the effects it had on individual consumers, and why, despite the 
warnings, such practices were allowed to continue. While the committee 
acknowledges ASIC's limited regulatory function over the provision of credit during 
this period, its focus nonetheless is on the measures that ASIC could or should have 
taken to arrest the trend in predatory lending and to protect the interests of retail 
borrowers. 
Previous inquiry 
5.25 The committee has previously inquired into poor lending practices as part of 
its broader 2012 inquiry into the post-GFC banking sector. It took evidence from 
people claiming that they had been the victims of predatory lending. Ms Denise 
Brailey, who headed up the Banking and Finance Consumers Support Association 
(BFCSA), asserted that fraud and maladministration, especially related to low doc 
loans was prevalent. The allegations were serious and went to matters such as the 
falsification of application loans.
25
  
5.26 During that inquiry, ASIC informed the committee that it had taken 
enforcement action regarding low doc loans over a number of years and that it had 'not 
identified widespread evidence of systemic misconduct in the banking sector along the 
lines described by Ms Brailey'. At the time, the committee expressed its concern about 
the obvious discrepancies between ASIC's account and Ms Brailey's claims of 
predatory lending and fraud. It believed that the matter warranted further investigation 
and that, upon receipt of allegations that presented an arguable case of wrongdoing, 
ASIC should undertake its own investigations to establish whether a prima facie case 
of fraud existed.
26
 
5.27 Following this suggestion, ASIC wrote to Ms Brailey requesting the 
documentation she had referred to that would support her allegations of misconduct. 
ASIC obtained and reviewed the documents provided by Ms Brailey but considered 
that the material did not provide evidence of any breach of the law by lenders.
27
 
According to ASIC, additional information posted on the BFCSA's website did not 
provide evidence of breaches of the laws administered by ASIC 'or indicate that any 
of the credit providers were aware of, encouraged, or inserted misleading information 
in application forms'.
28
 This current inquiry into the performance of ASIC provided 
                                              
25  Senate Economics References Committee, The post-GFC banking sector, November 2012, 
Parliamentary Paper No. 448/2012, p. 102. 
26  Senate Economics References Committee, The post-GFC banking sector, pp. 105 and 107–108. 
27  ASIC, Submission 45.1, pp. 28–29. 
28  ASIC, Submission 45.1, p. 29. 
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another opportunity for people who have suffered loss because of poor lending 
practices to recount their personal experiences. 
Submissions 
5.28 The committee received well over 160 submissions from people expressing 
concerns about the conduct of brokers and lending institutions. Most provided their 
own account of being caught up in poor lending practices and as a consequence losing 
their family home, life savings, credit rating and in many cases their health. 
A significant number of those who wrote to the committee were approaching 
retirement or had retired. Their experiences align with those cited in the CCLC 2003 
report and are consistent with the findings of APRA and the RBA around that time.  
5.29 According to the BFCSA, older retirees and pensioners have been the 
favoured target of white collar crime in Australia over the past two decades.
29
 
In respect of irresponsible lending, evidence before the committee supports this 
contention. For example, one couple, aged 71 and 64 years, had a loan of $900,000 
approved. They asked how was it possible for the bank to approve such an amount for 
'a 30-year term to people of our advanced age when we were Centrelink recipients 
earning $23,000 per annum combined'.
30
 Another couple in their late 60s received a 
loan of $360,000.
31
 These examples were not isolated cases of a person or retired 
couple receiving an annual income of below $35,000 obtaining a considerable loan 
over a 30-year term.
32
 One son noted that his father, on the pension of less than 
$30,000 a year and, in his opinion, losing his faculties, was 'granted a loan of 
$300,000 to invest in the stock market'.
33
 Another retired couple on the aged pension 
obtained a loan in 2007 of some $415,000 on a property and $209,000 on their home. 
They also received a $165,000 buffer loan 'to provide some portion of the deposits, 
and then provide a bit of capital to assist the loans'. In 2009, they got another loan 
from a different bank to refinance another property. They explained: 
We are now aged 75 and 68 and face the very real prospect of losing our 
home as we have no income apart from the pension. We have sold our 
shares, a car, spent our invested money and, where we were in a fairly 
sound financial position with assets over $1.5m we now have about 
$250,000 in equity and this is declining and we have no prospect of any 
improvement in our situation and find ourselves in an overwhelmingly 
frightening position.
34
 
                                              
29  Banking and Finance Consumers Support Association Inc, Submission 156, p. 5. 
30  Ms Ann Marie Delamere, Submission 3, p. 1. 
31  Name withheld, Submission 27. 
32  See also Submissions 19, 25, 27, 103, 178 and 265. 
33  Mr and Mrs Graeme and Nat Powell, Submission 8, p. 1. 
34  Name withheld, Submission 55, p. 1. 
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5.30 Another couple informed the committee that: 
…we are about to lose our family home and everything we have worked 
towards for over 40 years to secure a self-funded, comfortable retirement. 
Instead, we are broken mentally and physically and are now looking at a 
life of dependence on the old aged pension and an unnecessary drain on the 
public purse (the very thing we have worked our whole lives to avoid!).
35
 
5.31 In their words: 
We thought and trusted our 'Professional' Financial Planner, the Broker and 
the Lender on the understanding that they operated under strict legislation 
and Codes of Practice in 'a very stable Australian Banking System' as it was 
explained to us at the time. This misplaced trust has destroyed our lives.
36
 
5.32 The loan offers were directed at people who could borrow on the equity in 
their home or other assets. According to one couple who were 'spruiked into buying 
investment properties for their retirement': 
…we were 58 years old, we were asset rich and income poor after 40 years 
of hard work, we owned our factory premises our business and business 
equipment, savings and we had a small loan on our house. The banks said 
we could afford these low doc loans…These loans were never affordable, 
our income was exaggerated, our assets were overstated, our rental income 
was overstated. At 58 we got 30 year loans, we would have to work until 
we were 90 years of age, there has to be something wrong. We used our 
savings, everything we earned, buffer loans, selling our vehicles and 
equipment and after 7 years of stress we cannot pay anymore, it was a 
transferral of our wealth to the banks. This has happened all because we 
placed our trust in the banks, and ASIC protects the banks.
37
 
5.33 While consumers have a responsibility to attend to their own interests, 
a number of submissions spoke of unconscionable or misleading and deceptive 
conduct on the part of brokers and lenders. Welcome Australia Limited told the 
committee of the deliberate targeting of asset rich–income poor 'Australians with 
the intention of reaping financial gain that would invariably and knowingly lead to the 
loss of the victim's home'. It referred to campaigns directed at retirees, many of whom 
were living solely on the pension, enticing them to mortgage their homes 'while 
offering them the world'. According to Welcome Australia: 
The majority of these retirees have no idea as to the true picture of what is 
actually taking place, for once they sign that contract the money begins to 
flow, to the bankers, the financial institutions and the property speculators, 
                                              
35  Submission 67 (Confidential). 
36  Submission 67 (Confidential). 
37  Name withheld, Submission 93, p. 1.  
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while the investor/retiree begins to witness the dissolution of their asset, 
their family home.
38
 
5.34 Retired couples were not the only targets. One submitter stated that he was 
55 years old and had recently lost his job; even though the submitter indicated in 
writing that he was unemployed, he was successful in obtaining a $480,000 loan.
39
 
Another was a newly widowed 56-year-old woman who was not working, receiving a 
widow allowance and in poor health due to the stress and grief of losing a partner, 
when she refinanced her mortgage with a major bank. She later discovered that her 
income was recorded incorrectly in the loan application form and stated that, had she 
been earning that amount, she 'would never have had a need for a mortgage'. Arguing 
that the bank had taken advantage of, and defrauded, her, she wrote: 
Now aged 64, no longer a home owner for the first time in 34 years, robbed 
of a chunk of my rightful equity, not enough now to buy anything outright 
unless miles away from family friends…40 
5.35 A third case, but again only one of many, was a single mother who was 
studying and working part-time. She had been fortunate to have received an 
inheritance which had allowed her to buy her own home and to feel 'fairly secure'. 
She then explained: 
I was naive about investments and finances and believed what people with 
experience told me. I was told by a broker that I should invest in property, 
which I did with a low doc loan. I now clearly realise that I was never in a 
position to be able to pay back a loan as I did not have the income. I now 
have massive loans, no savings and have mortgaged my house. Life is now 
a struggle month to month to pay the loans.
41
 
5.36 A person on a disability pension, now forced to rent out her home and live at 
her daughter's house, was among the many who wrote to the committee.
42
 In some 
other instances, the banks approved unaffordable loans to people 'who could hardly 
read and write' or who had a poor command of the English language.
43
  
Disclosure 
5.37 Many of the people who wrote to the committee were clearly hard working 
Australians who over their lives had built up a nest egg so that they could support 
themselves comfortably in their retirement. As one couple remarked: 
                                              
38  Welcome Australia, Submission 230, p. 3.  
39  Name withheld, Submission 46, p. 1.  
40  Name withheld, Submission 158, p. 3. 
41  Ms Kirsty Torrens, Submission 180, p. 4. 
42  Name withheld, Submission 16.  
43  Submissions 52 (Confidential) and 183.  
Page 60  
 
We have both worked all our lives in good jobs, paid our bills and our taxes 
and raised our family, and had finally taken time out to relax when we were 
approached with this bank scam. However, we were completely sucked in 
by the scam and particularly when we were told the bank was the 
Commonwealth which we had always associated with being a good 
Australian citizen.
44
 
5.38 Many asked the same question—how could they find themselves in such a 
predicament? As one submitter put it: 
How did I [end] up with $530K debt when I had no income when Low 
Document Loan was approved to me…I will be facing a Bankruptcy as my 
house is only worth $430K.
45
 
5.39 For some, there was a definite sense that the banks had betrayed them. 
One submitter, who referred to herself as 'a loyal customer of 35 years', did not 
suspect that the bank would take advantage of long standing customers.
46
  
5.40 Another common complaint involved the failure to inform the borrower about 
the loan documents; important details of the loan structure; and how the loan 
arrangements would or could affect the borrower's circumstances.
47
 A most disturbing 
element, however, involved information contained in the loan application forms being 
deliberately fabricated after the applicant had signed the documents or in some cases 
signatures themselves being forged. Indeed, most of the people who wrote to the 
committee about being the victims of predatory lending also referred to forged loan 
application forms and the failure of the respective lending institution to verify the 
information.
48
 Falsified information included: inflated income details; over-valued and 
over-stated assets; fake Australian Business Numbers (ABNs); embellished 
employment details; and false income tax details. For example, one couple listed the 
anomalies in their application: 
Our actual total income has been changed and in fact overstated by almost 
$200,000, contrary to documented proof that was provided at the time, in 
the form of tax returns and other official documentation. 
No dependants included. In fact we have 2 children both at home, one at 
school. 
                                              
44  Name withheld, Submission 29, p. 1. 
45  Ms Hifumi Robbie, Submission 15, p. 1.  
46  Name withheld, Submission 158, p. 3. 
47  Submissions 15 and 52. 
48  Many submissions used their own experiences which taken together provided some sense of the 
nature and extent of the practice. For example, see Submissions 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 39, 48, 51, 52, 58, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 93, 101, 104, 105, 
131, 158, 171, 177, 183, 185, 195, 207, 218, 220, 221, 317, 320, 322, 351, 353, 378, 380, 381, 
382 and 401. 
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The actual value of our assets has been changed and in fact overstated, 
contrary to documented proof that was provided at the time. 
The actual cost of our expenses has been changed and in fact understated, 
contrary to documented proof that was provided at the time. 
The actual cost of our expenses has been changed and in fact understated, 
contrary to documented proof that was provided at the time, in the form of 
official documentation.
49
 
5.41 According to this couple, after they had signed and submitted the original 
documents to the bank, changes were made to the loan application form by person or 
persons unknown to them and without their authority, permission or knowledge.
50
 
A 73-year-old self-funded retiree and a permanent carer to his son provided another 
example that typified the range and extent of falsification of a loan application form: 
My income was altered from about $34,000 p.a. to $75,000 p.a.  
My 1999 Toyota worth about $6000 was valued at $25,000. 
My employment record was false. I had retired in 1995 and since then was 
never self-employed as a tutor as claimed falsely in the [loan application 
form]. 
My superannuation and $325,000 in non-existent shares were fabricated. 
I have never had an accountant or ABN as claimed. 
A Family Trust was fabricated and I have never been a sole trader. 
My home was overvalued by $100,000. 
I had signed a different declaration. I never signed the affordability 
statement/self-employment forms claimed to be held on file.
51
  
5.42 Again the submitter told the committee that the bank had 'never checked 
details with me to prove that I could service the loan'.
52
 Another couple told the 
committee that they were 'absolutely shocked' to find that their details had been 
'grossly falsified' and incomes 'hugely inflated'. They believed that the alterations were 
made by the bank after they had signed the forms. They explained further: 
We never had contact with the bank as this was done through a broker, if 
the lender had made just one phone call to us to check that these details 
were correct the loan would not have been approved and we wouldn't be in 
this position.
53
 
                                              
49  Name withheld, Submission 14, pp. 1–2. 
50  Name withheld, Submission 14, p. 2.  
51  Name withheld, Submission 60, p. 1. 
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5.43 For some, this practice was 'incomprehensible' and that no 'sane person would 
have continued with these loans had they been aware of the level of tampering 
required to get them approved'.
54
 One such submitter, who was receiving WorkCover 
payments, told the committee that her employment details had been altered but that 
the bank did not 'bother to collect any taxation returns to verify the income'.
55
 Another 
submitter informed the committee that the bank had never contacted his father's 
accountant to ascertain his financial position. He asked a question posed by so many 
others:  
Would it not be a financial provider's responsibility to perform at least the 
most basic due diligence before providing a large loan to anyone, let alone 
an 80 year old man?
56
 
5.44 One couple remarked that while the bank never phoned them or made 
inquiries into their ability to repay the loan, it did go 'to great lengths to get a 
valuation' on their property.
57
 Another could not understand why banks could 
undertake credit checks but not check income.
58
 
5.45 The committee suspects that there are many other people who, too 
embarrassed or disheartened by their experiences, have not come forward to reveal 
their own stories of improper lending practices. Indeed, the CCLC told the committee 
that it used to see such cases with 'alarming regularity'.
59
  
5.46 Many of the people who contacted the committee spoke of their sense of deep 
shame in succumbing to predatory lending. They felt humiliated and defeated by the 
whole business, which commonly had dragged on for years, draining their energy, 
damaging their personal relations as well as their physical and mental health. 
One submitter spoke of the indignity in finding herself in such desperate straits: 
I am ashamed of the position I am in because of bank approved low doc 
loans, there is fraud and forgery on our low doc loans, these loans ought to 
have been rejected, they were never affordable from the beginning, the 
depression, the stress, the fighting with my family, all our life savings gone, 
because of low doc loans.
60
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5.47 A 64-year-old pensioner who at first declined to accept an offer of a loan but 
subsequently was persuaded to borrow a much larger amount than initially requested 
summed up his situation: 
I am the victim of a Low Doc Loan which has sucked my life away and 
placed me on the brink of suicide. The poverty, sadness, despair and 
hopelessness which have been caused by my attempting to keep up 
repayments on a Low Doc loan which should never have been granted are 
real, cruel and horrible.
61
 
5.48 Another stated that, on reflection, he was encouraged to think beyond his 
circumstances. He realised that a more prudent decision, which he started with, 'was to 
purchase an affordable property but was convinced otherwise by an offer presented as 
a 'sensible and tax effective way to increase my superannuation'.
62
   
5.49 People spoke of having to live on the breadline just to try to repay the money 
after having worked all their lives; paid their bills and taxes; and raised their family.
63
 
The fear of losing their home was particularly alarming. One couple in their late 50s 
stated they 'should be planning retirement not worrying constantly if we will have 
a roof on our heads next week or next month'.
64
 One submitter, the sole carer of his 
son, feared that there would be no financial support or home for him.
65
  
5.50 Many borrowers who wrote to the committee also felt let down by ASIC. 
They believed that the system was unjust and consumer protection non-existent.
66
 
One submitter noted: 
I am left thinking that a consumer purchasing a domestic refrigerator has 
more consumer protection than a bank customer negotiating a loan over an 
asset that's taken a lifetime to acquire.
67
 
5.51 Another, who also argued that the Australian government appointed ASIC 
to protect consumer interests against misconduct by the financial institutions, stated 
that ASIC seems to be 'in bed with the banks'.
68
 In numerous cases, borrowers argued 
they had mounted a strong case of maladministration in lending but that when they 
contacted ASIC for assistance, it failed to act on their complaint in any effective 
way.
69
 Mr Timothy Chapleo voiced a common view: 
                                              
61  Name withheld, Submission 344, p. 1. 
62  Name withheld, Submission 46, p. 1.  
63  See for example, Submission 29.  
64  Name withheld, Submission 21, p. 2. See also Submission 27.  
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If they cannot be of any real value in policing rogue business and large 
organisations such as financial lenders and enforcing corrective measures 
then what value are they in a role that should see them being able to have 
some real ability to protect members of our society from unfair and bad 
elements in business.
70
 
5.52 The few cases cited so far only hint at the extent of the problem and the 
number of people who believe that they have been the victims of predatory lending. 
In many cases these people were desperate to stem the losses and salvage whatever 
they could from the financial mess they found themselves in and in particular to save 
or regain their family home. Their trust in the banking system has been shattered and 
their confidence in ASIC as an effective regulator destroyed. 
Loan application forms—anomalies and discrepancies 
5.53 The committee has recounted the stories of many borrowers who found 
themselves in dire circumstances because of irresponsible lending practices. 
In account after account, submitters expressed their shock at discovering that their 
forms had 'been manipulated to suit the purpose of the loan'.
71
  
5.54 The stories of altered loan application forms are hard to believe. The reported 
extent of these manufactured application forms raises many questions about why the 
practice was allowed to continue seemingly unchecked for so many years. As noted 
earlier, a 2003 ASIC-commissioned report referred to this matter as did both APRA in 
2003 and the RBA in 2004. Yet the practice continued for several more years until 
finally the states agreed to refer powers to the Commonwealth and new credit laws 
were passed. 
5.55 Many who obtained their loan through a broker indicated that the lender did 
not contact the borrower to check the details in the loan application form or take 
measures to verify the accuracy of the information. They claim that had the lender 
done so, it would not have approved the loan.
72
 Some were convinced that the banks 
were required by law to ensure the affordability of the loan: that it was the bank's 
responsibility to confirm that the information contained in the loan application form 
was accurate.
73
 One submitter stated that the bank 'did not protect us by 
communicating with us or checking any of the paperwork as a prudent lender would 
be expected to do...'
74
 
                                              
70  Mr Timothy Chapleo, Submission 7, p. 1. 
71  Name withheld, Submission 12, p. 2. See also Financial Ombudsman Service, Determination: 
Case number 323234, 17 December 2013, p. 3.  
72  Submissions 27, 28 and 29. 
73  Submissions 36 and 68. 
74  Name withheld, Submission 72.  
 Page 65 
 
5.56 In this regard, it should be noted that the 2003 Code of Banking Practice 
states clearly that before a bank offers or gives a credit facility, or increases an 
existing credit facility, it would 'exercise the care and skill of a diligent and prudent 
banker' in selecting and applying credit assessment methods and in forming an 
opinion about the borrower's ability to repay it.
75
  
Loan calculator 
5.57 It would appear that in most, but not all, cases before the committee, it was 
the broker who altered or inserted incorrect information in the loan application form. 
Many of the borrowers argued that the broker did not act on their behalf but was in 
effect the agent of the bank. In their view, the lender paid the broker, who often had 
access to the lender's computer systems, and 'was instructed by the lender on how 
to get various loans across the line and operated under the lender's systems and 
instructions'.
76
 Ms Brailey cited the use of a service calculator as evidence that brokers 
were indeed agents of the banks. She stated: 
I want to highlight that everything is predicated on a service calculator… 
All 11,000 brokers have a screen in front of them. They must put the base 
income in the top corner. At the bottom, it spits out a figure. The broker is 
then taught by the business development managers at bank level. They 
come out to your office and teach you how to use it. They ask the broker to 
write that figure on the loan application form in their own handwriting. So 
he or she writes $180,000, when the figure was $50,000. That, in a nutshell, 
is how that fudged figure emerges. 
The service calculator is a tool—it is a weapon.77 
5.58 ASIC argued, however, that ultimately the person who entered the incorrect 
information or tampered with the loan application form was the one responsible for 
the act: 
If an individual, whether a finance broker or a borrower, falsifies 
information in order to make a loan fit a calculator, it is the individual who 
has engaged in misconduct, not the person who has made the calculator 
available.
78
   
5.59 That is, the lender was not held responsible for the misuse of the calculator by 
the broker, even though the lender may have supplied the calculator and provided 
advice and instruction on its use.  
5.60 While the courts have tended to accept that brokers were not agents of the 
banks, the lending institutions do not come out of this period blameless. The banks 
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78  ASIC, Submission 45.1, p. 29. 
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and other lending institutions must have been aware of the dubious practices 
employed by some of the brokers arranging loans but chose to ignore them. Moreover, 
in some cases, the lending institutions clearly failed not only to exercise the skill and 
care of a diligent and prudent banker but were negligent even complicit in deceiving 
their customers. It should be noted that in its 2009 report on financial services and 
products, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
expressed some doubt about the degree to which banks acted 'ethically, appropriately, 
morally and prudently in their decisions to grant loans to some Storm customers'.
79
 
Committee view 
5.61 It would seem that on the face of the evidence, some lenders, irrespective of 
the loan application form, should not have approved certain loans: they were 
unaffordable and likely to fail. In other cases, again irrespective of the loan 
application form, the borrower should have taken care before signing the actual loan 
contract to make sure that the repayments were sustainable and would not jeopardise 
the assets securing the loan. 
5.62 Even so, the fact that this practice of manipulating information and faking 
signatures was allowed to continue for so long reflects badly on the brokers, the 
lenders and the regulator. It highlights the vulnerability of unwary and trusting 
borrowers, who were taken advantage of by unprincipled and self-interested brokers 
and lenders.  
ASIC's role and limitations 
5.63 Many submitters were of the view that the regulator did little to prevent 
predatory lending. ASIC informed the committee, however, that it made 'strategic use 
of the jurisdiction it did have'. It took court action; provided guidance to industry in 
areas where practice was poor; developed resources, tools and information for 
consumers of credit; and undertook surveillance activities where it saw problems in 
the industry. Moreover, ASIC endeavoured to understand the causes and effects.
80
 
For example, ASIC took the following action with regard to deceptive and misleading 
conduct: 
 2004—accepted an enforceable undertaking from mortgage broker Structured 
Solutions; 
 2006—took civil and criminal action against mortgage broker Tonadale Pty 
Ltd and Kelvin Sheers;  
 2006—obtained orders against mortgage brokers Sample & Partners Pty Ltd; 
and  
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 2009—took action against Whyte Corporation Pty Ltd.81 
5.64 As well as citing these few cases, ASIC drew attention to the difficulty of 
bringing the lender to account for the misconduct of the broker. It noted that ASIC 
intervened in the Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd matter to argue that, 'in the 
circumstances, the brokers should be considered agents of the lender and that the 
actions of the lender were unconscionable'. The courts did not accept ASIC's 
submissions. ASIC explained: 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal ultimately held 
that the broker was not the agent of the lender and, as a result, that the 
lender's conduct was not unconscionable, but that the relevant contracts 
were unjust under state legislation.
82
  
5.65 ASIC informed the committee that: 
The courts have found that, barring special circumstances, a mortgage 
broker is the agent of the borrower, and not the lender. This poses 
significant challenges for establishing unconscionable conduct where a 
broker is involved in the transaction, because: 
 the broker's actions are attributed to the borrower. For instance, if the 
broker has manipulated the loan application, unbeknownst to the 
borrower and the lender, the action is taken to be that of the borrower, 
and not the lender; and 
 the knowledge of a broker cannot necessarily be imputed to a lender. 
In these circumstances, as the lender typically deals with the broker 
and may not have any direct contact with the borrower, it is difficult 
to establish that the lender has sufficient knowledge of the borrower's 
circumstances for the lender's conduct to be unconscionable.
83
 
5.66 It appeared to ASIC that dishonest or fraudulent conduct had been 'more 
commonly found in relation to mortgage and finance brokers rather than lenders'.
84
 
The committee was told, however, that even where bank offers were alleged to have 
fabricated the loan forms, ASIC was reluctant to take action.
85
 In specific reference to 
the provision on unconscionable conduct in the ASIC Act, ASIC explained that as the 
provision covers a broad range of situations, the courts have 'generally applied it 
to address the most extreme classes of conduct in all cases'. It explained further: 
…the prohibition therefore does not provide a nuanced remedy that 
addresses the complexities of a transaction where problems may arise 
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because of the different interests of a consumer, a provider of an investment 
product, a lender and any finance broker.
86
 
5.67 ASIC noted further that borrowers who elected to pursue matters in court 
faced the same barriers as ASIC in establishing that a lender's conduct was 
unconscionable.
87
 Additional difficulties borrowers could face when taking action 
against the broker were also recognised by ASIC: 
Although a borrower may have a remedy against a finance broker for 
unconscionable conduct, the ability to obtain such a remedy, and value 
thereof, may be reduced in circumstances where the borrower is in financial 
hardship, due to an inability to repay the loan, and may be facing separate 
enforcement or legal action in relation to their home.
88
 
5.68 Thus, under the laws that existed before 2010, the people who were deceived 
by their brokers and abandoned by their lenders, had little prospect of success in 
the courts even though a lay person would clearly have understood the conduct of the 
broker or lender as unconscionable.   
Fraud 
5.69 As mentioned earlier, most complaints centred on the loan application form 
and the inaction by ASIC to deal with what the complainant considered was blatant 
fraud. In responding to alleged fraud occurring before the commencement of the 
National Credit Act, ASIC advised that the relevant state and territory police forces 
were the 'more appropriate authorities to investigate'. It noted that state and territory 
police had investigated some matters.
89
 ASIC stated further that it appeared that 
dishonest or fraudulent conduct had been 'more commonly found in relation to 
mortgage and finance brokers rather than lenders'.
90
  
Guidance, education and warning notices 
5.70 ASIC also informed the committee that it offered guidance for consumers 
through financial literacy material available on its website on managing credit and 
loans and debt. It also worked with industry, consumer groups and the external dispute 
resolutions schemes to improve practices. ASIC cited its work in fostering: 
 the development of a code of practice applicable to brokers and non-bank 
lenders; and  
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 enhancements to the codes of practice of both the banking industry and 
mutual sector.
91
  
5.71 As noted earlier, however, the banks already had a Code of Banking Practice 
requiring them to 'exercise the care and skill of a diligent and prudent banker'.
92
 
Committee view 
5.72 ASIC had available to it persuasive and less formal measures to stop 
unscrupulous practices. In this regard, the committee believes that ASIC did not take 
the opportunity to intervene in a far more direct and public way. It did not send a 
strong message regarding its concerns about irresponsible lending practices to lenders. 
Nor did ASIC do enough to alert Australian consumers to the risks associated with 
low doc loans, their vulnerability to irresponsible or even fraudulent activity, and of 
the need to protect their own interests. Such early and decisive publicity may have 
educated the community about ASIC's limited ability to protect their interests and 
minimised the damage. 
Individual complaints and ASIC's responsibility 
5.73 The CCLC argued that the role of a large national regulator is 'to respond to 
systemic and serious breaches of law within the industry that it regulates'. According 
to the CCLC, the expectation that ASIC would investigate and take action in 
complaints prior to the new credit laws was 'unreasonable': 
ASIC cannot be expected to resolve each individual consumer dispute, nor 
would it be in the public interest. ASIC should carefully consider how to 
respond to all potential breaches of the law, but should not necessarily 
undertake a formal investigation of every individual complaint that comes 
to its attention.
93
 
5.74 Furthermore, the CCLC highlighted that even in the face of 'extensive poor 
conduct' in lending in Australia, the laws then were limited and cases 'very difficult 
to win'.
94
 It stated: 
…prosecuting a case in relation to the conduct of an individual entity under 
the ASIC Act (without the credit laws) is a resource intensive exercise and 
will not necessarily result in the players being banned from the industry 
now. It will certainly not turn back time, nor enable consumers to keep 
assets they could not afford in the first place, or to retain assets used for 
security when the funds have been expended for the consumer's benefit.
95
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5.75 According to the CCLC, 'expending resources investigating conduct that has 
already been identified as a problem and has been the subject of major law reform is 
also clearly of limited value'.
96
 
5.76 The committee understands that ASIC's role between 2002 and 2010 when the 
new credit laws came into force was limited. The fact remains, however, and is a 
potent lesson for the regulator, that despite all the warning signs, ASIC remained in 
the background while borrowers found themselves exposed to unscrupulous lending 
practices and at risk of losing their homes and life savings. 
Conclusion 
5.77 The committee understands that ASIC receives a large number of complaints 
and reports of alleged wrongdoing and that it cannot possibly deal with such a large 
volume of individual complaints. But it also believes that individual complaints can 
provide early markers of a broader problem that ASIC should monitor and address. 
In this particular case of irresponsible lending, each single complaint was 
symptomatic of a more widespread and growing problem.  
5.78 The one compelling lesson to be learnt from the many cases of predatory 
lending that occurred between 2002 and 2010 is that ASIC must be more proactive 
and more assertive in stepping forward and exposing poor practices as soon as they 
surface. The committee concludes that ASIC should have done more to: 
 alert the public to the dangers of irresponsible lending and of the practices of 
some brokers that put their clients' interests at risk; 
 inform consumers about the need to protect their interests when entering into 
a loan: to make sure that it was affordable and warn them of the pitfalls of 
particular loans such as low doc loans; 
 educate the public about the importance of requesting and reading key 
documents and the dangers of signing incomplete documents;  
 identify that a systemic problem was emerging or already entrenched in the 
industry that needed decisive action to prevent further consumer harm;  
 take a stand against and investigate fraudulent activity such as the allegations 
of doctored loan documents including forged signatures and fabricated 
information, and of possible unconscionable conduct (enticing vulnerable 
people to take out unaffordable loans);  
 engage the banks in serious conversation about their duty to 'exercise the care 
and skill of a diligent and prudent banker', as stated  in subsection 25.1 of the 
Code of Banking Practice, and urge them to adhere to this undertaking;  
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 join forces with ASIC-approved external dispute resolution schemes to 
combat the misuse of loan service calculators and loan application forms, and 
any behaviour in the credit industry that went to unconscionable conduct; and 
 improve the way it conversed with borrowers who were seeking the 
regulator's assistance.  
5.79 Some recommendations that would have flowed naturally from the evidence 
presented in this chapter have been made redundant by recent reforms. There are 
others, however, that remain relevant but are developed and appear in later chapters. 
Noting ASIC's existing work on financial literacy, the committee, for the moment, 
makes the following recommendation.    
Recommendation 1 
5.80 The committee recommends that ASIC develop a multi-pronged 
campaign to educate retail customers about the care they need to take when 
entering into a financial transaction and where they can find affordable and 
independent advice or assistance when they find themselves in difficulties 
because of that transaction. 
New credit laws 
5.81 Due to the national credit reforms implemented in 2010, many of the 
unscrupulous practices identified in this chapter should now be unlawful and people 
involved in the provision of credit, including intermediaries such as brokers, subject to 
tighter regulation. In the following chapter, the committee considers the new credit 
laws and their effectiveness in protecting consumers from irresponsible lending 
practices.   
  
  
  
 
Chapter 6 
New credit laws 
6.1 There can be no doubt that between 2002 and 2010 improper, lax and even 
predatory lending practices were not uncommon. Indeed, these practices led to major 
reforms in the provision of credit. Effective from 1 July 2010, the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009 (National Credit Act) introduced for the first time in 
Australia stringent responsible lending obligations on credit providers and 
intermediaries such as finance brokers. 
6.2 In this chapter, the committee considers ASIC's new role and the effectiveness 
of the new laws in stamping out irresponsible lending practices. 
Background 
6.3 The committee's consideration of inappropriate lending practices between 
2002 and 2010 is not the first time that a parliamentary committee has recently 
identified irresponsible lending practices as a problem. It should be noted that the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJCCFS) 
received evidence about poor lending practices from many investors caught up in the 
failure of Storm Financial. Borrowers reported that they had signed blank loan 
applications and, following Storm's collapse, discovered they had taken out additional 
loans of which they were unaware. They also claimed copies of forms provided by the 
banks post-collapse show overstated income figures or asset values that led to grossly 
inaccurate representations of their capacity to repay the loans.
1
 Some of Storm's 
clients did not understand, or fully comprehend, that by borrowing against the equity 
in their family home they were, in effect, putting the ownership of their home at risk.
2
 
The PJCCFS found that practices by institutions lending for investment purposes were 
below community expectations and not subject to appropriate regulatory control.
3
  
Need for reform 
6.4 As noted in the previous chapter, from 2002 there had been a general and 
growing awareness in the industry of problems with inappropriate lending practices. 
This awareness led COAG to announce in March 2008 the need for a broad regulatory 
reform agenda that would include taking early action and progress on mortgage credit 
and advice, margin lending and non-deposit taking institutions.   
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6.5 The following month, the Productivity Commission found that a single 
national regulatory regime covering both mortgages and mortgage brokers would be 
'an efficient response to the need to address a number of malpractices on the part of 
certain brokers'.
4
 It recommended that responsibility for the regulation of credit 
providers and intermediaries providing advice on credit products ('finance brokers') 
should be transferred to the Australian government, with enforcement to be 
undertaken by ASIC. Amongst other things, the new national credit regime should: 
 cover all consumer credit products and all intermediaries providing advice on 
such products (including through electronic or other arms-length means); and 
 include a national licensing system for finance brokers, and a licensing or 
registration system for credit providers that would give consumers guaranteed 
access to an approved dispute resolution service.
5
 
6.6 In July 2008, COAG agreed to measures designed to provide better 
protections for financial consumers across Australia. It announced that the 
Commonwealth would assume responsibility for 'the regulation of trustee companies, 
mortgage broking, margin lending and non-deposit lending institutions as well as 
remaining areas of consumer credit'. It envisaged that: 
National regulation through the Commonwealth of consumer credit will 
provide for a consistent regime that extinguishes the gaps and conflicts that 
may exist in the current regime. The new regime is anticipated to introduce 
licensing, conduct, advice and disclosure requirements that meet the needs 
of both consumers and businesses alike. 
6.7 Over two years later, the Consumer Credit Protection Reform Package was 
introduced, which aimed to further this goal of a national, uniform approach to 
consumer credit laws. It included a national licensing scheme to overcome some of the 
current anomalies—a 'single standard and uniform regime for consumer credit 
regulation and oversight'.
6
  
New credit laws 
6.8 Under the new credit laws, credit licensees must comply with the responsible 
lending conduct obligations in chapter 3 of the National Credit Act. If the credit 
contract or consumer lease is unsuitable for the consumer, then credit licensees must 
not: 
 enter into a credit contract or consumer lease with a consumer; 
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 suggest a credit contract or consumer lease to a consumer; or  
 assist a consumer to apply for a credit contract or consumer lease.
7
  
6.9 These conduct obligations apply to credit providers—such as banks, credit 
unions and small amount lenders—and to finance companies, lessors under consumer 
leases and credit assistance providers such as mortgage and finance brokers. 
The legislation requires credit providers to make inquiries into whether the loan would 
meet the borrower's requirements and objectives. In other words, since the National 
Credit Act came into force in 2010, both lenders and brokers have 'a positive 
obligation to make inquiries into a borrower's financial situation (i.e. that the loan will 
not cause substantial hardship), and to verify that assessment'.
8
 For non-ADIs, 
the responsible lending obligations came into effect on 1 July 2010 and for ADIs on 
1 January 2011. Being banks and mutuals, ADIs had a pre-existing code of practice, 
which had a similar obligation. 
6.10 Much consultation and negotiation took place before the legislation was 
introduced. According to Mr Philip Field, Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), 
the process 'probably took the best part of two or three years of negotiations and 
roundtable meetings to get it into place and get people on board' including consumers, 
lenders, and brokers.
9
 Two parliamentary committees also scrutinised the proposed 
legislation that would introduce the credit reforms. Mr Raj Venga, Ombudsman, 
Credit Ombudsman Service (COSL), stated that the legislation was 'frankly, long 
overdue'.
10
 
6.11 The committee appreciates that this legislation had a fairly long incubation 
period and a definite purpose based on a clear understanding of the problems it was 
addressing. In addition, all stakeholders had the opportunity to engage in consultation 
and provide feedback. Even so, reforms of this nature, no matter how well-intended 
and considered, need time for their effectiveness to be tested.  
Views on its operation 
6.12 In early 2014, Mr Field informed the committee that the Financial 
Ombudsman had not seen a lot of cases arise yet and was 'just starting to get disputes 
around responsible lending under the National Credit Code'. He explained that FOS 
was a 'rear-view organisation' and people approached it sometimes many years after 
the original event. While his best guess was that the new legislation was 'working 
quite well', he would like the chance to see how the legislation settles down in terms 
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of changing lender behaviour. He suggested that it be given a fair opportunity to work 
and to see whether it actually solves the problem.
11
  
6.13 Mr Gerard Brody, Consumer Action Law Centre, informed the committee 
that, since the introduction of the licensing regime and particularly the responsible 
lending obligations, experience in the mainstream lending area indicated that practices 
had improved. He explained: 
Our experience is that the new obligations under the national credit law 
have improved processes and that we are not seeing the type of loss that 
people have experienced in the past, particularly because of the responsible 
lending obligations and the obligations upon credit providers to assess 
someone's capacity to repay and assess that a loan is in line with their 
objectives.
12
 
6.14 The CCLC agreed with the view that within mainstream lending there had 
been 'a noticeable tightening of lending procedures, particularly within the areas 
where the law applies'. It had certainly experienced a major reduction in the type of 
poor lending that was occurring beforehand. According to Mrs Karen Cox, CCLC, 
they 'get one-off cases where things have gone wrong' but: 
For consumer credit lending and residential investment lending we have not 
seen the sorts of cases seen in the past. That does not mean they do not 
exist, but we are not seeing them at all.
13
  
6.15 Mrs Cox stated further that the CCLC had started to win a couple of cases at 
the dispute resolution schemes on the interpretation of the law. In her view, however, 
it was 'very early days yet in terms of what the law actually means'. Noting that it was 
also very early days in terms of the compliance reaction, Mrs Cox anticipated that:  
…perhaps in time, we might see some people trying it on again. That would 
require ASIC to make sure that does not happen.
14
 
6.16 Thus, while those who commented on the new credit laws were generally 
satisfied that the legislation was working well, they still noted that the laws needed 
time to bed down before a more conclusive assessment of their effectiveness could be 
made. In this regard, Mr Field observed that, where someone has obtained a loan they 
could not afford, difficulties would generally become apparent within the first or 
second year, depending on the nature of the loan. He did note, however, that with 
self-funding, the borrowers would not realise problems until the self-funding ran out.
15
 
                                              
11  Mr Philip Field, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 24. 
12  Mr Gerard Brody, Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Action Law Centre, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 42. 
13  Mrs Karen Cox, Coordinator, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, pp. 41–42. 
14  Mrs Karen Cox, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 42.  
15  Mr Philip Field, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 24. 
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6.17 Challenging this point, Ms Brailey argued that some problems with lending 
practices remain. She explained that people who took out a loan in 2010 will 'not 
know that their loan is fraudulent, toxic, service calculators were used or the same 
model used by 85 per cent of the major lenders'. In her view, the contracts 'do not 
implode for five years'.
16
 She explained: 
The loans are being approved on the idea that you can afford it because you 
have some money in the bank. So where does that money come from? 
When the banks set up the loan, they give people $300,000 to go and buy a 
small property. It is usually $300,000 to $400,000—that is the average. But 
they give them an extra $50,000 and in some cases $100,000 to afford it. So 
they are paying the payments with the bank's own money, and the bank 
approves it. Then you go on for another two or three years like that and that 
is where the refinancing comes in, which ASIC has been going on about a 
bit. The commissioner said to me, 'Denise, I can assure you refinances are 
finished.' They are not. It is still going on. I was seeing it written only six 
months ago. It is still there.
17
 
6.18 Her concern was that when loans are taken out on the basis of the equity in an 
existing asset, the continuing refinancing and the continuing compounding interest on 
the debt increases the value of the loan which eats 'into the equity that is there'.
18
 
Possible gaps or weaknesses 
6.19 While in general the consumer advocacy centres recognised the benefits of the 
new legislation, they also identified a number of areas where there was a possible gap 
or weakness in the legislation. Mrs Cox from the CCLC noted that some areas of 
lending were not covered by the new law, including small business lending and other 
forms of non-residential investment lending.
19
 So, in her view, there were potential 
problems, but because the CCLC was not funded to assist people in this area, it would 
not necessarily receive evidence of what was going on there.
20
 Even so, the CCLC 
stated quite clearly its belief that: 
…investment lending has been instrumental in facilitating some spectacular 
investment failures with catastrophic results for many consumers, including 
self-funded retirees who have lost their homes and their life savings.
21
 
                                              
16  Ms Denise Brailey, President, BFCSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 47. 
17  Ms Denise Brailey, BFCSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 49. 
18  Ms Denise Brailey, BFCSA, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 50. 
19  Mrs Karen Cox, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 42. ASIC also made it 
clear that the National Credit Act does not apply to all borrowings by SMEs or to borrowings 
for investment purposes, other than investment in residential property. ASIC, answer to 
question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 2.  
20  Mrs Karen Cox, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, pp. 41–42. 
21  CCLC, Submission 194, p. 19. 
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6.20 The CCLC cited the Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) on credit for 
investment issued by the then Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation on 
21 December 2012. The draft legislation recognised that consumer losses due to 
misconduct were 'amplified where the consumer has borrowed to invest'. The RIS 
indicated that the current legislative framework did not adequately address misconduct 
in the credit to invest area. According to the RIS, ASIC's enforcement activity was 
'ineffective due to a combination of regulatory and enforcement gaps, the prohibitive 
cost and inefficiency of enforcement action and the unlikeliness of targeted 
enforcement action by ASIC resulting in behavioural change in the industry as a 
whole'.
22
 
6.21 The previous chapter referred to cases where people borrowed to invest and 
found themselves in difficulty. Also, as noted in the previous chapter, as early as 2003 
there were warnings about brokers arranging for borrowers to declare, incorrectly, that 
a loan was for investment rather than personal use (with the result that the consumer 
lost statutory protections provided under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code). 
Clearly, this is an area that requires careful monitoring.  
Fringe areas of lending  
6.22 Currently, the Consumer Action Law Centre's concern and focus is on the 
fringe areas of the marketplace, such as payday lending and consumer leases, also 
known as rent to own products. It highlighted concerns about systemic problems with 
compliance in some of these areas.
23
 For example, the Centre noted that property 
spruikers were not regulated and not licensed by ASIC. It suggested that 'there may 
well be commission arrangements between spruikers and certain brokers or lenders 
who encourage individuals to purchase property (with or without a loan) that are 
inappropriate'. The Centre cited the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee's 
2008 report that made a raft of recommendations including that the Australian 
government regulate property investment advisers under its financial services laws in 
the same way as financial advisers.
24
  
6.23 Mr Brody also drew attention to concerns and consumer complaints about 
businesses established purportedly to help consumers in financial difficulty that 
charge significant fees. He explained that such businesses are termed the 'for-profit 
financial difficulty' businesses and target people who are in financial difficulty, 
                                              
22  Treasury, Regulation Impact Statement: Credit for investment purposes, December 2012, p. 1. 
23  Mr Gerard Brody, Consumer Action Law Centre, Proof Committee Hansard, 
20 February 2014, p. 42.  
24  Consumer Action Law Centre, Additional Information 8, pp. 1–2. The report cited is Parliament 
of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into property investment advisers and marketeers, 
Final report, April 2008 www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/lawrefrom/ 
property_investment/final_report.pdf. One recommendation called for the Victorian 
Government to propose to the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs that the Australian 
government amend the ASIC Act and chapter 7 of the Corporations Act so advice about direct 
property investment is included in the financial services regime. 
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ostensibly to help them.
25
 According to Mr Brody, this type of business model does 
'not fit neatly within current regulations or ASIC's purview, but they are related to 
issues within ASIC's responsibility'. He stated: 
An effective regulator needs to be one that has the power to identify and act 
on new forms of consumer detriment in financial services…and we think 
that if the regulator's tools were improved this could improve the overall 
performance of ASIC.
26
 
… 
One of the problems in raising those sorts of issues with ASIC is that within 
the current regulatory framework they do not neatly fit within ASIC's 
responsibility. They are not providing a regulated service, and that can 
mean there are challenges in getting action on those sorts of problems. To 
the extent that it can I think ASIC assists us in understanding and raising 
these issues as far as possible. We have recently had a roundtable with them 
on that exact business model. But there is a limitation in the scope of what 
ASIC can do in relation to those businesses because of the regulations.
27
 
6.24 Mr Brody informed the committee that the Consumer Action Law Centre was 
seeing a number of businesses adopting the 'for-profit financial difficulty' type of 
model and was of the view that it was a 'growing sector'.
28
 
6.25 As an example of this type of practice, a committee member cited a recent 
case that had come to his attention, where: 
…a farm was in financial trouble and consultants came along and said, 
'We'll refinance you. Pay us $40,000 and we will get the money.' The 
$40,000 was squeezed out of every last bit of juice and there was never any 
loan…29  
6.26 Mrs Cox informed the committee that the CCLC had dealt with a very similar 
situation involving a smaller amount. She explained: 
There was a woman who had a range of debts after her marriage broke 
down, and they charged her a percentage—which amounted to somewhere 
between $11,000 and $17,000 in her particular case—to negotiate with her 
creditors. She could not raise that money, so they said, 'That's fine; we'll set 
up a direct debit arrangement and you can start paying us off.' By the time 
we came along, I think she had paid a fair amount on the direct debit 
arrangement. Absolutely nothing had been done, and her financial position 
was deteriorating. I assume that either they never intended to do anything or 
they were waiting till she had paid the entire fee before they began. We 
                                              
25  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 43. 
26  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 40.  
27  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 44. 
28  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 43. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 44. 
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quickly became involved and were able to resolve a lot of her issues with 
the help of another financial counselling agency, and in that particular case 
we managed to argue to get her out of the money that she had also paid.
30
  
6.27 Mrs Cox observed that the person who was supposed to assist the individual 
in debt in the above example previously had a financial services licence but was now 
banned from providing financial services. She noted that there was absolutely nothing 
that could be done about this new activity.
31
 According to Mrs Cox, in order to be 
captured by the credit regulation, a person has 'to suggest that someone either take out 
or stay in a particular credit product'. She explained further: 
The people providing such advice 'would argue—and, some legal advice 
suggests, successfully—that they are not actually suggesting any particular 
credit product; they are actually offering to negotiate with your creditors, 
and that is not caught as a credit activity or a financial service'.
32
 
6.28 In her experience, such practices were on the rise.33 Mrs Cox also noted that 
the CCLC was still dealing with complaints in particular areas such as payday lending 
where it was 'seeing a lot of problems' including where people were 'blatantly 
avoiding the law'. She indicated that although ASIC had taken action and was working 
on some cases in that area, the Centre was 'usually frustrated because we want it go 
faster'. According to Mrs Cox: 
Certain other members of the industry who believe they are complying and 
are upset that others are not being hung out to dry also express that 
frustration. Even those who believe they are complying in that sector we do 
not always agree with their interpretation of the law.
34
 
6.29 Mrs Cox noted that it was very important for ASIC to 'use the new tools that 
they have got under the new law to do whatever they can to actually prevent the type 
of behaviour that occurred between 2002 and 2010 from happening in the future'.
35
 
Clearly, this area of regulating the provision of credit services still requires close 
monitoring to ensure that the laws are providing the required level of consumer 
protection and to identify gaps that exist and should be covered by the credit laws. 
ASIC's assessment 
6.30 ASIC informed the committee that the National Credit Act had 'largely 
addressed the regulatory issues and market problems prevalent before 2010', although, 
in its view, 'it may be too early to make a final assessment of how effectively it has 
                                              
30  Mrs Karen Cox, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, pp. 44–45. 
31  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, pp. 44–45.  
32  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 44. 
33  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 45.  
34  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 42.  
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, pp. 40–41. 
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been done.
36
 Nonetheless, when asked whether there were any areas of concern 
emerging as the new credit laws bed down, ASIC cited two substantive issues. 
The first was concern that there could be 'a lack of competitive neutrality' where 
players offered products that were 'functionally similar to regulated products but 
without having to meet, for example, the licensing and responsible obligations through 
the National Credit Act'. ASIC explained that there were two different contexts in 
which this might occur: 
 mainstream products, where the lack of regulation may be the result of 
innovations in product design (such as peer-to-peer lending); and  
 avoidance activity on the fringes, where lenders and brokers deliberately 
change their business models and structures to fall outside the law or aspects 
of the law.
37
 
6.31 ASIC informed the committee that the government had recently taken steps 
to address some avoidance practices. It had done so 'by circulating draft regulations 
to close some gaps in the law being exploited by payday lenders and signalling a 
review of the exemption for indefinite and short-term leases in the National Credit 
Act'. ASIC observed, however, that:  
…given that the possible structures for avoiding the cap on costs are limited 
only by the ingenuity of those advising possible avoiders, the Government 
could consider a general anti-avoidance provision that sought to deter 
entities making repeated changes in business models to continue avoiding 
their obligations under the National Credit Act (rather than addressing each 
model as it emerges after the event).
38
 
6.32 In December 2012, Treasury consulted on proposals for changes relating to 
investment lending, peer-to-peer lending, small business lending, short-term and 
indefinite-term leasing, and a number of anti-avoidance mechanisms. ASIC stated that 
to the extent 'the Government identifies gaps or problems in relation to these topics 
they have not been addressed'.
39
 
6.33 The increase in the number of businesses that charge consumers fees to repair 
their credit records, or to pursue claims through the EDR schemes, was the second 
source of concern for ASIC. It explained: 
These companies often charge high fees for services that would otherwise 
be provided free of charge by the dispute resolution services, and may 
exacerbate the consumer's financial difficulties where they pursue 
unmeritorious claims that delay or impede the resolution of their position. 
                                              
36  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 1. 
37  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 3. 
38  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 3. 
39  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 1. 
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6.34 ASIC considered that the implementation of the responsible lending 
obligations would continue to be an area of review as the obligations are expressed 
in general terms, which allows for significant divergence in practices across the 
industry.
40
  
Committee view 
6.35 Since 2002, and undoubtedly well before, some unscrupulous people in the 
financial services industry exploited the inadequate regulation of consumer credit. 
Early indications suggest that the new credit laws have been effective in stamping out 
the predatory lending practices that existed between 2002 and 2010, though most 
submitters agreed that the laws need time to settle down before a definitive assessment 
of their effectiveness can be made.   
Conclusion 
6.36 The inescapable message coming out of the 2002–2010 period when 
irresponsible, even predatory, lending went largely unregulated and unchecked is that 
early indications of a problem must be attended to promptly and, where possible, 
stamped out before it takes root. This may mean simply enforcing existing laws or 
campaigning for new ones.  
6.37 New credit laws are now in place and appear to be working effectively, 
although there are suggestions that some people are operating on the margins of the 
legislation in an endeavour to circumvent the law. Indeed, a number of witnesses, 
well-positioned to comment, identified areas on the fringes of mainstream lending that 
still expose consumers to risks, such as the 'for-profit financial difficulty' businesses. 
It is important for ASIC to match the ingenuity of these operators. Additionally, ASIC 
needs to be ready to take on the challenge created by a constantly changing industry 
with the creation of new products and business models—some deliberately designed 
to exploit legal loopholes. It is also important for ASIC to remain alert and receptive 
to any signs of poor or irresponsible lending practices, and when they emerge, it must 
educate consumers of the dangers; act quickly where it has the power to do so; and 
actively lobby for changes if the laws are deficient.  
6.38 In the previous chapter, the committee recommended that ASIC consider 
adopting a multi-pronged campaign to educate retail customers. The campaign should 
focus on the care consumers need to take when entering into a financial transaction 
and where they can find assistance and affordable and independent advice when they 
find themselves in difficulties because of that transaction. In light of this chapter's 
discussion on the new credit laws, the committee builds on this recommendation. 
                                              
40  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 3. 
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Recommendation 2 
6.39 As part of the multi-pronged campaign (see Recommendation 1), the 
committee recommends that ASIC actively encourage consumers to report any 
suspected unscrupulous conduct related to consumer credit. 
Recommendation 3 
6.40 The committee recommends that as the national credit reforms 
introduced in 2010 bed down, ASIC should: 
 carefully monitor the implementation of the new laws giving particular 
attention to activities that may fall outside the legislation but which pose 
risks to consumer interests; 
 ensure that it acts quickly to alert consumers to likely dangers and the 
government to any problems that need to be addressed; and 
 build capacity to monitor and research lending practices and to be 
prepared to launch marketing and education strategies should poor 
practices begin to creep back into the industry. 
  
  
  
 
Chapter 7 
Financial Ombudsman Service and the 
Credit Ombudsman Service 
7.1 In many instances, consumers took their complaints about the conduct of 
brokers or lenders to one of ASIC's approved external dispute resolution (EDR) 
schemes. According to many submitters, however, they were dissatisfied or 
disappointed with the management of their case by the relevant EDR scheme.
1
 Based 
on personal experience, they found that the EDR process did not do 'nearly enough 
to help distressed people who had turned to them for help'.
2
 
7.2 In this chapter, the committee examines the role and functions of the two 
ASIC-approved EDR schemes that have a pivotal role in dealing with complaints 
about financial services and credit institutions.  
Background 
7.3 Under statute, holders of credit licenses and AFS licenses are required to be 
members of an ASIC-approved EDR scheme as a condition of their licence.
3
 
EDR schemes provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that operates 
outside the court system. Their specific functions within the broader financial services 
and new national credit regulatory regimes are to provide: 
 a forum for consumers and investors to resolve complaints (or disputes) that is 
quicker and cheaper than the formal legal system; and 
 an opportunity to improve industry standards or industry conduct and 
to improve relations between industry participants and consumers/investors.
4
 
7.4 Currently, two ASIC-approved EDR schemes operate—the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) and the Credit Ombudsman Service (COSL).
5
 
The benefits for borrowers seeking redress through the EDR process include: 
 free access; 
                                              
1  See for example, Submissions 26 and 84. 
2  See for example, Name withheld, Submission 35, p. 1.  
3  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Submission 194, p. 17.  
4  See ASIC, Regulation Impact Statement, Dispute resolution requirements for consumer credit 
and margin lending', May 2010, paragraph 42. 
5  The current regulatory architecture of the financial services complaints resolution system has its 
origins in the 1997 Wallis Inquiry, which identified the need for low-cost means to resolve 
disputes. See Financial Ombudsman Service, Submission 193, p. 3. 
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 the EDR schemes' broad remit to make decisions based on the additional 
factors of what is fair and reasonable and good industry practice;  
 resolutions may include financial compensation; and 
 decisions bind the lender but not the borrower.
6
 
7.5 An EDR scheme means that consumers do not have to pursue a formal, 
expensive and often daunting process through the courts.
7
 In summary, the 
EDR framework is intended to provide a way for complaints between financial 
services or credit providers and their clients to be resolved in a quick, effective and 
efficient way that is informal and does not follow the strict legal rules of evidence that 
apply in the courts.
8
 They also free up ASIC and allow it to concentrate on the most 
serious transgressions and system-wide problems that have much broader implications 
for the financial services industry and consumers. As the Consumer Action Law 
Centre observed: 
Fewer demands will be made of ASIC's resources where consumers have 
effective, fair and accessible options to resolve dispute with business 
themselves.
9
  
7.6 Thus FOS and COSL should be a vital part of any successful consumer 
protection framework. Indeed, Mr Brody, Consumer Action Law Centre, noted that 
the 'existence of free and independent external dispute resolution schemes is probably 
one of the greatest advances in consumer protection we have had in the last 
20 years'.
10
  Mrs Cox, Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc (CCLC), endorsed 
the view that the EDR schemes have a critical, valuable and important role. She noted 
that 'being able to send people to those schemes has been an amazing advance in 
consumer protection'. According to Mrs Cox: 
…the fact that we can now send people to a scheme and have the issue 
looked at after they have received a statement of claim is so valuable to the 
ordinary person out there who may have hit a bad patch and be struggling to 
pay a home loan, or who may have been completely done over in some sort 
of circumstance where they would have no hope of ever realistically 
approaching a court about it.
11
 
                                              
6  See ASIC, Regulation Impact Statement: Dispute resolution requirements for consumer credit 
and margin lending, May 2010, paragraph 57 and ASIC, Submission 45.1, p. 27. 
7  COSL, Submission 418, p. 1. 
8  Mr Raj Venga, Chief Executive Officer and Ombudsman, COSL, Proof Committee Hansard, 
20 February 2014, p. 17 
9  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 9. 
10  Mr Gerard Brody, Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Action Law Centre, 
Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, pp. 42–43. 
11  Mrs Karen Cox, Coordinator, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 43. 
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Financial Ombudsman Service 
7.7 In 2008 three schemes—the Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman, the 
Financial Industry Complaints Service and the Insurance Ombudsman Service merged 
to form FOS. FOS now has more than 16,000 members including banks, credit unions, 
building societies, credit providers, general and life insurance companies and brokers, 
superannuation providers, fund managers, mortgage and finance brokers, financial 
planners, stockbrokers, investment managers, friendly societies, time share operators 
and authorised representatives.
12
 They come under two broad categories: 
 Licensees—financial services providers (FSPs) that hold an AFS licence or a 
credit licence; and 
 Authorised Credit Representatives—businesses that represent a licensee.13  
Credit Ombudsman Service 
7.8 COSL has about 17,000 members comprising mainly finance brokers, 
non-bank lenders, mutual banks, credit unions, building societies, time share 
operators, small amount short term lenders, debt purchases and some financial advice 
firms. Members are drawn mainly from the 'small end of town' with more than 
90 per cent being sole traders or small businesses of less than five individuals. 
COSL informed the committee that most 'pay day lenders', time share operators and 
debt purchasers in Australia are members.
14
 
Criticisms of FOS and COSL 
7.9 In respect of ASIC's role in relation to the EDR schemes, a number of 
submitters held that ASIC, as the regulator, had abrogated its duty.
15
 One submitter 
suggested that ASIC failed to set proper guidelines for FOS and COSL and to use its 
powers to protect consumers where fraud and misrepresentation was 'so blatantly 
obvious to any outsider'.
16
 Another suggested that ASIC had failed to assess whether 
the EDR framework was working well.
17
  
7.10 Concerns about the EDR schemes' performance related to matters such as 
delays; perceived lack of independence (merely mouthpieces for the lenders); 
confusion between the responsibilities and jurisdiction of FOS and COSL; their failure 
to investigate fraud; the ceiling on compensation; and time restrictions because of 
statute of limitations. 
                                              
12  FOS, www.fos.org.au/members/search-for-members (accessed 31 January 2014).  
13  FOS, www.fos.org.au/members/search-for-members (accessed 31 January 2014). 
14  See for example, COSL, Submission 418. 
15  See for example, Submission 43.  
16  Name withheld, Submission 26, p. 1.  
17  Name withheld, Submission 184, p. 5. 
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Timeliness  
7.11 A number of submitters referred to the time taken by the EDR schemes 
to manage the process, for example to appoint a case manager.
18
 They highlighted the 
critical importance of dealing with complaints expeditiously: that delay posed a risk 
for customers, especially those falling behind in repayments and under threat of losing 
their property. One submitter suggested that the current 'ordinary wait time' was two 
years.
19
 The Consumer Action Law Centre also raised concern, shared by members of 
the industry, about delays.
20
  
7.12 FOS acknowledged that a theme through some of the submissions was the 
need to improve the speed with which it deals with complaints. In its submission, 
FOS informed the committee that in 2013 it accepted and resolved some 24,000 
disputes across its jurisdictions in banking, general insurance and life insurance and 
investments. It also dealt with 230,000 telephone inquiries from members of the 
general public.
21
 According to FOS, it had seen 'a dramatic increase in the volume and 
complexity of disputes', which had affected its responsiveness.
22
 FOS accepted that 
the number of disputes and the time taken to deal with them was a key challenge for 
the organisation. It informed the committee that it had been working hard to improve 
the timeliness of its dispute process, which remained at the forefront of its efforts 
to improve its performance.
23
  
7.13 COSL explained that the time it takes to deal with a complaint depends on a 
number of different factors, including: 
 the complexity of the complaint, including the evidence required to support 
each party's assertions, 
 the need to allow each party the opportunity to respond to the other's 
statements and evidence, and 
 the fact that it may need to extend the time within which a response is 
required.
24
 
7.14 According to COSL, within 24 to 48 hours of receiving a complaint, it writes 
to the consumer and the financial services provider to inform them that it has received 
the complaint. It provides them with the contact details of the case manager 
                                              
18  See Submissions 12, 23, 32, 179, 184 and 295. 
19  Name withheld, Submission 217, p. 1. 
20  Mr Gerard Brody, Consumer Action Law Centre, Proof Committee Hansard, 
20 February 2014, pp. 42–43. 
21  Mr Shane Tregillis, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 17. 
22  FOS, Submission 193, p. 1. 
23  Mr Shane Tregillis, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 26.  
24  COSL, Submission 418, p. 8. 
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responsible for dealing with the complaint. The case manager generally has full 
carriage of a complaint unless it is referred to the Ombudsman for determination at the 
end of the COSL process. 
7.15 The overall workload also affects the time it takes COSL to deal with a 
complaint. COSL noted that with the number of complaints increasing year on year, 
it had implemented a number of initiatives to improve its timelines. To demonstrate 
that these initiatives had already yielded some positive results, COSL compared 
statistics for the 2012–13 financial year to the previous financial year, which showed 
there had been: 
 an increase in complaints closed within a three month period from 
56.8 per cent to 60.4 per cent; and  
 an increase in complaints closed within a six month period from 76.2 per cent 
to 79.2 per cent. 
7.16 COSL informed the committee that these results were achieved despite 
receiving a 28 per cent increase in complaints in the 2012–13 financial year, on top of 
the 38 per cent increase in the previous financial year. According to COSL, it would 
continue to look for ways to improve its timelines, which remained a top priority, 
'without compromising the quality' of its decision-making.
25
 While Mrs Cox of the 
CCLC cited some major problems with delay, she was hopeful that the schemes were 
working to resolve these issues.
26
 
Independence of the EDR schemes 
7.17 A number of submitters were under the impression that the EDR schemes 
lacked independence and served merely as mouthpieces for the lenders—'a lapdog to 
the banks'.
27
 Some submitters argued that a conflict of interest was clear as the 
financial services providers pay for the schemes; have a large influence on policy; 
'make the rules'; and have ready access to the schemes. For example, one submitter 
suggested that he became aware that FOS was: 
…funded by the banks! So what possibility is there of a person like me 
being properly represented through such an Ombudsman service?
28
 
7.18 Borrowers also cited what appeared to them to be: 
 collusion between FOS and the banks to stall the supply of loan application 
forms; 
 banks not held to time frames that FOS imposed; and 
                                              
25  COSL, Submission 418, p. 8. 
26  Mrs Karen Cox, Coordinator, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 43. 
27  Name withheld, Submission 35. See also Submissions 48, 156 and Dr Evan Jones, 
Submission 295. 
28  Name withheld, Submission 77. 
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 overly generous treatment toward the banks in allocating time for them 
to supply materials but threatening the claimant with loss of their claim should 
they fall short of imposed inequitable time frames.
29
 
Funding of the external dispute resolution schemes 
7.19 FOS understood the strong likelihood that aggrieved consumers may perceive 
an industry-based dispute resolution scheme funded by the industry as inherently 
biased.
30
 Mr Shane Tregillis, Chief Ombudsman, FOS, explained that FOS was partly 
financed through membership fees for its industry members, which account for around 
20 per cent of FOS's funding. Case fees provide the bulk of FOS's funding; that is, 
FOS charges the financial institution a fee based on the stage at which a dispute 
is resolved.
31
 
7.20 Mr Tregillis stated that the payment system was largely a user-pays system 
structured so that clearly there were incentives for financial institutions:  
 not to bring complaints to FOS, because they pay a fee based on the number 
of complaints; and  
 to seek to resolve that complaint early in the process through agreement rather 
than going through our later stages.
32
 
7.21 COSL's funding is also made up of a combination of membership and 
complaint fees levied on financial services providers. It noted that with about 17,000 
members, most of its funding was derived from membership fees rather than 
complaint fees. It noted that the complaints it received and dealt with only accounted 
for about three per cent of its members: the overwhelming majority of its members did 
not pay any complaint fees. It could not understand the reason for submissions 
suggesting that its independence was compromised by the fact that it received 
complaint fees from financial services providers.
33
 
Board membership and industry 
7.22 The composition of the EDR schemes' boards also drew criticism from some 
people who had their case managed by FOS or COSL. One submitter told the 
committee that the boards were made up of 'the who's who of the banking and 
financial industry along with their lawyers/solicitors of which some are the very ones 
who take the borrowers to court to claim their family homes'.
34
 Another remarked that 
                                              
29  See Submissions 76, 77, 184, 217 and 259. 
30  FOS, Submission 193, p. 10.  
31  Mr Shane Tregillis, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 28.  
32  Mr Shane Tregillis, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 28. 
33  COSL, Submission 418, p. 6. 
34  Name withheld, Submission 43. 
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it seemed 'strange that bank employees are board members of FOS'.
35
 In their view the 
conflict of interest was obvious. 
7.23 FOS cited a number of inbuilt mechanisms that 'ensure that the schemes 
operate independently and with fairness and accountability', including requirements 
for: 
 an independent decision making processes—to preserve the Ombudsman's 
independence, the board does not interfere with decisions or get involved in 
the detail of cases which come before the Ombudsman; and 
 an oversight body with equal representation of consumers and industry 
together with an independent chair.
36
  
7.24 COSL acknowledged that some submitters expressed reservations about 
industry representatives being on its board. In this regard, however, it noted that ASIC 
'requires a board of an EDR scheme to comprise an equal number of consumer and 
industry representatives and an independent chair.
37
 It informed the committee that:  
The COSL Board is responsible for overseeing the operations of the Credit 
Ombudsman Service, for ensuring independent decision making by the 
Credit Ombudsman and staff of COSL, and for preserving the 
independence of the scheme and the COSL dispute resolution processes.
38
 
7.25 Indeed, the relevant ASIC regulatory guide requires FOS and COSL to be 
independent of the industry or industries that provide their funding and constitute their 
respective membership. The guide explains that such a requirement means that the 
decision-maker(s) and/or the staff of the scheme are: 
 entirely responsible for the handling and determination of complaints or 
disputes; 
 accountable only to the scheme's overseeing body (which as noted above 
should comprise an equal number of consumer and industry representatives 
and an independent chair); and 
 adequately resourced to carry out their respective functions.
39
 
Committee view 
7.26 The funding arrangements for the EDR schemes are appropriate and should 
not in any way compromise their independence. The equal number of consumer 
                                              
35  Mr Neville Ledger, Submission 347. 
36  Submission 193, p. 10 and FOS, www.fos.org.au/about-us/our-board (accessed 15 May 2014). 
37  Submission 418, p. 6. 
38  Submission 418, p. 7. 
39  ASIC, Approval and oversight of external dispute resolution schemes, Regulatory Guide 139, 
June 2013, paragraphs 139.89 and 139.94. 
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representatives on the boards should also provide assurances that the schemes are 
independent of industry. That said, the committee encourages FOS and COSL to do 
their utmost to ensure that consumers are aware of the safeguards in place designed 
to secure their independence and are conscious of the need to maintain their 
reputations as independent and fair schemes. 
Transparency 
7.27 One submitter noted that the financial service provider or bank involved in 
any serious systemic issue is not identified in any required quarterly reporting to ASIC 
or named publicly. He argued that 'consumer information fundamental to the 
protection of consumer rights is purposely withheld from every member of the 
public'.
40
 Likewise, Mr Peter Mair observed that while FOS's determinations are 
published, it does not identify institutions at fault. He stated further that apparently 
FOS is able to order refunds only to the policyholders that complain personally and 
'does not make any open public comment on the character of malpractices it 
discovers'. In his assessment—'a reticence that protects the secrecy'.41  
7.28 It should be noted that ASIC requires the EDR schemes' complaints and 
disputes handling and other procedures to accord with the principles of natural 
justice.
42
 COSL noted: 
To ensure parties to a complaint are accorded procedural fairness, we 
provide written reasons for any decision we make about the merits of a 
complaint and provide the parties with a reasonable opportunity to respond 
to our decision. 
To ensure the soundness and integrity of our decision-making process, all 
written decisions are reviewed internally by senior case managers before 
being issued. If a consumer seeks a (further) review of the decision, COSL's 
Head of Dispute Resolution will undertake a further review. 
Almost all our case management staff are legally qualified, given that 
regard for relevant law is a key benchmark in our decision-making 
processes.
43
 
7.29 FOS informed the committee that it deals with complaints on an individual 
basis working with the parties through cooperation. FOS publishes its findings 
to provide general information to assist the public understand its findings and general 
values but does not name the institution or the applicant.
44
 Mr Tregillis explained: 
                                              
40  Name withheld, Submission 192. 
41  Mr Peter Mair, Submission 2, p. 2. 
42  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 139, June 2013, paragraph RG139.110. 
43  COSL, Submission 418, p. 7. 
44  Mr Shane Tregillis, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 25. 
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If you started to name individual entities in determinations, I think we 
would become a much more court-like, complicated, contested process.
45
  
7.30 He noted that 'the essence of EDR was to be quick, easy and accessible, and 
to resolve most disputes by agreement'. According to Mr Tregillis, although the EDR 
schemes work well, there are always areas for improvement. He considered that the 
'history of FOS, COSL and the other schemes is that we have always had to relook 
and innovate'.
46
 
7.31 The Consumer Action Law Centre noted that the schemes could be 
encouraged to 'provide more effective guidance to complainants from both sides about 
how disputes are resolved'.
47
 Another submitter noted people who go to FOS should 
understand clearly that, although it has ombudsman in its title, it is a dispute 
resolution body and cannot put the complainant's case together for them.
48
   
Accountability and performance 
7.32 FOS and COSL must also adhere to core principles that underpin 
accountability. They are required to report any systemic, persistent or deliberate 
conduct to ASIC. According to ASIC, serious misconduct may include 'fraudulent 
conduct, grossly negligent or inefficient conduct, and wilful or flagrant breaches of 
relevant laws'.
49
 ASIC's understanding of 'systemic' relates to matters that 'have 
implications beyond the immediate actions and rights of the parties to the complaint or 
dispute'.
50
 ASIC recognised that some systemic issues could involve the conduct of 
multiple scheme members and may 'include general trends that might not implicate 
individual scheme members, but might reflect, for example, the need for a change in 
our regulatory guidance'.
51
 COSL explained: 
As a condition of ASIC's ongoing approval of COSL as an approved EDR 
scheme, we are required to report to ASIC, on a quarterly basis, any 
systemic issues or serious misconduct in relation to FSPs that we may 
identify while dealing with a complaint.
52
 
7.33 Consistent with this view, COSL noted that a systemic issue may arise out of 
a single complaint that has implications which extend beyond the parties to the 
particular complaint, or from multiple complaints which are similar in nature. 
                                              
45  Mr Shane Tregillis, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 26.  
46  Mr Shane Tregillis, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 26.  
47  Mr Gerard Brody, Consumer Action Law Centre, Proof Committee Hansard, 
20 February 2014, pp. 42–43. 
48  Submission 473 (Confidential). 
49  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 139, June 2013, paragraph RG139.124.  
50  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 139, June 2013, paragraph RG139.119. 
51  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 139, June 2013, paragraph RG139.137. 
52  COSL, Submission 418, p. 8. 
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COSL publishes information about systemic issues and serious misconduct it has 
identified in its Annual Report on Operations, which is available to stakeholders and 
the general public.
53
 
Reporting performance  
7.34 In addition to reporting on systemic matters and serious misconduct, FOS and 
COSL are required to collect data and report to ASIC about complaints and disputes. 
Their annual reports should also provide such information. COSL explained: 
We meet regularly with ASIC (on a quarterly basis at a minimum) to 
discuss, among other things, emerging issues or trends arising from the 
complaints we are dealing with. In this way, ASIC is able to effectively 
monitor and oversee our operations and ensure that we continue to meet the 
conditions of its ongoing approval of COSL as an approved EDR scheme.
54
 
7.35 Both schemes are also required to undergo regular independent reviews.55 
FOS recently underwent such a review. 
Identifying and reporting systemic issues 
7.36 Mr Field noted FOS's evolving approach to dealing with what appears to be 
emerging systemic issues. He stated that although there were some protocols in place 
when he first started at the Ombudsman's office in 2002, FOS's approach to systemic 
issues was very different today compared to then. He stated: 
In fact, I think at that stage looking at systemic issues was very much in its 
embryonic stages. Staff at the office were probably unsure about how to 
raise and deal with a systemic issue. Over 2002 to 2010, that process 
developed, and the confidence in using the systemic issues process 
developed to where it is today. We now have quite a large team dealing 
with systemic issues. It was certainly a learning phase for everybody in 
dealing with that, including for our financial services members.
56
 
7.37 COSL has similarly improved its reporting on systemic issues. Although 
formed in 2003, it was not until 2006 that COSL had a single ombudsman model. 
Mr Venga was of the view that COSL's reports on systemic issues are much better 
now than before.
57
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Committee view 
7.38 The damage caused by poor lending practices during the 2000s underscores 
the importance of identifying and arresting such practices before they take hold. 
The EDR schemes are important early detectors and, while the committee is 
encouraged by the EDRs' promising assessment of their own reporting of serious 
and/or systemic issues to ASIC, they should be constantly looking for ways 
to strengthen this reporting regime. 
Recommendation 4 
7.39 The committee recommends that ASIC devote a section of its annual 
report to the work of the financial services and consumer credit external dispute 
resolution (EDR) schemes, accompanied by ASIC's assessment of the systemic 
and significant issues the EDR schemes have raised in their reports to ASIC. 
Further, the committee recommends that ASIC include in this commentary 
information on any action taken in response to the matters raised in these 
reports.  
Jurisdiction, compensation and limitations 
7.40 This section examines the evidence the committee received that focused on 
the EDR schemes' jurisdictions, the amounts of compensation they can award and 
other factors that limit the actions EDRs can take.  
Confusion between FOS and COSL 
7.41 One submitter referred to FOS 'passing the buck' to COSL, which in turn 
determined that FOS was 'the appropriate entity to investigate such issues'.
58
 Another 
submitter also indicated that his case had gone from COSL to FOS back to COSL 
back to FOS back to COSL.
59
 Ms Denise Brailey told the committee that cases are 
often 'used as a football, being tossed from one EDR to the other'.
60
  
7.42 COSL explained that under its rules, it can exercise its discretion to decline 
to deal with a complaint if it is satisfied that a more appropriate forum should manage 
the matter such as a court, tribunal or another ASIC-approved EDR scheme.
61
 
Committee view 
7.43 Both EDR schemes should be aware of the need to facilitate referrals between 
them and have procedures and officers within their organisations responsible for 
expediting the transfer of cases and for keeping consumers briefed on progress.  
                                              
58  Submissions 11 (Confidential) and 266. 
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Jurisdiction—fraud and retail clients 
7.44 Most complaints made to the committee centred on the loan application form 
and the inaction by ASIC and the respective EDR schemes to deal with what 
submitters believed was blatant fraud. One submitter informed the committee that: 
The EDR bodies of FOS and COSL which are licenced by ASIC are very 
much on song with each other, all refusing to acknowledge fraud. With 
COSL once fraud is mentioned the cases are closed instantly.
62
 
7.45 Ms Brailey supported this view. She suggested that COSL states 'if it's fraud 
we cannot assist you'.
63
  
7.46 According to COSL, the difficulty with fraud is determining whether it 
happened:  
In most of the cases we have seen where complainants allege that they have 
been the victim of a home loan fraud, the financial services provider usually 
denies having engaged in the alleged conduct (and/or asserts that it was the 
consumer who had in fact committed a fraud).
64
  
7.47 COSL argued that an allegation of fraud is 'a very serious matter, capable of 
being the subject of both civil and criminal legal proceedings'. It explained that a 
claim of fraud in a civil action must still be determined according to the balance of 
probabilities. In this regard, COSL cited the approach taken by the courts, which have 
emphasised that the gravity of such allegations should be kept in mind and findings of 
fraud not made lightly. COSL stated: 
To prove a case of fraud in legal proceedings (or defend against such an 
allegation), parties are able to, among other things, issue subpoenas for the 
production of documents, give evidence under oath and cross-examine 
witnesses. This rigorous process of collating and testing the available 
evidence and its credibility enables the court to make a thorough 
assessment of each party's version of events and ultimately decide which is 
to be preferred (on the balance of probabilities).
65
 
7.48 COSL noted that parties to a COSL complaint alleging fraud do not have 
access to these evidentiary mechanisms. Further, COSL is limited by its rules in terms 
of 'its ability to obtain information from the parties (and non-member third parties, 
who are invariably involved in the claims we have seen)'. According to COSL, 
an EDR scheme is not like a court: 
We cannot subpoena witnesses, we cannot cross-examine people and we 
cannot take evidence under oath. That makes it very difficult for us to 
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establish that level of fraud. That is why we tend not to look at it. That is 
the qualification.
66
 
7.49 In its submission, COSL stated further that it would generally exercise its 
discretion not to deal with a complaint involving an allegation of fraud on the basis 
that it would be more appropriate for the complaint to be dealt with by a court. 
In doing so, it would have regard to: 
 the gravity of an allegation of fraud; 
 the limitations of the COSL process in terms of collating and testing each 
party's evidence to the degree of exactness required; and 
 the availability of the courts as an alternate forum to deal with such claims. 
7.50 According to COSL, however, it 'routinely considers whether, on their face, 
these complaints give rise to alternate claims—such as unconscionable conduct, unjust 
contract or misleading or deceptive conduct'. If COSL is satisfied there is an alternate 
claim that requires investigation, it advised that it would inform the parties of this and 
continue to deal with the complaint on this basis.
67
 
7.51 As noted in Chapter 5, prior to the enactment of the National Credit Act, 
ASIC was also reluctant to deal with reported cases of fraud. It preferred to refer such 
matters to the relevant state and territory police forces.
68
 
Committee view 
7.52 The committee has concerns that a complaint of possible fraud, involving for 
example a forged loan application, may be lost in the process of determining whether 
the alleged conduct involved fraud or another form of wrongdoing. The committee 
understands the seriousness of an allegation of fraud but in cases where the alleged 
wrongdoing is of a less serious nature, the committee believes that the EDR 
organisations are equipped to resolve the dispute and should do so. 
7.53 Where the allegation of fraud is of a most serious nature, the committee 
believes that the EDR schemes should refer the matter to ASIC immediately and also 
include the matter in their quarterly report. ASIC must then determine whether to refer 
the matter to the relevant police force. The committee is of the view that should the 
police decide not to act on the allegation, ASIC should take back responsibility for the 
matter. Essentially, the committee is concerned that complaints involving allegations 
of fraud are bouncing between agencies and no agency is taking responsibility for 
investigating these matters. The importance of acting on allegations of fraud is 
particularly evident when considering that allegations of forged and 'doctored 
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documents' were not confined to lending practices between 2002 and 2010 but were 
also evident in the Storm Financial case and, as will be seen later, the CFPL matter.  
Statute of limitations 
7.54 The CCLC noted that some of the consumers writing to the committee may be 
out of time with regard to their claims. In this regard, Mr Field of FOS informed the 
committee that there are time limits imposed by FOS's terms of reference. He stated 
that FOS 'can only consider a dispute about events that happened within six years. 
Some of those go back and are probably outside our terms of reference'.
69
 
7.55 When taking account of Ms Brailey's argument that some loans are designed 
to fail four or five years after the loan is granted, the six year limit seems too 
restrictive. The committee believes that ASIC and the EDR schemes should consider 
whether the limit of six years is appropriate.  
Compensation cap 
7.56 Currently, FOS and COSL are able to award compensation for loss up to 
$280,000. They are, however, able to consider a complaint if the amount of 
compensation claimed is greater than the monetary compensation ceiling but does not 
exceed $500,000.
70
 Some submitters, however, were of the view that the ceiling 
placed on eligibility was too low.
71
 For example one submitter suggested that the 
maximum amounts for a dispute value of $500,000 and an award sum of $280,000 
were 'grossly inadequate' and urgently needed to be increased.
72
 
7.57 In their response to the compensation cap, the EDR bodies focused on the 
amount of compensation that was likely to be awarded, as COSL explained: 
…the fact that compensation is likely to exceed our monetary compensation 
limit does not in itself prevent us from dealing with a complaint; it only 
prevents us from making a compensation award for an amount in excess of 
that limit.
73
 
                                              
69  Mr Philip Field, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 21. 
70  FOS, Submission 193, p. 9 and Mr Field, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, 
p. 21. 
71  See Submissions 79, 153, 156 and 285.  
72  Name withheld, Submission 184. See also Mr Errol Opie, Submission 259, who stated that cases 
which are closed and thrown out by FOS and COSL just because they exceeded the scheme's 
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7.58 Mr Field emphasised that it was not so much the amount of the loan but the 
amount of compensation that determines the jurisdiction to consider disputes. 
He stated: 
In most cases the amount of compensation actually payable will generally 
fall within our compensation cap of $280,000. Some borrowers want to 
have the whole of the loan written off. Where that amount exceeds 
$500,000 we are unable to consider the dispute under our terms of 
reference.
74
  
7.59 But, according to Mr Venga, setting aside the loan is very rare and so the 
amount of compensation tends to be much less that the loan itself.
75
 Thus, the 
EDR schemes do not consider the ceiling on compensation as being too low.  
7.60 Mr Field referred back to the principle that underpins external dispute 
resolution schemes—to offer a service to consumers mainly and small businesses. 
Therefore, in his view, it was appropriate to have a limit somewhere. He noted that 
FOS deals with some very large loan claims but 'where you have got people with 
$5 million or $10 million loans, maybe they are better off dealt with in court'.
76
 COSL 
agreed with this contention. It also noted that EDR schemes provide an alternative to 
court proceedings and are not bound by strict rules of evidence: 
Quite often, the parties to a complaint have differing and competing 
versions of events, with little or no documentary evidence in support. In 
these cases, we draw inferences and conclusions based on the information 
obtained from the parties and make findings of fact on the balance of 
probabilities. 
Given these limitations, we consider that some complaints are more 
appropriately dealt with by the more formal process of the courts, 
particularly if large sums of money are involved.
77
 
7.61 COSL also noted that the ceiling did not tend to exclude consumers. As an 
example, it explained that in the 2012–13 financial year it was unable to deal with 
only two complaints because the likely compensation would have exceeded its 
monetary compensation limit. According to COSL, in the preceding financial year, 
there was only one such complaint; these figures represented 0.06 per cent and 
0.04 per cent, respectively, of all the complaints COSL finalised in each of those 
years.
78
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Awarding compensation and consumer expectations 
7.62 With regard to compensation, a number of submitters were also highly critical 
of the method for assessing damages. According to Mr Field, FOS's approach to the 
assessment of loss is intended to ensure that borrowers are compensated fairly where 
they have been provided with a loan that, had their lender acted in a diligent and 
prudent way, they should not have received.
79
 He explained that, where the lender was 
at fault in approving the loan, the borrower would be compensated for the purchase, 
sale and holding costs. He noted, however, that in most cases the borrower is unable 
to repay the loan which means that the loan is not written off and the borrower does 
not get to retain the property that they acquired with the loan proceeds. Mr Field 
elaborated that, in such cases, 'the property should be sold and used to repay the 
loan'.
80
 
7.63 COSL reinforced the message that complaints upheld about irresponsible, 
unjust or unconscionable lending, 'rarely result in the entire loan being set aside'. 
In this regard, the law is conscious that a borrower must not be 'unjustly enriched'. 
COSL explained that applying this principle means that: 
…while the borrower may be relieved from their obligations under their 
loan contract (in whole or in part), they will be required to account to the 
lender for any benefit they have received as a result of obtaining the loan, 
so as to ensure the borrower does not obtain a 'windfall'.
81
 
7.64 According to COSL, it takes account of whether the borrower 'has actually 
obtained some material benefit as a result of entering into the loan—for example, 
by purchasing a property (either as a home or for an investment), obtaining funds for 
personal spending or renovations, or refinancing to a lower interest rate'.
82
 Mr Venga 
noted that at the end of the day borrowers have to be accountable for the benefit they 
obtained from the loan, 'whether it is by not paying rent or by having a house to live in 
and things like that'. He emphasised that this is what the law says, which in his 
opinion was 'quite fair'.
83
 
7.65 In some cases, the EDR organisations may also apportion a share of the 
liability to the borrower, where it deems that the borrower in some way contributed to 
the loss. 
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Financial Ombudsman Service—recommendations and determinations 
7.66 Taken together the complaints against the two EDR schemes in essence centre 
on their apparent lack of independence and their bias toward the credit providers at the 
expense of the consumer. In this regard, the committee notes that EDR 
complaints/disputes handling and other procedures are bound by the principles of 
natural justice.
84
 
7.67 FOS decides each complaint before it on its merits having regard to the 
relevant law, good industry practice, codes of practice and previous FOS decisions.
85
 
In its determinations involving loans taken out before the National Credit Act's 
responsible lending obligations came into force, FOS has stated that: 
…the statutory responsible lending provisions reflect pre-existing 
obligations for lenders to exercise the care and skill of a diligent and 
prudent lender when making their credit assessment.
86
  
7.68 For example, FOS would have regard to the provisions of the National Credit 
Code or its predecessor the UCCC. FOS would also have regard to a financial services 
provider's common law contractual duty and whether the particular circumstances of 
the case gave rise to a claim of unconscionable or misleading conduct under the ASIC 
Act and the applicable provisions of the Code of Banking Practice.  
7.69 FOS has made a number of determinations on cases involving low doc loans 
and falsified loan application forms. FOS made it clear that it and its predecessor have 
held the long-standing view that 'low doc does not mean low care'. In its 
determinations, FOS has explained that if there is information provided to the 
financial services provider that 'a diligent and prudent lender would have (or should 
have) investigated further, then that investigation should have been undertaken': 
A failure to exercise the care and skill of a diligent and prudent lender may 
result in a finding of maladministration.
87
 
7.70 In some instances, FOS has determined in favour of the borrower where it 
found that the lender engaged in maladministration because it did not act diligently or 
prudently in establishing that the borrower could service the loan.
88
 For example, 
in one such determination, FOS stated: 
…it was incumbent upon the FSP [financial service provider], exercising 
due care and skill, to make inquiries about the Applicant's income to be able 
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to repay the loan over the loan period. If it had done so, any adequate 
inquiry would have revealed that she…did not have the financial capacity 
to repay principal and interest repayments…89 
7.71 FOS explained further: 
…the FSP's lending policy of not requiring independent verification of the 
Applicant's self-employment was contrary to good industry lending 
practice. Even though the FSP complied with its policy, by doing nothing 
more, it failed to exercise due care and skill in assessing the loan 
application. Its decision to lend $700,000 to the Applicant was 
maladministration in lending.
90
 
7.72 FOS has also noted that: 
…a borrower's self-certification of financial information in a low doc loan 
application would not 'necessarily protect a financial services provider from 
a claim of maladministration in lending if the circumstances were such that 
a diligent and prudent banker ought to have made inquiries to verify that 
information, but chose not to do so.'
91
 
7.73 When resolving a dispute, FOS takes into account what is fair and reasonable. 
Thus, FOS explained that where borrowers have contributed to their loss by failing 
reasonably to protect their own interests, it may be appropriate to apportion loss 
between the borrower and the financial services provider.
92
 For example, FOS has 
found that 'a loan applicant who signs a loan application form in blank (or worse with 
false information) and then signs a loan contract and mortgage ought reasonably take 
some responsibility for their decision to apply for and enter into the loan contract'.
93
 
Thus in some cases FOS has determined that the borrower should share liability for 
his or her loss and assess the proportion of that liability. For example, in a 
determination FOS advised that: 
A person who applies for a loan (in the absence of some vitiating conduct 
on the part of the FSP) should give consideration to their own financial 
situation and how they believe they will be able to repay the loan. It is not 
sufficient for a loan applicant to, in effect, turn a blind eye as to how they 
will repay the loan; 
A person who applies for a loan should take care to protect their own 
interests by not signing an incomplete or blank loan application. It is 
reasonable to assume that the reason why a lender is requesting details the 
loan applicant's financial position is because it will rely on the information 
                                              
89  FOS, Determination: Case number 227019, 29 May 2013, p. 14. 
90  FOS, Determination: Case number 227019, 29 May 2013, p. 15.  
91  FOS, Determination: Case number 233936, 29 April 2013 (involving loans taken out in 2008); 
FOS, Determination: Case number 227019, 29 May 2013, (involving loans taken out in 2006). 
92  FOS, Determination: Case number 233936, 29 April 2013, p. 7. 
93  FOS, Determination: Case number 254056, 25 September 2013, p. 13. 
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provided to make an assessment about their capacity to repay and whether it 
needs to make any further inquiries; 
The loan applicant will have a further opportunity to protect their own 
interests when presented with the actual loan agreements. Again, absent 
some vitiating factor by the FSP, the loan applicant can decide not to sign 
the loan agreement.
94
  
Loan agreement 
7.74 It would seem that from FOS's viewpoint, the loan agreement, which forms 
the legal contract binding lender and borrower, is the critical document and not the 
loan application forms. The onus is thus on the lender to ensure that it acts diligently 
and responsibly when offering a loan. Irrespective of the information contained in the 
loan application form, it is the terms of the agreement on which the validity of the 
contract rests. Therefore, the information contained in the loan application may be 
correct but the terms of the contract unjust and vice versa. 
7.75 The committee understands the sense of betrayal and outrage that borrowers 
have experienced when they learn that their loan application forms have been 
falsified. But they should look to the terms of their loan agreement as evidence that 
the lender acted unjustly or unfairly in offering a loan for which they clearly could not 
service and which placed their home or other assets in jeopardy. 
7.76 As the committee found in Chapter 5, it would seem that on the face of the 
evidence some lenders, irrespective of the loan application form, should not have 
provided particular loans: they were unaffordable and likely to fail. In other cases, 
again irrespective of the loan application form, the borrower should have taken care 
before signing the actual loan contract to make sure that the repayments were 
sustainable and would not jeopardise the assets securing the loan. 
7.77 While the loan contract itself is the key document, the act of tampering with 
an application form cannot be justified under any circumstances. The committee is of 
the firm view that, although the broker may have been the instigator, the lender is 
complicit if it turns a blind eye to such wrongdoing.   
Committee view 
7.78 Effective external dispute resolution schemes free up ASIC to concentrate on 
the most serious transgressions and system-wide problems that have much broader 
implications for the financial services industry and consumers. The EDR schemes are 
a key part of any successful consumer protection framework. During the inquiry, 
many submitters who believed they were victims of predatory lending were not only 
critical of ASIC but also of its approved EDR schemes: FOS and COSL.  
                                              
94  FOS, Determination: Case number 227019, 29 May 2013, pp. 15–16. See also FOS, 
Determination: Case number 254056, 25 September 2013, p. 13.  
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7.79 In many cases their criticism appeared unwarranted, but the submissions did 
identify a number of areas where the schemes could improve their performance, such 
as the time taken to manage a complaint. Clearly, this has been a problem for some 
time, however, both EDR schemes have indicated that they are committed to 
improvement in this area. Also, while accepting that an EDR process is intended 
to provide a low cost, less formal process to resolve complaints for consumers, 
the committee nonetheless is of the view that the caps on eligibility and compensation 
appear to be too low. There is a particular problem for small businesses seeking a 
resolution to a dispute that may breach the eligibility cap or in some other way not 
qualify under the EDR schemes' terms of reference.  
7.80 The committee is also concerned about allegations of fraud and the likelihood 
of those of a less serious nature falling through the gaps. While certain claims, such as 
falsified information in loan application forms or forged signatures on such documents 
may be classified as less serious offences, they still warrant attention. In the 
committee's view, ASIC, together with FOS and COSL, should establish protocols 
to ensure that such allegations are not handed from one agency to another and then 
somehow abandoned in the process. Again, there should be some body, preferably the 
EDR schemes, responsible for dealing with complaints of less serious fraud involving 
tampered loan application forms including forged signatures.  
7.81 Finally, although the committee notes the assurances by both EDR schemes 
that their reporting of systemic issues to ASIC is now much better, the committee 
believes ASIC could improve the overall transparency of this reporting regime and 
how it responds to significant matters contained in them.   
Recommendation 5 
7.82 The committee recommends that the Financial Ombudsman Service and 
the Credit Ombudsman Service set key performance indicators (KPIs) for 
meeting milestones in their management of a complaint, publish these milestones 
and KPIs on their website and report their performance against these KPIs in 
their annual reports.  
Recommendation 6 
7.83 The committee recommends that ASIC, in consultation with the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) and the Credit Ombudsman Service (COSL): 
 consider amending the terms of reference for FOS and COSL so that the 
caps on the maximum value of a claim that the EDR schemes may 
consider and the maximum amount that can be awarded are increased 
and indexed to the consumer price index; 
 examine the processes for reporting to ASIC matters of significance and 
emerging systemic issues with a view to improving the reporting regime; 
 establish protocols for managing allegations of less serious fraud 
to ensure that such complaints do not get lost in the system and are 
recorded properly on ASIC's databases;  
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 improve the guidance provided to complainants so they fully understand 
that FOS and COSL are dispute resolution bodies and that complainants 
must prepare their own cases; and 
 consider establishing special divisions in FOS and COSL to deal with 
small business complaints. 
7.84 Before the committee concludes its consideration of predatory lending, it 
draws attention to the current concerns of the Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW). 
The Centre noted that a consumer support group was giving advice to many 
consumers, who borrowed between 2001 and 2010, that 'would appear to be not well 
founded in law'. It stated: 
While some of these borrowers have definitely been adversely affected by 
poor lending practices, the remedies available at law at the time, and even 
now, are not as extensive as some borrowers have been led to believe. 
Many borrowers are being advised to stop making payments on their loans 
altogether and are risking the repossession of their properties as a result (in 
addition to possibly being liable for further interest, charges and 
enforcement expenses).
95
 
7.85 The committee has detailed numerous cases where highly vulnerable people 
were taken advantage of by unscrupulous brokers and in some cases negligent lenders. 
The submitters rightly call for justice. Despite the harm caused through the 
misconduct of others, some complainants, however, do not appreciate the legal 
obstacles to achieving what they would term a 'fair deal'. Indeed, there are two areas in 
particular where their expectations do not match the likelihood of success: holding 
lenders to account for the misdeeds of brokers; and the level of compensation due to 
them.  
7.86 In this regard, the committee underlines the following messages from the 
consumer advocacy associations, EDR schemes and ASIC that relate to lending 
practices before 2010: 
 Brokers as agents for the lender—the courts have found that, barring special 
circumstances, a mortgage broker was the agent of the borrower and not the 
lender; the broker's actions were attributable to the borrower; and the 
knowledge of a broker could not necessarily be imputed to the lender. 
 Contract—the loan agreement is the legal contract binding lender and 
borrower and therefore is the critical document, not the loan application 
forms. The loan application forms 'do not in any way create or bind the 
applicants to a loan contract' with the financial service provider. Nor do they 
'create an obligation' on the provider that it must offer finance to the 
applicant.
96
 FOS explained further: 
                                              
95  CCLC, Submission 194, p. 15. 
96  FOS, Determination: Case number 323234, 17 December 2013, p. 5.  
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The existence of the errant signatures on the [loan application forms], do 
not void the subsequent…loan contracts offered by the FSP and accepted 
by the Applicants. The crucial question to be considered is whether a 
diligent and prudent lender would have approved the loans?
97
 
 Compensation—while the borrower may be relieved from their obligations 
under their loan contract (in whole or in part), they will be required to account 
to the lender for any benefit they have received as a result of obtaining the 
loan, so as to ensure the borrower does not obtain a 'windfall'.
98
 This means 
that a court or EDR process would take into account whether the borrower 
'has actually obtained some material benefit as a result of entering into the 
loan; for example, by purchasing a property (either as a home or for an 
investment), obtaining funds for personal spending or renovations, or 
refinancing to a lower interest rate'.
99
 As COSL noted—setting aside the loan 
is very rare and so the amount of compensation tends to be much less than the 
loan itself.
100
 
 Standard of proof—what appears to be malfeasance to a borrower may be 
difficult to prove in a courtroom, thus borrowers who elect to pursue matters 
in court face the same barriers as ASIC in establishing that a lender's conduct 
was, for example, unconscionable or that fraud took place.
101
  
Conclusion 
7.87 This one case study of problems in consumer credit between 2002 and 2010 
(when the new credit laws came into force) sets the groundwork for the report. 
It introduces a number of key issues that surface and resurface in different contexts 
throughout this work. They include: 
 ASIC has limited powers and resources but even so appears to miss or ignore 
early warning signs of corporate wrongdoing or troubling trends that pose a 
risk to consumers;  
 the financial services industry is dynamic with new products and business 
models regularly emerging, which requires ASIC to be alert to the changes 
and any risk they pose to consumers or investors; 
 in this changing environment, there are always people looking to find ways 
to circumvent the law—ASIC needs to have the skills and industry experience 
to be able to match their ingenuity;  
                                              
97  FOS, Determination: Case number 323234, 17 December 2013, p. 5.  
98  COSL, Submission 418, p. 6.  
99  COSL, Submission 418, pp. 5–6. 
100  See paragraph 7.59. 
101  ASIC, Submission 45.1, p. 26. 
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 consumers trust their advisers, brokers and financial institutions to do the right 
thing by them to the extent that they may sign incomplete or blank documents, 
do not ask questions and do not seek second opinions—importantly such trust 
is open to abuse; 
 consumers have unrealistic expectations of what ASIC can do and the extent 
to which the regulator is able to protect their interests or investigate their 
complaints;  
 ASIC's communication with retail investors and consumers needs to improve 
significantly;  
 the important role other participants in the financial services industry can have 
in assisting ASIC in its regulatory role, which then allows the regulator 
to concentrate its limited resources on serious and systemic matters; and 
 some advisers or brokers targeting, deliberately and systematically, the more 
vulnerable members of the community, especially older Australians with 
assets but without high levels of financial literacy. 
7.88 In the following chapters, the committee considers in depth another case 
study—the Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited matter—which elaborates on 
some of the issues already raised but in a different context. 
  
  
 
Chapter 8 
Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited: 
What went wrong at CFPL and why? 
8.1 One of the committee's major concerns during this inquiry was the 
misconduct by financial advisers and other staff at Commonwealth Financial Planning 
Limited (CFPL), part of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group (CBA), and 
what some regard as ASIC's failure to respond to reports of this misconduct in a 
timely and effective manner.  
8.2 This chapter provides an overview of the CFPL case, an analysis of what went 
wrong at CFPL and why, and a critical appraisal of the CBA's characterisation of the 
misconduct at CFPL as 'inappropriate advice' to clients. 
8.3 Other issues raised by the CFPL matter are explored in the next three 
chapters. Chapter 9 provides: 
 an overview of the surveillance project that ASIC undertook in relation to 
CFPL in 2007–08, and an assessment of the Continuous Improvement 
Compliance Program (CICP) that was implemented as a result in April 2008; 
and 
 a review of ASIC's response to reports of misconduct at CFPL, including the 
disclosures made by CFPL whistleblowers. 
8.4 Chapter 10 assesses the adequacy and effectiveness of the enforcement 
actions taken by ASIC in relation to the CFPL matter including, among other things, 
the enforceable undertaking from CFPL that ASIC accepted in October 2011. 
Chapter 11 examines the integrity of the client file reconstruction and compensation 
process put in place by CFPL/the CBA. The committee's conclusions on the CFPL 
matter are contained in Chapter 12. 
8.5 The committee has received evidence from various parties involved in the 
CFPL matter including CFPL clients, a CFPL whistleblower, the CBA and ASIC. 
In addition to submissions and oral evidence from ASIC and the CBA, the committee 
has published submissions from former CFPL clients, family members of former 
CFPL clients, or representatives of CFPL clients, who, in addition to being highly 
critical of the CBA, in varying degrees argued that ASIC failed to prevent the 
misconduct at CFPL or respond appropriately when the misconduct became known. 
Three of these submitters—Mrs Jan Braund, Ms Merilyn Swan and the law firm 
Maurice Blackburn—also provided oral evidence to the committee on 10 April 2014. 
In addition, the committee received a number of submissions and oral evidence from 
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one of the CFPL whistleblowers, Mr Jeffrey Morris, that was highly critical of the 
CBA and ASIC's handling of the matter.
1
 
Chronological overview 
8.6 In mid-2010, public reports emerged of problems affecting the quality of 
financial advice being provided to CFPL clients. While the exact nature and extent of 
these problems is contested (and explored further below), it is accepted by all parties 
that multiple CFPL advisers failed to meet required compliance standards and 
provided advice that was irresponsible, self-serving and incidental to client interests. 
The precise timeframe of this adviser misconduct remains unclear, but in terms of the 
individual CFPL advisers subject to ASIC enforcement action, most of the misconduct 
appears to have taken place between 2006 and 2010. For one adviser, Mr Christopher 
Baker, ASIC found compliance failures from 1 March 2005; for another, 
Mr Jade Zaicew, ASIC suggested that misleading and deceptive conduct took place 
between August 2011 to May 2012.
2
  
8.7 A chronological summary of the CFPL matter is provided below in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Chronological summary of the CFPL matter 
Date Event 
February 2007 ASIC commenced a surveillance project in relation to CFPL. 
February 2008 ASIC notified CFPL of its concerns resulting from the findings of its 
surveillance project. 
April 2008 CFPL implemented the Continuous Improvement Compliance Program in 
response to ASIC's concerns. 
September 2008 Mr Don Nguyen, a CFPL financial adviser, was suspended from CFPL for 
compliance failures. 
15 October 2008 Mr Nguyen returned to CFPL as a senior planner, in effect a promotion from 
his position prior to suspension. 
30 October 2008 The CFPL whistleblowers faxed an anonymous report to ASIC (signed 'the 
three ferrets'), reporting Mr Nguyen's conduct and a 'high level' cover-up of 
that conduct at CFPL. 
10 November 2008  The CFPL whistleblowers sent their first follow-up email to ASIC. In 
subsequent exchanges in November 2008 and February 2009, ASIC indicated 
that the issue was still 'under consideration'. 
                                              
1  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421 (and supplementary submissions). Mr Morris appeared 
before the committee in Canberra on 10 April 2014.  
2  On Mr Baker see ASIC, 'ASIC accepts enforceable undertaking from former Commonwealth 
Financial Planning adviser', Media Release, no. 12-63AD, 4 April 2012; on Mr Zaicew see 
ASIC, 'ASIC bans former Commonwealth Financial Planning adviser from financial services 
and credit activities', Media Release, no. 14-068MR, 4 April 2014.  
 Page 111 
 
May 2009  Frustrated by ASIC's apparent inaction, the CFPL whistleblowers provided 
their information to a journalist from Investor Daily. Articles about the CFPL 
matter were published in Investor Daily on 18 May 2009, 25 May 2009 and 
22 June 2009. The article on 25 May named Mr Nguyen. 
2 June 2009 Mr Jeffrey Morris, one of the CFPL whistleblowers, met with CBA Group 
Security and reported his knowledge about Mr Nguyen and the management 
'cover up'. 
4 June 2009 The CFPL whistleblowers sent an anonymous email to CBA senior 
management (the 'Mallord' email), providing information on Mr Nguyen and 
the management 'cover up'. 
29 June 2009 Mr Nguyen met with CFPL managers and was told to resign. 
6 July 2009 Mr Nguyen formally resigned, citing ill health and denying any wrongdoing. 
27 July 2009 The CBA filed a breach report with ASIC regarding Mr Nguyen. 
24 February 2010 The CFPL whistleblowers made their first visit to ASIC. Mr Morris later 
wrote they 'marched in ASIC's door…to demand action'.3 
24 March 2010 ASIC issued notices to CFPL to hand over documents relating to Mr Nguyen. 
Mr Nguyen's client list and audit trail data was required immediately, and his 
client files were required by 9 April 2010. 
24 March 2010 Project Hartnett, the CFPL's process for determining compensation payable to 
clients of Mr Nguyen and, later, clients of adviser Mr Anthony Awker, began. 
19 July 2010 ASIC referred a brief on Mr Nguyen to a delegate for consideration of a 
banning action. 
21 July 2010 CFPL gave ASIC a commitment to remediate former clients of Mr Nguyen.  
3 November 2010 CFPL commenced a remediation project for former clients of Mr Nguyen.  
3 March 2011 ASIC banned Mr Nguyen from providing financial services for seven years. 
25 October 2011 CFPL entered into an enforceable undertaking with ASIC. 
19 March 2012 Mr Nguyen's banning order was upheld by the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) on appeal. 
25 October 2013 The independent expert engaged in relation to the enforceable undertaking, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, provided ASIC with its final report. 
26 November 2013 ASIC accepted the final report of the independent expert, formally bringing 
the enforceable undertaking between CFPL and ASIC to a close. 
                                              
3  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 3. 
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The misconduct of individual CFPL financial advisers 
8.8 In its first written submission on the CFPL matter, ASIC outlined the various 
aspects of the conduct of individual CFPL advisers that most concerned the regulator 
and were the subject of regulatory action. These were: 
 failing to have a reasonable basis for advice; 
 failing to provide Statements of Advice; 
 making statements that were false or misleading in a material particular; 
 making forecasts that were misleading, false or deceptive; 
 failing to make reasonable inquiries before implementing advice; 
 providing asset allocation advice far above that recommended for the client's 
risk profile; and 
 failing to complete 'financial needs analysis' documentation.
4
 
8.9 ASIC has taken enforcement action against eight individual CFPL advisers.5 
Five of these advisers were banned by ASIC from providing financial services, and 
three removed themselves from the industry under an enforceable undertaking. 
The advisers banned from providing financial services were: 
 Mr Don Nguyen—banned for seven years on 3 March 2011, with the decision 
upheld by the AAT on 19 March 2012; 
 Mr Anthony Awkar—permanently banned on 19 April 2012; 
 Ms Jane Duncan—banned for three years on 19 April 2012; 
 Mr Rick Gillespie—permanently banned on 30 October 2012; and 
 Mr Jade Zaicew—banned for seven years on 4 April 2014. 
8.10 The advisers who removed themselves from the industry for a defined period 
under an enforceable undertaking were: 
 Mr Simon Langton—two years, from 9 January 2012; 
 Mr Christopher Baker—five years, from 3 April 2012; and 
 Mr Joe Chan—two years, from 1 June 2012. 
8.11 A large proportion of the evidence received by the committee in relation to 
the CFPL matter concerned one CFPL adviser in particular, Mr Don Nguyen. 
Mr Nguyen was an authorised representative of CFPL between 1 October 2003 until 
his resignation on 6 July 2009. His conduct was the subject of a series of CFPL 
                                              
4  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 12.  
5  ASIC's submission, which was provided to the committee in August 2013, indicated that ASIC 
had taken enforcement action against seven CFPL advisers. An eighth former CFPL adviser, 
Mr Jade Zaicew, was banned by ASIC for seven years on 4 April 2014.  
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whistleblower reports to ASIC, the first of which was made anonymously on 
30 October 2008 after Mr Nguyen returned to CFPL on 15 October 2008 following a 
period of suspension for suspected compliance failures. As noted above, Mr Nguyen 
was banned by ASIC from providing financial services for seven years on 
3 March 2011.
6
  
CFPL's sales-based culture 
8.12 While Mr Nguyen's conduct was particularly egregious, it should be noted 
that it is broadly agreed—by ASIC, the CBA and Mr Morris—that the problems at 
CFPL did not start or end with Mr Nguyen. Rather, the problems that ASIC identified 
at CFPL went beyond any single adviser or group of advisers; at the heart of these 
problems were systemic and organisation-wide failures within CFPL. In one of its 
submissions, ASIC reports that it had concerns about the:   
…adequacy of CFPL's processes and controls, its dealing with misconduct 
by its representatives in a consistent manner, its capacity for early 
identification of irregularities in its advice process, the adequacy of controls 
over its clients' records and the consistent application of its complaints 
handling and internal dispute resolution processes.
7
 
8.13 Mr Morris told the committee that Mr Nguyen and other non-compliant 
advisers would not have been able to operate as they had were it not for the 'incredibly 
loose, non-compliant culture' at CFPL. He described an aggressive sales-based culture 
wherein advisers pushed clients into inappropriately high-risk products both to earn 
bonuses and 'avoid getting the sack'.
8
 
8.14 Maurice Blackburn provided a similar assessment based on the experiences of 
former CFPL clients that it represented in various civil actions. Its work on behalf of 
these clients revealed a toxic, 'boiler room'-like environment at CFPL, where advisers 
chasing commissions would systematically target clients in conservative positions, 
selling them into high-risk products that were inconsistent with their conservative risk 
profiles. Maurice Blackburn explained that in order to do this, the advisers needed 
to circumvent processes that would usually 'work by putting some downward pressure 
on those sorts of extreme sale practices'. These processes included the preparation and 
maintenance of Financial Needs Analysis and Statements of Advice documents.
9
 
8.15 Maurice Blackburn explained to the committee that almost all of its 30 clients 
were retirees, who had originally been in conservative investments. These clients had 
been:  
                                              
6  ASIC, 'Clients of Commonwealth Financial Planning compensated and ASIC bans former 
financial adviser for seven years', Media Release, no. 11-42AD, 10 March 2011. 
7  ASIC, Submission 45, pp. 12–13.  
8  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 45.  
9  Mr John Berrill, Lawyer and Principal, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 17.  
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…convinced by Mr Nguyen to transfer their moneys into much riskier and 
high-risk investments and they lost substantial moneys. The most stunning 
example we had was a couple in their mid-80s who had a $5 million 
portfolio and lost $2½ million of that. They were conservative investors and 
they were convinced by Mr Nguyen through a process that was completely 
flawed. It involved lots of cutting and pasting of documents, almost all of 
which were not completed by them or sighted by them.
10
 
8.16 Interestingly, in a 2007–08 surveillance project carried out by ASIC in 
relation to CFPL (which is discussed in the next chapter), ASIC appeared to have 
identified the relationship between the amount of revenue a particular adviser was 
bringing in and the CFPL's tolerance of non-compliance on the part of that adviser. 
On 29 February 2008, ASIC wrote to the CFPL that it had found: 
…that of the 38 representatives who were rated Critical [by the CBA's Risk 
Matrix system], CBA revoked the authorisation of only 12 representatives. 
We do not know why the remaining representatives continue to retain their 
authorisations. There appears to be some correlation between the amount of 
revenue generated by the representative and CBA not revoking an 
authorisation.
11
 
8.17 On 5 May 2014, the ABC's Four Corners program revealed documentation 
showing that in 2006 Mr Nguyen was, in fact, assessed by the CBA as being a 
'Critical Risk' by its compliance team.
12
 This information would appear consistent 
with the suggestion in ASIC's 2008 letter that CFPL/the CBA appeared willing to turn 
a blind eye to non-compliant advisers, so long as they were earning significant 
revenue for the company (as Mr Nguyen was).  
8.18 In his submission, Mr Morris wrote that Mr Nguyen 'was widely known as 
"Dodgy Don" for years before the events of 2008–09'. That Mr Nguyen's 'dodgy' 
conduct was at once widely known and generally tolerated was, Mr Morris argued, 
indicative of a culture at CFPL/the CBA that was driven by 'sales and a metricated 
short term remuneration/bonus structure at all levels and where ethics and propriety at 
best take a back seat'.
13
 The abovementioned findings of ASIC's 2007–08 surveillance 
project, together with Four Corners' revelations about Mr Nguyen's 2006 risk 
assessment, appear to firmly support Mr Morris's assessment in this regard. 
                                              
10  Mr John Berrill, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 13.   
11  ASIC, letter to Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited and Financial Wisdom Limited, 
29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 4. 
12  ABC, Four Corners, 'Banking Bad', 5 May 2014, and supporting document at www.abc.net.au/ 
4corners/documents/2014/BANKING/Nguyen_CBA_Internal_Review_2006.pdf. 
13  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 4 (italics in source).  
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Allegations of forgery 
8.19 One of the most serious allegations made against the CBA during the inquiry 
was Mrs Jan Braund's claim that the bank had either ignored or sought to cover up 
Mr Nguyen's misuse of her signature to facilitate product-switches and other 
transactions that she had not authorised.  
8.20 Mrs Braund provided the committee with evidence demonstrating that a 
number of these transactions took place when she and her husband were overseas, 
when it would have been physically impossible for her to sign the transaction 
authorisations. A number of these transactions were apparently made using a copy of 
Mrs Braund's signature. Mrs Braund emphasised that she had never given Mr Nguyen 
permission to use her signature, and tabled a statutory declaration to that effect during 
her appearance before the committee.
14
  
8.21 According to Mrs Braund, the CBA had refused to take any action in relation 
to her allegations that Mr Nguyen used a photocopy of her signature to invest against 
her profile.
15
  The CBA responded that it had in fact investigated Mrs Braund's claims 
of forgery, and accepted that she could not have put several of the signatures on 
authorising documents. The bank nonetheless maintained that the findings of its 
investigation of Mrs Braund's claims were inconclusive, and did not warrant a report 
to the police: 
We had our security team investigate those issues. Our security team is a 
team comprised, in many cases, of ex-police officers, so they do have 
experience in these types of issues. We were not able to conclusively find 
evidence that we felt would be sufficient to lead to a brief to go to the 
police. I would draw a distinction there, because in other cases of advisers 
we did actually find clear evidence of forgery and we did report the matter 
to police and the police looked into the issues. In this particular case with 
Mr Nguyen, we were not able to form a conclusive view that there had been 
forgery.
16
 
8.22 The CBA told the committee that Mrs Braund's allegations regarding the 
misuse of her signature to facilitate an unauthorised 'switch back' of funds to managed 
investments in October 2008 was 'based on her misunderstanding of circumstances'. 
According to the CBA, Colonial First State 'failed to execute' Mrs Braund's 
October 2008 request that her investment be switched from managed investments into 
cash. Therefore, rather than a 'switch back' taking place using her forged signature, 
the CBA claims that the original switch to cash never actually took place: 
[A]s Mrs Braund's original October 2008 instruction had not been executed, 
there was no 'switch back' transaction at all. Therefore no 'switch back' 
                                              
14  Mrs Janice Braund, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 8. 
15  Mrs Janice Braund, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 2.  
16  Mr David Cohen, General Counsel and Group Executive, Group Corporate Affairs, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 23.  
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document came into existence and as a result Mrs Braund's signature was 
not used.
17
 
8.23 The CBA also addressed Mrs Braund's allegations regarding the use of her 
photocopied signature on a number of switch and withdrawal requests from 2006 to 
2008 at times when she was overseas. As to why the misuse of Mrs Braund's signature 
on these occasions did not result in a report to the police, the CBA again argued that it 
'found insufficient evidence to support a report to the police'. Specifically, the CBA 
told the committee that Mrs Braund had indicated that Mr Nguyen had informed her 
that he had photocopied her signature (although the bank did not directly state that 
Mrs Braund had authorised Mr Nguyen to use that signature). CFPL's investigation 
subsequently found that four signatures on withdrawal and withdrawal/switch requests 
appeared to be identical, but that all withdrawals had been deposited directly into the 
Braunds' non-CBA bank account: 
CFP believes it is likely that the Braunds requested these four withdrawals 
and the instructions were submitted by Mr Nguyen or someone else at CFP 
to execute these instructions on behalf of the Braunds while they were 
overseas and not able to sign the forms themselves. CFP believes this was 
done in order to facilitate access to their funds while the Braunds were 
overseas. CFP has been unable to verify its belief with Mrs Braund because 
she has refused to meet with CFP. 
CFP also investigated whether there was any advantage obtained by any 
staff member in the execution of these instructions. No benefit (payment, 
credit, bonus) was earned or received by any CFP staff member in relation 
to a withdrawal or switch on the Braunds' accounts involved in these four 
transactions.
18
 
8.24 In addition, the CBA noted that there were certain difficulties in Mrs Braund's 
case which weighed against making a report to police. They included: the uncertainty 
around whether Mr Nguyen had himself affixed Mrs Braund's signature to the 
transaction requests; no benefit was to be gained by Mr Nguyen or any other CFPL 
employee from affixing Mrs Braund's signature to these requests; and as Mr Nguyen 
was no longer employed at CFPL it was not possible to question him about the 
matter.
19
 
8.25 While the CBA did not make a report to the police regarding Mrs Braund's 
case, the CBA told the committee that it had, in the past, referred advisers to the 
police where it had found evidence of forgery. However, in the Nguyen case and in 
the case of Mr Gillespie, CBA investigations had not revealed the hard evidence 
needed to make a report to the police. Still, the CBA assured the committee that it 
would not hesitate to report these advisers to the authorities if it acquired the 
necessary evidence: 
                                              
17  CBA, answer to question on notice, 24 April 2014, pp. 2–3.  
18  CBA, answer to question on notice, 24 April 2014, p. 3.  
19  CBA, answer to question on notice, 24 April 2014, pp. 4–5. 
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We have nothing to hide about this. If there was forgery perpetrated then 
we have nothing to hide. There is no gain. It is a criminal offence. It should 
be reported to the police, as we have done in the past and we would be 
prepared to do so in the future.
20
 
8.26 ASIC's evidence to the committee would tend to support the CBA's claim that 
it was willing to report forgery to the police when it had evidence available to make 
such a report. Mr Greg Kirk told the committee that his understanding was that the 
CBA had: 
…referred at least one matter to the police—not Mr Nguyen but a 
Mr [Anthony Awkar]—that involved forgery. Mr [Awkar] was banned by 
us, in part using the evidence about the forgery. I think the police 
determined not to take the case further because they did not think they 
could prove that to a criminal standard in a court.
21
 
8.27 In addition to being critical of the CBA's apparent inaction in relation to her 
allegations of forgery, Mrs Braund also told the committee that ASIC had failed 
to take any action in relation to her claims.
22
 Discussing the forgery allegations, ASIC 
also told the committee that it would be unlikely to prepare a brief for the DPP in 
relation to signature fraud simply on the word of a complainant. Even if it were clear 
that a signature was not the signature of the complainant: 
…proving who actually did put the signature on [a form] is another 
question and we need to prove that beyond reasonable doubt. So it is not as 
simple as taking it straight to the DPP or indeed taking it to the court.
23
 
Don Nguyen's promotion and allegations of a management 'cover up' 
8.28 As noted above, Mr Nguyen was suspended from CFPL in September 2008 
for suspected compliance failures. According to Mr Morris, Mr Nguyen's suspension 
had been prompted by a number of developments, namely that: Mr Nguyen had failed 
a file audit; client complaints were 'pouring in' as Mr Nguyen's poor advice was 
exposed by the onset of the global financial crisis; Mr Nguyen had been caught paying 
$50 'backhanders' to Chatswood Branch staff to give him client details directly; and he 
had been caught 'red handed' by a compliance manager defrauding CommInsure 'by 
tendering $5,000 invoices for financial advice that was never provided'.
24
 An internal 
CFPL memo provided by Mr Morris suggests Mr Nguyen was suspended in August 
2008 'as a result of an issue raised with respect to an advice fee for a client in receipt 
                                              
20  Mr David Cohen, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 38.  
21  Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader, Deposit Takers, Credit and Insurance Providers, 
ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 75.  
22  Mrs Janice Braund, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 2. 
23  Mr Tim Mullaly, Senior Executive Leader, Financial Services Enforcement, ASIC, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 83.  
24  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 8.  
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of a trauma claim'.
25
 This advice fee is evidently the CommInsure fraud referred to by 
Mr Morris. 
8.29 Despite what would appear to have been overwhelming evidence of 
misconduct on Mr Nguyen's part, on 15 October 2008 Mr Nguyen not only returned 
to work at CFPL, but was promoted to the position of senior planner. Mr Morris and 
the other CFPL whistleblowers alleged in their anonymous fax to ASIC on 
30 October 2008 that Mr Nguyen's promotion was part of a management conspiracy 
to avoid paying client compensation. The amounts involved, the whistleblowers 
suggested, ran into the tens of millions—'enough to cost all the managers involved 
their jobs'. The whistleblowers explained that by promoting Mr Nguyen, 
CFPL management was able to ensure he had access to his clients, which was 
necessary to allow him 'to dupe and discourage clients from pursuing their 
complaints'. The whistleblowers further alleged that CFPL management realised that 
if they sacked Mr Nguyen, this would place the CFPL in a 'very poor position' 
to defend compensation claims by his clients. Conversely, promoting Mr Nguyen 
would 'tend to strengthen their position'.
26
  
8.30 Mr Morris explained that, following Mr Nguyen's suspension from CFPL in 
September 2008, he personally witnessed the workings of a CFPL management 
conspiracy to cover up Mr Nguyen's wrongdoing. His version of events, if accurate, 
would indicate a coordinated and systematic effort by CFPL/the CBA to mislead 
Mr Nguyen's clients and discourage them from pursuing compensation claims, and is 
worth quoting at length: 
Contrary to what was said earlier [by CBA representatives appearing before 
the committee on 10 April 2014], [CFPL management] knew Nguyen had 
done all the things he was accused of; he was caught red-handed. They 
announced he had been suspended for fraud and he would not be coming 
back. The trouble is that, with the GFC going on, they needed a planner to 
hose down Nguyen's clients who were complaining. They offered his client 
book to another planner. They gave him his phone. After a week of this, of 
all the client complaints ringing up, and being told by the complaints people 
that they were not going to do anything for them, he threw the phone back 
and he said he would not have anything to do with it. 
So they brought Nguyen back and reinstated him and promoted him so that 
he could fob off the clients and discourage them from making complaints 
about what had happened. At the same time, they had done a file review 
and they had found photocopied risk profiles in his fact files. The risk 
profile is probably the most critical thing a planner does. Nguyen just gave 
everybody more or less the same risk profile. He got to the point where he 
just photocopied them. They found this in 2008, and he should have been 
dismissed at that point. But they brought him back for two reasons. One 
                                              
25  A copy of this memo, dated 25 November 2009, is attached to Submission 421.5. Elsewhere, 
the CBA has stated that Mr Nguyen was suspended in September (rather than August) 2008.  
26  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, pp. 11–12.  
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was to hose down the client complaints. The other was to sanitise his files. 
They gave him a second assistant to help sanitise the files. I saw him there, 
day after day, with liquid paper going through changing things in the fact 
files.
27
 
8.31 The CFPL whistleblowers alleged that while the compliance team at CFPL 
had recommended that Mr Nguyen be sacked for his misconduct, the team had 
evidently been warned to 'back off' by CFPL/CBA management 'on a sufficiently 
senior level'. The whistleblowers further alleged that CFPL's internal complaints 
handling area: 
…also appears to have been got at (again at a senior level, probably above 
Commonwealth FP) and agreed to deal with complaints about Don Nguyen 
on a purely individual basis, just looking at what is in front of them for each 
case and ignoring the wider systemic issues of which they are well aware.
28
     
8.32 On 5 May 2014, Four Corners broadcast a handwritten document by a CFPL 
compliance officer on 24 November 2008 that read in part: 'If pulled Don out, huge 
compensation issue for CFP—Better to work for client's best interests to resolve all 
issues'.
29
 This document, which Mr Morris has since provided to the committee, 
would appear to support the whistleblowers' claims that Mr Nguyen was promoted 
with a view to minimising any compensation costs for the CBA.
30
  
8.33 While the CBA conceded that the decision to promote Mr Nguyen was wrong, 
it also suggested that the reasoning at the time was that he would be subject to closer 
supervision in his new role:  
In hindsight, it is very clear to us that he should not have been promoted. 
The reasoning at the time seems to have been that in this more senior 
position he would actually see fewer clients. He would supervise but he 
would actually physically see fewer clients. He was also relocated to 
Chatswood, where he would be under the closer supervision of his 
manager. Clearly, that was the wrong decision in view of the investigative 
reports and as events unfolded, but it was the decision taken at the time. 
Furthermore, I think at the time the full extent of his misconduct was 
clearly not known; but, with the benefit of hindsight, it was the wrong 
decision.
31
 
8.34 The CBA made no attempt to defend the decision to promote Mr Nguyen. 
It should nonetheless be noted that if CFPL management genuinely believed that 
Mr Nguyen would see fewer clients as a senior planner, this evidently did not work. 
                                              
27  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 47.  
28  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, pp. 9–11.  
29  ABC, Four Corners, 'Banking Bad', 5 May 2014, www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2014/05/05/ 
3995954.htm.  
30  A copy of the compliance note, dated 24 November 2008, is attached to Submission 421.6. 
31  Mr David Cohen, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 24.  
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Ms Swan, for instance, reports that her parents met with Mr Nguyen twice in 
November 2008.
32
  
8.35 A report by Adele Ferguson and Chris Vedalgo in the Fairfax press suggested 
that upon Mr Nguyen's return from suspension in late 2008 he was placed under 
supervision and his Statements of Advice were vetted before being provided to clients. 
Ms Ferguson and Mr Vedalgo report that on 22 December 2009, Mr Nguyen was 
notified that his advice to clients would no longer need to be vetted before being sent 
to clients.
33
 This report, if accurate, would suggest that not only did Mr Nguyen 
remain in direct contact with clients as a senior planner, but also that any heightened 
supervision to which he was subject following his return from suspension was 
temporary.  
8.36 Asked why the CBA did not make a breach report to ASIC when Mr Nguyen 
was first suspended in September 2008, the CBA told the committee that the findings 
from the investigation at the time were 'inconclusive'. While acknowledging 
'the decisions made around' the investigation of Mr Nguyen in September 2008 and 
his subsequent return to work were 'the wrong decisions', the CBA did not directly 
concede that it should have made a breach report to ASIC at the time.
34
 
CBA's actions between Mr Nguyen's promotion and his forced resignation 
8.37 According to Mr Morris, between Mr Nguyen's return from suspension in 
October 2008 and his forced resignation in mid-2009, Mr Nguyen set about sanitising 
client files 'literally liquid paper bottle in hand, with a little help from his two 
servicing planners'.
35
 At the same time, Mr Nguyen continued to mislead and deceive 
clients. This included an episode in late 2008 where Mr Nguyen missed the team's 
Christmas party because: 
…he and his two servicing planners were busy trying to stitch up a 93 year 
old with $1.6 million to invest for a $32,000 [2% flat] advice fee. It goes 
without saying that no financial planner with a shred of decency to them 
would have contemplated acting this way.
36
 
8.38 Frustrated by what they regarded as a CFPL management cover-up of 
Mr Nguyen's activities (and, as discussed in the next chapter, by ASIC's failure to act 
on their information) in May 2009 the CFPL whistleblowers provided their 
information to an Investor Daily journalist. The whistleblowers reasoned that: 
                                              
32  Ms Merilyn Swan, Submission 395, pp. 7–8,  
33  Adele Ferguson and Chris Vedalgo, 'Bank tried to hide documents from victims of banned 
planner', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 June 2013, p. 1.  
34  Mr David Cohen, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, pp. 23–24.  
35  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 15.  
36  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 14.  
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…going public would force CBA to act and go through the farce of a 
'voluntary disclosure' to ASIC of what they had long known. That hot 
potato dumped in their lap should in turn force ASIC [to] act.
37
 
8.39 Articles based on the whistleblowers' information were published by Investor 
Daily on 18 May 2009, 25 May 2009 and 22 June 2009. The article on 25 May named 
Mr Nguyen. Shortly after the publication of the 25 May article, Mr Nguyen was 
suspended from work. Mr Morris, meanwhile, reported his allegations regarding a 
CFPL management cover-up of Mr Nguyen's conduct to CBA Group Security on 
2 June 2009. On 4 June 2009, the CFPL whistleblowers also sent an anonymous email 
to CBA senior management (subsequently referred to as the 'Mallord' email, for the 
name that appeared in the sender's address) in an attempt to ensure the bank had no 
reason not to act.
38
 Mr Morris suggests that the whistleblowers' actions were 'the 
direct cause of Nguyen's forced "resignation" on 2 July 2009 and CBA's filing of a 
Breach Report with ASIC regarding Nguyen on 27 July 2009'.
39
 
8.40 Mr Nguyen resigned from CFPL on 6 July 2009, while still on suspension. 
In his letter of resignation, he denied any wrongdoing and cited ill health as the reason 
for resigning.
40
 Mr Morris alleged that Mr Nguyen was allowed to resign and receive 
payments from a generous CommInsure income protection policy (worth 75 per cent 
of his former salary) as a pay-off for not revealing what CFPL management had 
encouraged him to do since his first suspension.
41
   
8.41 Asked to what extent the CFPL breach report to ASIC regarding Mr Nguyen 
was prompted by the Investor Daily articles, the CBA told the committee: 
In reviewing the situation at that time, that was one contributing factor but 
not the sole one. There was already an investigation taking place and the 
information that actually came out allowed us to have some more 
information to follow up. So it was not the sole issue but it led to a 
combination of pieces of information.
42
 
8.42 According to ASIC's submission, when CFPL lodged its breach report 
regarding Mr Nguyen it indicated that it had conducted a review of 16 of Mr Nguyen's 
client files after receiving 'a couple of major complaints from clients'. The breach 
report, it implied, was prompted by this file review.
43
 The CBA did not refer to the 
                                              
37  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 15. 
38  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, pp. 17–18.  
39  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 21 (italics in source).  
40  A copy of Mr Nguyen's letter of resignation is attached to Submission 421.6. 
41  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 25.  
42  Ms Marianne Perkovic, Executive General Manager, Wealth Management Advice, CBA, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 22. 
43  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 9.  
Page 122  
 
internal disclosures of the whistleblowers, or the publication of the Investor Daily 
articles, as factors contributing to the decision to prepare the breach report.
44
  
CBA's characterisation of misconduct at CFPL as 'inappropriate advice' 
8.43 In its written submission, the CBA acknowledged that 'in the past a small 
number of its advisers, none of whom remain with CFPL, provided inappropriate 
advice to some customers'.
45
 
8.44 The CBA was challenged to defend its characterisation of the misconduct at 
CFPL as 'inappropriate advice' during its appearance before the committee. 
The CBA's group general counsel, Mr David Cohen, responded as follows: 
'Inappropriate' is the word we used because it covers the fact that in some 
cases advice was just not suitable for the client in question. 'Inappropriate' 
covers the fact that some of the behaviours, which I think you are alluding 
to, from some of our people just were not the appropriate behaviours, were 
not the behaviours that we expect and enforce today. As I said, the people, 
the structures and the culture just were not the right people, structures and 
cultures at the time, and we should have done better.
46
 
8.45 The CBA was further pressed on this issue, and asked why it had used the 
term 'inappropriate advice' in its submission when the chairman of the CBA, 
Mr David Turner, told shareholders at the CBA's 2013 annual general meeting that 
what had happened was 'shocking'. Mr Turner was further quoted as saying: 
There's no excuse for giving bad advice, absolutely no excuse. We had the 
wrong people giving the advice and the business was structured wrongly, 
and remunerated wrongly, and the culture was wrong.
47
 
8.46 At the committee's public hearing, the CBA conceded that 'some of the 
workings of [CFPL] were shocking'.
48
 It added that its use of the term 'inappropriate 
advice' did not mean that the CBA believed: 
…the circumstances that occurred should be treated lightly, and we 
certainly do not treat it lightly. We had taken the view—a very serious 
view—that we needed to substantially improve the business because it was 
not run the way it should have been run. There is no doubt about that. I do 
not wish to downplay for a second the fact that the impact on customers 
was severe…We do not treat lightly the fact that we did have poor systems, 
                                              
44  A copy of the breach report is attached to Submission 421.5. 
45  CBA, Submission 261, p. 3.  
46  Mr David Cohen, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 20. 
47  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 21. Mr Turner is quoted speaking at the CBA 
annual general meeting in Clancy Yeates, 'Rogue planner behaviour "shocking": CBA', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 8 November 2013. 
48  Mr David Cohen, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 21.  
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we did not have the right people and we did not have the right culture, as 
the chairman has said.
49
 
Pain and suffering resulting from the CFPL case 
8.47 As noted above, despite characterising the misconduct at CFPL as 
'inappropriate advice', the CBA acknowledged that the 'impact on [CFPL clients] was 
severe'. The evidence provided by a number of former CFPL clients drove home the 
extent of the harm caused, which went far beyond financial detriment. These clients 
spoke of being bullied by CFPL/the CBA, and described the stress and uncertainty 
that they and their families were subject to as a result of misconduct at CFPL.  
8.48 The personal toll that this misconduct had on clients was made clear in a 
submission from Mr and Mrs Mervyn and Robyn Blanch. Mrs Blanch was a client of 
Mr Nguyen, and between May 2007 and March 2009, Mrs Blanch's $260,000 
investment in an Allocation Pension portfolio prepared by Mr Nguyen was reduced to 
$92,000.
50
 In addition to outlining the financial losses they suffered, Mr and 
Mrs Blanch emphasised the distress they experienced in dealing with Mr Nguyen and 
other CFPL and CBA staff:  
Throughout our association with CBA/CFPL's staff and Nguyen we have 
been subjected to deliberate acts of fraud and deceptive and misleading 
conduct. We have been ignored, lied to, stonewalled, fobbed off, bullied, 
and sent fraudulent documentation by CFPL staff and CBA's senior 
management within Customer Relations. They actively tried to cover up 
Nguyen's activities, denying any knowledge of or liability for his conduct.
51
 
8.49 In her appearance before the committee, Mrs Braund relayed how the 
investment she and her husband made with CFPL coincided with the onset of 
Mr Braund's dementia. Mrs Braund told the committee that her husband had always 
taken care of their finances; as Mr Braund's dementia worsened, she relied on 
Mr Nguyen to act with honesty and integrity. However, Mr Nguyen failed to carry out 
her request that their investments be moved to cash in early 2007 and used a copy of 
Mrs Braund's signature to move the Braunds' money into high risk investments 
without her approval. Ultimately, this betrayal of trust meant that at the same time as 
Mrs Braund was caring for her dying husband, she was also forced to deal with a 
massive decline in the value of her investment and a bank that refused to acknowledge 
any wrongdoing or provide meaningful compensation: 
People's lives have been shattered. I have been scorned… 
                                              
49  Mr David Cohen, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 21. 
50  In addition to the submission from Mr and Mrs Blanch, their experience is outlined in a 
submission from their daughter, Ms Merilyn Swan, Submission 395. Ms Swan also gave 
evidence at a public hearing on 10 April 2014. 
51  Mr and Mrs Merv and Robyn Blanch, Submission 300, p. 1.  
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CBA has bullied me and they gave me this incredible feeling that, while 
I was dealing with Alan's dying, I still had to try to deal with them.
52
 
8.50 Mr Frazer McLennan, writing on behalf of his wife Gloria, who was a client 
of CFPL adviser Mr Chris Baker, described the effect on his wife of watching as her 
investment (which was placed in an aggressive portfolio without her knowledge) 
rapidly declined in value: 
[M]uch of Gloria's anguish is caused by her deep down to the bone sense of 
fairness. She endeavours to make everything fair for all in any situation, 
and sometimes to her detriment. In this case her sense of fairness is being 
challenged, and it's not fair what Commonwealth Financial Planning is 
doing, and it does her head in, which does 'us' harm as well. They are being 
corporate bullies trying to wear down individuals who they have done 
wrong.
53
  
Committee view 
8.51 The committee notes that in a limited way the CBA has acknowledged that 
there were problems in its financial advice business, and expressed regret that some of 
its customers were affected by 'inappropriate advice' received from a 'small number' 
of CFPL advisers. The CBA has also acknowledged that it mishandled the Nguyen 
matter, at least with respect to the CFPL investigation of his compliance failures in 
2008 and his subsequent return to CFPL in October 2008 after a short period of 
suspension.  
8.52 These modest acknowledgements aside, the committee believes that the 
CBA's characterisation of the misconduct at CFPL as 'inappropriate advice' provided 
by 'a small number' of CFPL advisers, deliberately and grossly understates the extent 
of the wrongdoing within CFPL. The committee believes the phrase 'inappropriate 
advice' comprehensively fails to capture the deceptive and misleading conduct of 
CFPL financial advisers. Indeed, the committee heard compelling evidence that client 
signatures were forged and/or misused by CFPL financial advisers, and while the 
committee reserves judgement on whether this activity would provide a basis for 
criminal action, it suggests that to characterise such activity as 'inappropriate' is, 
in itself, entirely inappropriate. Further, the phrase 'inappropriate advice' does not 
capture the systemic failures in the CFPL's business operations, including the 
ineffective compliance regime and toxic sales-based culture fostered by flawed 
remuneration arrangements. 
8.53 The committee also notes that the phrase 'inappropriate advice' stands in stark 
contrast to the admission by the chairman of the CBA, Mr David Turner, that what 
happened at CFPL was 'shocking', and that there was 'absolutely no excuse' for the 
way the business was operated (see Box 8.1). 
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Box 8.1: 'Inappropriate advice' or 'shocking' conduct? 
'CFP acknowledges that in the past a small number of its Advisers, none of whom 
remain with CFP, provided inappropriate advice to some customers'. 
Source: Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group, Submission 261, p. 4.  
The submission was provided to the committee on 11 November 2013. 
'What we did was shocking. There's no excuse for giving bad advice, absolutely no 
excuse. We had the wrong people giving the wrong advice and the business was 
structured wrongly, and remunerated wrongly, and the culture was wrong'. 
Source: Mr David Turner, chairman of the CBA, speaking at the CBA's 
2013 AGM on 8 November 2013, as quoted in Clancy Yeates, 'Rogue 
planner behaviour "shocking": CBA', Sydney Morning Herald, 
8 November 2013, www.smh.com.au. 
8.54 Moreover, the committee remains unconvinced by the CBA's explanation of 
the circumstances surrounding Mr Nguyen's promotion in October 2008 to the 
position of senior planner. While the CBA acknowledged the decision to promote 
Mr Nguyen was wrong, it explained that the reasoning at the time was that in his new 
role Mr Nguyen would be subject to higher levels of supervision. The CBA's 
explanation for Mr Nguyen's promotion is nonsense. Beyond the fact that 
Mr Nguyen's poor practices were already well established by 2008 (indeed, he had 
been rated a 'critical risk' by the CBA in 2006), there is little evidence that upon his 
return to CFPL in October 2008 Mr Nguyen was placed under heightened supervision 
for a prolonged period. The committee believes Mr Morris's explanation for 
Mr Nguyen's promotion is far more convincing: that is, CFPL management decided 
it would be easier to 'hose down' client complaints, and generally minimise the CBA's 
exposure to compensation claims, if Mr Nguyen remained a CFPL adviser. 
 
  
 
Chapter 9 
Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited: 
ASIC's investigations of misconduct at CFPL 
9.1 As noted in the previous chapter, the committee received evidence from a 
number of CFPL clients and their representatives who contend that ASIC's handling 
of the CFPL matter was inadequate. In varying degrees, these witnesses argued that 
ASIC: 
 erred in not publicly revealing that it had undertaken a surveillance project in 
relation to CFPL between 2007 to 2008 or that the problems revealed by this 
surveillance led to the imposition of the Continuous Improvement 
Compliance Program (CICP) in April 2008—this non-disclosure, it is 
suggested, left existing and future CFPL clients exposed to losses that might 
otherwise have been prevented;  
 was slow to respond to whistleblower information about misconduct at CFPL, 
resulting in further losses to unsuspecting clients and enabling CFPL/the CBA 
to cover-up the extent of the misconduct at CFPL and thereby deny fair and 
reasonable compensation to victims; and 
 has generally acted in a way that has privileged the interests of CFPL/the 
CBA over the interests of affected CFPL clients, and failed to provide 
adequate information or support to those clients. 
9.2 Also, the CICP implemented in April 2008 proved to be an inadequate 
response to the misconduct at CFPL, and one that placed too much store in the ability 
and willingness of CFPL/the CBA to address the problems that had been detected 
effectively. These complaints and the conduct of ASIC's investigations into 
misconduct at CFPL are explored further in this chapter.  
9.3 The related complaint that ASIC put in place an inadequate and inappropriate 
enforceable undertaking with CFPL in 2011, and that this has enabled CFPL/the CBA 
to manipulate the process of compensating affected CFPL clients, is considered in the 
next two chapters. 
The 2007–08 surveillance project 
9.4 ASIC suggested in its first written submission that it had long been alert to 
potential problems with the quality of advice being provided by the financial planning 
industry in Australia. ASIC's concerns in this regard, it wrote, had prompted it 
to initiate surveillance projects on three of the largest industry participants in 
Australia: CFPL, AMP and Professional Investment Services. ASIC's surveillance 
project in relation to CFPL commenced in February 2007 and was completed in 
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February 2008. The project involved interviews with various CFPL staff and the 
review of 496 pieces of advice provided by 51 advisers.
1
 
9.5 According to ASIC, its surveillance of CFPL was not intended to identify 
problem advisers, but rather to 'examine the quality of advice and processes overall 
within CFPL'. Its surveillance found: 
…significant concerns in relation to supervision, file review procedures, 
advice templates, breach reporting, record keeping and compliance, and 
significant and widespread problems with the quality of advice.
2
 
9.6 It is worth noting that the import of this surveillance project is contested: 
ASIC, on the one hand, suggested that the project (and others undertaken in relation to 
AMP and Professional Investment Services) 'ultimately led to enforceable 
undertakings with all three firms'. Mr Morris, by contrast, suggested that CFPL 
believed ASIC had given it the 'all clear' at the end of the surveillance project 
(as discussed further below). The enforceable undertaking referred to in ASIC's 
submission was put in place on 26 October 2011. 
9.7  Putting aside the degree to which the surveillance project 'ultimately led' to 
the enforceable undertaking in October 2011, the immediate outcome of the 
surveillance project was that in February 2008 ASIC wrote to the CBA advising it of 
the problems detected by the surveillance project and the concerns ASIC had about 
the CFPL business.
3
 
9.8 Following a request from the committee at a public hearing on 10 April 2014, 
ASIC provided the committee with a copy of the letter it sent to CFPL on 
29 February 2008. The content of the letter is consistent with the summary ASIC 
provided in its submission of the surveillance project findings but for one important 
fact: ASIC had not previously mentioned that, in addition to CFPL, the surveillance 
project also focused on the operations of another CBA subsidiary, Financial Wisdom 
Limited (FWL). The advice provided by FWL, and in particular by Mr Rollo Sherriff 
(an adviser at the Cairns-based financial advisory firm, Meridien Wealth, which was a 
subsidiary of FWL), was addressed as part of a recent joint Four Corners and Fairfax 
Media investigation.
4
 Following this public disclosure, ASIC provided the committee 
with a supplementary submission explaining that it had conducted an investigation of 
Mr Sherriff's conduct, but had decided against taking any enforcement action against 
him. This supplementary submission, however, makes no mention of ASIC's 
                                              
1  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 6.  
2  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 6.  
3  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 6.  
4  Adele Ferguson and Mario Christodoulou, 'Rollo Sherriff and Meridien Wealth: How a 
rock-solid institution backed the wrong planner', Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 2014, 
Business News, p. 1. 
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surveillance of FWL in 2007–08.5 The May 2014 revelations about CFPL and FWL 
are discussed further in Chapter 12. 
9.9 ASIC's February 2008 letter to the CFPL referred to a number of compliance 
failures and other shortcomings in the CBA's financial advice business (specifically, 
CFPL and FWL), including:  
 numerous weaknesses in the CBA's compliance framework, which ASIC 
concluded was not adequate to allow the CBA to comply with the 
requirements of paragraph 912A(1)(ca) of the Corporations Act;  
 apparent failures in the CBA's Risk Matrix system in assessing the quality of 
advice and compliance of financial advisers, such that ASIC was 'concerned 
with how your policy is implemented and accordingly, your ability to ensure 
your representatives are complying with the law'; 
 widespread failures to maintain required documentation within client files and 
other significant record keeping failures, including missing or deficient 
Financial Needs Analysis and Statement of Advice documents;  
 inadequate procedures for managing advisers who had been given the highest 
risk rating by the CBA, and insufficient evidence that poor compliance ratings 
had any impact on the bonuses an adviser received; and 
 evidence suggesting a correlation between the CBA's tolerance of 
non-compliance on the part of an adviser and the amount of revenue that an 
adviser was generating for the business (as noted in the previous chapter).
6
  
9.10 In its letter to the CFPL, ASIC also noted that only seven of 38 CBA 
representatives who had been rated as 'critical' by the CBA's Risk Matrix were 
reported to ASIC under s912D of the [Corporations Act], one of which was after the 
surveillance had commenced. ASIC wrote: 
Given the seriousness of the conduct, we have concerns about CBA's ability 
to discharge their obligation to report significant breaches under s912D of 
the Act.
7
 
9.11 ASIC expressed particular concern that many of the problems it identified in 
its surveillance project had previously been 'put to CBA in 2006, after a smaller 
surveillance was undertaken of CFPL's Bankstown branch and FWL's Cairns 
branches'. These recurring concerns included the non-completion or poor quality of 
Financial Needs Analysis and Statement of Advice documents, and the failure 
to report significant compliance breaches to ASIC as required by section 912D of the 
Corporations Act. ASIC stated: 
                                              
5  ASIC, Submission 45.8. 
6  ASIC, letter to Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited and Financial Wisdom Limited, 
29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, pp. 1–5. 
7  ASIC, letter to CFPL and FWL, 29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 4. 
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Despite assurances from CBA in May 2006 that CBA had overhauled its 
compliance arrangements and the suggestion that many of ASIC's concerns 
were historical, we have reason to believe, on the basis of our findings in 
this Surveillance, that our concerns are ongoing.
8
 
9.12 Finally, ASIC concluded its letter to the CFPL by indicating that it was 
considering what action to take in relation to its findings. It further stated that the 
purpose of the letter was 'to give CBA an opportunity to put to ASIC a proposal that 
will satisfactorily address these issues.'
9
 
The Continuous Improvement Compliance Program 
9.13 In April 2008, CFPL implemented the CICP in response to ASIC's concerns. 
According to ASIC, the CICP was 'also intended to address problems identified by 
CFPL in a number of reviews it had undertaken itself, including reviews using an 
external firm'. The CICP consisted of eight work streams overseen by a CICP project 
steering committee within CFPL: strategy and risk framework; breach/incident 
reporting; advice documentation; systems and management reporting; operating 
structure; people and culture; retrospective analysis; and adviser competence and 
supervision. The CICP project steering committee met with ASIC on a monthly basis 
to discuss the project.
10
  
9.14  The findings of ASIC's 2007–08 surveillance project and the subsequent 
implementation of the CICP were not made public at the time. This was, ASIC 
explained in its submission, consistent with ASIC's then practice of not making public 
comment on regulatory matters. Appearing before the committee, ASIC further 
explained that the view at ASIC in 2008 was that if a matter was not made public 
'there was more chance of negotiating a good outcome from the entity involved' 
without a protracted legal battle. When the CICP was implemented, ASIC also 
reasoned that given the quality of financial advice was poor across the industry 
(affecting as much as 20 per cent of the market, according to ASIC's intelligence and 
analysis) it might have been unfair to publicly single out CFPL.
11
 
9.15 In her submission, Ms Swan was highly critical of ASIC's decision not to 
release the findings of its surveillance project and 'warn investors of this grave 
situation' at CFPL.
12
 
9.16 ASIC conceded that the decision not to publicly announce the surveillance 
project findings and the subsequent CICP was a mistake. While the decision was 
                                              
8  ASIC, letter to CFPL and FWL, 29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 5. 
9  ASIC, letter to CFPL and FWL, 29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 5. 
10  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 6. 
11  Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader, Deposit Takers, Credit and Insurance Providers, 
ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 74.  
12  Ms Merilyn Swan, Submission 395, p. 18.  
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consistent with ASIC's approach to such matters at the time, ASIC emphasised that, 
were the surveillance and subsequent enforcement action to take place today, ASIC 
would make this public: 
That was one of the other learnings. At the time, there was not sufficient 
public transparency around the continuous improvement compliance 
program, and the concerns that ASIC had at that time around CFP's advice 
were not announced publicly. As a matter of course, that would now be a 
public announcement with all the implications of that in terms of putting on 
additional pressure and public expectations, allowing committees like this 
to ask how things are going. So that is one aspect of an action today that 
would help to ensure that it progressed more effectively.
13
  
Failure of the CICP to prompt the necessary change at CFPL 
9.17 Evidence received by the committee, particularly from Mr Morris, indicated 
the CICP was regarded by staff at CFPL (including compliance staff) with an attitude 
that could be described as anything between indifference and contempt.   
9.18 Mr Morris was damning in his appraisal of both ASIC's surveillance project, 
which he suggested took too long to gather too little information, and the resulting 
CICP, which, in his view, had no substantive effect on how CFPL conducted its 
business: 
[T]hey took a year to look at it, which is an awful long time to just be there 
gathering intelligence. They looked at 500 pieces of advice from 
50 planners. Well, that should not take 12 months. Then they took another 
couple of months in April 2008. That is when they decided to have the 
much vaunted CICP program. I was in that business for years and I could 
not perceive any impact from that program. Leaving that [aside], if they 
commenced that program in April 2008, as they say, and yet 3½ years later, 
in October 2011, ASIC find it is necessary to go to an enforceable 
undertaking, what were they doing for those 3½ years of that CICP 
process?
14
 
9.19 The experience of Mr Morris, as relayed in both his written submissions and 
oral evidence, is instructive in terms of the apparent indifference at CFPL to the CICP. 
Mr Morris's induction as an employee of CFPL in March/April 2008 roughly 
coincided with the conclusion of the surveillance project and the implementation of 
the CICP. According to Mr Morris, he was told by a manager during his induction that 
ASIC had just undertaken a full review of CFPL and given it a 'clean bill of health'. 
While the manager in question did not refer to the surveillance project and the CICP 
specifically, Mr Morris has since concluded that this is what the manager was 
referring to. The view that ASIC had effectively given CFPL the 'all clear' and that the 
CICP largely reflected this was, in Mr Morris' opinion, widespread at CFPL: 
                                              
13  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 68.  
14  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 44.  
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I suspect that perusal of the actual ASIC 'findings' of February 2008 and 
notes of the monthly meetings of the 'steering committee' of their 'CICP' 
process will show a fairly detached, theoretical and leisurely approach to 
any problems found.
15
 
9.20 Mr Morris also argued that, from what he was able to observe personally, 
the CICP led to no meaningful change in how the CFPL conducted its business. 
According to Mr Morris, even compliance managers at CFPL were indifferent to 
meeting the objectives of the CICP. Mr Morris referred to the experience of one of his 
fellow whistleblowers to demonstrate the point:  
One of the other whistleblowers was one of the planners who was reviewed. 
I think I put in my submission that he was asked to change a few things in a 
couple of financial plans and a couple of months later he went to give it to 
the compliance manager who said, 'Don't worry about it. ASIC's lost 
interest and gone away.' Nobody took it seriously, I suspect.
16
 
9.21 Highlighting the apparent indifference at CFPL to the CICP, evidence 
received by the committee during the inquiry indicated that the CBA Board likely had 
minimal or no awareness of the CICP. In its written submission, ASIC suggested that 
the CICP 'had a very senior project steering committee that reported both to the Board 
of CFPL and the Board of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia'.
17
 However, 
in response to questions from the committee, the CBA confirmed that the CBA Board 
had little if any visibility of the CICP. The CICP was, the CBA told the committee, 
initiated by the CFPL management team and neither required CBA Board approval 
nor operated under CBA Board oversight. The CBA further informed the committee 
that a review of the minutes of the CBA Board and its sub-committees suggested the 
CICP was first mentioned to the Board on 9 July 2009 (15 months after it was 
implemented) as part of a broader presentation on the CBA's financial advice 
business. The only other reference to the CICP in Board papers that the CBA could 
find was in a paper considered by the Board on 9 August 2011, which updated the 
Board on an internal audit report and regulator concerns regarding parts of the 
Colonial First State advice business. The reference to the CICP in that paper seems 
to have been a passing one in a paragraph outlining the history of regulatory issues at 
CFPL.
18
   
9.22 Regardless of the level of CBA oversight of the CICP, ASIC acknowledged 
that it should have moved toward an enforceable undertaking from CFPL sooner, 
rather than relying on CFPL's ability to 'identify and rectify all the problems that 
                                              
15  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 337, p. 2.  
16  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 44.  
17  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 6.  
18  CBA, answer to question on notice, no. 9 (received 24 April 2014), p. 6.  
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started to emerge'.
19
 ASIC told the committee that ultimately the latter approach, as 
pursued through the CICP: 
…did not prove effective. It was not proving effective over time, and whilst 
it possibly was reasonable to try that initially, we should have cut that short 
earlier. We should have monitored it more closely and put tougher time 
limits on it and tougher testing of the monitoring all along the way and 
made a decision earlier to give up on that process and move to the tougher 
enforceable undertaking process.
20
 
9.23 The CBA itself conceded that the CICP failed to address the problems at 
CFPL, and suggested that ASIC was likely justified in eventually determining that the 
CICP was failing to achieve its objectives. Mr Cohen told the committee: 
My impression is that, as [the CICP] progressed, ASIC increasingly felt 
uncomfortable around the business's ability to actually achieve the desired 
outcomes. That was my impression, that it was a gradual sense that came 
upon ASIC. I think, in fairness to ASIC and with the benefit of hindsight, 
that they had grounds for that concern. I do think that the CICP did not 
achieve what it was designed to achieve as quickly as it was designed to be 
achieved. That, I think, dawned upon ASIC as the matter progressed.
21
 
ASIC's handling of reports of misconduct at CFPL 
9.24 ASIC's acknowledgement that it should have 'monitored [the CICP] more 
closely and put tougher time limits on it' is particularly telling in light of the 
17 months that elapsed between the whistleblowers contacting ASIC and ASIC 
moving toward formal enforcement action against CFPL. Indeed, one of the most 
important issues raised in this inquiry was why it took ASIC until March 2010 to form 
the view, as it puts it, that 'the CFPL matter needed to move from a cooperation 
resolution of concerns to a formal enforcement action with set timeframes and 
documents produced under notice'.
22
     
9.25 On 30 October 2008, seven months after the CICP was agreed, the CFPL 
whistleblowers made their first report to ASIC. In an anonymous fax, signed 'the three 
ferrets', Mr Morris and two of his colleagues detailed information regarding 
Mr Nguyen's misconduct and what they considered was a CFPL management cover 
up of that misconduct.
23
 The CFPL whistleblowers concluded their fax to ASIC with a 
                                              
19  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 68. 
20  Mr Greg Kirk, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 67.  
21  Mr David Cohen, General Counsel and Group Executive, Group Corporate Affairs, CBA, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 31.  
22  ASIC, answer to question on notice, Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Estimates,  
4–6 June 2013, no. 180 (received 17 October 2013). 
23  Of the three whistleblowers, only Mr Morris's identity has been revealed publicly. Mr Morris 
reports that one of the whistleblowers passed away at the age of 35; the other has elected to 
remain anonymous. Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 31. 
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warning that the client files that could shed light on Mr Nguyen's misconduct were in 
the process of being sanitised by Mr Nguyen and his assistants:  
The client files will basically tell the story—as they did for the internal 
compliance people. There is some urgency in securing them as they are 
being 'cleaned up'.
24
 
9.26 According to Mr Morris, the whistleblowers had expected ASIC to 'turn up 
with a warrant to seize the files'. When that did not happen, the whistleblowers 
followed up their fax with a series of anonymous emails urging action: 
However as the days passed with no sign of a fire breathing regulator on the 
doorstep, we decided to follow up ASIC by email. Weeks turned into 
months. Email followed email. ASIC said they were investigating. But if 
that were so, why hadn't they seized the files?
25
 
9.27 In early December 2008, ASIC raised concerns about Mr Nguyen with CFPL, 
and requested that CFPL provide information on Mr Nguyen at a CICP meeting 
scheduled for 18 December 2008. Mr Nguyen's conduct was discussed at that 
meeting, and, according to ASIC, the CFPL advised in a follow-up communication 
that: 
…four complaints had been received about Mr Nguyen, three of these had 
been resolved and CFPL was dealing with the remaining client, who had 
legal representation. CFPL also advised that Mr Nguyen was being closely 
supervised and his advice vetted prior to being provided.
26
 
9.28 Mr Nguyen's conduct was discussed at subsequent CICP meetings. ASIC 
acknowledged in its submission that while it informed the whistleblowers that their 
complaints were under consideration, it did not inform them of how the matter was 
being handled or the broader work being undertaken in relation to CFPL.
27
 In this 
respect, ASIC's account is consistent with evidence from Mr Morris, who noted that in 
March 2009, in response to a query as to the progress of their complaint, the 
whistleblowers were simply told the 'issues are still currently being considered'.
28
 
9.29 In his submission, Mr Morris noted that after Mr Nguyen's resignation in 
July 2009, the CFPL whistleblowers were basically left exposed at CFPL, with ASIC 
apparently unwilling to take meaningful action against the organisation: 
The Ferrets survived for the time being. The hostility from CFP managers 
towards us was pretty clear. It was an incredibly stressful situation. Aside 
from trying to survive in a hostile environment to continue gathering 
information, ASIC's indolence had forced us to basically expose ourselves 
                                              
24  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 13.  
25  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 14.  
26  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 8.  
27  ASIC, Submission 45, p. 8. 
28  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421.3, p. 1.  
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[both CFP & Nguyen would easily work out who was behind the Investor 
Daily articles] and we had been concerned from the start about Nguyen's 
mental state. I always took special care when walking to my car in the 
underground carpark.
29
 
9.30 Mr Morris further reported that at the end of 2009, one of the whistleblowers 
left CFPL, 'suffering acutely from the stress of the situation'. Mr Morris's 
fellow-whistleblower had, according to Mr Morris, found the 'interrogation by [CBA] 
Group Security' particularly stressful.
30
 
9.31 By March 2010, exasperated by ASIC's apparent inaction in relation to the 
information they had provided, and frustrated by what they regarded as the CBA's 
ongoing efforts to cheat CFPL clients out of proper compensation, the whistleblowers 
visited ASIC's office. Mr Morris wrote: 
ASIC tries to imply that they instigated this meeting. Whilst it is literally 
true that they invited us to 'come in from the cold' and meet with them, this 
invitation was only in response to persistent follow ups from us. We knew 
we could have gone in at any time. We did not do so earlier because of our 
concerns about Nguyen and ASIC's ability to keep a secret. We would have 
preferred all along to remain anonymous. We went in when we did because 
we despaired of ever getting ASIC moving otherwise, because our cover 
was blown anyway and because not even our actions in mid 2009 had 
succeeded in getting through to them.
31
 
9.32 According to Mr Morris, the whistleblowers were told by ASIC during their 
first meeting that from that day forward, they had whistleblower protection (under the 
Corporations Act), but that it 'wouldn't be worth much'. The meaning of this comment 
specifically, and the inadequacies of the current whistleblower protections generally, 
are explored further in Chapter 14.     
9.33 In their meeting with ASIC on 24 February 2010, the whistleblowers again 
urged ASIC to seize CFPL client files, 'which were still being worked on'. Mr Morris 
noted that they also offered their inside knowledge to help ASIC understand how 
client files had been manipulated; this offer, he pointed out, was never taken up.
32
  
9.34 Independent of the actions by the CFPL whistleblowers, in March 2010 
Maurice Blackburn launched the first of a number of court actions in the NSW 
Supreme Court against CFPL. The institution of proceedings was reported in the 
                                              
29  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 27.  
30  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 27.  
31  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 28.  
32  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Submission 421, p. 28. 
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press, and Maurice Blackburn was advised that within 24 hours ASIC 'raided' CFPL's 
premises and confiscated documents and computer records.
33
 
9.35 On 24 March 2010, ASIC notified CFPL that it required the 'immediate 
production of documents relating to Mr Nguyen'.
34
 In an answer to a question on 
notice from Senate estimates in June 2013, provided on 17 October 2013, ASIC 
clarified that immediate production was required for client list and audit trail data 
(a section 19 notice), while CFPL was given until 9 April 2010 to hand over client 
files (a section 33 notice).
35
  
9.36 Mr Morris was critical of the decision to give CFPL two weeks to hand over 
client files, suggesting this provided CFPL with time to undertake a final 'clean up' of 
the files. He also noted that only 79 client files were handed over to ASIC on 
9 April 2010, with 423 files identified as missing. The fact that 139 of those 423 files 
were subsequently located and provided to ASIC on 17 June 2010 was, according to 
Mr Morris, more cause for suspicion. It should have been obvious to ASIC, he argued, 
that CFPL had used the extra time to 'work on these files'—that is, to further sanitise 
them.
36
 
9.37 Upon review of Mr Nguyen's files, on 19 July 2010 ASIC referred a brief on 
Mr Nguyen to a delegate for consideration of banning action. Several days later, ASIC 
meet with CFPL, and CFPL gave a commitment to remediate former clients of 
Mr Nguyen. As discussed in the next chapter, from August to October 2010, 
negotiations took place between CFPL and ASIC regarding the compensation process 
that would be put in place to this end.
37
 
9.38 ASIC's submission does not relate the exact sequence of events that led it 
to serve notices on CFPL requiring the production of documents. Nor does it shed any 
light on what role, if any, the whistleblower information or the action by Maurice 
Blackburn played in ASIC's decision-making. Rather, ASIC's submission simply 
reported: 'Following the work carried out in 2008 and 2009, ASIC made a decision in 
March 2010 that the matter should be dealt with by its Enforcement team'.
38
  
9.39 In addition to criticism from Mr Morris and former CFPL clients, ASIC's 
apparent lack of responsiveness to the misconduct at CFPL was heavily criticised by 
the Rule of Law Institute. ASIC's mishandling of the whistleblower disclosures, 
                                              
33  Mr John Berrill, Lawyer and Principal, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee 
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argued the Institute, allowed the misconduct at CFPL to continue, and by extension 
meant that CFPL clients lost more money than they otherwise would have: 
The history of the Commonwealth Bank's whistleblowers, who alerted 
ASIC to allegations of corruption within the CBA in October 2008, as 
described in a number of newspaper articles by investigative journalists 
Adele Ferguson and Chris Vedelago, is sobering. The extensive delays in 
responding to the concerns appropriately with enforcement action and 
providing the public information as self-described by ASIC in its 
submission enabled corrupt practices to continue and vulnerable consumers 
to lose more.
39
 
9.40 ASIC conceded that it should have been more active in following up with the 
CFPL whistleblowers:  
When we got that contact from the whistleblowers, we should have been 
back in contact with them, seeking more information straight away. 
[…] 
We acknowledge in our submission that that should have been done and did 
not happen. We have taken steps subsequently to make sure that in future a 
different approach will be taken.
40
 
9.41 Asked whether ASIC would handle the problem of CFPL differently today, 
ASIC told the committee: 
Under current ASIC operations we would not be in the very awkward 
position of having a non-public broad program [that is, the CICP] in place 
that we could not discuss with whistleblowers when they contacted us 
because we had not made it public. So we would not have been carrying 
that baggage to begin with. We would now go back to those whistleblowers 
very quickly, get more information from them and focus in on that issue.
41
 
9.42 As discussed in Chapter 14, ASIC also informed the committee that one of the 
key lessons it had taken from the CFPL matter was that it needs to improve how it 
communicates with whistleblowers and handles the information they provide. As a 
result, ASIC has put in place new processes relating to whistleblowers (again, these 
changes are discussed further in Chapter 14). 
9.43 ASIC told the committee that the information it received from the 
whistleblowers about Mr Nguyen in October 2008 was in part integrated into its 
broader program of monitoring the CFPL—a process that ASIC conceded 'did not end 
up working adequately'. However, ASIC also followed up with CFPL about 
Mr Nguyen specifically. Discussing this process, ASIC told the committee that it now 
recognised that it placed too much faith in the capacity of the CFPL to address these 
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concerns. With regard to the whistleblower information on Mr Nguyen provided on 
30 October 2008, ASIC advised that: 
…within a month [it] confronted Commonwealth Financial Planning about 
Nguyen and asked for documents and various materials on Nguyen. We 
were given information on Nguyen and told that Nguyen was being 
addressed and that there was a program to look at the complaints that had 
been made and compensate people if necessary. Again, within the broader 
program that is the sort of thing that we were expecting them to do. Again, 
we put too much faith in them to do that well, and they did not do that as 
well as they should have. I think on their own evidence [the CBA] would 
acknowledge that.
42
 
9.44 The 'faith' that ASIC placed in CFPL/the CBA was discussed by critics of 
ASIC's handling of the CFPL matter. In his written submission, Mr Morris posited 
that ASIC's 'incredible reluctance' to act on evidence of malfeasance at CFPL was 
likely a function of ASIC's genuine belief that 'everything was fine with the big 
players' in the financial advice industry.
43
 Similarly, Ms Swan suggested that ASIC 
was too close to large financial institutions such as the CBA and was, therefore, 
poorly placed to police potential misconduct: 
There seems to be an incredibly cosy relationship between the CBA, ASIC 
and the financial institutions. ASIC has just depended on the large financial 
institutions saying, 'Everything is okay; you do not have to worry.'
44
 
Committee view 
9.45 The committee notes that ASIC has acknowledged the shortcomings of the 
Continuous Improvement Compliance Program, and that all parties now accept that 
the CICP failed to rectify the serious problems with the quality of advice and 
standards of practice at CFPL. Nonetheless, the committee is concerned that at the 
time of providing its first written submission in August 2013, ASIC appeared 
to believe that the CICP had been subject to oversight from the CBA Board. Evidence 
from the CBA would suggest that whatever formal reporting lines existed between the 
CICP steering committee and the CBA Board, in practice the Board effectively had no 
oversight or ongoing awareness of the CICP.  
9.46 The committee also believes that ASIC's suggestion that the surveillance 
project undertaken between February 2007 and February 2008 'ultimately led' to the 
enforceable undertaking accepted by ASIC in October 2011 needs to be heavily 
qualified. In particular, the committee notes that in the first instance the surveillance 
project led to an inadequate outcome: the CICP. Moreover, evidence received by the 
committee would suggest that information from a number of other sources, not least 
the CFPL whistleblowers, may have been more decisive than ASIC's surveillance in 
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2007–08 in leading to the enforceable undertaking. While the committee 
acknowledges that the intelligence gathered from the 2007–08 surveillance project 
may well have informed the subsequent decision by ASIC to seek an enforceable 
undertaking, it believes that the suggestion the project 'ultimately led' to the 
enforceable undertaking overstates the degree to which ASIC recognised the 
seriousness of the problems at CFPL prior to the CFPL whistleblowers forcing 
the issue.  
9.47 Evidence received during this inquiry has underlined ASIC's poor handling of 
the CFPL whistleblowers and the information they provided. The committee regards 
the fact that it took ASIC nearly 17 months to take meaningful action in response to 
the information provided by the CFPL whistleblowers as a significant failure on the 
part of the corporate regulator. Having said that, the committee notes that ASIC has 
itself acknowledged its failures in this regard, both in terms of taking too long to move 
toward an enforceable undertaking (the terms and outcome of which are considered in 
the next two chapters) and in terms of its handling of the CFPL whistleblowers and 
the information they provided. The committee also notes advice from ASIC 
(discussed, along with the broader issue of Australia's corporate whistleblowing 
framework, in Chapter 14) that it has since reviewed its whistleblower processes.  
9.48 So far in its examination of the CFPL episode, the committee has found that 
the conduct of some financial advisers was unethical, dishonest, well below 
professional standards and a grievous breach of their duty of care to their clients. 
The way in which they targeted vulnerable trusting people and placed conservative 
investors in high-risk products showed a callous disregard for their clients' interests. 
ASIC's slow response and the CFPL's apparent preoccupation with its own difficulties 
added to the damage that resulted. That a major and reputable financial institution 
could have tolerated for so long conduct that involved bad advice, poor record 
keeping, missing or incomplete client files as well as allegations of forged documents 
is not easy to accept. ASIC's lack of attention and action is also hard to explain. 
  
  
 
Chapter 10 
Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited: 
ASIC's enforcement action 
10.1 This chapter continues the consideration of the CFPL matter by assessing the 
adequacy and effectiveness of ASIC's enforcement actions against individual advisers 
and the organisation since 2010. In particular, this assessment considers whether the 
enforceable undertaking from CFPL that ASIC accepted in October 2011 was an 
appropriate and sufficient response to the misconduct at CFPL, and whether it has led 
to positive changes in the way CFPL now conducts its business. 
Adequacy of ASIC's enforcement actions against individual advisers 
10.2 There was some discussion in the course of the inquiry regarding the 
enforcement actions ASIC took against individual CFPL advisers, and whether the 
sanctions against these advisers were adequate given the severity of their misconduct. 
Consideration was also given to whether the fact that only eight advisers were subject 
to ASIC's enforcement action accurately reflected the number of CFPL staff 
implicated in the misconduct. As noted in the previous chapter, five advisers received 
bans of varying duration, and three provided an enforceable undertaking removing 
themselves from the industry for a certain period. While Mr Awkar and Mr Gillespie 
received permanent bans, Mr Nguyen was only banned for seven years. Asked 
whether the seven-year ban imposed on Mr Nguyen was adequate, ASIC responded: 
I think the best way to respond to that is not to comment in relation to one 
individual planner but the overall outcomes: the compensation program, the 
eight—it is now up to eight—planners who have been banned in one sense 
or another, the tens of millions of dollars that the Commonwealth Bank has 
had to expend fixing its procedures, the entire new leadership and so on and 
so forth. If you put all that together, we think it is a very important 
outcome, allowing for the fact of those lessons that we have been talking 
about in some detail that we could have done better.
1
 
10.3 Asked if advisers other than those subject to ASIC enforcement action might 
have been involved in misconduct, the CBA responded:  
[O]nce issues were known and we did have a list of advisers, the business 
actually did go back and review all of the advisers, and that came up with a 
number of advisers that we did have concerns about. We then used an 
independent accounting firm to help us determine any patterns and they 
used some forensic techniques. That led to the total number of advisers that 
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we did have concerns about which was 19 and that included Nguyen and 
Awkar.
2
 
10.4 The CBA told the committee that some of these cases remained under review. 
10.5 In its written submission, the CBA advised that in addition to the CFPL 
advisers named in media articles and subject to ASIC enforcement action, CFPL had 
'terminated a number of other Advisers whose advice standards did not meet the level 
required by the CFP'.
3
 Asked how many staff had left CFPL following the revelations 
of misconduct at CFPL and subsequent ASIC enforcement actions, the CBA told the 
committee that: 
…a number of people left the business over the period as part of the change 
that we instituted in the business. Approximately 72 people in total left the 
business either through resignation because they were not happy with the 
way we were changing things or as a result of being terminated. A number 
of those were planners. I think a total of 12 planners were terminated, and 
another 11 planners resigned of their own accord. There were other staff 
who also left as a result of that. There were other sanctions, but those are 
the main ones, and that was part of the process of changing not only the 
people but also the attitude within the business.
4
 
The enforceable undertaking and change at CFPL 
10.6 On 25 October 2011, ASIC accepted an enforceable undertaking from CFPL. 
As the CBA explained in its submission, the undertaking 'required CFP to assess the 
adequacy of its Risk Management Framework (RMF) against generally accepted risk 
management standards. On completion of this assessment, CFPL was required 
to develop an Implementation Plan that would not only address deficiencies in the 
RMF but also specifically address certain concerns raised by ASIC in the [enforceable 
undertaking]'. These concerns were whether: 
a) There have been adequate processes and controls in place to deal with 
ongoing risks of noncompliance. 
b) Representative misconduct has been dealt with in a consistent manner. 
c) Recurring themes have been appropriately identified. 
d) Data analysis processes and reporting capabilities allow for early 
detection of advice process irregularities. 
e) There have been adequate controls over client records. 
                                              
2  Mr David Cohen, General Counsel and Group Executive, Group Corporate Affairs, CBA, 
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3  CBA, Submission 261, p. 6.  
4  Mr David Cohen, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 35.  
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f) There has been consistent application of CFP's complaints handling and 
internal dispute resolution processes.
5
 
10.7 The enforceable undertaking was announced by ASIC on 26 October 2011. 
The media release provided the following explanation: 
CFP has agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of its risk management 
framework and legal and regulatory obligations regarding the provision of 
financial services, financial advice and the monitoring and supervision of 
its representatives…Under the [enforceable undertaking], CFP will proceed 
to develop an implementation plan to address any unresolved deficiencies 
identified by the assessment of its risk management framework. The 
implementation of the plan will be the subject of review and ongoing 
reporting to ASIC over the next 2 years by an independent expert (whose 
engagement is to be approved by ASIC). Where a client is found to have 
been adversely impacted by the conduct of a representative, CFP will 
consider the circumstances and appropriately remediate the client.
6
 
10.8 One of the issues addressed during the committee's consideration of the CFPL 
matter was whether the CFPL enforceable undertaking had been effective in driving 
improvements in the CFPL's business operations. Both the CBA and ASIC argued that 
the enforceable undertaking had been successful in this regard; other witnesses, 
however, contended that the enforceable undertaking was a weak and poorly targeted 
response to the misconduct at CFPL, and that it had failed to bring about the necessary 
changes in the way the business operated. 
CBA on cultural and system changes at CFPL 
10.9 The CBA reported that as a result of the revelations of misconduct at CFPL 
and the subsequent enforceable undertaking, it had 'significantly transformed' its 
financial advice business, in terms of 'the management, the culture, the processes and 
the business systems'.
7
 
10.10 In its appearance before the committee, the CBA emphasised that the 'cultural 
change component was a very big piece of the change process' in its financial advice 
business. The current executive general manager of the CBA's Wealth Management 
division, Ms Marianne Perkovic, explained to the committee that a key factor in this 
cultural change was a revision of remuneration structures at CFPL: 
The main driver of changing that culture was restructuring the remuneration 
and also the KPIs of not just the planners but all of the management within 
the advice business, up to my level as well. Two of the key changes in that 
were gate openers across remuneration payment, firstly, for risk culture and, 
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secondly, for adherence to compliance. Each of those needs to be met 
before any remuneration is paid to the adviser. And then we have moved to 
a more balanced scorecard approach, where the focus is absolutely on 
quality advice and quality advice measures for the advisers but also for 
people across the business—so the managers of advisers as well.8 
10.11 The CBA added that to drive cultural change in its financial advice business, 
it had sought to encourage people within the business to 'speak up' when they had 
concerns.
9
 The CBA also told the committee that there was no-one currently in the 
CBA's wealth management advice leadership team who was in the team in 2010. 
The bank added that none of the advisers 'who were found to have issues' remained 
employed at CFPL.
10
   
10.12 Whereas the CBA's financial advice business was previously under Colonial 
First State, the CBA reported that the business now reported directly to the CBA's 
Wealth Management division. This change, it suggested, reflected: 
…the scale and importance of the business, and also addresses any conflict 
or perception of conflict of interest with regard to Colonial First State, so 
advice now is a stand-alone business.
11
 
10.13 The CBA explained that it had implemented major changes in how its 
compliance and risk management operations were structured in relation to CFPL. 
It told the committee that whereas risk and compliance functions were previously 
located within CFPL, parts of these functions were now located: 
…outside of the business, as well as there being enhanced risk and 
compliance inside the business, with an enhanced adviser insurance team 
operating risk and advice solutions teams inside the business as well as an 
enhanced focus on risk and compliance from outside the business, and an 
independent organisation reporting to the [chief risk officer].
12
 
10.14 One of the most blatant failures of the CFPL revealed in evidence was its 
inadequate file management system. The CBA noted that a large proportion of the 
discussion regarding CFPL's failures had focused on its poor file management, 
and that it recognised: 
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…it is very important to be able to have access to files and we have spent 
$25 million putting in a document management system so that we will be 
able to have online access to our files and file retention.
13
 
10.15 The CBA also reported that it had made a substantial investment in its 
IT infrastructure in order to develop an 'early warning system' to facilitate 
investigation and compliance: 
This [system] has factors like concentration risk, risk profiles and generally 
the activity of the investment that is happening. These systems allow us to 
immediately be notified if there are issues or concerns across any of the 
investments of our customers and any behaviours across advisers. So that 
system is our first point of call and is working; it has worked in the business 
for coming up to 12 months now.
14
 
10.16 The CBA has also implemented a IT system called Connect, which it claims 
provides: 
…a single view of the adviser, consolidated information around that 
adviser—including their qualifications, their actions, their clients and, 
importantly, particularly their customer complaints—so that we are able, 
with the click of a button, to see all of that with regard to individual 
advisers.
15
 
10.17 In response to a question taken on notice, the CBA informed the committee 
that whereas on 1 January 2008 CFPL had 15 staff employed in compliance officer 
roles, as of 1 January 2014 there were 43 compliance officers.
16
 
Critics of the enforceable undertaking and its impact 
10.18 One former client of CFPL suggested that ASIC's decision to seek an 
enforceable undertaking, rather than pursue court action against CFPL, was indicative 
of ASIC's tendency to privilege the interests of CFPL over the interests of CFPL 
clients. The submitter was of the view:  
ASIC's willingness to accept enforceable undertakings instead of taking 
Court action against CFP for breaches of legislation and reported criminal 
activity, fraud and forgery, suggests preferential treatment and protection of 
CFP over the actual victims of those crimes.
17
 
10.19 Mr Morris explained that while the enforceable undertaking might have 
brought CFPL 'up to current minimum industry standards', he was not convinced that 
it had addressed the underlying problems at CFPL. He suggested that while CFPL 
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15  Ms Annabel Spring, CBA, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 38. 
16  CBA, answer to question on notice, no. 9 (received 24 April 2014), p. 11.  
17  Name withheld, Submission 374, p. 1.  
Page 146  
 
might well be complying with the enforceable undertaking, the problem remained 
that: 
…the subtleties that allow a place like CFP to operate are not picked up in 
the [enforceable undertaking]. For example, at Commonwealth Financial 
Planning one of the big problems was that because it is basically a bucket 
shop and a sales channel, the overwhelming proportion of the advice that 
I saw and most of the advice that Nguyen gave is what is called defined 
scope advice. By narrowing the scope down to advice to invest in a certain 
product, you basically wipe out all your duties to the client to take into 
account other considerations. All you are going to do is invite them to 
invest in this product and the [enforceable undertaking] does not address 
that problem.
18
 
10.20 Mr Morris seemed to suggest that the changes implemented at CBA were a 
case of 'too little, too late'; he argued it was unlikely these changes would have 
addressed the underlying problems at CFPL: 
[W]hat they have done is what they had to do and it has probably taken the 
firm to where it should have been six years ago. To have taken this long to 
put in an electronic system to store documents seems incredible to me, 
particularly when a sister business of Commonwealth Financial Planning 
had that system in place years ago. What they have done, I think, is 
basically enough to address the Don Nguyen situation, but what remains is, 
I think, symptomatic of broader problems in the industry, in that, although 
they have changed their remuneration model, when you look at the detail of 
their submission, they do not say that the bonus scheme is now based purely 
on quality of advice. There is a reduced emphasis on sales volumes. I do not 
know exactly what that means. I have a difficulty with any professionals 
with a fiduciary duty where you are also making them salesmen. I think that 
is an impossible conflict of interest to reconcile. As well, I have broader 
concerns about vertical integration in the industry based on what I have 
seen at CFP and what happened there.
19
  
10.21 Assessing the enforceable undertaking within the context of ASIC's overall 
handling of the entire CFPL matter, Mr Morris, argued that ASIC's enforcement 
actions were designed more to disguise ASIC's incompetence than punish CFPL/the 
CBA: 
I submit that, as the ineffective regulator responsible for the industry, ASIC 
has a fundamental conflict of interest in exposing the full extent of the 
corruption and dishonesty of such a major institution such as CFP/CBA; as 
that would in turn be such a damning indictment of their own incompetence 
and abysmal failure in supervision that it must in turn have implications for 
ASIC itself. 
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ASIC has therefore chosen to ignore the full extent of CFP/CBA's 
malfeasance in favour of lauding itself for the easy wins of imposing an 
Enforceable Undertaking and banning seven crooked planners—all of 
whom were actually offered up by CFP/CBA rather than being caught by 
ASIC.
20
    
ASIC's assessment of the impact of the enforceable undertaking 
10.22 ASIC told the committee that whereas the CICP lacked a 'clear delineation' of 
what CFPL needed to do to satisfy ASIC's requirements, the enforceable undertaking 
had been more rigorous in this respect. Pressed to explain the differences between the 
CICP and the enforceable undertaking, ASIC told the committee that the undertaking 
had stronger mechanisms for driving cultural and system changes at CFPL: 
It is that the CICP process did not involve a commitment to change the 
remuneration structures. The underlying drivers of the bad culture and the 
bad advice were not removed. At that stage it would have been a difficult 
thing to require as part of a less formal, non-enforcement agreement for 
those things to change, because they were the structures that were 
throughout the industry. They were driving the culture of the entire 
industry. For an informal agreement to say this firm rather than any other 
has to change its remuneration when we did not have any backing from the 
law in terms of bans on commissions or anything would have been a very 
difficult thing. I think that, by the time we got to the [enforceable 
undertaking] with the serious threat of investigation and legal action, that 
pushed them that extra step to start changing those remuneration structures. 
I think that, in terms of really changing things going forward, changing the 
culture and what drives the planners within the firm was the big 
difference.
21
 
10.23 ASIC told the committee that it appeared that positive changes had taken 
place at CFPL:  
We have seen a lot of progress in that respect. There is an entirely new 
management and leadership team. There are different remuneration 
structures, different management structures and so on and so forth.
22
  
10.24 At the same time, ASIC acknowledged that change at CFPL remained, in 
some respects, 'a work in progress'. In particular, ASIC noted that the CFPL still 
needed to improve its breach reporting to ASIC, and indicated this remained an area 
that ASIC would continue to monitor closely.
23
 The need for CFPL to improve its 
breach reporting to ASIC was, in fact, noted in the final report from 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the independent expert appointed in respect to the 
enforceable undertaking. Specifically, the independent expert report, which was 
provided to ASIC on 25 October 2013, found that CFPL appears to take longer than 
the required timeframes to determine whether issues and incidents within the business 
are significant and therefore reportable to ASIC.
24
 Mr Kell underlined this issue at the 
public hearing on 10 April 2014: 
I just wanted to note that one of the core problems that we had with CFP 
was the adequacy of their breach reporting. Indeed, it remains an ongoing 
issue. While most elements of the enforceable undertaking have been 
carried out and implemented to our satisfaction, we are still requiring CFP 
to test the effectiveness of their breach reporting procedures. We still have 
concerns in that area, and that is an area where we are following up with 
them. We do take that very seriously. It has not been an area where we have 
been happy with the standard of the reporting.
25
 
10.25 Asked if ASIC maintained that an enforceable undertaking was the best 
mechanism to address CFPL's conduct, and whether it achieved what it was intended 
to achieve, ASIC concluded: 
We do believe the enforceable undertaking allowed us to make much more 
wide-ranging changes at CFP than a more formal court based process 
would have allowed for, including major changes to their compliance 
systems and record keeping along the lines that we have just indicated. It is 
also worth remembering that the penalties available to apply through a 
more formal court process against CFP at the time this occurred were 
around $170,000… 
…The key issue here is: have we in fact required or forced CFP to make the 
sorts of changes that mean that it offers much higher quality advice to its 
clients? That is really what we needed to achieve at the end of the day to lift 
its game very dramatically. We think in many of those areas that it has 
happened, and in some areas where we still have concerns there is ongoing 
work. But that has been occurring within the framework of the [enforceable 
undertaking], and I mentioned earlier breach reporting is one of those 
ongoing areas.
26
 
How independent was the 'independent expert'? 
10.26 There was also some discussion during the public hearing about whether the 
independent expert appointed under the terms of the enforceable undertaking, PwC, 
had a potential conflict of interest, given it also acts as the CBA's auditor. The CBA 
rejected the idea that PwC had a conflict of interest in its appointment as independent 
expert:  
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As auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers have to be independent of us. You 
may be aware that Sarbanes-Oxley requirements in the US drove a big 
change in how auditors must be independent of the companies that they 
audit. So PricewaterhouseCoopers have to maintain an arm's length from us 
in order to be our auditors generally. When it comes to the actual 
[enforceable undertaking], they and we and ASIC were comfortable that 
their independence as auditors allowed them to be the independent expert in 
the case of the [enforceable undertaking].
27
 
10.27 Speaking more generally, the CBA told the committee that it was confident in 
the rigour of the enforceable undertaking process and the role of independent experts 
therein. In particular, the CBA emphasised that independent experts appointed under 
the enforceable undertaking had a strong reputational incentive to ensure they 
undertook their work in a diligent and properly independent manner:  
As you probably know, we have had other enforceable undertakings. Our 
experience in each case has been that the scope of the independent expert's 
role is very detailed, it is very clear what that role is, and the independent 
expert is a party to those discussions, because the independent expert 
obviously has to be satisfied that it can perform that scope. In terms of the 
actual implementation, the independent experts that we have dealt with, 
being major accounting firms, have their own reputation to consider. It 
would be risky for them in the extreme to allow business at the line 
management level to remain as it was and yet to report to ASIC that things 
had changed. We have never experienced that. I am surprised to hear that it 
exists, but it is certainly not reflective of the experience we have had at all. 
We have found that our independent experts involved in the process have 
been very active, have been quite prepared to speak out whenever things 
have not been proceeding according to plan and have been quite open with 
ASIC about that. We have encouraged that. I would find it curious if an 
independent expert were prepared to run the risk of allowing things not to 
change and yet report to ASIC that things have changed.
28
 
10.28 ASIC told the committee that while it had the power of veto over the CBA's 
choice of independent expert, it had been satisfied with PwC's appointment. ASIC 
also noted that as part of the tender process, all tenderers (including PwC) 'had to 
address issues around whether there were conflicts and how they might be handled'.
29
 
10.29 At the same time, Mr Medcraft and Mr Kell both acknowledged that PwC's 
dual roles as auditor of CBA and independent expert under the CFPL enforceable 
undertaking did raise questions about a potential conflict of interest: 
Mr Medcraft: …I think you make a good point, Senator; if somebody is the 
auditor and they want them to be the independent expert, essentially you 
should have a sceptical presumption about how they are going to manage 
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the independence issue, the potential conflicts of interest. There should 
always be a presumption and questioning on this particular issue. I think 
that is an important point. 
Mr Kell: And I suspect that we would take a different approach today 
compared to the approach we took back then.
30
  
10.30 In addition to underlining issues regarding the integrity of the CFPL 
enforceable undertaking process, these comments also raise broader questions about 
the procedures around the use and appointment of independent experts in enforceable 
undertakings. These broader questions are considered further in Chapter 17. 
10.31 In the course of the discussion about the independent expert appointed under 
the CFPL enforceable undertaking, the CBA was asked whether reports of these 
experts should be made public. The CBA indicated it would have no objection to such 
reports being made public, and that to do so would allow the seriousness with which 
the CBA regards such matters to be 'appropriately reflected in the full transparency of 
daylight'.
31
 As discussed further in Chapter 17, ASIC also indicated that it believes 
there would be merit in making independent expert reports publicly available.
32
   
Committee view 
10.32 The committee notes the advice provided by the CBA and ASIC on the 
important changes implemented at CFPL as a result of the enforceable undertaking. 
Among the CBA's key assertions are that it has, in respect of CFPL: 
 expended millions of dollars to fix its procedures; 
 cleared out CFPL staff suspected or proven to have engaged in wrongdoing; 
 installed an entire new leadership at CFPL; 
 significantly transformed its financial advice business; and 
 achieved a cultural transformation and now encourages people to 'speak up'. 
10.33 If these changes have indeed taken place and produce the intended result, 
the committee should generally be satisfied that they will make future compliance 
failures at CFPL less likely and, where compliance failures do occur, more likely to be 
detected and addressed in a timely and effective manner. The Future of Financial 
Advice (FOFA) reforms are also addressing some of the previously identified 
problems in the financial advice industry that were again exposed through the 
committee's examination of CFPL. In particular, the requirement that advisers must 
act in the best interest of clients and the ban on conflicted remuneration are improving 
standards and moving the industry away from a sales-based culture. The committee 
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does, however, note with some concern that CFPL's breach reporting to ASIC 
continues to be deficient. The CBA needs to address this issue as a matter of high 
priority. Furthermore, the eleventh hour revelation about inconsistencies in CBA's 
evidence before the committee, to be considered in Chapter 12, casts serious doubts 
about whether the desired changes have taken root. 
 
  
 
Chapter 11 
Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited: 
The file reconstruction and compensation process 
11.1 A central concern of the committee's inquiry was the adequacy and integrity 
of the ASIC-approved compensation arrangements that the CBA put in place for 
affected CFPL clients. While ASIC and the CBA maintain that the process resulted in 
fair outcomes for affected clients, the committee has also received evidence from 
other witnesses that suggested the CBA's compensation assessments were based on 
files that were incomplete or otherwise compromised by the original non-compliance 
of CFPL staff. Mr Morris and Ms Swan go so far as to suggest that the CBA 
deliberately 'doctored' files or otherwise manipulated the compensation process in 
order to dupe clients out of the money they were entitled to receive.  
11.2 This chapter examines the integrity of the file reconstruction and 
compensation process. 
Summary of the file reconstruction and compensation process 
11.3 In March 2010, CFPL initiated Project Hartnett, which, according to ASIC, 
was the process for determining whether compensation was payable to a CFPL client 
and, if so, how much. In summary, the Project Hartnett process involved: 
 contacting clients to advise that CFPL had concerns about the advice they had 
received; 
 assessing whether a client's circumstances were accurately reflected in his or 
her file and, where appropriate, directly contacting a client in order to make 
such an assessment (on the basis of this assessment, CFPL would then assess 
if compensation was payable); and  
 meeting, where appropriate, with CFPL clients to obtain detailed information 
regarding their circumstances and assess whether the advice they received was 
appropriate to those circumstances.
1
 
11.4 On 21 July 2010, CFPL gave ASIC a commitment to remediate former clients 
of Mr Nguyen. Between August and October 2010, negotiations took place between 
ASIC and CFPL regarding the adequacy of the CFPL's proposed compensation 
arrangements. ASIC had particular concerns that CFPL's initial proposal did not 
include a mechanism for the independent review of compensation offers. As a result 
of the negotiations, the compensation arrangements announced in November 2010 
included the following key elements: 
 a review of all relevant client files by CFPL; 
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 the ability for clients to obtain independent advice, up to the value of $5,000 
and paid for by CFPL, to assess the compensation offer (in some cases more 
than $5,000 was paid); 
 a process whereby clients were informed of dispute resolution options, 
notably the free external dispute resolution scheme, the Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS), if the compensation was still in dispute; and 
 the appointment of an independent expert to review the adequacy and 
appropriateness of the compensation processes, including: 
 whether all relevant clients were covered; 
 calculation methodologies for compensation offers; and 
 client communication, including those few cases where clients were 
unable to be contacted.2 
11.5 ASIC also negotiated with CFPL to ensure that all of Mr Nguyen's clients 
who had received a settlement offer prior to the commencement of Project Hartnett in 
March 2010, were reviewed and assessed using the Project Hartnett methodology.
3
 
ASIC explained that the 'overarching aim' of the compensation process was to: 
…restore clients to the financial position they would have been in had the 
inappropriate elements of the advice not occurred and they had been 
provided with appropriate advice. 
This was done by assessing the advice strategy and comparing the client's 
actual portfolio financial position against a reference portfolio, based on 
their assessed risk profile. The difference was paid as compensation to the 
client. CFPL also repaid any fees that did not reflect value for the service 
provided. The compensation amount also considered the time value of 
money and taxation impacts as appropriate.
4
 
11.6 Project Hartnett later also included clients of Mr Awkar. A second phase of 
compensation was developed as part of the enforceable undertaking to remediate 
clients of other CFPL advisers (that is, not Mr Nguyen or Mr Awkar) who had been 
the subject of a breach report by CFPL to ASIC. This compensation phase is referred 
to as the 'Past Business Review'.
5
 
11.7 As many of the client files of Mr Nguyen and other CFPL advisers were 
incomplete or compromised by the non-compliant behaviour of CFPL advisers, the 
compensation assessment process involved the reconstruction of client files so as to 
provide an accurate picture of a client's actual financial circumstances. However, as 
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discussed further below, the nature and intent of this reconstruction process is 
contested. 
11.8 ASIC informed the committee that the CFPL compensation process ultimately 
involved the review of more than 7,000 client files, with compensation totalling 
approximately $51 million paid to over 1,100 of these clients.
6
 This evidence will be 
revisited in Chapter 12.  
Criticisms of the file reconstruction and compensation process 
11.9 Maurice Blackburn told the committee that its own clients were ultimately 
satisfied with the compensation processes and outcome put in place by CFPL 
following ASIC's intervention in 2010 and the settlements of all the Maurice 
Blackburn civil court actions in 2011. The law firm, however, expressed 'some 
concerns about the compensation arrangements that were put in place and in 
particular, whether unrepresented persons' losses would have been adequately 
assessed'.
7
 In particular, Maurice Blackburn was concerned that CFPL's own 
calculation of compensation due to each client relied in part on information from 
CFPL's client files, 'some of which were tainted with the questionable practices of 
Mr Nguyen'. Moreover, CFPL's assessments were, in Maurice Blackburn's experience:  
…sometimes more risk tolerant (thereby resulting in lower financial losses) 
than was ultimately negotiated at mediation. Therefore, unless clients 
disputed CFPL's retrospective reassessments, they may well have received 
compensation which did not reflect their losses.
8
 
11.10 The CFPL's program for compensating Mr Nguyen's victims did have a 
review mechanism, whereby an independent expert oversighted the compensation 
arrangements. However, Maurice Blackburn suggested that: 
…to be fully effective, this [review mechanism] required the independent 
expert to have the resources to conduct full retrospective reviews of all 
CFPL's and Nguyen's clients' investment positions and to conduct forensic 
analyses to compare the investment positions with the outcome achieved 
under Mr Nguyen's advice. 
To have such a review in place would have been a big undertaking 
requiring very significant resources to support the independent expert to 
examine the portfolios of the hundreds of clients of CFPL and Nguyen. To 
the best of our knowledge this did not occur.
9
 
11.11 Maurice Blackburn also suggested that the external oversight of the process 
'really has very little impact on the rigor of the process unless the external oversight 
                                              
6  ASIC, Submission 45.3, p. 12. 
7  Maurice Blackburn, Submission 200, p. 2.  
8  Maurice Blackburn, Submission 200, p. 2.  
9  Maurice Blackburn, Submission 200, pp. 2–3.  
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includes a whole raft of people conducting the same reviews on an individual basis'.
10
 
Asked to summarise its concerns, Maurice Blackburn told the committee that, at the 
heart of the problem, was that the compensation process involved self-assessment by 
CFPL with a lack of external oversight.
11
 In order to compensate clients, CFPL 
needed to assess whether the products that Mr Nguyen had been selling them were 
appropriate to their risk profile, and doing so on the basis of their Financial Needs 
Analysis. However, CFPL did this reassessment 'based on documents they had, some 
of which were tainted and flawed'.
12
 It was not clear, Maurice Blackburn further 
explained, to what extent CFPL tested the integrity of these documents through 
consultations with aggrieved clients.
13
  
11.12  Asked whether those CFPL clients who were not represented by Maurice 
Blackburn would have had materially different compensation outcomes if they had 
been represented, Maurice Blackburn told the committee: 
I think they probably would have been, yes. It seemed to us that the few 
clients who came to us after they had signed up to the direct compensation 
arrangements had been put in a higher risk tolerance category and therefore 
their losses were assessed as being less than they might otherwise have 
been. For example, one of the main people we acted for, before he came to 
us, was offered one-tenth of what we ultimately negotiated for…them.14 
11.13 Mrs Braund's own experience would appear to support claims that the files 
used by the CBA to assess compensation payable to clients had been compromised. 
Mrs Braund explained in her submission that Mr Morris provided her with a copy of 
her CFPL client file as a safeguard against the risk of the file otherwise 'disappearing' 
from the CBA's records. She further reported that she later received a copy of her file 
from the CBA, but certain documents included in the client file provided by 
Mr Morris were missing from the CBA-supplied client file. According to Mrs Braund, 
this included the original document from 2002 where she established her investment 
with CFPL on the basis that it was to be invested conservatively 'and that I would only 
use proceeds from capital'.
15
 This document, which was a handwritten note that 
appears to have been prepared by Mr Nguyen, was tabled by Mrs Braund during her 
appearance before the committee on 10 April 2014. 
11.14 Like Maurice Blackburn, Ms Swan suggested that the offer of compensation 
made to her parents was based on a file that had been compromised. Unlike Maurice 
                                              
10  Mr John Berrill, Lawyer and Principal, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 15. 
11  Mr John Berrill, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 13. 
12  Mr John Berrill, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 14.  
13  Mr John Berrill, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 14.  
14  Mr John Berrill, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 16.  
15  Mrs Janice Braund, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 6.  
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Blackburn, Ms Swan directly alleged that CFPL/CBA staff had in fact fraudulently 
altered client files in order to deny clients fair compensation: 
My detailed submission to this inquiry exposed the role of CBA and ASIC 
in reducing my parents' investment of $260,000 to only $92,000 within 
22 months. I am here today because CBA's financial planner, Don Nguyen, 
and CBA's senior management engaged in systematic fraud, forgery, and 
deceptive and misleading conduct, to retrospectively cover up Nguyen's 
activities, to specifically refute my parents' claims and to minimise CBA's 
financial liability.
16
 
11.15 Specifically, Ms Swan alleged that after first advising that they had lost her 
parents' files, the CBA sent her parents: 
…copies of fraudulently altered and falsified documents that CBA 
management had manufactured to convince my parents that they were 
responsible for choosing high-risk investments.
17
 
11.16 These documents, according to Ms Swan, included a fraudulent Statement of 
Advice and Financial Needs Analysis, complete with forged signatures.
18
 Asked how 
she knew the documents were fraudulent, Ms Swan explained: 
Because, unlike most of the clients of Mr Nguyen, my parents walked off 
with an original copy of their statement of advice…So, when they send me 
documentation and claim it is a copy of the statement of advice or extracted 
from the statement of advice or part of the contract in the statement of 
advice, I fortunately have an original, so I can prove categorically that the 
documentation they sent me was fraudulent.
19
 
11.17 Ms Swan contended that the 'cover up' extended well beyond CFPL itself, and 
was in fact endorsed by senior management at CBA: 
Instead of saying, 'Yes, we've been caught, we own up, we'll compensate 
you, we'll rewind this problem and we'll apologise,' there was a deliberate 
decision made by senior management at CBA, right at the top, to cover this 
up.
20
 
11.18 Ms Swan also claimed that despite the commitment given by CFPL to review 
and assess settlements made prior to the commencement of Project Hartnett in March 
2010 (as referred to above), her parents were never contacted by the CBA: 
When ASIC became involved, they directed CBA to contact all of the 
affected clients and advise them that they could have their compensation 
                                              
16  Mrs Merilyn Swan, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 1.  
17  Mrs Merilyn Swan, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 1. 
18  Mrs Merilyn Swan, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 1. 
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reviewed. That has not happened. My parents have never received a letter 
reopening that. When I eventually engaged Financial Resolutions Australia 
on my behalf to contact them to renegotiate or reopen and review our 
compensation, we merely received this letter from [the director of CBA 
Customer Relations] in 2013 to say, 'It had been reviewed, it was 
appropriate, and we will not be discussing this anymore.'
21
  
11.19 Ms Swan discounted the value of the oversight of the compensation 
assessment process by an independent expert. Ms Swan argued that the independent 
expert's review would itself have been based on 'fraudulent documentation which does 
not reflect the true situation'. Given her scepticism regarding the compensation 
assessment process and the independent expert's review of that process, Ms Swan 
expressed concern that the compensation process had not been: 
…open to any scrutiny by the clients. We have not been invited in to have it 
explained. I do not know how the [compensation assessment] calculation is 
done.
22
 
11.20 Ms Swan concluded that, given the compensation process appeared to have 
been based on the 'CBA's own fraudulent documentation', the CBA's claim that the 
'compensation process and discussions with their customers have been honest and 
transparent are farcical'.
23
 
11.21 Mr Morris who, as noted in Chapter 8, claims to have personally witnessed 
Mr Nguyen and his colleagues doctoring client files, told the committee that he was 
also able to observe the compensation process 'very closely'. It appeared to Mr Morris 
that 'a lot of bad faith' underlined that process: 
The vast majority of people got a letter in the mail with an offer of money 
that said: 'You may have received inappropriate advice. Here is $100,000'—
or $50,000 or whatever number [it] was—'and here is a panel of six law 
firms or you can see somebody else if you want to. Here is five grand to get 
that ticked off.' For most people who get an offer like that in the mail it is 
just going to be manna from heaven. I observed close-up what they were 
doing to massage that process to minimise the compensation cost.
24
 
11.22 According to Mr Morris, rather than seeking to compensate the clients of 
'rogue planners' (as CFPL/the CBA characterised them), CFPL instead: 
…sought at every turn, by every means, to cover up what occurred, to 
destroy or suppress the evidence in the files and to defraud the victims of 
the compensation they were entitled to.
25
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11.23 Mr Morris voiced particular suspicions regarding Project Hartnett, suggesting 
that given there were about 50 people working on the project over a period of several 
years, it was difficult to accept that these people were simply working on 
reconstructing 182 files. He told the committee that if the intention were simply to 
reconstruct files, it: 
…would be [a] simple matter to print out a statement of advice. If it was on 
the system, all you have to do is press the print button and add that to the 
file. It simply does not compute that those people were engaged on an 
innocent file reconstruction and compensation program.
26
 
11.24 Asked whether there was a need for a 'full, properly independent review' of 
CFPL client files, Mr Morris responded: 
Absolutely and also of more clients than just the Don Nguyen ones. It is a 
business where even ASIC said there were fundamental widespread 
problems with the advice. Of the 7,000 pieces of advice that were reviewed, 
16 per cent of them resulted in compensation being paid. That is a massive 
proportion. It is a business that was clearly non-compliant. To say there 
were only seven rogue planners and only 7,000 pieces of advice that needed 
to be considered in that environment I think is ludicrous. I suspect a broader 
review is going to uncover there are a lot more, like tens of thousands of 
clients, who are probably entitled to compensation. It has never been looked 
at.
27
 
CBA's response to criticism regarding file reconstruction and 
compensation 
11.25 The CBA defended the integrity of the file reconstruction process, and told 
the committee that the process included extensive checks and balances to ensure fair 
compensation outcomes for CFPL clients.  
11.26 Given the deficient state of many client files, the CBA was asked if it had 
considered contacting individual clients and asking them to review their respective 
files for completeness and accuracy. The CBA confirmed that its remediation process: 
…did not include asking clients to review the Bank's file in toto. Depending 
on the issue(s) we found with each adviser, we determined what 
information was required in order to re-evaluate the advice given. 
In many cases we had all of the information required to re-assess the advice 
received, whether through documents in the client file, or by referencing 
data in our electronic records management and product systems. Where 
hardcopy documentation was lacking, CFP printed file documents from 
electronic storage or contacted relevant customers, requested their records 
and used these to assist its review. 
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Almost half of the client cases reviewed (3289 of 7038) involved CFP 
contacting the client to seek additional information. In approximately one 
third of those cases (1166 of 3289), the clients provided additional 
information that was used by CFP in evaluating their case.
28
 
11.27 Not surprisingly, the CBA told the committee that it was confident the 
compensation process had: 
…correctly compensated adversely affected customers with a fair and 
reasonable outcome, by correcting their position as if they had received 
appropriate advice.
29
 
11.28 The CBA also suggested that 'almost all of those customers who were affected 
by these events have been restituted to their satisfaction'.
30
 Only a 'handful' of affected 
CFPL clients, the bank told the committee, remained dissatisfied with the restitution 
provided or offered to them.
31
 
11.29 Asked about Ms Swan's suggestion that there was 'no facility in the 
compensation process for clients or their advisers to review the documents being used 
for the compensation calculation', the CBA told the committee: 
We do acknowledge the lack of documentation that the business did have in 
reviewing customer information. We relied on a lot of information from 
current systems and processes that we did have. In some cases where we 
were not clear on the information that was recorded in the file, we contacted 
the customer and asked them if they had documentation, and we relied on 
that documentation. So through the Blanches, through Merilyn Swan, we 
did work with the group that was representing her for two years and did 
actually ask for a copy of the original documentation that would have 
assisted us in deciding or discussing the remediation process that we had.
32
 
11.30 The CBA further stated that it did not believe the remediation process was 
deficient.
33
 It outlined the steps taken in Project Hartnett when files were incomplete: 
Each of the cases that we reviewed had a case manager—so there was 
contact with customers. We spoke to them directly or they had a 
representative acting on their behalf. Through that engagement and through 
the process we established an amount that we thought was the 
compensation amount had they had appropriate advice. We did actually 
explain the process around the information that led to that, the allocation of 
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the client's risk profile and the observations that we made about the 
investments that that client had with us and other investments that they had. 
It was in those initial conversations that it came to light that it was not 
correct or that there was other information that the customer may have had 
and those were the records that we then relied on going through that 
process. 
With the 7,000 client cases that we looked at through this whole 
remediation process of [Project Hartnett] plus through the enforceable 
undertaking, a lot of those cases were remediated and we had very good 
communication between the customer or their legal representative. There 
was a selection of customers where it did take a longer time, because on 
multiple requests of information we did not receive it and we had to act on 
the information that we received—albeit continuing to ask for other 
information that would help us clarify and help us determine any 
differences in what the framework was giving us.
34
 
11.31 CBA explained to the committee that some client files, particularly for 
Mr Nguyen, were 'not in the right order'. It stated further that: 
…in terms of the files themselves, and the customers that those files 
belonged to, we started to work through what other information the bank 
had that could be contributed, which we could put into those files. I am 
talking about things like application forms on their investment that we had 
access to. Those were the pieces of information that we put on the client. It 
was known as a client file through the Hartnett process, not the original 
file.
35
 
11.32 The CBA also told the committee that it had advised ASIC of the state of the 
CFPL client files, including the number of missing files. It had, in turn, agreed with 
ASIC on a process for securing enough information so that it could determine the 
appropriate level of compensation for each client.
36
 
ASIC's evidence on file reconstruction and compensation 
11.33 While acknowledging that the poor record keeping practices at CFPL had 
proven a major problem, ASIC told the committee that CFPL/the CBA had been 
upfront about the need to reconstruct client files: 
Record keeping was very poor. Again, because they were not adequate, 
there was a process of trying to reconstruct files, and CFP were telling us 
they were doing that. They were very open. That needed to be done to try to 
find out what had happened and regenerate from their system some of the 
documents.
37
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11.34 Alluding to Mr Morris's suggestion that the CFPL had engaged in a systemic 
effort to fraudulently reconstruct files in order to deny CFPL clients proper 
compensation, ASIC suggested that: 
…there is some chance that, internally within CFP, people observing [the 
file reconstruction] may have interpreted that as an illegitimate process 
whereas it was a process that we understood [was undertaken] for proper 
purposes and was openly advised to us.
38
 
11.35 ASIC also told the committee that it had not generally pursued claims that 
CFPL client files had been 'sanitised' or 'doctored' in order to defraud CFPL clients. 
Such allegations, it told the committee, had generally taken the form of vague 
'Chinese whispers within the CFP' that files were being cleaned up.
39
 Similarly, 
responding to Ms Swan's suggestion that her parents' file had been 'doctored' by the 
CFPL, ASIC said: 
We know the file was to some degree reconstructed. Essentially, it was not 
clear to us from looking at the material that there was evidence that it had 
been doctored in some way to try and benefit CFP subsequent to its original 
generation, beyond the general reconstruction.
40
 
11.36 ASIC also clarified that while it believed it had misplaced its trust in CFPL in 
terms of expecting it to make the cultural and system changes that needed to be made 
at the time of the CICP, this did not mean ASIC believed the CFPL had 'sanitised' or 
'doctored' client files in order to defraud CFPL clients of proper compensation. 
Mr Kirk told the committee: 
My comment earlier that our trust was misplaced was not intending to 
suggest it was misplaced in the sense that we now think that CFP had a 
program for changing or doctoring files. We do not think that is the case. 
We have not seen evidence that that is the case. I just wanted to clear that 
up. We trusted them that they would be able to uncover all of their own 
problems and fix them and change their culture, and that trust was 
misplaced—not a trust about honesty about files.41 
11.37 Asked if ASIC was comfortable with the CBA not writing to all of its clients 
and asking them to provide any material that might be relevant to assist in the 
reconstruction of the files, ASIC responded:  
We were certainly conscious of that as a problem and we tried to put some 
measures in place in the compensation scheme to address it. Generally, with 
clients subject to the review, they were all notified that they were part of the 
review. They were not sent their file. 
[…] 
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In a second phase, CFP had to go through the file and analyse whether it 
contained full records of the client's position…There was a process 
whereby they had to check whether the file was adequate or whether there 
were gaps in it. Where there were problems, they then made contact with 
the client and tried to reconcile what the client understood the history and 
instructions to have been with what was in the file. That contact was 
initially by phone, to check whether there was any disparity between the 
client's understanding and what was in the file. If that showed up any 
problems at all, the next step was a full interview with the client. It is a 
difficult issue to address when the files are inadequate. There was a process 
to try and do that. I guess the final step in that process was to have access, 
for the people getting compensation offers, to an adviser and that paid for, 
so there could be a test at that point and some push-back against what had 
been offered to them, some questioning of whether the records were 
accurate and consistent with what the client was telling that adviser.
42
 
11.38 In an answer to a question on notice, ASIC further suggested that it would 
likely have been 'largely futile' for the CBA to send every client a copy of his or her 
file. Most clients, ASIC contended, could not be expected to be aware of all the 
documents that should be contained in their file. Moreover, such a process would 
probably have significantly delayed the compensation process, as clients took time to 
respond, 'or, more likely, did not respond at all given the difficulty of the questions 
being posed'.
43
 
11.39 ASIC further explained that the professional services firm appointed under 
Project Hartnett was required to assess the compensation methodology, review a 
number of client files and randomly select client cases to test the adequacy of 
compensation offers, including cases where there was a dispute with the client about 
the compensation on offer.
44
 Moreover, ASIC itself reviewed aspects of the 
compensation process, 'especially if there were matters that seemed to involve a high 
level of disputation towards the end of the process'.
45
 Clients who disputed the 
compensation offer also had the option of taking their claims to FOS.
46
 
11.40 ASIC told the committee that while the process of reviewing and 
reconstructing CFPL client files might not have been perfect, ultimately it was 
satisfied with the integrity of the process and the compensation outcomes it delivered 
for affected CFPL clients: 
I think in the circumstances, where there was this problem with record 
keeping and inadequate files, the process put in place, in terms of a large, 
mass-scale thing, where 7,000 clients were looked at, had appropriate steps 
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to try and address that problem. I am not saying that that is going to be 
perfect in every file. When documents do not exist, the situation is very 
difficult, no matter what process you adopt.
47
 
11.41 Asked about unresolved CFPL client claims, and its contact with the various 
parties regarding these claims, ASIC told the committee: 
In terms of the contact with CFP, it is not only getting reports from them on 
progress but getting copies from them of correspondence sent to the clients 
and knowing the content of that material and stipulating what needs to be in 
some of that. One of the things we did towards the end of last year was to 
make sure that they made it unambiguously clear to the remaining people 
with contested claims that not only could they go to FOS to have it resolved 
but CFP would waive any jurisdictional limits in that process. Some of 
those problems are under limited jurisdiction or they are disputes about 
whether there had been a previous agreement and there was already a 
binding deed of release and such. We got them to clarify for all of those 
customers that they were willing to waive those things.
48
 
11.42 ASIC explained that across the compensation program (which included 
former clients of both Mr Nguyen and other CFPL advisers) it understood there were 
57 former clients with issues potentially remaining, although for 45 of these the 
problem was they were uncontactable.
49
 Excluding clients who could not be 
contacted, there remained 12 clients with unresolved claims against CFPL, out of a 
client base of 7,000, and after over 1,100 compensation offers had been made across 
this client base.
50
  
CBA's offer of $5000 to offset the cost of an independent review 
11.43 The CBA offered affected CFPL clients $5,000 to help pay for an independent 
review of his or her compensation assessment by a 'qualified accountant, solicitor, or 
licensed financial adviser of the customer's choice'.
51
 
11.44 Ms Swan claimed that she was unable to access CBA's $5,000 offer to pay for 
an accountant or lawyer: 
They refused to pay [Financial Resolutions Australia], whom I have chosen 
to represent me, that money to do this investigation. Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth Bank are picking and choosing which companies they will 
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deal with. This is not an open process. They are picking and choosing 
which accountants and which lawyers you can employ.
52
 
11.45 Asked about the utility and adequacy of $5,000 on offer from the CBA, 
Maurice Blackburn told the committee: 
To the extent to which people did access independent information and 
advice, that is fine. To the extent to which $5,000 would have been enough, 
it depends who you go to, I suppose, and what their expertise is. But, again, 
from a principled point of view, you would say: yes, there is the potential 
for that to provide independent rigour, independent oversight and 
independent review, but was it taken up and was that the way it was played 
out? Not from the experience we had or the information we had seen from 
other clients.
53
 
11.46 Upon further questioning, Maurice Blackburn revealed that the cost of the 
service it provided to the 30 CFPL clients it represented would have been around 
$30,000 to $35,000 per client (these costs were covered by the CFPL as part of the 
settlement).
54
  
11.47 ASIC at one point implied that it would be reluctant to require the CBA to 
undertake the type of comprehensive file review undertaken by Maurice Blackburn, 
because such an approach would be prohibitively expensive for the CBA. Specifically, 
when the committee pointed out that Maurice Blackburn's client file reviews had cost 
somewhere in the order of $35,000 per client, and indicated that this might be the cost 
per client of a proper file review, ASIC responded that when multiplied across the 
7,000 affected clients at CFPL the cost to the CBA would run into the hundreds of 
millions of dollars (see Box 11.1). Drawing on ASIC's approach to the enforceable 
undertaking negotiations with CFPL, it would also seem to indicate that, in its 
approach to negotiating enforceable undertakings more generally, ASIC may give 
excessive regard to the burden an undertaking might impose on a company. This 
broader point concerning ASIC's approach to enforceable undertakings is explored 
further in Chapter 17. 
ASIC on the possibility of a new review of CFPL client files 
11.48 Asked if there would be any legal obstacle to ASIC requiring the CFPL to 
undertake a full, independent review of CFPL client files, ASIC responded that it 
could only do so in the context of an enforceable undertaking or settlement agreement. 
Given the CFPL did not offer to undertake such a review in the context of their 
enforceable undertaking negotiations with ASIC in 2010, ASIC advised that it would 
be unlikely to do so now or in the future given the 'prohibitive cost and time involved 
in such a process'. ASIC also informed the committee that it was unable to require 
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CFPL to undertake such review under the terms of the 2011 enforceable undertaking, 
and that there were only limited (and highly unlikely) circumstances in which it could 
now require CFPL to do so.
55
 In any case, ASIC reiterated its view that the CFPL 
compensation process adequately compensated CFPL clients who had suffered a 
financial loss as a result of inappropriate advice, including clients without legal 
representation.
56
 
 
Box 11.1: Is ASIC reluctant to make CBA pay for a client file review? 
The following exchange during the public hearing on 10 April 2014 raises questions 
about ASIC's willingness to require the CBA to undertake a comprehensive review of 
CFPL client files because of the cost associated with that review: 
CHAIR: We all understand the process, because we had it in exhaustive 
detail this morning, but our questioning queries the utility of that process, 
when CBA did not seek every person to provide any relevant 
supplementary material to help in the reconstruction of the file. That is the 
first point. The second complaint this morning was the inadequacy of the 
$5,000 ceiling. We had evidence from the lawyers from Maurice 
Blackburn, who handled 30 or 40 clients, to the satisfaction of all of their 
clients, that their costs per file were something like an average of $35,000. 
What I am putting to you, Mr Kirk, is that the process of review, 
remediation, reconstruction of files, was in and of itself inadequate and 
necessarily led to poor outcomes. That is what I am asking you to address. 
Why were you satisfied with that process? 
Mr Kirk: I think in the circumstances, where there was this problem with 
record keeping and inadequate files, the process put in place, in terms of a 
large, mass-scale thing, where 7,000 clients were looked at, had appropriate 
steps to try and address that problem. I am not saying that that is going to 
be perfect in every file. When documents do not exist, the situation is very 
difficult, no matter what process you adopt. 
CHAIR: Yes, but, if the problem derives from the fact that the officers of 
Commonwealth Financial Planning at first instance, with any or all of the 
7,000 clients, did not do their job properly, did not maintain records, 
falsified records, falsified signatures, so that nothing could be reconstructed 
properly, in terms of outcomes, bad luck for the Commonwealth Bank. It 
should have been instructed to do the job properly, as was done by this law 
firm in Melbourne, Maurice Blackburn. If that cost $35,000 or $40,000 per 
client, well, that is the penalty for not operating properly in the marketplace 
at first instance. 
Mr Kirk: But doing that for 7,000 clients, at $35,000 or $40,000, would be 
a few hundred million dollars. 
                                              
55  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 51. 
56  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 52. 
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CHAIR: It would. That is not your concern. It is the concern of the 
shareholders of Commonwealth Bank, the concern of the directors of 
Commonwealth Bank. Let the directors go to the meeting and explain that 
the dividend has been reduced by 10c this year because of the incompetence 
that was allowed by the senior managers. It is not your concern. That is the 
point I am trying to make. Who cares? 
Source: Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p.78. 
 
Questions about the compensation scheme for non-Project Hartnett clients 
11.49 To this stage of the case study, most of the evidence has been drawn from 
clients of Mr Don Nguyen. Their evidence clearly indicates that, since becoming 
aware of misconduct in CFPL, they have been bitterly disappointed with the process 
of rectification and the bank's attitude. A number of similar accounts can also be 
drawn from confidential submissions. They include:  
 A elderly man, whose wife was housebound, had his only assets of around 
$100,000 in term deposits—the CBA convinced him to switch all his money 
into the Colonial Mortgage Fund. The financial adviser did not produce a 
Statement of Advice but used a Transaction Without Advice document. This 
document is meant to be used where a client comes into the bank asking for a 
particular product themselves and receives no advice from the planner, which 
was clearly not so in this case. It was alleged that the planner claimed the 
commission on this false basis. Although the Fund was frozen, with the help 
of an advocate, the man was able to receive several thousand dollars in 
compensation for the losses he sustained but did not receive compensation for 
the extreme distress due to the defective advice.  
 A woman in her 90s was put into the Colonial First State Enhanced Income 
Fund on the understanding that it was a conservative product and better than a 
term deposit. She received no explanation from her adviser that there was risk 
attached to this product. The money was in the fund for 20 months during the 
global financial crisis with a loss of $1,500 on the entry price and exit price. 
Over that period of time, the client missed out on some $30,000 in interest 
payments that would have been received had the funds been in a term deposit. 
With the assistance of an advocate, she was able to obtain over $30,000 
compensation in contrast to the original offer of $1,500. 
 A Centrelink recipient, with very poor literacy skills, signed documents that 
he could not understand including a Statement of Advice and was placed in an 
aggressive portfolio.
57
 
                                              
57  Submission 471, (Confidential). 
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11.50 Although these particular clients of CFPL eventually received compensation, 
it was only through the intercession of an advocate who 'kicked and screamed' on their 
behalf and even then there was no allowance for the clients' pain and suffering. 
11.51 It must be kept in mind that there were other people who also have suffered 
loss because of the actions of other CFPL advisers. Clients of Mr Nguyen, and later 
clients of Mr Anthony Awkar, were subject to the compensation scheme known as 
Project Hartnett. Subsequently, another compensation scheme, referred to as the Past 
Business Review, was initiated to recompense clients of other advisers that were 
named in breach reports or about whom CFPL received complaints.
58
 
11.52 The accounts given by Mr Nguyen clients and those of other now banned  
financial advisers stand in stark contrast to those of CBA and ASIC. Indeed, the 
committee has received submissions from a number of CFPL clients whose 
experiences of the process after 2009 reveal quite a different story from the bank's. 
One such client who, in 2007, rolled over the last of her AMP superannuation fund 
into CFPL became alarmed at the large amounts of money disappearing from her 
superannuation. Her financial planner was Mr Chris Baker who left CFPL in February 
2009. She cannot recall hearing from CFPL until 2013 when a staff member: 
…who apparently had been my new financial advisor since 2009, contacted 
me to tell me about the Christopher Baker Enforceable Undertaking to 
ASIC and informing me that I might be entitled to compensation.
59
 
11.53 She explained that: 
 she had to ask for copies of her file on three separate occasions from three 
separate people; 
 her signature appears on some pages of the documents but she does not 
remember having ever discussed the content with Mr Baker let alone seen or 
received a Statement of Advice; her middle name is spelt incorrectly, twice 
and crossed out; the information on the medical practitioner is spelt 
incorrectly; and the answers to the questionnaire on her medical history and 
family medical history are not true; 
 for many years she had been paying for 'very expensive insurance' that she did 
not want and did not know she had; and 
 since 2009, her adviser, who replaced Mr Baker, had never once called her or 
returned her calls or responded to messages left for him.
60
 
11.54 She noted further that there was another document from 2008, which she 
supposedly signed with her married name even though she had reverted to using her 
maiden name. In her view, the document was 'dodgy': 
                                              
58  ASIC, Submission 45, pp. 13–14. 
59  Name withheld, Submission 374, p. 6. 
60  Name withheld, Submission 374, pp. 6–7. 
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I have no idea what this document is or what it is saying. I have asked…the 
complaints officer at CBA, three times for more information on the original 
of the document, where it is, who is the author and what does it mean.
61
 
11.55 When she finally spoke to someone at CBA and asked if she could see her file 
she was told: 
…Baker did not keep good records and what he did have was with a special 
team of case managers who were looking into Baker's client files to 
determine how much financial loss his clients had suffered. He also told me 
Baker had about 1500 clients and CFP were flat out trying to clean up the 
problem. 
I said I wanted to speak to the case manager looking into my case and 
I wanted access to my records. He told me that was not possible. The 
records were located somewhere else and not on CFP's premises. He said he 
did not know exactly where they were. He told me that I could not see the 
case manager because he was about to go on holidays.
62
 
11.56 This CFPL client received a letter of offer with a 60-day time limit in which 
to accept or reject the offer, five days before the time limit expired. She explained: 
I was so upset by this. It was so unfair. I tried calling again but the numbers 
they had provided were disconnected and I couldn't get through to anyone. 
I had to leave another voicemail message for [name withheld] and 
eventually called CBA general complaints before I got someone to respond 
to me.
63
 
11.57 Another case also demonstrates that the damage caused was not confined to 
financial loss. Indeed, some clients have been completely bewildered by the 
remediation process itself, which they have found confusing and stressful. One such 
person only learnt of the extent of Mr Rick Gillespie's misconduct from ASIC in a 
letter received as late as April 2014. The submitter had been a client of Mr Gillespie 
and her instructions to him were that she was risk averse and wanted to protect her 
principal 'at all costs'. In summary, the submitter identified the following facts: 
 money was lost from her super fund while Mr Gillespie was her financial 
planner; 
 CBA knew at the time of assigning her account to Mr Gillespie that he was 
under investigation; 
 although the bank was aware of Mr Gillespie's fraudulent activities the bank 
did not contact her—thereby not providing her with the opportunity to 
scrutinize and reassess her finances; 
                                              
61  Name withheld, Submission 374, p. 7. 
62  Name withheld, Submission 374, p. 8. 
63  Name withheld, Submission 374, p. 10. 
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 there was total confusion and mixed messages from the bank about who was 
managing her affairs after Mr Gillespie left CFPL; 
 ASIC's focus appeared to be on gathering evidence against Mr Gillespie and 
not on supporting the victim—indeed the submitter was of the view that she 
would not be protected by ASIC and that it was not acting on her behalf; and 
 CFPL did not advise her of the full extent of wrongdoing alleged against 
Mr Gillespie until April 2014—for example, she met with representatives 
from CBA in April but even then did not know the extent or involvement of 
any wrongdoing by the bank regarding her financial situation.
64
 
11.58 At this late stage, rather than being reassured by the remediation process, this 
victim has been left even more troubled: 
This is a problem not of my making. All this cloak and dagger stuff with 
ASIC and 4 Corners is all well and good, but it is making me sick and at the 
end of the day I still have no way of knowing if I have been a victim of a 
CBA staff financial planner who failed to comply with financial services 
laws.
65
  
11.59 The husband of another CFPL client informed the committee that: 
I have witnessed on a number of occasions Gloria becoming upset to the 
point of tears while on the phone to Commonwealth Financial Planning 
trying to obtain information, ask questions, and correct the record.
66
 
11.60 The committee has also received correspondence from a couple who entrusted 
the CBA/Colonial with '$1 million hard earned dollars from two middle class 
Australians who worked hard at jobs and renovated homes and sold them to get 
ahead'. In late 2009, they complained to the CBA's state manager over their losses and 
no service. They eventually had $12,000 in fees returned for no service. However, at 
no stage were they informed about Mr Gillespie and his conduct. The bank blamed the 
poor performance of their portfolio on the global financial crisis.
67
 
11.61 Following the May 2014 Four Corners program, a CBA case manager 
contacted the couple, sent them a package of documents with a request to verify their 
signatures. After viewing the documents, they identified 17 forged signatures—many 
of the forgeries related to moving superannuation into the fund, switching, statements 
of advice and withdrawals. The CBA case manager did not provide them with any 
information or explanation for pursuing this matter now, after all these years. 
                                              
64  Submission 469 (Confidential). 
65  Name withheld, Submission 127, p. 1.  
66  Mr Frazer McLennan, Submission 127, p. 1. 
67  Correspondence to committee (name withheld). 
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11.62 The cases dealing with CFPL cited throughout this report clearly demonstrate 
that the wellbeing of a number of the bank's customers was not a priority—whether it 
was during the initial stage of receiving financial advice through to seeking and in 
some cases obtaining compensation. 
11.63 As the committee gathered more and more evidence, lingering doubts about 
the robustness and fairness of the compensation process began to grow. It could see 
major flaws in the process, in particular: 
 the delays in CFPL recognising that advisers were providing bad advice or 
acting improperly and in CFPL acting on that knowledge and informing 
clients;  
 the use of letters or the telephone to contact clients and the manner in which 
information was conveyed, which rather than reassure clients tended in some 
cases to intimidate and confuse them; 
 CFPL's obfuscation when clients sought information on their 
accounts/adviser;  
 a strong reluctance on the part of CFPL to provide files to clients who 
requested them;  
 no allowance made for the power asymmetry between unsophisticated, and in 
many cases older and vulnerable clients, and the CFPL; 
 throughout the compensation process the client was being used to test 
decisions or conclusions already reached by CFPL;  
 no client representative or advocate was present during the early stages of the 
investigation to safeguard the clients' interests when files were being checked 
and in many cases reconstructed; 
 the numerous allegations of missing files and key records, of fabricated 
documents and forged signatures, which do not seem to have been 
investigated;  
 instances where the CFPL's initial offer of compensation was manifestly 
inadequate; and 
 the offer of $5,000 to clients to pay the costs of an expert to assess the 
compensation offer was made available only after the CFPL had determined 
that compensation was payable and an offer had been made. 
11.64 Recent developments have only deepened the committee's misgivings about 
the integrity and fairness of the process. 
 
  
 
Chapter 12 
Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited: 
Recent developments and committee conclusions 
12.1 This chapter outlines the developments that occurred in the final two months 
of the committee's inquiry that led to ASIC and the CBA correcting key evidence 
about the compensation process that both organisations gave to the committee. 
This chapter also contains the committee's overall conclusions on the CFPL matter. 
Developments in May 2014 
12.2 As noted in Chapter 9, following a request from the committee at a public 
hearing on 10 April 2014, ASIC provided the committee with a copy of the letter it 
sent to CFPL on 29 February 2008.
1
 The content of the letter revealed that ASIC's 
surveillance project focused on the operations of another CBA subsidiary, Financial 
Wisdom Limited (FWL), in addition to CFPL. 
12.3 The content of this letter is troubling for several reasons. First, the letter 
indicates that ASIC's surveillance was directed towards advice provided by two CBA 
subsidiaries, not just CFPL. The fact that FWL was subject to surveillance was not 
revealed in ASIC's summary of the surveillance project in its written submission,
2
 
nor had ASIC referred to its concerns regarding FWL at any prior point in the inquiry. 
The issues relating to FWL, and in particular with regard to adviser Mr Rollo Sherriff, 
were not widely revealed until Fairfax Media published allegations regarding FWL 
and Mr Sherriff on 3 May 2014. Subsequently, ASIC provided the committee with 
a supplementary submission which explained that ASIC had conducted an 
investigation into Mr Sherriff's conduct, but decided against taking any enforcement 
action against him. ASIC also noted that its 'work on this matter led to CBA reviewing 
all advice given by Mr Sherriff to his clients and FWL paying compensation totalling 
$7.3 million to 98 of Mr Sherriff's clients'.
3
  
12.4 Since that letter was provided to the committee, further revelations and 
significant developments have occurred. On the evening of Friday, 16 May 2014, both 
ASIC and the CBA provided the committee with statements correcting evidence 
previously given during this inquiry. According to the CBA, some elements of the 
compensation process described in its submission were not applied consistently. 
The primary differences were:  
                                              
1  ASIC, letter to Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited and Financial Wisdom Limited, 
29 February 2008, Additional Information 7. 
2  ASIC, Submission 45, pp. 12–13.  
3  ASIC, Submission 45.8, p. 1. 
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 not all CFPL and FWL customers were offered $5,000 to obtain independent 
advice to review their compensation offer; 
 not all CFPL and FWL customers received all the written correspondence 
described in the CBA's submission including upfront communication with 
affected customers to advise them of concerns about the quality of advice 
provided; and 
 an independent accountancy expert did not endorse and oversee the 
remediation process for FWL clients as FWL was not subject to the 
CFPL enforceable undertaking.
4
 
12.5 The CBA advised that where it discussed total compensation payments and 
the remediation process in its submission or at a public hearing, this applied to both 
CFPL and FWL customers. ASIC provided a further supplementary submission that 
noted some of the information ASIC put to the committee about the compensation 
process was inaccurate because it was based on the CBA's submission.
5
 ASIC's 
previous submissions reported that the compensation paid to affected clients of CFPL 
totalled $51 million. The total compensation is now $52 million; of that amount, 
$10.5 million was paid to affected clients of advisers of FWL and $41.5 million was 
paid to affected clients of advisers of CFPL.
6
 
12.6 Since becoming aware of anomalies in CBA's advice, ASIC informed 
the committee that it would impose, by agreement with the CBA, conditions on the 
AFS licences of CFPL and FWL. The revised conditions follow concern that 
customers of other high-risk advisers in CFPL and FWL were disadvantaged because 
their compensation process was different from the clients of Mr Nguyen and 
Mr Awkar—that compensation arrangements were applied inconsistently cross all 
affected customers of the businesses. The new conditions require CFPL and FWL 
to apply the conditions agreed to under Project Hartnett to all clients who did not 
originally receive the benefit of those measures.
7
 This includes offering up to $5,000 
to seek independent advice from an accountant, lawyer and/or licensed financial 
adviser; and allowing all affected clients to reopen the question of compensation.
8
 
12.7 The committee was not satisfied with the information contained in ASIC's late 
supplementary submission or the CBA's correspondence. Although both documents 
were supposed to correct misinformation provided to the committee, they only added 
to the confusion already surrounding the compensation process. The committee then 
wrote to CBA seeking clarification. For example, the committee sought to establish 
the meaning of 'not all CFPL and FWL customers were offered $5,000 to obtain 
                                              
4  CBA, Additional Information 10. 
5  CBA, Additional Information 10. 
6  ASIC, Submission 45.6, p. 5. 
7  See paragraph 11.4.  
8  ASIC, Submission 45.6, p. 5. 
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independent advice to review their compensation offer'. The advice received is now 
clear that 'none' of the customers under the Past Business Review or three other CFPL 
advisers received this offer.
9
 
12.8 Information provided to the committee shows that: 
 under the Past Business Review 2,287 cases were considered and 403 offered 
compensation; and  
 of the three other CFPL advisers, 573 cases were reviewed of which 55 cases 
were offered compensation.
10
 
12.9 The clients of FWL were not part of the Past Business Review but, according 
to CBA, FWL 'adopted a remediation policy that was very closely based on the Past 
Business Review'. Thus, the committee concludes that these customers (of the 
793 cases where advice was provided, 258 cases were offered compensation) similarly 
did not receive the $5,000 offer to assist them obtain independent advice.  
12.10 It also turns out that not one of the above clients received an initial letter 
stating that the CFPL/FWL had concerns about the advice provided. According to the 
CBA: 
Communications to clients of advisers in the Past Business Review were 
made when further information was required from the customer in order to 
assess the case and/or there was an assessment of inappropriate advice and 
compensation was assessed as payable. 
The communication with respect to the FWL clients was similar to those in 
the Past Business Review.
11
  
12.11 For months the committee had been led to believe that all clients, not only 
those of Mr Nguyen and Mr Awkar, had received equal treatment under the 
compensation schemes. In part, this discrepancy may explain why some people have 
written to the committee completely confused and distressed by recent correspondence 
from the CBA.  
12.12 This obfuscation by the CBA has further undermined the committee's 
confidence in the integrity of the process.  
12.13 The committee wants to make two final points about the compensation 
offered: the amounts were substantial and, in a number of cases, the difference 
between the CBA's first and final offers was significant. The committee has cited a 
few cases already. For example, Maurice Blackburn referred to one of its clients who, 
before he sought legal representation, 'was offered one-tenth of what Maurice 
                                              
9  CBA, answer to question on notice, no. 18, p. 13. 
10  CBA, answer to question on notice, no. 18, p. 7. 
11  CBA, answer to question on notice, no. 18, p. 15. 
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Blackburn ultimately negotiated'.
12
 In order to obtain some sense of the gap between 
the first and final offers, the committee obtained from the CBA in confidence a 
sample from the highest to the lowest. The figures have been rounded and 
approximate but they included an initial offer of $230,000 to a final offer of around 
$657,000 (a difference of about $427,000), an initial offer of $29,000 to a final offer 
of $101,500 (a $72,500 difference) and an initial offer of $5,500 to a final offer of 
$33,900 (a difference of around $28,000). On the lower end of the scale they ranged 
from an initial offer of $49,000 to a final offer of $50,000 (a difference of just over 
$1,000). From the indicative sample provided, the other differences recorded between 
the initial offer and the final offer involved sums of $23,800, $13,600, $12,700, 
$10,800, $6,900, $2,000, $184 and zero.  
Committee view 
12.14 The preceding chapters have outlined the committee's concerns about ASIC's 
response to the seriousness of the problems at CFPL. The committee also has 
significant concerns about the process for providing restitution to affected clients. 
From the very beginning of the inquiry, the committee has been troubled by the CBA's 
attitude and the information it has provided. 
12.15 Firstly, the committee believes that the CBA's bland suggestion that clients 
received 'inappropriate advice' ignores the very real distress experienced by CFPL 
clients as a result of the calculated deceit by their financial advisers. The committee 
has little doubt that the pain and suffering experienced by the CFPL clients who gave 
evidence was almost certainly experienced by countless other CFPL clients.  
12.16 Secondly, the FWL matter was not disclosed to the committee, either by ASIC 
or the CBA, until April 2014 when the committee obtained from ASIC a letter it sent 
to the CBA on 29 February 2008. The letter indicated that ASIC's surveillance was not 
only directed toward the advice being provided by the CFPL, but also the advice from 
another CBA subsidiary, FWL. 
12.17 Finally, there were the developments in May 2014 that led to licence 
conditions being imposed on CFPL and FWL and both ASIC and the CBA providing 
statements to the committee correcting their evidence. This shows that, for some time, 
both the committee and ASIC had not been kept fully or properly informed of the 
compensation process for clients affected by serious misconduct within two of the 
CBA's businesses. Until ASIC and the CBA provided corrections to their evidence, 
the committee had not been provided with accurate information on the total amount of 
compensation or the process for remediation. The imposition of licence conditions 
on CFPL and FWL show that ASIC has finally begun to hold the CBA to account. 
Nevertheless, ASIC continues to maintain that the compensation process, as originally 
devised, 'was fair and robust'.
13
  
                                              
12  Mr John Berrill, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 16. 
13  ASIC, Submission 45.6, p. 5. 
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12.18 Notwithstanding the recent developments, the committee is deeply concerned 
by both the number of clients that were potentially affected by serious misconduct 
who have not received fair compensation and the processes put in place by the CBA 
to reconstruct incomplete client files and compensate CFPL clients. The committee is 
particularly concerned by the apparent asymmetries of knowledge and negotiating 
power inherent in the compensation process, wherein vulnerable clients without expert 
financial knowledge or legal representation (including clients without the means 
to access legal representation) were largely forced to rely on the CBA's assurances 
about the integrity of the process. The evidence received from the law firm Maurice 
Blackburn that suggested CFPL clients without legal representation may have 
received inadequate compensation was telling in this regard. There was a clear 
incentive for CFPL to minimise the amounts it repaid clients; clients that challenged 
the compensation offered and had copies of their documentation had their payments 
substantially increased. 
12.19 The committee considers that there are potentially many more affected clients 
that have not been fairly compensated. The clients that the committee invited to give 
evidence at a public hearing were exceptional in that they were willing to voice 
their concerns publicly and were able to fight for compensation because of their 
circumstances, either because they had a family member determined to assist them 
with their case or because the next CFPL adviser they dealt with after a rogue adviser 
was Mr Jeffrey Morris, one of the whistleblowers, who gave them a copy of their 
original file. 
12.20 The committee notes that the CBA made (or will make) $5,000 available to 
each affected CFPL client to help pay for an independent review of the compensation 
offered. The CBA, however, controlled which accountants or lawyers could be 
selected. In any case, the committee believes this $5,000 is inadequate for its intended 
purpose. In this connection, the committee points to the evidence received from 
Maurice Blackburn suggesting that the reviews it conducted of client files cost 
somewhere in the order of $35,000 per client (this cost being covered in the eventual 
settlement between Maurice Blackburn's clients and the CBA). While the committee 
does not believe that Maurice Blackburn's charges are necessarily indicative of the 
amount other law firms (or other suitably qualified professionals) might charge for 
this service, it would nonetheless strongly suggest that the $5,000 offered by the CBA 
was inadequate. 
12.21 The committee has carefully weighed the evidence received about the file 
reconstruction process, including evidence from ASIC and the CBA suggesting the 
process was fair and proper, and evidence from Mr Jeffrey Morris and Ms Merilyn 
Swan suggesting the process involved the manipulation of client files to reduce 
compensation payable. The committee believes that serious questions remain 
unanswered on this score. A more comprehensive, independent review of both CFPL 
client files and the file reconstruction process is necessary to remove doubts about the 
integrity of the process. The committee believes that such a review should include a 
forensic re-examination of the files of each client potentially affected by misconduct 
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within CFPL, and assess whether the compensation made available to CFPL clients 
was adequate.  
12.22 To the committee, it appears that the following five options are available: 
(a) the arrangements in place as a result of the licence conditions ASIC 
recently imposed on CFPL's and FWL's AFS licences are left to run their 
course; 
(b) the above arrangements or a separate review process agreed to by ASIC 
and the CBA, and funded by the CBA, with the addition of a client 
advocate appointed as part of the review process to ensure client 
interests are properly represented;  
(c) a complete review of the compensation arrangements for all clients of 
financial advisers suspected of providing bad advice, to be undertaken 
by an independent law firm or other expert appointed by the 
government, again with a client advocate appointed; 
(d) an independent inquiry established by the government and headed by an 
eminent and knowledgeable person, such as a retired judge; or 
(e) a Royal Commission. 
12.23 As noted above, the committee is not satisfied with option (a), that is, 
the current arrangements. It is acknowledged that the process has the advantage of 
compensation potentially being determined in a timely fashion. It is also 
acknowledged that an ASIC-appointed independent expert will now oversee the 
compensation process. However, the committee notes that the independent expert was 
not appointed to act as an advocate for client interests. The absence of a client 
advocate in the compensation process is, in the committee's view, a key deficiency in 
that process. The compensation arrangements are also supposed to comfort affected 
clients; yet, the committee has been contacted by several clients now anxious and 
confused by the CFPL's communications with them. Another key concern is that 
the CBA is still determining the compensation amounts based on files that contain 
documents claimed to be fraudulent or that are 'missing' key documents. The scheme 
also applies only to a limited number of clients, whereas the committee has received 
evidence indicating that the problems with CFPL were far more widespread. 
12.24 Options (b) and (c) aim to improve on the current arrangements by requiring 
a client advocate. These processes may still result in relatively timely determinations. 
They also have other advantages such as greater independence from the CBA and, 
unlike a public inquiry, the cost of the review could be borne entirely by the CBA. 
However, both options (b) and (c) only deal with instances of misconduct that have 
currently been identified. The committee has no reason to believe that the cases on the 
public record to date represent the entirety of the serious misconduct that took place 
within CFPL. 
12.25 The committee's confidence in ASIC's ability to get the process right this third 
time is severely undermined and the committee is not convinced that the regulator 
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should be left to manage this matter any longer. ASIC has shown that it is reluctant 
to actively pursue misconduct within CFPL and FWL; rather, it appears to accept the 
information and assurances the CBA provides without question. The committee is also 
strongly of the view that the CBA's credibility in the CFPL matter is so compromised 
that it should not be directly involved in future arrangements for investigating the 
misconduct or reviewing the compensation process.  
12.26 There were fundamental and widespread problems within CFPL. It is essential 
that: 
 all rogue advisers are identified and that any conduct that may amount to a 
breach of any law or professional standard pursued; and 
 all clients who have suffered as a consequence of the serious misconduct that 
occurred receive just compensation.  
12.27 Given the seriousness of the misconduct involved and the need for all client 
files to be reviewed, the committee believes that a review with sufficient investigative 
and discovery powers should be established by the government to undertake this 
work. To resolve this matter conclusively and satisfactorily, the inquiry would need 
the powers to compel relevant people to give evidence and to produce information or 
documents. The committee is of the view that a judicial inquiry is warranted. 
The CFPL scandal needs to become a lesson for the entire financial services sector. 
Firms need to know that they cannot turn a blind eye to rogue employees who do 
whatever it takes to make profits at the expense of vulnerable investors. If this matter 
is not pursued thoroughly, there will be little incentive for Australia's major financial 
institutions to take compliance seriously. 
Recommendation 7 
12.28 The committee recommends that the government establish an 
independent inquiry, possibly in the form of a judicial inquiry or Royal 
Commission, to: 
 thoroughly examine the actions of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(CBA) in relation to the misconduct of advisers and planners within the 
CBA's financial planning businesses and the allegations of a cover up; 
 identify any conduct that may amount to a breach of any law or 
professional standard; 
 review all files of clients affected or likely to be affected by the 
misconduct and assess the appropriateness of the compensation processes 
and amounts of compensation offered and provided by the CBA to these 
clients; and 
 make recommendations about ASIC and any regulatory or legislative 
reforms that may be required. 
  
  
 
Chapter 13 
Internal control systems  
13.1 The committee has discussed significant non-compliance issues in one of 
Australia's most reputable organisations—the CBA. The previous chapter, however, 
concluded with the committee expressing concerns that the financial services sector 
needs to draw lessons from the CFPL experience of non-compliance. In this regard, 
during the inquiry the committee also considered non-compliance issues within 
another major financial institution—Macquarie Group (specifically Macquarie 
Equities Limited, a financial advice and investment service business within Macquarie 
Group that carries on its business under the name Macquarie Private Wealth). 
Moreover, in its consideration of lending practices between 2002 and 2010, the 
committee found that some of Australia's banking institutions turned a blind eye to 
irresponsible and unethical conduct, including predatory lending, in breach of their 
code of practice and community standards.  
13.2 In light of what appear to be serious flaws with the internal risk management 
processes related to legislative and regulatory compliance in these companies, 
the committee believes that this aspect of non-compliance warrants a much closer 
look. In this chapter, the committee briefly underlines some of the critical compliance 
failings in CFPL and then in greater detail looks at the internal compliance workings 
in Macquarie Equities Limited to tease out whether it adds to or allays the committee's 
concerns about non-compliance, particularly as it relates to consumer protection. 
The committee also considers the effectiveness of ASIC's role in ensuring that 
companies have robust compliance management systems in place. The committee 
shines a light on, and considers whether, the system of internal control is adequate as 
it relates to compliance risk.
1
 
Compliance  
13.3 ASIC's chairman, Mr Greg Medcraft, stated that firms' compliance 
arrangements played a crucial role in ensuring that the firms do not fail to meet 
expected standards, which was 'a very important message that goes to the heart of 
companies' compliance arrangements'. He said compliance 'should be seen as an 
investment, not as a necessary evil, and if compliance professionals can ensure they 
have strong arrangements in place then hopefully we will not have to pay them a 
visit'.
2
 The Governance Institute of Australia insisted that the primary responsibility 
for corporate misconduct resides with the individuals and companies that carry out 
these actions. The regulator's role is 'to provide guidance as to duties and 
                                              
1  By compliance risk, the committee means the potential for a company to fail to comply with all 
applicable laws, regulations and codes of practice. 
2  Thomson Reuters, Special Report: ASIC: The Outlook for Enforcement 2012–13, p. 5. 
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responsibilities, and undertake enforcement where breaches of those duties and 
responsibilities occur'.
3
  
Commonwealth Financial Planning 
13.4 A condition of an AFS licence is to 'establish and maintain compliance 
measures that ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that the licensee complies with 
the provisions of financial services laws'.
4
  
13.5 The committee has in great detail chronicled the failings in CFPL. In this 
chapter, the committee is concerned predominately with the institution's compliance 
regime. The committee understands that as early as 2006, as a result of its 
surveillance, ASIC alerted the general manager of the CFPL to key concerns about 
CFPL's compliance framework. One such concern was that representatives rated as 
critical (the highest risk category) as a result of serious misconduct were not 
'effectively addressed within the current framework'.
5
 In particular, ASIC doubted 
CBA's 'ability to ensure its representatives were complying with the law'.
6
 In February 
2008, ASIC wrote to CFPL about the inadequacy of its processes and controls: 
…we are concerned that your own data suggests that your compliance 
framework is not adequately detecting serious misconduct. We are therefore 
concerned that you are not adequately using your framework to 
continuously ensure you are meeting your licence obligations.
7
 
13.6 ASIC noted further that only seven of the 38 representatives who were rated 
as critical were reported to ASIC under section 912 of the Corporations Act. 
It concluded that given the seriousness of the conduct, ASIC had concerns about 
CBA's ability to discharge this obligation to report significant breaches under that 
section. ASIC informed the CFPL that despite the bank's assurances back in 
May 2006 that it had overhauled its compliance arrangements, ASIC had reason to 
believe, on the basis of its surveillance findings, that its concerns were still 'ongoing'.
8
  
13.7 Soon after this letter and a meeting between CFPL and ASIC, the CFPL 
implemented a Continuous Improvement Compliance Program (CICP). After some 
time, however, it became evident that this plan was ineffective, which then led to the 
execution of an enforceable undertaking in October 2011—five years after ASIC 
                                              
3  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 4. 
4  See for example, Enforceable Undertaking from Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited, 
accepted by ASIC on 25 October 2011.  
5  ASIC, letter to Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited and Financial Wisdom Limited, 
29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 1.  
6  ASIC, letter to CFPL and FWL, 29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 2. 
7  ASIC, letter to CFPL and FWL, 29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 3. 
8  ASIC, letter to CFPL and FWL, 29 February 2008, Additional Information 7, p. 5. 
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raised its initial concerns. ASIC conceded that the process between the CICP and the 
enforceable undertaking was 'too long'. According to ASIC: 
We should have monitored it more closely and put together tougher time 
limits on it and tougher testing of the monitoring all along the way and 
made a decision earlier to give up on that process and move to the tougher 
enforceable undertaking process.
9
 
…with the benefit of hindsight we feel we should not have placed as much 
reliance on Commonwealth Financial Planning's ability to identify and 
rectify all of the problems that started to emerge.
10
 
13.8 While the committee accepts that ASIC could have insisted on a more robust 
process and more carefully monitored the implementation of that process, questions 
about the CFPL's own compliance mechanisms remain. As Mr Kirk explained, ASIC 
had trusted the CFPL. ASIC believed that the CFPL 'would be able to uncover all of 
their own problems and fix them and change their culture'.
11
 This trust was misplaced.  
13.9 As agreed to in the enforceable undertaking in October 2011, CFPL undertook 
to initiate a review that would address ASIC's concerns, including whether: 
 there were adequate processes and controls in place to deal with ongoing risks 
of non-compliance; 
 representative misconduct had been dealt with in a consistent manner; 
 recurring themes had been appropriately identified; 
 data analysis processes and reporting capabilities allow for early detection of 
advice process irregularities; 
 there had been adequate controls over client records; and  
 there had been consistent application of CFPL's complaints handling and 
internal dispute resolution processes.
12
 
13.10 This list underscores the significant nature of ASIC's concerns. One of the 
most troubling aspects of the conduct of some CFPL financial planners was that it was 
deliberate and systematic, not negligent or sloppy. The conduct was targeted at 
vulnerable and trusting customers who sustained significant losses; it was a breach of 
the bank's fiduciary duty and obligation to use reasonable care. The supervisors who 
knew of such behaviour failed miserably in their duty to report such misconduct. 
Without doubt the compliance culture in and around CFPL was seriously 
compromised.  
                                              
9  Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader, Deposit Takers, Credit and Insurance Providers, 
ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 67. 
10  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 68. 
11  Mr Greg Kirk, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 79. 
12  ASIC, 'ASIC accepts enforceable undertaking from Commonwealth Financial Planning', Media 
Release, no. 11–229, 26 October 2011.  
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13.11 Of grave concern is that weaknesses in this area of compliance are still 
evident. As noted in Chapter 10, the independent expert's final report found that the 
CFPL needed to improve its breach reporting and ASIC regarded this area as an 
ongoing issue. Both assessments, however, were made before 16 May 2014, when the 
CBA informed the committee belatedly that the remediation process was 'not applied 
consistently'.
13
  
13.12 In April 2014, the CBA led the committee to believe that, among other things, 
it had implemented 'major changes' in how its compliance and risk management 
operations were structured—it spoke of 'enhanced risk and compliance inside the 
business'. Yet within five weeks, the CBA wrote to the committee revealing what it 
termed inconsistencies in its accounts of the compensation process. In effect, the 
CBA's group general counsel, the bank's representative for this inquiry, had been 
unaware that he was misleading the committee. His eleventh hour revelations about 
the compensation process whereby not all clients were treated equally suggest that the 
concerns about risk management and compliance within CFPL are far from being 
addressed. 
Macquarie Private Wealth 
13.13 In January 2013, ASIC expressed its concern that Macquarie Equities 
Limited's (MEL) management 'may have failed to foster and maintain a proper 
commitment to, and culture of, compliance' within the Macquarie Private Wealth 
business.
14
 ASIC found MEL had failed to address recurring compliance deficiencies 
that involved a significant number of advisers. MEL entered an enforceable 
undertaking on 29 January 2013.  
13.14 MEL's compliance deficiencies were initially identified by MEL's own client 
file reviews dating back to 2008. Indeed, the enforceable undertaking noted that 
between 2008 and March 2010, Macquarie Private Wealth conducted client file 
reviews of its representatives, which 'indicated deficiencies involving a significant 
number of the Representatives'. These shortcomings were recurring and not reported 
to ASIC nor were they rectified in all cases. Between December 2011 and 
August 2012, ASIC conducted surveillance checks of Macquarie Private Wealth. 
These checks identified similar issues to those identified by Macquarie Private 
Wealth's own reviews.
15
 Specifically, the deficiencies included instances of: 
 client files not containing statements of advice; 
 advisers failing to demonstrate a reasonable basis for advice provided to the 
client; 
                                              
13  CBA, Additional Information 10. See also paragraphs 10.24–10.25. 
14  Enforceable Undertaking from Macquarie Equities Limited, accepted by ASIC on 
29 January 2013, paragraph 2.17. 
15  Enforceable Undertaking from Macquarie Equities Limited, accepted by ASIC on 
29 January 2013, paragraphs 2.6–2.10. 
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 poor client records and lack of detail contained in advice documents; 
 lack of supporting documentation on files to determine if there was a 
reasonable basis for the advice provided to the client; and  
 failing to provide sufficient evidence that clients were sophisticated investors. 
13.15 Again, as with the CFPL, these identified deficiencies were of considerable 
significance and go to serious breaches of duty of care to customers. ASIC stated that 
these five areas of deficiencies were not reported to ASIC. Unequivocally, it described 
these deficiencies as 'serious' and noted that 'any remediation initiatives attempted by 
MEL over a four year period had been ineffective'.
16
 ASIC was concerned that MEL 
may have failed to address satisfactorily weaknesses in the Licensee Risk Framework. 
Among the numerous areas of concern, were whether: 
 there had been effective licensee risk policies, processes, controls and systems 
having regard to the nature, size and complexity of its business; 
 there had been compliance with the obligations regarding the provision of 
personal advice, general advice and execution-only dealing transactions, 
including necessary detail in advice documents to enable retail investors 
to make informed decisions; 
 representative conduct had been dealt with in a consistent and appropriate 
manner, including having robust consequences or non-compliant 
representatives;  
 recurring issues had been effectively identified and addressed over a period of 
time; and 
 effective compliance training and education had taken place. 
13.16 On 15 March 2013, ASIC's deputy chairman, Mr Peter Kell, informed the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJCCFS) that 
one aspect of ASIC's concerns with Macquarie Private Wealth's operations was that 
Macquarie had identified a range of compliance problems within its business, but not 
reported them to ASIC. He explained this issue of failing to report was something that 
ASIC wanted to highlight more broadly across the financial services industry:  
We have seen inconsistencies in the approach of different firms in terms of 
how they report breaches. We have been highlighting recently that we 
expect firms to, if you like, err on the side of caution and come to us if they 
have identified a problem within their own operations, rather than make an 
assumption that this can fly under the radar and is not a concern. We are 
highlighting that as an area where we expect to see stronger action from the 
industry as a whole. 
…Perhaps in some firms there are issues around the compliance staff, 
compliance units and compliance functions within the firms' operations. It 
                                              
16  ASIC, 'ASIC accepts enforceable undertaking from Macquarie Equities Ltd', Media Release, 
13-010MR, 29 January 2013. 
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has been a longstanding issue that they are not always dealt with as 
seriously as we would like, but we are seeing that change across the 
industry.
17
 
13.17 According to Mr Kell, ASIC continues to emphasise that reporting 
non-compliance was 'an important part of a well-functioning system'. He said:  
…where firms identify problems with their own operations—advisers who 
have behaved inappropriately or provided inappropriate advice; systems 
errors that have caused significant issues for consumers—we expect to hear 
about that sooner rather than later.
18
  
13.18 Fellow commissioner, Mr John Price, stated that the enforceable undertaking 
required Macquarie 'to rethink significantly the way it monitors its representatives and 
to create a culture where compliance is central to getting that advice'.
19
 Importantly, 
Ms Joanna Bird of ASIC told the committee that Macquarie Private Wealth had 
'systemic failings of compliance and it had a poor compliance culture'.
20
 Mr Medcraft 
told that committee that he gets annoyed 'when basically there is not that 
self-reporting'. He noted further that the troubling thing was when ASIC finds 
something and it asks the question, 'Well, there's a problem there; what else is there?' 
He stated further: 
But I think for Australians to be confident in participating in the financial 
system it is actually really important that those that are part of that system 
do self-report where there is a problem. Transparency is, I think, really 
important. It is not a systemic problem, but there is a broad spread of 
behaviour, and some of it is at the very top end of our system…that some of 
the issue about self-reporting relates to some very large financial services 
holders. It is not just maybe at the bottom end. It is at the top end.
21
  
13.19 It should be noted that the CFPL and Macquarie Private Wealth are not the 
only highly regarded institutions that have come to public attention. ASIC found in 
2009 that ANZ Custodians had failed to report significant breaches of its obligations 
to ASIC and demonstrated a poor compliance culture. In 2011, the regulator also 
questioned whether UBS Wealth Management Australia had appropriate compliance 
                                              
17  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services Hansard, Oversight of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, 15 March 2013, pp. 15–16. 
18  Mr Peter Kell, ASIC, PJCCFS Hansard, Oversight of ASIC, 15 March 2013, p. 16. 
19  Mr John Price, ASIC, PJCCFS Hansard, Oversight of ASIC, 15 March 2013, p. 13. 
20  Ms Joanna Bird, Senior Executive Leader, Financial Advisers, ASIC, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 95. 
21  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, PJCCFS Committee Hansard, Oversight of ASIC, 
15 March 2013, p. 16. 
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risk management policies, although ASIC did acknowledge that UBS informed it of 
possible breaches.
22
 
13.20 Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gillian underscored the need to have 
'substantive rather than technical compliance'.
23
 The question remains, considering the 
repeated instances of non-compliance, have the institutions now put in place risk 
management mechanisms that would prevent any repeat of the mistakes of the past?  
ASIC's response 
13.21 ASIC noted that AFS licensees have obligations under subsection 912A(1) of 
Corporations Act, among other things, to: 
 do all things necessary to ensure that the financial services covered by their 
licence are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly;  
 have adequate arrangements in place for managing conflicts of interest;  
 comply with the conditions on their licence;  
 comply with the financial services laws;  
 take reasonable steps to ensure that their representatives comply with the 
financial services laws;  
 unless regulated by APRA, have adequate financial, technological and human 
resources to provide the financial services covered by their licence and 
to carry out supervisory arrangements;  
 maintain the competence to provide the financial services covered by the 
licence;  
 ensure that their representatives are adequately trained and competent 
to provide those financial services;  
 if they provide financial services to retail clients, have a dispute resolution 
system; and  
 unless they are regulated by APRA, establish and maintain adequate risk 
management systems.
24
  
13.22 According to ASIC, it has not undertaken a specific assessment of the 
effectiveness of the internal compliance arrangements of AFS licensees. It had, 
however, undertaken a review of the business and risk practices of the top 
50 AFS licensees that provide financial product advice to retail clients.
25
 In 2011, 
                                              
22  Enforceable Undertaking from Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited and ANZ 
Nominees Limited, accepted by ASIC on 6 March 2009; and Enforceable Undertaking from 
UBS Wealth Management Australia Ltd, accepted by ASIC on 17 March 2011. 
23  Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan, Submission 121, p. 3. 
24  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), pp. 5–6. 
25  ASIC, Review of financial advice industry practice, Report 251, September 2011. 
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ASIC found in respect of the top 20 licensees that, while they were focused on risk 
management and compliance, there were a number of issues, including: 
 proactive licensee monitoring, which should be instrumental in detecting 
incidents and breaches; and  
 risk profiling tools, whereby advisers should not rely on risk profiling tools 
without also considering if the outcomes are appropriate for their clients' 
circumstances.
26
 
13.23 ASIC found in 2013 that most of the top 21 to 50 of these AFS licensees were 
taking steps to mitigate key risks, although a number of issues were highlighted, 
including: 
 monitoring and supervision of advisers, whereby licensees: 
 must ensure their advisers comply with their stated procedures;  
 must check references of new advisers to exclude 'bad apples'; 
 must report breaches and demonstrate remediation plans are in place;  
 should retain access to client records at all times; and 
 product and strategic advice, whereby conflicts of interest need to be managed 
and clients educated about risk and return so that their expectations are more 
realistic.
27
  
13.24 According to ASIC, effective internal compliance arrangements were 'crucial 
to meeting these statutory obligations'. In keeping with the principles-based nature of 
the financial services legislation, however, ASIC does not prescribe how licensees 
should meet these obligations but has released a number of regulatory guides.
28
 
Industry associations have also published a number of standards and codes. 
13.25 ASIC noted that self-regulation involved industry developing and enforcing 
its own regulatory rules, with no or minimum government intervention. ASIC went on 
to explain: 
Ideally, self-regulation should be initiated by industry, rather than imposed 
upon it.  However, Government can create environments that encourage 
self-regulatory initiatives, for example, by recognising a self-regulatory 
regime in legislation and providing incentives to comply with the regime.
29
 
                                              
26  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 6. 
27  ASIC, Review of financial advice industry practice: Phase 2, Report 362, July 2013. 
28  These include Regulatory Guide 104, Licensing: Meeting the general obligations; Regulatory 
Guide 105, Licensing: Organisational competence; and Regulatory Guide 165, Licensing: 
Internal and external dispute resolution. 
29  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 7. 
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13.26 Although ASIC supported self-regulatory measures, especially where industry 
standards or requirements exceeded legal requirements, it stated that based on its 
experience: 
…self-regulatory models are rarely an effective or acceptable alternative to 
explicit regulation in the context of retail financial markets because 
currently pre-conditions for effective self-regulation are rarely present in a 
fully developed state.
30
 
13.27 Mr Tregillis, a long-term regulator who understands that regulators have a 
very difficult job in meeting the demands placed upon them, cited the approach being 
taken in the UK toward compliance. He noted: 
The UK regulator, for example, has a special-person sort of regime whereby 
they can, where they are concerned about compliance failings, not wait until 
there is a breach but actually require an expert person or a special person to 
do a review and report to the regulator. That is double edged, but it is a 
proactive mechanism. It is useful in the sense that it does not mean that the 
regulator has to have permanent resources; you can get people with 
expertise to do it. That is something that could be considered.
31
 
ASX corporate governance principle 3 
13.28 In this chapter, the committee has focused simply on the internal risk 
management systems that cover compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
However, the ASX sets the bar higher. Commentary accompanying its corporate 
governance principle 3 states: 
Acting ethically and responsibly goes well beyond mere compliance with 
legal obligations and involves acting with honesty, integrity and in a 
manner that is consistent with the reasonable expectations of investors and 
the broader community. It includes being, and being seen to be, a 'good 
corporate citizen'… 
The board of a listed entity should lead by example when it comes to acting 
ethically and responsibly and should specifically charge management with 
the responsibility for creating a culture within the entity that promotes 
ethical and responsible behaviour.
32
 
13.29 The committee found that two major companies fell far short of the expected 
standard of compliance. Clearly, more effective internal systems of self-regulation, 
monitoring and reporting within companies to address cultural issues dealing with 
non-compliance need to be devised and implemented. Having a compliance model 
                                              
30  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 8 (received 21 May 2014), p. 7. 
31  Mr Shane Tregillis, Chief Ombudsman, FOS, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, 
p. 26. 
32  ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, 3rd Edition, Principle 3. 
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that is able to detect corporate breaches, recognise their significance, and promptly 
report on and rectify any deficiencies is vital to the health of the corporation.  
13.30 It may be time for the ASX and ASIC to review their guidance on risk 
management, placing an emphasis on the adequacy of internal compliance 
arrangements and appropriate reporting obligations for non-compliance. 
The government should also look more closely as to whether the legislation needs to 
be strengthened to require companies to have more robust systems in place to help 
them comply with applicable laws and regulations to foster a culture of compliance.  
13.31 It should be noted that the maximum penalty for not reporting a significant 
breach (or likely breach) within ten business days of becoming aware of the breach (or 
likely breach) is: 
 for an individual, $8,500 or imprisonment for one year, or both; and 
 for a company, $42,500.
33
 
13.32 ASIC should also bear in mind the lessons to be learnt from the CFPL and 
Macquarie Private Wealth cases and ensure that its surveillance of companies for 
compliance is far more intrusive and less trusting. Further, in light of the poor 
performance of the internal compliance regime in CFPL and Macquarie Private 
Wealth, the committee is also inclined to share Mr Medcraft's scepticism and ask 
'what else is there?' The committee is concerned with Macquarie's failure to report and 
particularly the breakdown in its compliance regime. Indeed, as noted previously, 
Ms Bird told the committee that Macquarie Private Wealth had 'systemic failings of 
compliance and it had a poor compliance culture'.
34
 The committee is concerned with 
the efficacy of the enforceable undertaking entered into as a result of serious 
compliance deficiencies within Macquarie Private Wealth. Given that ASIC did not, 
until recently, fully understand how the CBA was implementing its compensation 
schemes for clients affected by the CFPL scandal, the committee doubts ASIC is fully 
aware of the Macquarie business and remediation process. While the enforceable 
undertaking remains in place, ASIC should undertake intensive surveillance of 
Macquarie Private Wealth to ensure that ASIC's concerns are in fact being addressed 
and that a culture of compliance is being adopted.  
Recommendation 8 
13.33 The committee recommends that ASIC establish a pool of approved 
independent experts (retired experienced and hardened business people with 
extensive knowledge of compliance) from which to draw when concerns emerge 
about a poor compliance culture in a particular company. The special expert 
would review and report to the company and ASIC on suspected compliance 
failings with the process funded by the company in question. 
                                              
33  See ASIC, Breach reporting by AFS licensees, Regulatory Guide 78, February 2014, paragraph 
RG 78.32. 
34  Ms Joanna Bird, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 95. 
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Recommendation 9 
13.34 The committee recommends that the government consider increased 
penalties and alternatives to court action, such as infringement notices, for 
Australian financial services licensees that fail to lodge reports of significant 
breaches to ASIC within the required time. 
Recommendation 10 
13.35 The committee recommends that ASIC review its surveillance activity 
with a view to making it more effective in detecting deficiencies in internal 
compliance arrangements. 
Recommendation 11 
13.36 In light of the Commonwealth Financial Planning matter, the committee 
recommends that ASIC undertakes intensive surveillance of other financial 
advice businesses that have recently been a source of concern, such as Macquarie 
Private Wealth, to ensure that ASIC's previous concerns are being addressed 
and that there are no other compliance deficiencies. ASIC should make the 
findings of its surveillance public and, in due course, provide a report to this 
committee. 
 
 
  
 
 
PART III 
Investigations and enforcement 
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Overview of Part III 
 
Of ASIC's many and varied responsibilities, it is ASIC's discretionary role of 
investigating and taking enforcement action in response to alleged contraventions 
of the laws it administers that is the most high-profile and controversial aspect of 
ASIC's work.  
This report has already begun examining ASIC's performance in relation to its 
enforcement responsibilities through the two case studies outlined in Part II. 
These case studies highlighted issues with specific cases. Some of the concerns 
identified, however, have wide application; for example, the experience of the CFPL 
whistleblowers is relevant to all corporate whistleblowers. 
This part of the report draws on multiple cases and general observations to undertake a 
broader study of ASIC's enforcement record. In particular, it considers how ASIC 
receives and assesses misconduct reports, conducts an investigation, decides whether 
to pursue a particular case and how its enforcement action is conducted. 
A selection of significant enforcement matters that ASIC has been involved in over 
the past five or more years can be found at Appendix 5.  This selection may assist 
the reader understand ASIC's enforcement record and the varied nature of misconduct 
that the regulator may need to pursue. The matters outlined are the James Hardie 
litigation, Australian Wheat Board, Centro, the case against Andrew Forrest and 
Fortescue, ABC Learning, various collapsed property finance schemes, mortgage 
funds and debenture issuers, Opes Prime, Storm Financial, Stuart Ariff and Trio 
Capital. These cases may have been referred to in submissions and by witnesses at the 
public hearings, and may be noted in the report where relevant, but they are not 
examined in detail. Many of these cases have already been the subject of a 
parliamentary inquiry or extensive public discussion. 
  
  
 
Chapter 14 
Corporate whistleblowing: ASIC's performance and issues 
with the current protections 
14.1 Paragraph (e) of the terms of reference for this inquiry provides that 
the committee should consider the performance of ASIC with regard to the 
'protections afforded by ASIC to corporate and private whistleblowers'. 
The importance of this aspect of the inquiry has been underlined by suggestions that 
ASIC was slow and ineffective in responding to information provided by 
whistleblowers at Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL) about alleged 
misconduct within the organisation.
1
 
14.2 This chapter provides:  
 an overview of the protections afforded to corporate and private 
whistleblowers in Australia, and an explanation of ASIC's place within 
Australia's corporate whistleblower framework; 
 an analysis of evidence received by the committee on the need to reform 
Australia's corporate whistleblower protections, and an overview of 
recommendations for reform made by witnesses; and 
 the committee's recommendations for improving Australia's corporate 
whistleblowing regime.  
Why is whistleblowing important? 
14.3 In his submission, Professor AJ Brown provided the following definition of 
'whistleblowing':  
[W]histleblowing means the 'disclosure by organisation members (former 
or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of 
their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to effect 
action'…In other words, whistleblowers are organisational employees, 
officers and other insiders—as distinct from customers, members of the 
public or others who may have evidence or complain of organisational 
wrongdoing.
2
 
14.4 There was broad agreement from witnesses that effective and appropriately 
broad corporate whistleblower protections were of fundamental importance in 
ensuring good regulatory and corporate governance outcomes. For instance, ASIC 
wrote that whistleblower reports provided it with 'important information about the 
                                              
1  ASIC's handling of the information received from the CFPL whistleblowers was examined in 
Chapter 8. 
2  Professor AJ Brown, Submission 343, p. 2.   
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activities and the culture of the companies and other entities we regulate'. It further 
noted that whistleblowers 'are often particularly well placed to provide direct 
information about corporate wrongdoing by virtue of their relationships or position'.
3
 
14.5 Systems that encourage would-be whistleblowers to make disclosures, and 
that in turn protect whistleblowers from retribution, are important because 
whistleblowers play a key role in preventing and detecting corporate wrongdoing. 
Dr Bowden pointed to a 2009 PricewaterhouseCoopers survey on economic crime 
(along with similar surveys and studies) to demonstrate this point, noting that the 
survey found 'whistleblowers were the highest source for identification of internal 
wrongdoing'.
4
 
14.6 Dr Bowden, also suggested that effective corporate whistleblower protection 
regimes provide substantial financial and economic benefits, not least because trusted 
organisations are more profitable and their costs of compliance lower.
5
 
14.7 The Blueprint for Free Speech reported findings from surveys suggesting the 
Australian public recognises the value of measures that protect and encourage 
whistleblowing: 
81% of Australians believe that people should be supported for revealing 
serious wrongdoing, even if it means revealing inside information. 87% of 
those surveyed in Australia, agreed that if someone in an organisation has 
inside information about serious wrongdoing, they should be able to use a 
journalist, the media, or the internet to draw attention to it.
6
 
14.8 CPA Australia, meanwhile, noted that whistleblowing was 'an effective 
mechanism for the identification and rectification of wrongdoing'. At the same time, 
CPA Australia stressed that the positive benefits of corporate whistleblowing in 
Australia were contingent on the trust would-be whistleblowers had in ASIC to act on 
the information they provided. That is, would-be whistleblowers would be far more 
likely to actually make a report to ASIC if they were confident that the information 
they provided was going be taken seriously and addressed.
7
 
14.9 Dr Bowden made a related if broader point in an article he supplied to the 
committee. In that article, Dr Bowden argued that the exposure of wrongdoing by 
whistleblowers was not, by itself, sufficient to ensure that the wrongdoing would 
cease. In his view, it was also necessary for a whistleblowing support system to 
                                              
3  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 135.  
4  Cited in Dr Peter Bowden, Submission 412.1, p. 2.  
5  Dr Peter Bowden, Submission 412, p. 1.  
6  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 165, p. 3.  
7  CPA Australia, Submission 209, pp. 5–6.  
 Page 199 
 
'ensure that the allegation will be investigated, and that, if found to be true, it will be 
stopped, and if a crime has been committed, the perpetrator will be punished'.
8
 
Whistleblower protections in the Corporations Act 
14.10   Since 1 July 2004, the Corporations Act has provided certain protections to 
whistleblower activities. These protections are intended, as ASIC notes on its website, 
'to encourage people within companies, or with special connections to companies, 
to alert ASIC and other authorities to illegal behaviours'.
9
 The protections were 
introduced by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9).  
14.11 The protections in Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act were summarised by 
ASIC in its main submission to this inquiry. They include:  
…protection from any civil liability, criminal liability or the enforcement of 
any contractual right that arises from the disclosure that the whistleblower 
has made. Part 9.4AAA also includes a prohibition against the victimisation 
of the whistleblower, and provides a right to seek compensation if damage 
is suffered as a result of that victimisation. For example, under Pt 9.4AAA, 
a whistleblower whose employment is terminated, or who suffers 
victimisation as a result of their disclosure, may commence court 
proceedings to be: 
a) reinstated to their job or to a job at a comparable level; and 
b) compensated for any victimisation or threatened victimisation.10  
14.12 The Corporations Act also includes a confidentiality protection for the 
whistleblower, making it an offence for a company, the company's auditors, or an 
officer or employee of that company to reveal the whistleblowers' disclosed 
information or identity.
11
 
14.13 Part 9.4AAA outlines the types of information disclosures that attract 
whistleblower protections under the Act; who can qualify as a whistleblower; who the 
disclosure of information should be made to; and the conditions in which such a 
disclosure must be made. In order to receive protection under the Corporations Act as 
a whistleblower, the person disclosing misconduct within a company must be:  
 an officer or employee of that company; or  
 have a contract to provide goods or services to that company; or  
                                              
8  Dr Peter Bowden, Submission 412.1, p. 5.  
9  ASIC, 'Protection for whistleblowers', www.asic.gov.au. 
10  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 134. The protections are also summarised in Treasury, 
Submission 154, pp. 10–11.  
11  Disclosure of this information to ASIC, APRA, a member of the Australian Federal Police or 
disclosure with the whistleblower's consent is allowed. 
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 be an employee of a person that has a contract to provide goods or services to 
that company.
12
 
14.14 In order to be protected, the whistleblower must make the disclosure of 
misconduct to ASIC, the company's auditor, or certain persons within that company.
13
  
14.15 The Corporations Act also provides that, in order to qualify for whistleblower 
protection, the person making a disclosure cannot do so anonymously. The discloser 
must make the disclosure in good faith and have reasonable grounds to suspect that: 
 the company has, or may have, contravened a provision of the corporations 
legislation; or 
 an officer or employee of the company has, or may have, contravened a 
provision of the corporations legislation.
14
  
ASIC's role in relation to whistleblowers 
14.16 ASIC has a central role in relation to whistleblowing in the Australian 
corporate sector. As noted above, the Corporations Act prescribes that other than 
internal disclosures and disclosures to a company's auditor, only disclosures made to 
ASIC are covered by the whistleblower protections within the Act.  
14.17 It appears that ASIC receives a substantial amount of information from 
whistleblowers. Demonstrating this point, in its main submission ASIC noted that it 
received 845 reports of misconduct in 2012–13 from people who could potentially be 
considered whistleblowers under the Corporations Act. Table 20 in the submission 
provided a breakdown of the outcome for these reports—for example, 129 were 
referred internally for further action, 105 were resolved and 115 were not within 
ASIC's jurisdiction.
15
 
14.18 While the Corporations Act establishes an explicit role for ASIC as a receiver 
of whistleblower disclosures, a number of witnesses pointed to the fact that the Act is 
silent on how the regulator should actually handle the information it receives from 
whistleblowers. ASIC itself noted that the protections: 
…operate to protect and provide remedies for whistleblowers against third 
parties rather than mandating any particular conduct of ASIC. These 
                                              
12  Corporations Act 2001, s. 1317AA(1)(a). 
13  Corporations Act 2001, s. 1317AA(1)(b). 
14  Corporations Act 2001, ss. 1317AA(1)(d)–(e). As ASIC notes in its main submission, similar 
protections 'are available to a whistleblower in possession of information relating to 
contraventions of banking, insurance and superannuation legislation, under the Banking Act 
1959, the Insurance Act 1973, the Life Insurance Act 1995 and the [Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993'. ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 135. 
15  ASIC, Submission 45.2, pp. 136–37.  
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protections do not deal with how ASIC is to treat whistleblowers and 
documents relating to whistleblowers.
16
  
14.19 Similarly, while the Corporations Act establishes protections available to 
whistleblowers, it does not mandate or enable ASIC to act on behalf of whistleblowers 
to ensure their rights as whistleblowers are protected. Indeed, as ASIC noted in its 
submission, where a whistleblower: 
…seeks to rely on the statutory protections against third parties, they will 
generally have to enforce their own rights or bring their own proceedings 
under the relevant legislation to access any remedy. The legislation does not 
provide ASIC with a direct power to commence court proceedings on a 
whistleblower’s behalf.17 
14.20 While the Part 9.4AAA whistleblower protections do not mandate any 
particular conduct by ASIC in relation to whistleblowers, ASIC noted that the ASIC 
Act nonetheless requires it to:  
…protect any information provided to us in confidence, from all reports of 
misconduct, whether or not the confidential information is received from a 
whistleblower or any other person.
18
 
14.21 However, ASIC also points out that while it seeks to prevent the unauthorised 
use or disclosure of information provided to it by whistleblowers, current legislation 
does not provide additional protections for documents that contain whistleblower 
information, including information that might reveal a whistleblower's identity. 
Moreover, ASIC has had past difficulties 'resisting applications for the production of 
such documents during litigation'.
19
 This is a cause for concern for ASIC, and as such 
one of its recommendations for regulatory change (as noted below) is to amend the 
legislation so that ASIC cannot be required to produce a document revealing a 
whistleblower's identity unless ordered to do so by a court or tribunal. 
The need for whistleblower reform 
14.22 Overwhelmingly, those witnesses who addressed the issue of Australia's 
corporate whistleblower framework were of the view that reform was needed in the 
area. ASIC itself, as discussed in the next section, argued for modest reforms 
to enhance whistleblower protections. 
14.23 Admittedly, not all submissions received by the committee supported the case 
for whistleblower reform. Most notably, the Corporations Committee of the Law 
Council of Australia's Business Law Section maintained that there was 'no serious 
                                              
16  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 135. 
17  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 136. 
18  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 135. 
19  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 136. 
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defect in [the Part 9.4AAA] provisions or the way they have operated in practice'.
20
 
This view, however, proved an exception, with most witnesses regarding the current 
whistleblower regime as, in varying degrees, out-of-date and inadequate. Areas of 
particular concern included: the Corporations Act's overly narrow definitions of who 
might be considered a whistleblower and the type of disclosures that could attract 
whistleblower protections; the absence of any requirement in the Act for internal 
whistleblowing processes within companies; and the fact that the Act does not 
mandate a role for ASIC in protecting whistleblowers. 
14.24 In making the case for reform, several witnesses suggested that the current 
legislation had proven ineffective in protecting the interests of whistleblowers. 
The Rule of Law Institute focused its criticism on ASIC specifically, contending that 
it had failed to protect whistleblowers from reprisals.
21
 CPA Australia, meanwhile, 
wrote that 'recent high profile cases appear to have undermined ASIC's reputation in 
regards to managing whistleblowing disclosures'.
22
 In the CFPL matter, the decision 
of Mr Morris and the other CFPL whistleblowers to blow the whistle on the 
misconduct at CFPL ultimately proved very costly for each of them on a personal 
level. Professor Brown told the committee that stories like Mr Morris's: 
…are not unusual, and they have not been unusual for quite a long period of 
time. People have been going to regulators with information; it is just that 
they then become quiet collateral damage and walk away from it, much as 
often happens in the public sector.
23
 
14.25  Professor Brown suggested there was a lack of empirical evidence 'regarding 
the incidence, significance, value and current needs and challenges' with respect to the 
management of whistleblowing in Australia. While acknowledging this 'knowledge 
gap', Professor Brown also argued that 'Australia's legal regimes for facilitating, 
recognising, and responding appropriately to public interest whistleblowing in the 
corporate and private sectors are patchy, limited and far from international 
best-practice'. He added that given the deficiencies in the primary national private 
sector statutory provisions on whistleblowing, 'it is not surprising that ASIC's track 
record as a key agency responsible for whistleblowing is generally regarded as poor'.
24
 
14.26 In addition to the need to make specific improvements to the Corporations 
Act, Professor Brown also identified a need for a comprehensive approach to 
corporate whistleblower protections across jurisdictions in Australia: 
As pressure builds for more effective whistleblower protection in the 
corporate and private sector, failure to take a comprehensive approach may 
                                              
20  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 7.  
21  Rule of Law Institute, Submission 211, p. 6. 
22  CPA Australia, Submission 209, p. 6. 
23  Professor AJ Brown, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 53. 
24  Professor AJ Brown, Submission 343, p. 2.  
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well result in a proliferation of separate whistleblowing requirements on 
business in different areas of regulation, leading to heightened 
complexities, confusion and cost for Australian businesses and regulators 
alike.
25
 
14.27 Dr Bowden made a similar point, arguing that Australia should avoid adopting 
a whistleblower protection scheme for each industry, as the United States has done. 
The complexity of the US approach, he argued, served to discourage would-be 
whistleblowers from reporting misconduct, as it often was not even clear who they 
should make a disclosure to or which legislation covered their disclosure.
26
 
14.28 The Governance Institute of Australia argued that there appeared to be a 
'disconnect between the regulatory framework in place for protecting corporate and 
private whistleblowers and the way in which it operates in practice'.
27
 The Governance 
Institute, therefore, recommended a targeted review of: 
…the regulatory framework for corporate and private whistleblowing which 
recognises the involvement of multiple regulators in the process of 
investigating and prosecuting corporate and private whistleblowing.
28
 
14.29 The Governance Institute pointed to what it regarded as the technical and 
narrow operation of the Corporation Act's whistleblower protections. The Institute 
suggested that while ASIC is 'doing its best' within the constraints of the legislation, 
a need remains for: 
…a much broader whistleblowing protection that applies to all people who 
bring complaints in good faith to the attention of all regulators, whether 
they are the ACCC, ASIC, the ATO, the Federal Police or state based 
authorities.
29
 
The 2004 parliamentary committee report on CLERP 9 
14.30 Even when the current corporate whistleblower protections were added to the 
Corporations Act in 2004, observers suggested that it was likely that further reform 
would be needed. Indeed, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services' (PJCCFS) report on the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (the CLERP 9 Bill), 
characterised the whistleblower protections in the Bill as 'sketchy in detail', even if 
                                              
25  Professor AJ Brown, Submission 343, p. 2.  
26  Dr Peter Bowden, Submission 412, pp. 1–2; Professor AJ Brown, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 April 2014, p. 51.  
27  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 3.  
28  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 3. 
29  Mr Douglas Gration, Director, Governance Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 April 2014, pp. 62-63. 
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their intention was clear. The committee concluded that the whistleblower protections 
would ultimately require 'further refinement'.
30
 
14.31 Specific concerns raised by the PJCCFS included the limited scope of the 
definition of protected disclosures, the lack of any requirement that companies 
establish internal processes to facilitate whistleblowing, and the fact the proposed 
protections were silent on what role, if any, ASIC had in preventing reprisals against 
whistleblowers or acting to protect whistleblowers when reprisals took place. 
The PJCCFS also criticised the fact that the whistleblower protections did not extend 
to cover anonymous disclosures, and recommended removing the requirement that a 
whistleblower be acting in 'good faith'. The PJCCFS concluded that the proposed 
whistleblowing provisions were a step in the right direction, but 'only a first step' and 
'not ambitious' at that.
31
 Tellingly, the PJCCFS foreshadowed the future need for a 
comprehensive review of Australia's whistleblower framework: 
Once the proposed whistleblower provisions come into operation, answers 
to the questions that it poses may become clearer. Indeed the longer term 
solution may be found in the development of a more comprehensive body 
of whistleblower protection law that would constitute a distinct and separate 
piece of legislation standing outside the Corporations Act and consistent 
with the public interest disclosure legislation enacted in the various states.
32
 
Is Australia lagging behind the world on whistleblower reform? 
14.32 Highlighting the lack of progress on whistleblower reform since 2004, 
a number of experts on whistleblowing suggested that Australia's corporate 
whistleblower framework had fallen behind those in other parts of the world.  
14.33 Several submitters noted that high profile corporate failures had driven moves 
in other countries to improve systems to encourage and protect corporate 
whistleblowers. For example, Professor AJ Brown noted that the United States had 
been progressively developing and strengthening its corporate whistleblowing regime 
since several high-profile corporate collapses in 2000 and 2001, which led to 
a strengthening of the corporate whistleblower regime by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002. The global financial crisis prompted a second wave of reform of the 
US whistleblower framework, with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 including provision for a whistleblower bounty 
program. Professor Brown noted that while the Australian reforms of 2004 were 
                                              
30  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, CLERP (Audit Reform 
and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003, Part 1: Enforcement, executive remuneration, continuous 
disclosure, shareholder participation and related matters, June 2004, Parliamentary Paper 
No. 122/2004, p. xxii.  
31  PJCCFS, CLERP 9 Bill, June 2004, p. 29.  
32  PJCCFS, CLERP 9 Bill, June 2004, p. xxii.  
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a 'partial response' to the first of the two waves of reform, Australia had made no 
further reforms since.
33
 
14.34 Other witnesses tended to agree that Australia's corporate whistleblower 
protections compared poorly to those in other countries. Dr Bowden was unequivocal 
on this point: 
We are behind the rest of the world—simple—and it is a shame that we are. 
As I said, I am looking for this committee to change it and bring us into the 
20th century—not the 21st century, just the 20th century.34 
Treasury's 2009 review of corporate whistleblower protections 
14.35 The current corporate whistleblower protections were the subject of a 
2009 Treasury options paper, Improving protections for corporate whistleblowers. 
In a foreword to the paper, the then Minister for Financial Services, Superannuation 
and Corporate Law, the Hon Chris Bowen MP, acknowledged that the current 
corporate whistleblower regime did not appear to be working as intended:  
The importance of protecting corporate whistleblowers has been recognised 
for many years. However, while legislative protections have been provided 
under the Corporations Act 2001 since 2004, they appear to have been 
poorly regarded and rarely used. At the time this paper was written, only 
four whistleblowers had ever used these protections to provide information 
to ASIC.
35
 
14.36 Despite the Minister's criticisms of existing protections, the review process 
stalled in early 2010 after a brief series of consultations on the issues raised in 
the options paper. In its submission, Treasury reported that the comment received on 
the option's paper 'provided no strong consensus on reforming protections for 
whistleblowers, and the issue was not taken further by the previous government'.
36
 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 
14.37 In contrast to the lack of reform in relation to corporate whistleblowing, 
Australia's public sector whistleblower framework recently underwent a major reform 
process. These reforms were given effect by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 
(PIDA). Several witnesses suggested that PIDA represented a best-practice approach 
to whistleblower legislation, and recommended that it be used as a template for 
corporate whistleblower reform. For example, the Blueprint for Free Speech wrote 
that PIDA was a 'world-leading protection regime for whistleblowers' in the public 
                                              
33  Professor AJ Brown, Submission 343, p. 3. 
34  Dr Peter Bowden, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 52. 
35  Treasury, Improving protections for corporate whistleblowers: options paper, October 2009, 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1620/PDF/whistleblower_options_papers.pdf, p. iv. 
36  Treasury, Submission 154, p. 11. 
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sector.
37
 The Blueprint for Free Speech argued that key elements of the protection 
regime for public sector whistleblowers that might be considered in some form for the 
private sector regime included: 
 the requirement for government departments to have a designated 'disclosure 
officer' to receive disclosures; 
 better and easier access to compensation for whistleblowers in cases where 
they suffer reprisals; 
 extension of whistleblower protections to allow external disclosures (for 
example, to the media) in situations where the whistleblower believes that an 
internal or ASIC investigation was inadequate; 
 cost protections, so that in instances where a whistleblower seeks to enforce 
their rights through legal action, the costs of that action are only payable by 
the whistleblower where the action was brought vexatiously; 
 protections for anonymous whistleblowers; and 
 the existence of a dedicated Ombudsman with powers to investigate and hear 
the complaints of whistleblowers.
38
 
14.38 Dr Sulette Lombard made the point that whereas PIDA provided some 
guidance to whistleblowers and others as to what happens with information provided 
by whistleblowers, the Corporations Act was silent on this.
39
 
14.39 While by no means rejecting the value of PIDA-like arrangements in the 
private sector, Professor AJ Brown cautioned that 'detailed consideration' would need 
to be given to how such arrangements may need to be adjusted so that they operated 
effectively in the private sector.
40
 
14.40 ASIC made a similar point. It suggested, on the one hand, that there might be 
'some elements' of the public sector reforms that could be considered in a review of 
the corporate whistleblower protections. However, ASIC added that: 
…there may also be some different considerations applying to disclosures 
about private institutions than public institutions, including the greater need 
to balance privacy and confidentiality considerations.
41
 
                                              
37  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 165, p. 4.  
38  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 165, pp. 4-5 
39  Dr Sulette Lombard, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 52. 
40  Professor AJ Brown, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 52. 
41  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 24. 
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Committee view 
14.41 The committee believes a strong case exists for a comprehensive review of 
Australia's corporate whistleblower framework, and ASIC's role therein.  
14.42 The fact that momentum appears to have been lost following the release of the 
2009 Treasury options paper is unfortunate. In that paper, the then Minister for 
Financial Services, Superannuation and Corporate Law described the corporate 
whistleblower protections in the Corporations Act as 'poorly regarded and rarely used'. 
The committee has heard from a number of whistleblowers in the course of this 
inquiry, including one of the CFPL whistleblowers, whose experiences suggest that 
this very much remains the case. The committee notes that progress on the issue 
stalled in early 2010 because, as Treasury puts it, there was 'no strong consensus on 
reforming protections for whistleblowers'. Even if this were the case, the committee 
believes reform remains necessary. A comprehensive review process would help build 
the consensus necessary to deliver this reform. 
14.43 The committee notes that PIDA includes whistleblower protections that are 
widely regarded as world's best-practice. As such, the committee believes a 
comprehensive review of Australia's corporate whistleblower should have regard to 
the provisions in PIDA and give detailed consideration to whether these provisions 
might have valuable application in the private sector.   
ASIC's revised approach to handling whistleblower disclosures 
14.44 At various points during the inquiry, ASIC acknowledged that one of the key 
learnings from the CFPL matter was that it needed to improve its communication with 
whistleblowers and better utilise whistleblower information. Specifically, ASIC 
acknowledged that it: 
…could have and should have spoken to the whistleblowers earlier, sought 
more information from them and, within the limitations [imposed by 
ASIC's confidentiality obligations or the need to ensure the appropriate 
administration of justice], provided them with some assurance that ASIC 
was interested and active in the matter, that their report was being dealt 
with seriously and that something was being done.
42
 
14.45 ASIC informed the committee that as a result of these learnings, it had 
enhanced the way it identifies and communicates with potential whistleblowers. ASIC 
explained in its main submission that this approach seeks to ensure that ASIC: 
a) has appropriate training and expertise in all stakeholder and 
enforcement teams for the handling of whistleblower reports; 
b) maintains a coordinated, centralised procedure for the tracking and 
monitoring of all whistleblower reports; 
                                              
42  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 137. 
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c) gives appropriate weight to the inside nature of the information 
provided by whistleblowers in our assessment and ongoing handling of 
the matter; 
d) provides prompt, clear and regular communication to whistleblowers to 
the extent possible and appropriate during our investigations; and 
e) maintains the confidentiality of whistleblowers within the applicable 
legal framework.
43
  
14.46 In his submission, Professor AJ Brown noted that ASIC has only put in place 
'operational systems to support its limited role in whistleblowing in very recent times, 
despite [the whistleblower provisions in Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act] having 
been in place for almost 10 years'.
44
 However, during his appearance before the 
committee, Professor Brown acknowledged that the recent changes ASIC had 
implemented to improve its interactions with whistleblowers and how it handles the 
information they provide represents a substantial step forward. In this sense, 
he implied that ASIC's handling of its interactions with the CFPL whistleblowers 
could be viewed as historical rather than current problems. Professor Brown 
suggested: 
…we already know that ASIC's performance on the question of managing 
whistleblowers has changed enormously since some of the circumstances 
which contributed to the inquiry and the circumstances as they stand today. 
So, to the extent that there might be justifiable criticism of ASIC's 
performance in relation to whistleblowers in 2008 or 2009, we already 
know that we are dealing with a completely different landscape now, 
because of the fact that ASIC, as the major corporate regulator, has clearly 
woken up to and is responding to whistleblowing as an issue in its 
jurisdiction in very distinct and clear ways, from which other regulators and 
other agencies probably can already start to learn.
45
 
14.47 For its part, the Governance Institute welcomed 'the steps that ASIC is taking 
to improve its handling of whistleblowers', but reiterated that 'ASIC can only do so 
much in the narrow legislative regime that it has at the moment'. As such, the 
Governance Institute emphasised the need for: 
…a more extensive regime giving much, much better protection not only to 
the regulator, which I think is what ASIC is focused on, but also to the 
whistleblower concerned.
46
 
                                              
43  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 137. Also see Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 2. 
44  Professor AJ Brown, Submission 343, p. 2.  
45  Professor AJ Brown, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 50.  
46  Mr Douglas Gration, Director, Governance Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
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Committee view 
14.48 The committee welcomes the steps ASIC has recently taken to improve how it 
interacts with whistleblowers and handles the information they provide. At the same 
time, the committee believes that more substantive legislative and regulatory changes 
will likely be required to improve Australia's corporate whistleblower framework.   
ASIC's recommended options for legislative and regulatory change 
14.49 In addition to reporting on the steps ASIC has taken to improve its handling of 
whistleblowers and the information they provide, ASIC's main submission also 
provided three recommendations for regulatory and legislative change in relation to 
whistleblowers. These recommendations, reproduced below in Table 14.1, relate 
to the definition of 'whistleblower', the scope of disclosures covered by whistleblower 
protections and clarifying when ASIC may resist orders for the production of 
information that might reveal a whistleblower's identity. 
Table 14.1: ASIC's options for change regarding whistleblowers 
Issue 
Regulatory change options for consideration by 
government 
The definition of 'whistleblower' 
does not cover all of the people who 
may require whistleblower 
protections 
Expanding the definition—expanding the definition of 
whistleblower in Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 
to include a company's former employees, financial 
services providers, accountants and auditors, unpaid 
workers and business partners 
The whistleblower protections do 
not cover information relating to all 
of the types of misconduct ASIC 
may investigate 
Expanding the scope—expanding the scope of 
information protected by the whistleblower 
protections to cover any misconduct that ASIC may 
investigate 
The whistleblower protections are 
not sufficiently clear as to when 
ASIC may resist the production of 
documents that could reveal a 
whistleblower's identity 
Protecting whistleblower information—amending the 
legislation so that ASIC cannot be required to produce 
a document revealing a whistleblower's identity 
unless ordered by a court or tribunal, following 
certain criteria 
Source: ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 13. 
14.50 ASIC's recommendations did not prove contentious. To the extent that 
witnesses commented on the recommendations, it was simply to suggest that they 
were a good starting point for reform. For instance, Professor AJ Brown supported 
ASIC's recommendation that the protections in Part 9.4AAA be extended to 
information indicating a contravention of any legislation that ASIC can investigate, 
including breaches of relevant criminal law, rather than simply the corporations 
legislation. However, he also suggested that the extension and clarification of the 
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definitions should be done in a way that not only aligns with ASIC's investigate 
jurisdiction, but also achieves the purpose of encouraging and protecting disclosures.
47
  
Committee view 
14.51 The committee believes ASIC's recommendations in relation to 
whistleblowers are a sensible and measured response to broadly recognised 
deficiencies in the current whistleblower protections. The committee recognises that 
the definition of 'whistleblower' in the Corporations Act is currently too restrictive, 
as is the scope of information that can attract whistleblower protections. 
The committee also agrees that there would be value in clarifying when ASIC can 
resist the production of documents which might reveal a whistleblower's identity.  
14.52 While the committee believes the changes suggested by ASIC would be of 
benefit, it views the proposed changes as first steps in a broader reform process.  
Other potential areas for reform 
14.53 As noted earlier, most witnesses who addressed the issue of Australia's 
corporate whistleblower framework argued that there was a need to strengthen current 
arrangements. Ideas for reform suggested by one or more of these witnesses included: 
 extending corporate whistleblower protections to cover reports from 
anonymous whistleblowers; 
 removing the requirement that whistleblowers need to make their disclosure in 
'good faith';  
 legislative and regulatory changes to encourage or require better systems 
within Australian corporations for encouraging and protecting internal 
disclosures; 
 extending whistleblower protections to cover external disclosures 
(for example, to the media) in certain circumstances; 
 providing for a clearer and fairer system for compensation to whistleblowers 
in cases where the whistleblower protections have not worked and the 
whistleblower has suffered as a result of making a disclosure;  
 the possible introduction of reward-based whistleblower incentives or 
qui tam arrangements, similar to those that exist in the United States; 
 enhancing or clarifying ASIC's ability to act as an advocate for 
whistleblowers;  
 strengthening the penalties that might be applied against persons or companies 
that disadvantage or seek to disadvantage a whistleblower; and 
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 measures that would enhance ASIC's ongoing contact with whistleblowers, 
and recognise the importance whistleblowers generally place on being 
informed of actions undertaken in relation to matters they make a disclosure 
about. 
14.54 Each of these ideas is set out below. Several of these ideas were addressed in 
the PJCCFS's 2004 report on the CLERP 9 Bill; where this is the case, it is noted 
to provide policy context. 
Protecting anonymous disclosures 
14.55 The PJCCFS's 2004 report on the CLERP 9 Bill recommended that the 
government consider extending whistleblower protections to cover anonymous 
disclosures. It argued that a requirement that a person making a disclosure must have 
'an honest and reasonable belief' that an offence has or will be committed (the 
PJCCFS's preferred alternative to the 'good faith' test that was ultimately legislated) 
would provide a safeguard against vexatious anonymous disclosures.
48
 
14.56 The government of the day rejected the PJCCFS's recommendation, arguing 
that extending the whistleblower protections to cover anonymous disclosures: 
…may encourage the making of frivolous reports, and would generally 
constrain the effective investigation of complaints. Allowing anonymity 
would also make it more difficult to extend the statutory protections to the 
relevant whistleblower.
49
 
14.57 Professor AJ Brown argued for the extension of whistleblower protections to 
anonymous whistleblowers, suggesting this would not: 
…raise practical difficulties, since the protections and other obligations are 
only triggered if or when the identity of the whistleblower is subsequently 
revealed, and confirmed to be within the statutory definition above.
50
 
14.58 Mr Jeffrey Morris explained to the committee that part of the reason the CFPL 
whistleblowers elected to make an anonymous report was that they lacked confidence 
in ASIC's 'ability to keep a secret'.
51
 Interestingly, when asked if the lack of 
protections in Part 9.4AAA for anonymous disclosures gave him and his fellow 
whistleblowers cause to reconsider making their disclosure to ASIC, Mr Morris said 
it did not, because: 
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…if ASIC had acted on the information we had given them, the whole 
matter would have been resolved and we would never have needed to have 
broken cover.
52
 
14.59 Asked if whistleblower protections should be extended to cover anonymous 
disclosures, ASIC responded: 
We understand that potential whistleblowers may wish to remain 
anonymous for fear of reprisal, reputational damage or other negative 
consequences of their whistleblowing. Nevertheless, it can be important for 
ASIC to know the identity of a whistleblower for practical purposes, 
including to substantiate their claims and progress the investigation. 
However, ensuring that whistleblowers' identities can be protected from 
disclosure to third parties is a different and significant issue. In our 
submission to the Senate inquiry, we suggested providing ASIC with 
greater scope to resist the production of documents revealing a 
whistleblower's identity, in order to better ensure the protection of this 
information.
53
 
The 'good faith' requirement 
14.60 As noted earlier, in order to qualify for the whistleblower protections in the 
Corporations Act, a discloser must make the disclosure in good faith. In the course of 
the inquiry, a number of witnesses questioned the value of the 'good faith' 
requirement, and argued for its removal.  
14.61 The PJCCFS's 2004 report on the CLERP 9 Bill recommended that the 'good 
faith' requirement be removed, arguing the protections should be based on the premise 
that: 
…the veracity of the disclosure is the overriding consideration and the 
motives of the informant should not cloud the matter. The public interest 
lies in the disclosure of the truth.
54
 
14.62 The then-government did not accept the recommendation, responding that the 
'good faith' requirement would help minimise vexatious disclosures and ensure 
persons making disclosures did not have 'ulterior motives'. The removal of the 'good 
faith' requirement could, it argued: 
…give rise to the possibility that a disgruntled employee might attempt to 
use the [whistleblower] provisions as a mechanism to initiate an 
unnecessary investigation and thereby cost the company time and money.
55
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14.63 Professor AJ Brown argued that the 'good faith' requirement is 'out of date and 
inconsistent with the approach taken by Australia's public sector whistleblowing 
legislation, as well as best practice legislative approaches elsewhere':
56
 
For several reasons, 'good faith' is not a useful concept to appear at all in 
whistleblowing legislation. Motives are notoriously difficult to identify and 
may well change in the process of reporting, for example, when an internal 
disclosure is ignored or results in the worker suffering reprisals. Because it 
is such a subjective and open-ended requirement, the likely effect of a good 
faith test is negative—that workers simply choose not to report their 
suspicions about wrongdoing, because they are unsure whether or how this 
test would be applied to their circumstances.
57
 
14.64 Professor Brown suggested that the only proper test was that which applied in 
PIDA: that a disclosure must be based on an honest belief, on reasonable grounds, that 
the information shows or tends to show defined wrongdoing; or does show or tend to 
show such wrongdoing, on an objective test, irrespective of what the discloser 
believes it to show.
58
 Similarly, the Blueprint for Free Speech suggested that the 'good 
faith' requirement had the unhelpful effect of shifting the focus from the importance of 
the information disclosed to the motives of the whistleblower.
59
 
14.65 Dr Bowden explained why he believed the 'good faith' requirement should be 
removed by way of example: 
[I]f you were under a supervisor who consistently pushes the envelope on 
his ethical behaviour and eventually you end up by blowing the whistle on 
something that you think is going to get through, are you acting in good 
faith or not? It is hard to tell. But if you pointed out a wrongdoing, that is 
enough for me. My own belief is that the good faith requirement should be 
scrapped entirely. It is whether they have revealed a wrongdoing and a clear 
wrongdoing at that, a provable wrongdoing at that.
60
 
14.66 Dr Brand supported Dr Bowden's reasoning, telling the committee that the 
issue was the 'quality of the information' rather than the motive for providing that 
information. Dr Brand's colleague, Dr Lombard, added that while it was reasonable 
to want to prevent vexatious whistleblowing, there were better ways to achieve this 
than the current 'good faith' test.
61
 
14.67 Professor Brown explained that all the research on why people became 
whistleblowers indicated that a decision to make a disclosure basically involved a 
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judgement on whether anybody was going to be interested in receiving the 
information, and whether the discloser would receive support and recognition for 
making the disclosure. Professor Brown explained that 'those very basic messages': 
…are influenced very strongly as soon as you introduce things like a good 
faith requirement. The classic example was that, previously, I think in 
around 2007 or 2008, on the ASIC website there was specific guidance to 
anybody who was seeking to use part 9.4AAA that they would have to 
reveal the information in good faith. At that time, the advice on the ASIC 
website was to the effect that that would not include information that was 
malicious. All good investigators—and I have my own investigation 
background—know that information that is provided for malicious reasons 
can be just as useful and important and revealing as other information. It 
does not mean that it is not information which should be revealed.
62
 
14.68 According to Professor Brown, the lack of precision as to what was meant by 
'good faith' left whistleblowers vulnerable to accusations that they had an ulterior 
motive in making a disclosure. As such, would-be whistleblowers might conclude that 
it was not worth making a disclosure on the grounds that no one would take them 
seriously.
63
 
14.69 In response to a question on notice, ASIC declined to take a position on the 
merits of the 'good faith' requirement, suggesting this was 'ultimately a policy question 
for government'. Nonetheless, in declining to take a position on the subject, ASIC 
made the general point that: 
…if there are any deficiencies identified in the current whistleblower 
protections that may be proving to be an impediment to potential 
whistleblower disclosures, these should be carefully reviewed and change 
considered.
64
   
Protecting disclosures to third parties, such as the media 
14.70 Professor Brown argued that the fact that the Part 9.4AAA protections do not 
extend to corporate whistleblowers who take their disclosure to the media or other 
third parties is a 'major gap'. There were circumstances, Professor Brown argued, in 
which it was widely accepted that this approach was reasonable; for example, where 
an internal disclosure or disclosure to the regulator was not acted on, or where it was 
impossible or unreasonable to make an internal disclosure or disclosure to ASIC.
65
 
14.71 Asked whether the whistleblower protections should be extended to cover 
external disclosures to the media in certain circumstances, ASIC responded: 
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There may be circumstances where a person suffers reprisal following their 
making external disclosures to third parties, such as the media, and it may 
be useful to consider extending the whistleblower protections in such a 
situation. However, ultimately, this is a policy question for government.
66
 
Improving internal disclosure systems 
14.72 Several witnesses argued for the introduction of a regulatory requirement for 
companies to establish internal whistleblower systems. Such an approach, these 
witnesses suggested, could improve corporate governance outcomes while reducing 
the regulatory burden on ASIC. 
14.73 The PJCCFS's 2004 report on the CLERP 9 Bill recognised the importance of 
internal corporate disclosure systems. The PJCCFS recommended that: 
…a provision be inserted in the Bill that would require corporations to 
establish a whistleblower protection scheme that would both facilitate the 
reporting of serious wrongdoing and protect those making or contemplating 
making a disclosure from unlawful retaliation on account of their 
disclosure.
67
  
14.74 In making its case, the PJCCFS noted that in the United States the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that every public company in the United States establish 
mechanisms which allow employees to provide information anonymously to the 
company's board of directors. Sarbanes-Oxley also stipulates that disclosures made 
through this internal reporting mechanism constitute protected whistleblower 
activity.
68
 
14.75 The then government did not accept the recommendation, on the basis that: 
Prescribing particular systems which all companies must implement in 
order to facilitate whistleblowing could prove to be overly rigid and 
unsuitable for particular companies in the Australian market.
69
 
14.76 Professor Brown explained to the committee that the overwhelming majority 
of whistleblower complaints in the private sector (over 90 per cent) where made 
internally in the first instance. In cases where an internal disclosure was dealt with 
quickly and properly, Professor Brown reasoned, the entire whistleblower system 
worked more efficiently and the burden on ASIC was reduced.
70
 Professor Brown 
added having a requirement for companies to have internal whistleblower 
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arrangements in place could work in the interest of a company. In fact, 
Professor Brown suggested that such a requirement should: 
…incentivise businesses to adopt whistleblower protection strategies by 
offering defences or partial relief from liability, for itself or its managers, if 
the business can show (a) it had whistleblower protection procedures of this 
kind, (b) that the procedures were reasonable for its circumstances, and 
(c) that they were followed (i.e. that the organisation made its best efforts to 
prevent or limit detriment befalling the whistleblower).
71
 
14.77 Professor Brown also noted that this positive approach appeared to be 
working in the United States.
72
 
14.78 The lack of a 'mandated requirement for Australian corporates to institute 
internal structures to facilitate whistleblowing' was a key point of concern in the 
submission made by Dr Brand and Dr Lombard. Such a requirement, they argued, 
would encourage rates of whistleblowing, with evidence suggesting that 'the level of 
whistleblowing activity in a corporation is positively associated with the level 
of internal support for whistleblowing'. Also, rather than increasing the regulatory 
burden on ASIC, good internal systems 'have the potential to ensure tips are 
"screened", thus reducing pressure on the public regulator (i.e. ASIC) and preserving 
resources'.
73
  
14.79 Dr Brand and Dr Lombard further noted that PIDA appears to recognise the 
advantages of internal reporting systems, inasmuch as external disclosures are 
generally only permitted after an internal disclosure has been made. In this way, 
they argued: 
…PIDA offers a model for increased activity within corporations in relation 
to whistleblowing handling and response, with the possibility of 
concomitant increases in the level of whistleblowing activity, and the 
potential for reduced demand on ASIC's resources.
74
 
14.80 Discussing the potential regulatory burden of a requirement for companies 
to establish and maintain internal whistleblower systems, Dr Brand emphasised that 
the internal compliance requirements that might be imposed on companies should be 
'part of a positive message', and undertaken in a 'light touch' manner. Such an 
approach might include: 
…saying the directors' annual report needs to refer to whether there is an 
internal whistleblowing system and whether there was ever an occasion in a 
given 12-month period where the timelines for response were not met, or 
where the matter was referred externally because the whistleblower was not 
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happy with the response they got, which is the public interest disclosure 
model. We think even a little thing like that could make a big difference…75 
14.81 Asked to comment on recommendations from witnesses aimed at improving 
the internal systems within corporations to encourage and protect whistleblowers, 
ASIC responded that this was a matter for government. At the same time, ASIC 
indicated that it would 'support consideration of any reforms that improve companies' 
governance arrangements to ensure that they support and meet their obligations 
towards whistleblowers'.
76
 
Compensation for whistleblowers 
14.82 In his submission, Professor Brown argued that the compensation provisions 
in Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act are limited and vague, providing no clear 
guidance about how an application for compensation can be made, 
the potential relief from costs risks, the situation regarding vicarious liability, the 
burden of proof, and so on. Professor Brown recommended that the compensation 
entitlements be amended so that they were consistent with PIDA.
77
 
Reward-based whistleblower incentives and qui tam arrangements 
14.83 A number of witnesses, including Mr Morris, told the committee that 
consideration should be given to introducing rewards or other monetary incentives for 
corporate whistleblowers. Mr Morris told the committee that a system that rewarded 
whistleblowers, like the system in the United States, would help to improve 
compliance in the Australian financial services industry: 
I think what would clean up this industry overnight would be some form of 
financial compensation for whistleblowers that would allow them to move 
on with their lives and would encourage people to come forward, as we did. 
In [the CFPL] case, the compensation paid to victims so far is in the order 
of $50 million. If the institution at fault, as part of whistleblowing 
provisions, then had to pay the whistleblower, say, a certain percentage 
based on the actual compensation paid to victims—so that is established 
malfeasance, I suspect you would have a lot more whistleblowers coming 
forward. I would suspect you would find the institutions would have to 
improve their behaviour overnight if literally any employee could bring 
them down when they were doing the wrong thing with some sort of 
incentive—not necessarily a huge incentive, like in the United States, but 
some reasonable basis to allow people to move on with their lives.
78
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14.84 Asked if he was advocating an incentive based scheme to reward 
whistleblowers who disclose malfeasance, Mr Morris answered that he would like 
to see either incentives or a compensation scheme introduced: 
The last time I saw the person at ASIC he basically said to me in as many 
words, 'Thanks for sacrificing yourself.' It is not a very attractive prospect 
for anybody else to want to emulate what we did.
79
 
14.85 Professor Bob Baxt AO told the committee that while any reward-based 
system would need appropriate safeguards, careful consideration should nonetheless 
be given to whether would-be whistleblowers in Australia might be encouraged 
through monetary rewards. He suggested that with proper safeguards, it was likely: 
…the regulators will get better results which means that people will get 
better recovery regimes and the government will get a bit of money, 
because it will recover fines.
80
 
14.86 Professor Baxt also discounted the notion that a reward-based system would 
somehow be inconsistent with Australian culture. At the very least, he argued, the 
merits of such an approach should be subject to careful assessment before being 
rejected.
81
  
14.87 In his submission, Professor Brown highlighted the success of qui tam or 
reward-based disclosure incentives in other countries, including the United States, 
in helping detect corporate wrongdoing. Allowing a whistleblower a percentage of the 
amount of money recovered from fraud or of the penalty imposed had, he suggested. 
'been at the heart of a significant expansion of attention on whistleblowing by the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission'.
82
 Professor Brown concluded 
that qui tam should be considered if Australian corporate whistleblower protections 
are to be best practice.
83
 
14.88 Dr Bowden similarly argued that Australia should consider the adoption of a 
rewards scheme for whistleblowers similar to that in place in the United States. 
He noted the monies recovered through fines and levies paid by US companies to the 
US Government as a result of qui tam cases.
84
 In his view, concerns that a rewards 
scheme would negate the moral position of the corporate whistleblower were not 
necessarily well-founded, as the 'ultimate result is that the wrongdoing is stopped'.
85
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14.89 The Blueprint for Free Speech also suggested that consideration should be 
given to qui tam remedies, such as those which exist in the United States.
86
  
14.90 The committee explored this point with ASIC during the public hearings. 
Mr Medcraft acknowledged that a reward system for whistleblowers might provide 
would-be whistleblowers with some comfort by knowing that, if they lost their jobs or 
damaged their careers as a result of their disclosure, they would nonetheless receive 
some compensation. At the same time, Mr Medcraft explained that before an effective 
bounty reward system for corporate whistleblowers could be implemented in 
Australia, it would likely be necessary to revise upwards the civil penalties Australian 
corporations were subject to: 
Senator, on your question about the payment of a bounty, one of the issues, 
when we looked at it, is that the penalties are really low in Australia and the 
way that the system works in the States is that you get a percentage, and so 
would it actually be meaningful to have that? I guess it is a bit of a chicken-
and-egg situation. If the penalties were more realistic then paying a 
percentage of them actually might then become an incentive. So I think you 
need to look at the issue with the penalties in mind as well.
87
  
14.91 Mr Medcaft added that ASIC had also considered whether a reward-based 
system would be consistent with Australian culture: 
Are we a bounty hunter culture? Is it the Australian ethos to go after money 
in the same way? That is really a matter for community debate. But 
certainly, as you say, in America is seems to work quite effectively—
getting a bounty. But I think you need to look at the issue from a cultural 
perspective and then, secondly, the incentive—and making sure that it does 
give them that comfort, that they will have that financial security.
88
 
ASIC's role as an advocate for whistleblowers and the penalties for victimising a 
whistleblower 
14.92 A key finding to emerge from the committee's consideration of the protections 
afforded by ASIC to corporate and private whistleblowers is that ASIC does not 
appear to have a clear substantive role in protecting the interests of whistleblowers. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, ASIC stated that whistleblowers 'will generally have to 
enforce their own rights' if seeking to rely on the statutory protections.
89
 Asked if it 
was fair to conclude that ASIC does not have a substantive role as an advocate for 
corporate whistleblowers, ASIC agreed that the current whistleblower provisions 
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'do not either require or empower ASIC to treat whistleblowers or the information 
they provide in any particular way'.
90
 
14.93 One of the more troubling pieces of evidence received from Mr Morris was 
that the CFPL whistleblowers were effectively reconciled to losing their jobs as a 
result of their decision to make a disclosure to ASIC. In his first submission, 
Mr Morris recalled that when the whistleblowers met with ASIC for the first time on 
24 February 2010 (16 months after providing ASIC with an anonymous report) they 
were told by an ASIC official that from that day forward they had whistleblower 
protection, but that 'wouldn't be worth much'.
91
 Asked about this comment, Mr Morris 
told the committee that he believed the ASIC officer in question was 'just being frank' 
about the limitations of the whistleblower protections: 
[T]he whistleblower protection basically, as he said, [are] not worth much. 
But I think we had made a decision. We recognised at the outset that we 
would be giving up our jobs by what we were doing.
92
 
14.94 On the CFPL whistleblowers' expectations regarding ASIC's role in protecting 
them, Mr Morris also told the committee: 
…I do not think at the outset we seriously expected ASIC to protect us. If 
you look at their whistleblower protections, there are a lot of weasel words 
in there and it is very, very limited. I suspect, if a company wants to get rid 
of a whistleblower, they never do it because you are whistleblower.
93
 
14.95 In an article by journalist Adele Ferguson, Mr Morris indicated that he was 
essentially left to negotiate his own exist from the CBA when he raised concerns with 
ASIC about death threats he believed had been made. He reported that: 
…I was told by my ASIC contact in a rather offhand manner, 'It's probably 
bullshit, but if you're worried, go to police.'
94
 
14.96 This issue is by no means new. In fact, in its 2004 report on the CLERP 9 Bill, 
the PJCCFS noted that while the Bill made causing, or threatening to cause, detriment 
to a whistleblower a contravention of the Corporations Act:  
…it does not specify whether ASIC or the company have a role in 
preventing reprisals from taking place and if they do what action they 
should take. In other words, it is unclear whether the onus rests solely on 
the whistleblower who has been subject to unlawful reprisal to defend 
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his/her interests or whether the agency receiving the report should assume 
some responsibility for protecting the whistleblower.
95
  
14.97 In light of this, the PJCCFS recommended that 'a provision be inserted in the 
Bill that would allow ASIC to represent the interests of a person alleging to have 
suffered from an unlawful reprisal'.
96
 However, the PJCCFS's recommendation was 
not accepted by the government of the day. The government argued that in instances 
where a company violates the whistleblowing provisions, whistleblowers could pursue 
compensation under the statute: 
Existing section 50 of the ASIC Act already provides ASIC with the ability 
in certain circumstances to commence civil proceedings in a person's name 
to recover damages. Where it is in the public interest, this would generally 
permit ASIC to represent a whistleblower in a claim for damages. However, 
this provision would not permit ASIC to conduct a criminal prosecution or 
to represent a whistleblower in an action for reinstatement. The 
Government considers that an ability for ASIC to represent a person in this 
sort of action is not necessary.
97
 
14.98 Several witnesses suggested this current state of affairs was unacceptable. 
Professor Brown, for example, argued that ASIC needed the ability to investigate and 
remedy alleged reprisals regardless of whether the primary alleged wrongdoing is 
being investigated.
98
 In his appearance before the committee, Professor Brown 
underlined the importance of this issue: 
[T]he crucial question is: whether or when or which Commonwealth 
regulator, whether it is ASIC or whether it shared, should have a 
responsibility for being able to, more or less, intervene and seek remedies 
or take injunctions or step in in the management of and in the fates of 
individual whistleblowers before it gets any worse. Or if it has already got 
to the stage of being something which is compensable damage, stepping in 
to make sure that the action is taken that would lead to that compensation 
being paid. So the questions are about who should provide the real glue in 
the system to make protection and/or compensation real. Those are very 
important questions. Somebody has to do it, otherwise it will not happen.
99
 
14.99 Professor Brown subsequently explained that in the absence of an overarching 
system for protecting all corporate whistleblowers, ASIC should have a responsibility 
to protect its own whistleblowers. However, he suggested there was ultimately 
a need to: 
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…think about creating an infrastructure whereby that responsibility can be 
satisfied more effectively, whether it is by the Fair Work Ombudsman or 
through the Fair Work system, or more generally, or a separate office that 
covers whistleblower protection right across all employers, so that ASIC 
does not have to do it and can retain its core focus on corporate regulation 
and enforcement of corporate law.
100
 
14.100 Professor Brown recommended that, consistent with the approach taken in 
PIDA, the victimisation of whistleblowers in circumstances of deliberately intended 
detriment should be a criminal offence.
101
  
The need to keep whistleblowers 'in the loop' 
14.101 Mr Jeffrey Morris told the committee that one the frustrations of the CFPL 
whistleblowers was what he referred to as the 'one-way flow of information'. This was 
a reference to the lack of information from ASIC about how it was acting on the 
information provided by the whistleblowers.
102
  
14.102 The Blueprint for Free Speech wrote that for whistleblowers, who often risk 
their jobs and even their long-term careers to reveal wrongdoing, it is very important 
to know that something is being done about the wrongdoing they have disclosed.
103
  
14.103 As noted earlier, ASIC claimed that one of the lessons it has taken from the 
CFPL matter is that it needs to improve the way it communicates with whistleblowers. 
According to ASIC, it has already implemented a new approach to how it manages 
whistleblowers and the information it receives from them (as outlined earlier). 
14.104 Dr Brand and Dr Lombard noted that the Corporations Act provides little or 
no guidance in terms of keeping a whistleblower informed of actions taken in relation 
to the information they provide. This serves, they argued, to dissuade would-be 
whistleblowers from making disclosures. By contrast, PIDA outlines how disclosures 
should be dealt with and imposes a general obligation to investigate disclosures. 
Further, where a decision is made not to investigate a disclosure, PIDA: 
…creates a statutory requirement to inform the whistleblower of the reasons 
why, and requirements are imposed in relation to the length of any 
investigation, as well as an obligation to give the whistleblower a copy of 
the report of the investigation.
104
 
14.105 When asked about Dr Brand and Dr Lombard's suggestion, ASIC responded 
that whereas PIDA was directed towards the inherent public interest in the 
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transparency of public institutions, different considerations may need to be weighed in 
regard to the private sector. ASIC acknowledged the interest whistleblowers have in 
how ASIC has acted on the information they have provided, and reiterated that it had 
updated its approach to communicating with whistleblowers. At the same time, ASIC 
told the committee that there were limitations on the amount of information it could 
provide to whistleblowers: 
Whistleblowers are not themselves subject to confidentiality obligations, 
and they may have different or additional motives to those of ASIC. In 
general, it can be difficult for ASIC to be as open about our investigations 
as we would like to in all cases, including because this could jeopardise the 
success of the investigations or future legal proceedings. These factors 
would all need to be considered in deciding whether to include such 
requirements in Pt 9.4AAA.
105
 
Committee view 
14.106 The committee believes there is merit in a number of the recommendations for 
whistleblower reform made by witnesses during the inquiry. 
14.107 The weight of evidence received by the committee would suggest that 
Australia's corporate whistleblower protections should be extended to cover 
anonymous disclosures. The committee also believes the 'good faith' requirement 
serves as an unnecessary impediment to whistleblowing, and should be removed from 
the Corporations Act.  The committee received some evidence suggesting that the 
whistleblower protections should be extended to cover external disclosures to third 
parties, such as the media, in certain circumstances. On the face of it, this would seem 
a sensible reform. However, the committee believes that further consideration of the 
issue is required.  
14.108 The committee acknowledges the importance of internal whistleblower 
systems, and believes that consideration should be given to mechanisms that 
encourage or require companies to implement such systems. The benefits of any 
regulatory requirement that companies implement such systems should, however, 
be weighed against the regulatory burden this might impose on Australian businesses. 
14.109 The committee notes that most witnesses who addressed the issue of 
compensation or rewards for whistleblowers felt that consideration should be given 
to introducing a reward-based or qui tam scheme for corporate whistleblowers. 
This would represent a fundamental shift in approach to corporate law enforcement in 
Australia, and the committee is mindful of concerns that such an approach might be 
considered by some to be inconsistent with Australian culture. Nevertheless, the 
committee agrees with witnesses that reward-based or qui tam systems do seem 
to improve rates of whistleblowing, and by extension the detection of corporate 
                                              
105  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 23. 
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misconduct. As such, these approaches should be given careful consideration as part 
of a broader review of Australia's corporate whistleblower arrangements.  
14.110 Another aspect of the current whistleblower protections in the Corporations 
Act that concerns the committee is that ASIC does not appear to have a clear role in 
actually ensuring that the protections are applied. At the same time, the committee is 
not convinced that ASIC currently has the expertise or resources necessary to act as an 
effective advocate for whistleblowers. Therefore, the committee believes that, subject 
to a broader review of Australia's corporate whistleblower arrangements, an 'Office of 
the Whistleblower' should be established within ASIC. The office could provide a 
dedicated point for all whistleblowers to contact ASIC, ensuring that specialist staff 
are managing and protecting whistleblowers. The office could also undertake work 
to encourage whistleblowers to come forward, and would be advertised in a prominent 
place on ASIC's website. An Office of the Whistleblower could also help improve 
ASIC's communication with whistleblowers and ensure that they are kept 'in the loop' 
regarding any action taken in relation to the matters raised by their disclosures 
(subject, of course, to ASIC's confidentiality obligations and the need to ensure the 
appropriate administration of justice). In this sense, the office would help embed and 
advance the work ASIC has recently undertaken to improve its ongoing 
communication with whistleblowers.  
14.111 Finally, the committee notes Professor Brown's concern regarding 
the adequacy of penalties that can be imposed if a whistleblower is victimised. 
While little evidence was received on this point, the committee believes this issue 
should be considered as part of a broader review of Australia's corporate 
whistleblower arrangements.  
Recommendation 12 
14.112 The committee recommends that, consistent with the recommendations 
made by ASIC, the government develop legislative amendments to: 
 expand the definition of a whistleblower in Part 9.4AAA of the 
Corporations Act 2001 to include a company's former employees, 
financial services providers, accountants and auditors, unpaid workers 
and business partners; 
 expand the scope of information protected by the whistleblower 
protections to cover any misconduct that ASIC may investigate; and 
 provide that ASIC cannot be required to produce a document revealing a 
whistleblower's identity unless ordered by a court or tribunal, following 
certain criteria.  
Recommendation 13 
14.113 The committee recommends that an 'Office of the Whistleblower' be 
established within ASIC. 
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Recommendation 14 
14.114 The committee recommends that the government initiate a review of the 
adequacy of Australia's current framework for protecting corporate 
whistleblowers, drawing as appropriate on Treasury's 2009 Options Paper on the 
issue and the subsequent consultation process. 
Recommendation 15 
14.115 The committee recommends that, subject to the findings of the broader 
review called for in Recommendation 14, protections for corporate 
whistleblowers be updated so that they are generally consistent with and 
complement the protections afforded to public sector whistleblowers under the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. Specifically, the corporate whistleblower 
framework should be updated so that: 
 anonymous disclosures are protected; 
 the requirement that a whistleblower must be acting in 'good faith' in 
disclosing information is removed, and replaced with a requirement that 
a disclosure: 
 is based on an honest belief, on reasonable grounds, that the 
information disclosed shows or tends to show wrongdoing; or  
 shows or tends to show wrongdoing, on an objective test, regardless 
of what the whistleblower believes;  
 remedies available to whistleblowers if they are disadvantaged as a result 
of making a disclosure are clearly set out in legislation, as are the 
processes through which a whistleblower might seek such remedy; 
 it is a criminal offence to take or threaten to take a reprisal against a 
person (such as discriminatory treatment, termination of employment or 
injury) because they have made or propose to make a disclosure; and 
 in limited circumstances, protections are extended to cover external 
disclosures to a third parties, such as the media. 
Recommendation 16 
14.116 The committee recommends that, as part of the broader review called for 
in Recommendation 14, the government explore options for reward-based 
incentives for corporate whistleblowers, including qui tam arrangements. 
 
  
 
Chapter 15 
Early intervention 
15.1 In June 2012, ASIC's chairman stated that ASIC 'was very focused on 
proactive surveillance, by working with the media to call things early, to try and warn 
consumers and to actually engage with product manufacturers early and say, 'Is this 
really the right product you want to be selling to the market?''. According to 
Mr Medcraft, ASIC is 'trying to be proactive not just being, if you want, the 
ambulance that arrives at the scene of the accident when it occurs'.
1
 
15.2 Many witnesses to the inquiry were of the view, however, that ASIC does not 
deal with all the complaints it receives adequately; rather they argued ASIC ignores 
grassroots warnings of impending collapses and crisis.
2
 The committee has already 
cited two cases as particular examples of where, without any effective form of early 
intervention, an emerging problem was allowed to develop causing harm to many 
retail consumers and investors. In this chapter, the committee's primary focus is on the 
way in which ASIC receives and investigates complaints and reports of corporate 
wrongdoing.  
Managing complaints and receiving reports of corporate wrongdoing  
15.3 As evident in this report so far, a regulator's failure to respond effectively to 
an emerging problem can result in significant losses incurred by consumers and 
investors. For example, the committee looked at the poor lending practices that were 
allowed to continue long after they became evident. Indeed, over a period of eight or 
so years the accumulation of many individual acts of irresponsible or predatory 
lending caused great harm to many people. According to the Banking and Finance 
Consumers Support Association (BFCSA), 'almost all of the consumers affected who 
are BFCSA members, could have avoided serious loss, had ASIC delivered detailed 
warnings and simultaneously took criminal action against the promoters'. It stated 
further that 'in particular ASIC ought to have immediately banned unsafe products'.
3
  
15.4 With regard to the CFPL matter, Mr Frazer McLennan could not understand 
why ASIC's processes took so long. He stated:  
The length of time it took for ASIC to get Commonwealth Financial 
Planning to a point where it had to admit to wrongdoings was far too long.
4
  
                                              
1  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services Hansard, Statutory Oversight of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, 22 June 2012, p. 13. 
2  Submissions 130, 132, 136, 140, 141, 156 and 160. 
3  Banking and Finance Consumers Support Association, Submission 156, p. 8. 
4  Mr Frazer McLennan, Submission 127, p. 1. 
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15.5 ASIC's slow response meant that many investors suffered significant financial 
loss as well as emotional distress.  
15.6 Unfortunately these two case studies are not isolated. It is important to place 
the committee's current inquiry in a broader context that takes account of recent 
corporate failures and subsequent inquiries, which importantly exposed familiar 
problems. This inquiry is only the latest to demonstrate, and further highlight, areas 
where ASIC needs to improve. To convey some sense of the problems associated with 
ASIC's slow response to warning signs, the committee briefly touches on the findings 
from two recent inquiries.  
Liquidators inquiry 
15.7 A dominant theme in the committee's 2009 report on liquidators was ASIC's 
unresponsiveness to the complaints it received about the conduct of some liquidators 
or administrators. Many submissions noted that their complaint to ASIC about the 
behaviour of an insolvency practitioner was either put aside, answered months later, 
or simply recorded on a database with no subsequent action taking place. 
The committee cited account after account of individuals writing to ASIC just to have, 
in their view, their concerns brushed away. The lack of regulatory response to the 
many and persistent complaints about Mr Stuart Ariff was most damning. 
Storm Financial  
15.8 The 2009 inquiry that examined the collapse of Storm Financial also 
highlighted ASIC's failure to act early to prevent further losses. Evidence before the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJCCFS) 
highlighted the general understanding that ASIC's response was inadequate. During 
that inquiry, CPA Australia suggested that ASIC's approach to acting on complaints 
had been too reactive, possibly due to resource constraints: 
They really need to toughen up on the proactive, doing things earlier, and if 
that means more resources…then that is where the energies should be, 
because at the moment…they seem to come in either after the fact or when 
they go in early we do not see anything actually happen that changes the 
course of events that subsequently follows.
5
  
15.9 A number of submitters to that inquiry suggested that a ready, willing and 
able regulator was needed to take the necessary steps to ensure that all the participants 
in the industry comply with the laws. Some of the observations included: 
                                              
5  Mr Paul Drum, CPA Australia, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services Hansard, Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia, 26 August 2009, 
p. 68. 
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 ASIC should strive for a primarily preventive function, through greater 
monitoring, supervision and enforcement of obligations imposed on 
AFS licensees and other entities falling within its jurisdiction;
6
 and 
 ASIC needs to be able to 'respond pre-emptively'.
7
  
Evidence before this committee 
15.10 The criticism about ASIC's slow response and its failure to join up the dots is 
also a recurring theme in submissions to this new inquiry. The submitters who 
commented on ASIC's tardiness in responding to reports of possible breaches of the 
law included retail investors, registered ASIC agents, licensed financial planners and 
liquidators.  
15.11 One submitter was of the view that over many decades, ASIC's inaction has 
seen significant, consistent and ongoing consumer and investor losses through failed 
entities such as Fin Corp, Westpoint, Rothwells, Tricontinental, Opus Prime, Lift 
Capital, Bond Corp, HIH, Ansett, One.Tel, Quintex, Basis Capital, Great Southern, 
Timbercorp, Babcock & Brown and Trio Capital. He was of the view that, had ASIC 
analysed and understood the real causes of the historical failures of such entities, it 
could have either attempted to prevent the losses or have at least reduced the quantum 
of losses to consumers. In his opinion, ASIC could have done so by 'implementing or 
regulating a system that more readily identifies companies that have a much higher 
level of risk, having potential "red flag" issue/s and or, failure altogether'.
8
 
15.12 As a specific concern, the Institute of Chartered Accountants similarly 
identified the amount of time that it takes ASIC to act and respond to a complaint or 
information. It stated that while there was no doubt that ASIC must be thorough in its 
investigations, questions have been raised about 'why it can sometimes take a number 
of years to respond to allegations made in the public arena'. The Institute contended 
that: 
In certain cases, a quick and timely response can have the effect of limiting 
the adverse consequences of any actual market misconduct that relates to 
the allegations. A timely and effective process of working through such 
allegations can also send the right signal to others who may have access to 
information that would be helpful to ASIC achieving the right regulatory 
outcomes.
9
 
                                              
6  Q Invest, Submission 374 to the PJCCFS's Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in 
Australia, p. ii. 
7  Mr John Brogden, Investment and Financial Services Association, PJCCFS Hansard, Inquiry 
into Financial Products and Services in Australia, 28 August 2009, p. 50. 
8  Mr Bruce Keenan, Submission 197, p. 5. 
9  Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Submission 203, p. 4. 
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15.13 The Australian Shareholders' Association was concerned about ASIC's 
complaints management policies and practices, which to the interested or affected 
party, appear to be reactive and not alert to potential problems. It gained the 
impression that overseas regulators were able to act more quickly to assess a situation, 
take action and reach a conclusion compared to Australia where it seemed litigation, 
or the threat of such, delayed these steps. In its view, actions such as 'withdrawing 
a product or suspending/banning an individual take too long'.
10
 The Consumer Credit 
Legal Centre (NSW) likewise expressed concerns about the 'very long time' for ASIC 
to act on a complaint.
11
 It noted: 
Even where consumer advocates are pleased with the ultimate outcome, the 
void that exists between complaint(s) and outcome is disconcerting at best 
and downright infuriating where consumer harm is accumulating and 
industry practice becoming entrenched.
12
 
15.14 Mr Brody, Consumer Action Law Centre, also maintained that the time taken 
between raising an issue and a result was an area of consistent frustration. As an 
example of delay, the Consumer Action Law Centre cited the very large number of 
serious complaints about the debt collection firm ACM that it had referred to ASIC 
from 2008 requesting it to intervene.
13
 The Law Centre explained that it continued 
to refer complaints to ASIC and, 'growing increasingly frustrated with the lack of 
response we took the unusual step of criticising ASIC in a 2010 media release'.
14
 
It noted further that ultimately ASIC commenced proceedings against ACM in May 
2011 and secured 'an excellent outcome' in the Federal Court in October 2012. 
The Law Centre observed, however,  
…a great deal of consumer detriment may have been avoided had ASIC 
responded more quickly—it is notable that the 2011 proceedings concerned 
conduct by November 2008 and June 2010, and that the court outcome was 
not achieved until 2012, some four years after the issue was initially 
identified.
15
  
15.15 Indeed, the Commonwealth Ombudsman noted that one of the most frequent 
complaints about ASIC lodged with his office was that the regulator had not 
investigated and/or taken enforcement action in relation to a report of misconduct or 
breach of legislation. He explained: 
Complainants typically state they have reported to ASIC what they believe 
to be a significant act of misconduct or breach of legislation by a director, 
other company official or a company itself. Following receipt of a letter 
                                              
10  Australian Shareholders' Association, Submission 151, p. 2.  
11  See also Submissions 99, 100, 240 and 279. 
12  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Submission 194, p. 21.  
13  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 7. 
14  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, pp. 5–6.  
15  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, pp. 5–6. 
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from ASIC responding to the complainant's report of misconduct and 
advising that it will not investigate, the complainant contacts the 
Ombudsman because they consider ASIC is not meeting its responsibility 
as a regulator.
16
 
15.16 A number of individuals made similar complaints to the committee about 
ASIC not pursuing reports of serious breaches.
17
 In their view, signs were present that 
clearly warranted ASIC's attention but simply did not register with the regulator. 
Submitters cited early indications of a company in trouble or company directors 
engaging in misconduct that went unnoticed. These examples included companies 
failing to lodge required returns or producing accounts; alterations to a company's 
registration without a director's knowledge; company name changes and turnover in 
board members; a history of associated entities in receivership and the issue of a stop 
order; and non-payment of employee superannuation entitlements.
18
  
Individual experiences 
15.17 Some of the evidence before the committee recounted experiences that have 
been raised during other parliamentary inquiries. For example, it appeared to 
Mr Lindsay Johnston, who reported on the activities of Mr Stuart Ariff, that: 
…law enforcement agencies and regulators perform no investigation 
beyond the substance of the initial complaint. In respect of my complaints if 
the ASC [ASIC's predecessor] had acted and made requests for 
documentation it would have received at an early stage the documentation 
that was ultimately brought before the Court. Had the ASC and ASIC 
performed as a regulator as expected by the community, it is highly likely 
that by 1999 there would have been some disciplinary action taken against 
Stuart Ariff and a near certainty that sufficient evidence would have existed 
to ensure he was never to be admitted to practice as an insolvency 
practitioner.
19
 
15.18 Ms Anne Lampe also questioned ASIC's management of complaints. While 
working at ASIC's media unit, she became aware that ASIC received frequent 
complaints about 'dodgy and suspect investment schemes as well as lost investments 
in failed companies'. Ms Lompe found that the complaints were 'dutifully logged and 
filed'; their recording was methodical; and records well kept. Her concern was that 
action stalled with the recording and filing of the reports and that 'too many 
complaints remained buried in the archives'. She explained further:  
It was only when the volume of complaints and losses about a particular 
scam reached tsunami level, or investors with losses contacted a member of 
                                              
16  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 6. 
17  See for example, Mr Ben Burgess, Submission 190 and Institute of Chartered Accountants 
Australia, Submission 203. 
18  Submissions 40, 42, 99, 223, 239, 240, 246, 260, 279, 324, 326, 330 and 376. 
19  Mr Lindsay Johnston, Submission 130, p. 2. 
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parliament, or triggered a media inquiry that ASIC seemed to spring into 
action.
20
  
15.19 She recalled writing articles after Storm's collapse when she learnt first-hand 
from other financial advisers about the lead-up to the failure. According to Ms Lampe 
the advisers had known what was happening at Storm and had:  
…contacted ASIC well before its demise warning that Storm was over-
leveraging elderly clients and had put them in a one-product-suits-all model 
rather than taking into account investors’ individual needs to draw up an 
appropriate financial plan. The advisors reported that investors were at great 
risk. One lot of intel came from an internal Storm source.
21
  
15.20 In Ms Lampe's opinion, ASIC could have taken on board the warnings and 
whistleblower complaints and used its power to review client files—a random sample 
to see 'whether Storm advisors were drawing up appropriate individual financial plans 
to meet the needs of its clients'. She suggested: 
That would have shown whether each investment plan was different, or 
whether they were all stamped from the same template. Such an inquiry 
would have shown that there was a sameness and a high risk and alarmingly 
high borrowing component in each client file. In short it should take 
whistleblowers seriously, rather than shunning them as troublemakers with 
an axe to grind.
22
  
15.21 One person in the financial services industry stated that he knew for a fact 
that: 
…many people in Queensland tried to warn ASIC about Storm but on all 
occasions these warnings were ignored. A far more pro-active approach by 
people who understood the true nature and risk of the Storm Financial 
methodology could, I believe, have saved an awful lot of time, money, 
anxiety for all concerned.
23
 
15.22 But there were many other submitters who wrote about their experiences of 
ASIC's inaction that are completely removed from Storm, Mr Ariff, or CFPL. 
Furthermore, they are drawn from many sectors of Australia's corporate world. They 
recounted their own personal experiences of making a complaint or reporting a 
possible breach of the law, or cited cases where ASIC should have paid attention to 
early alarm bells. They raised concerns that ASIC ignores or fails to take corrective 
action on early or advanced warning signs of dubious practices. Dr Peter Brandson 
referred to distressed victims of banking malpractice 'being fobbed off'—getting the 
'run around'. He stated: 
                                              
20  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, p. 2. 
21  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, p. 3. 
22  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, pp. 3–4. 
23  Mr Robert Bennetts, Submission 393, p. 2. 
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The aim seems to be to let the dissatisfied victim—who has had little help 
in actually seeing justice done—let off some steam and then be left to pick 
up the pieces of their shattered life while ASIC neatly files the complaint.
24
 
15.23 For example, some complained about ASIC's apparent indifference to 
indicators of misconduct by directors or companies in trouble, such as unpaid workers' 
entitlements or word of mouth intelligence about a company engaging in suspicious 
conduct.
25
 One such witness stated that in his particular case, he believed the company 
was trading while insolvent: 
ASIC appear to have ignored complaints made by numerous injured 
individuals as well as the findings (however preliminary) of professionals 
such as the company's administrator and latterly its liquidator. This is 
despite mounting evidence in support of the original complaints made and 
despite the fact the evidence gathering and investigation of the companies' 
affairs has been the result of other parties unrelated to ASIC and submitted 
to them in good faith.
26
  
15.24 In his view, the magnitude of losses could have been mitigated: 
…if ASIC had intervened with a more timely investigation and possibly 
issued an enforcement order requiring company officers to undertake action 
to protect the  interests of the various stakeholders.
27
 
15.25 Mr Peter Leech, another submitter, raised his concerns in the context of 
phoenix activity where four different individuals on four separate occasions 
complained about the same company. According to Mr Leech, his original complaint 
made very clear that 'if the Director as the Proprietor of the company cannot pay GST, 
PAYG and/or Superannuation obligations, then one could reasonably consider that the 
Director and the Company could not satisfy Part 1 of Sect 95A'. He stated further: 
Given past history, it is foreseeable that the alleged non-compliance will 
occur again. Numerous employees and creditors have been left without due 
entitlements. In each complaint and subsequent review after review—ASIC 
have 'chosen not to proceed' simply asking us, the complainants, to give 
them more evidence. Yet it is the Commission that has the legislative 
authority, resources and mandate to pursue such evidence and we, as 
individuals, are specifically precluded from such data. If ASIC won't 
investigate—who will?28 
15.26 A submitter cited the case of Wellington Capital amending the constitution of 
the Premium Income Fund but, despite reports to ASIC, the regulator failed to take 
                                              
24  Dr Peter Brandson, Submission 232, p. 7. 
25  See for example, Submissions 40, 94 and 132.   
26  Submission 326 (Confidential). 
27  Submission 326 (Confidential). 
28  Mr Peter Leech, Submission 132, p. 1. 
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action. According to the submitter the amendment was later overturned in the Federal 
Court but too late to reverse the consequences of the amendment.
29
  
15.27 Another submitter lodged a detailed complaint with ASIC about a renewable 
energy company but, in his words, 'to no avail'. He noted that the company in question 
raised approximately $16 million through prospectuses but did not lodge its required 
returns for some time. According to the submitter, shareholders were 'certainly not 
kept informed'. Assets were transferred to a US entity and the submitter believes that 
the company was deregistered in November 2012. He also referred to a gold 
exploration listed company. In his view, ASIC chose to ignore the many warning 
signs in both cases, and 'could and should have done more to protect shareholders and 
question the discharge of management fiduciary responsibilities'.
30
 
15.28 Mr Roger Cooper related similar experiences with ASIC's slow response to 
his concerns about a questionable company. He informed the committee that by the 
time he contacted ASIC for guidance: 
Micro Corp had become MCI Technologies Ltd who became Tomato 
Technologies Ltd who became Asian Pacific Ltd and they had drawn a lot 
of flak from disgruntled users and eventually in August 2012 they were 
suspended from the ASX.
31
  
15.29 In Mr Cooper's words, with patience he tried 'every avenue possible to try and 
get some accountability happening'. At that time, Mr Cooper thought the ASX would 
be interested in the behaviour of Tomato Technologies, which was a listed company, 
and track its record with Consumer Protection Agencies. His letter to the ASX did not 
receive 'the dignity of a written reply but merely a wish[y] washy phone call'.
32
 
15.30 Mr Cooper noted that, at an early stage in December 2000, the Australian 
Financial Review provided a revealing and scathing account of Tomato Technologies 
Ltd and its modus operandi. The article referred to 'the dubious pedigree and track 
record of its founder and Board members', which, according to Mr Cooper, raised 
'serious questions about the company way back then'. He informed the committee that: 
Tomato Tech. remarkably expanded overseas into the UK, Canada and the 
USA. The UK Financial Services Authority and the UK Office of Fair 
Trading condemned the company. The BBC consumer TV program Watch 
Dog twice featured the company as a warning to consumers. How could all 
this be under the radar of ASIC?
33
  
                                              
29  Name withheld, Submission 81. 
30  Mr Roger Cooper, Submission 40, p. 2. 
31  Mr Roger Cooper, Submission 94, p. 2. 
32  Mr Roger Cooper, Submission 94, p. 2. 
33  Mr Roger Cooper, Submission 94, p. 4. 
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15.31 In his opinion, ASIC was aware of the fraudulent behaviour of the company 
he was dealing with and did nothing: 
If organisations like ASIC were actually businesses with competitors they 
would go broke. Micro Corporation/Tomato Tech. Ltd had no institutional 
investors and even from a layman's vantage point the company structure 
and behaviour was suspect but apparently under the auspice of ASIC. 
Corporate Watchdog indeed. They were totally indifferent, disinterested 
and offered no help to victims whatsoever.
34
 
15.32 He wrote: 
The company name changes and the incredible turnover of board members 
would I thought, attract attention, but no. At what stage do alarm bells go 
off at ASIC?
35
 
15.33 Yet another case involved LM Investment Management Limited (LMIM), 
the responsible entity (RE) for various registered and unregistered managed 
investment schemes, including the LM Managed Performance Fund (MPF). 
The Advisers' Committee for Investors (ACI) submitted that during the last quarter of 
2012 ASIC investigated the MPF due to negative press and gave it a clean bill of 
health. In 2012, LMIM released MPF accounts, which had been audited in the 
previous June, showing an MPF asset value of $377 million with future developed 
value of MPF's largest asset at $1.5 billion for Maddison Estate. LMIM went into 
voluntary liquidation on 19 March 2013.
36
  
15.34 The ACI advised that it became increasingly concerned about the sequence of 
events that 'failed to protect the interests of investors both on a domestic and 
international basis'. It questioned 'the structure, organization and fairness of Australia's 
regulatory system'.
37
 The investors' group asked that if ASIC had concerns about 
LMIM in May/June 2012, why did it let it continue to accept millions of dollars from 
unsuspecting investors without either warning investors or placing conditions on 
LMIM? It also questioned why ASIC allowed LMIM to continue to accept investor 
funds when ASIC's enquiries into the RE in 2012 should have revealed that LMIM did 
not obtain any independent valuations for properties it was purchasing with investor 
funds. The ACI noted that the 'requirement for independent valuations for the 
purchase of large assets is a requirement of many major countries in the developed 
world'. In its view, ASIC's failure to identify this crucial mistake by LMIM 'to obtain 
independent valuations (not only at purchase but also during the life of that asset) 
indicates that there are serious questions to be asked of ASIC by this inquiry'.
38
 
According to the ACI:  
                                              
34  Mr Roger Cooper, Submission 94, p. 4. 
35  Mr Roger Cooper, Submission 94, p. 4. 
36  Advisers' Committee for Investors, Submission 170, p. 5. 
37  Advisers' Committee for Investors, Submission 170, p. 1. 
38  Advisers' Committee for Investors, Submission 170, p. 6. 
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…the reports to creditors issued by the voluntary administrators of LMIM 
(as early as April 2013) provide details of unpaid and undocumented loans 
from LMIM to Drake and his related entities and possible breaches of duty 
and other offences under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). These facts 
reported on by the voluntary administrators were clear grounds for an 
earlier intervention by the regulator.
39
 
15.35 The ACI is concerned that by failing to act swiftly and decisively, ASIC has 
allowed further damage to occur to investors.
40
 It argued that where breaches of the 
Corporations Act are identified, ASIC should 'act quickly to take steps to ensure those 
breaches are dealt with in a timely manner'. The ACI informed the committee that: 
There are approximately 10,000 LMIM investors, worldwide, and 4,500 in 
the MPF alone including home based and expatriate Australians. These 
investors, some of whom will have no ability to recover from such a 
devastating loss, stand to lose a significant part if not all of their investment 
in the funds of this Australian company which is now in liquidation. Many 
of these investors will lose their life savings. 
Although the ACI approached ASIC some months ago urging quick action, 
ASIC only took formal steps in the Federal Court to freeze the assets of the 
main director Mr Drake in September 2013 some 6 months after the 
company was placed into voluntary administration. Given that assets such 
as cash may be transferred quickly, why did the regulator in such a large 
corporate failure (one of the largest in Australia after the HIH collapse) fail 
to act immediately to obtain freezing orders of LMIM, Mr Drake and other 
related entities to ensure the status quo at that time was maintained and 
value preserved for investors?
41
 
15.36 According to the ACI, ASIC's failure to take substantial, early steps to deal 
decisively with the causes and results of this corporate collapse contrast starkly with 
the quick action and early prosecutions after the Bernie Madoff scandal broke in the 
United States.
42
 
15.37 Another group of concerned investors, the Association of ARP Unitholders 
Inc, reminded the committee that: 
It was the actions of an alert Industry participant who forced ASIC to take 
action in the Trio matter, yet any number of opportunities existed starting 
with the licensing of executives of Trio through to the failure to follow up 
serious valuation questions in conjunction with APRA.
43
 
                                              
39  Advisers' Committee for Investors, Submission 170, p. 6. 
40  Advisers' Committee for Investors, Submission 170, p. 6. 
41  Advisers' Committee for Investors, Submission 170, p. 7. 
42  Advisers' Committee for Investors, Submission 170, p. 7. 
43  Association of ARP Unitholders Inc, Submission 173, p. 1. 
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15.38 The committee received many other complaints that are too numerous to 
detail here about ASIC's supposedly inadequate response to complaints or reports of 
corporate misconduct. Some additional cases include a report from a compliance 
officer and internal auditor about an accounting practice providing a 'one shop' service 
including finance, taxation and financial planning advice. According to the submitter, 
ASIC took no action which has resulted in mounting client investor losses to a level of 
$10 million to $15 million.
44
 The committee also received a confidential submission 
dealing with an agricultural managed investment scheme and the alleged misuse of 
funds. In this case, the liquidator reported the misuse of funds raised for the scheme 
to ASIC, alleging that funds had been used to 'prop up' previous projects operated by 
the responsible entity, which had significant cash flow problems. The submitter 
informed the committee that they had never been contacted by anyone at ASIC in 
relation to his complaint, 'apart from a boilerplate response, nor have I heard about 
any action against the directors of the company'.
45
 
Reports from industry professionals 
15.39 Importantly, some of the people making reports or expressing concerns to 
ASIC come from people within the industry, such as registered ASIC agents and 
financial planners.  
15.40 Mr David Pemberton, a CPA who holds a public practicing certificate and 
whose firm is a registered ASIC agent, wrote to ASIC on 5 June 2009 on his company 
letterhead. He drew to ASIC's attention his misgivings about the activities of a person 
with a history of failed enterprises who, in his view, should be investigated for 
insolvent trading under the Corporations Act. Mr Pemberton informed the committee 
that: 
ASIC's bland & generic response of 6 July 2009 was the second and last 
contact I received from ASIC in this matter.
46
 
15.41 He believed that any complaint from a professional should have caused ASIC 
to investigate. He explained: 
This complaint was very deliberately made to ASIC at its highest level 
because of the known issues of ASIC incompetence. ASIC Darwin has a 
sizeable office less than three kilometres from my office in Darwin. What is 
the price of a local call or for that matter an STD call?
47
 
                                              
44  Burke Bond Financial Pty Ltd, Submission 98, p. 2. 
45  Submission 100 (Confidential). 
46  Mr David Pemberton, Submission 279, p. 3. 
47  Mr David Pemberton, Submission 279, p. 3. 
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15.42 Mr Pemberton advised the committee that many professionals shared his 
views on ASIC and 'have ceased reporting suspect activity due to ASIC's chronic 
incompetence and inaction'.
48
 In his view: 
ASIC needs to be a Kelpie as opposed to being a Bassett Hound. It's about 
being proactive and fearless in directing the flock. It's about knowing when 
to be quiet, alert and watchful; knowing when to work out wide or get in 
close and knowing when to run, bark and if necessary bite.
49
 
15.43 One experienced financial planner, Mr Ben Burgess, took a complaint to 
ASIC on behalf of his client that involved an allegation that a bank had misled and 
coerced his client into 'investing into various high risk investments, despite requesting 
a much lower risk term deposit'. ASIC was provided with a complete copy of the 
client file as well as supporting documentation and calculations. He explained: 
Six months later I had to call ASIC myself to find out what progress had 
been made, only to be told 'I'm sorry but ASIC does not handle individual 
complaints but only systemic problems'. 
To date there has been no progress toward resolution of this case despite the 
vast amount of time; effort and expense incurred by the clients and I in 
fighting for this complaint and doing a large part of the work that ASIC 
itself should have done.
50
  
15.44 Mr Burgess concluded that ASIC failed 'in a most basic way by not even 
bothering to keep me or my clients informed'.
51
  
15.45 An area of particular note, however, involved professionals that are required 
under statute to make reports of possible wrongdoing. These statutory reports are a 
valuable source of 'front line' information about possible breaches of the corporation 
legislation.
52
 Some such submitters commented on ASIC's tardiness in responding to 
reports of possible breaches of the law, including reports from auditors and 
liquidators. 
Auditors 
15.46 Under the Corporations Act, auditors are required to notify ASIC in writing 
of circumstances that they suspect, on reasonable grounds, amount to a contravention 
of the Act. They are also required, inter alia, to report circumstances that amount to an 
attempt by any person to unduly influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead a person 
                                              
48  Mr David Pemberton, Submission 279, p. 3. 
49  Mr David Pemberton, Submission 279, p. 6. 
50  Mr Ben Burgess, Submission 190, p. 2. 
51  Mr Ben Burgess, Submission 190, p. 1. 
52  See for example, The Auditor-General, ASIC's Processes for Receiving and Referring for 
Investigation Statutory Reports of Suspected Breaches of the Corporations Act 2001, Audit 
Report No. 18 of 2006–07, pp. 13–14. 
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involved in an audit. The same conditions apply to lead auditors for an audit of a 
compliance plan. BDO Australia explained further: 
Under s311 and 601HG of the Corporations Act, an auditor is obligated to 
report to ASIC matters that they have reasonable grounds to suspect amount 
to a significant contravention of the Corporations Act or, in the case of 
matters that are not a significant contravention, the auditor believes that the 
matter will not be adequately dealt with. 
An auditor who fails to comply with s311, 601HG or 990K (as applicable) 
is guilty of an offence.
53
 
15.47 BDO Australia referred to a section 311 report it produced in 2007. 
It stated that 'despite the extensive amount of work and costs involved in conducting 
the investigation, there would appear to have been no action taken by ASIC to 
investigate the matter' and that 'neither the audit partner who submitted the section 311 
report nor any of the relevant parties have received any communication from ASIC in 
relation to the matter'. BDO was concerned, however, about one particular report, 
where the investigation involved an extensive amount of work and costs, but ASIC 
appeared to have taken no action.
54
 This apparent lack of action, posed a number of 
questions for the auditor: 
 Was the matter ever investigated by ASIC? 
 If the matter was investigated, why were the parties who had the most 
knowledge of the alleged breaches of the Corporations Act not contacted by 
ASIC? 
 If the matter was investigated, then why was there no communication to the 
audit partner that the matter had been investigated and finalised? 
15.48 BDO Australia was of the view that, as a minimum, the whole process 
indicated a deficiency in communication to the underlying parties involved. Further, 
the audit partner questioned the ability of ASIC to assist registered company auditors 
to 'fulfil their supervisory roles and reporting responsibilities under existing 
legislation'. BDO surmised that: 
If no action is taken when reported breaches are identified, auditors should 
not be burdened with the responsibility and cost of complying with sections 
of the legislation which are not going to be enforced.
55
 
15.49 In this regard, not only is ASIC failing to provide a good example for its 
gatekeepers but there is the potential to undermine confidence in the reporting system 
and act as a disincentive for reporting suspected corporate wrongdoing.  
                                              
53  BDO Australia, Submission 163, p. 1. 
54  BDO Australia, Submission 163, p. 1. 
55  BDO Australia, Submission 163, p. 2. 
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15.50 A number of auditors shared this concern about ASIC's response to statutory 
reports of suspected breaches. For example, one auditor submitted that 'as an auditor, 
we were required to lodge the s.311 notice within 28 days of finding a breach yet there 
is no timeframe imposed on ASIC for at least appearing like they are doing something 
about it'. In confidence, the auditor informed the committee that her firm lodged 
a section 311 notice with ASIC in relation to one of its audit clients. In a letter to 
ASIC, the auditor reported the client's reluctance to assist in the conduct of the audit 
and resistance to providing information pertinent to the audit. The letter also noted 
instances of the client providing false and misleading information to the auditor and 
the possibility of fraud and misappropriation.
56
 
15.51 The firm issued a qualified disclaimer opinion for the year ended 2011 for the 
client. The client did not send the firm's opinion to ASIC with their Form 388 but 
instead had their solicitor, who was also an auditor, issue an unqualified opinion for 
the 2011 year. According to the submitter this 'was accepted by ASIC even though we 
were still the listed registered auditors for this client (which is a company limited by 
guarantee) for the 2011 year'. The submitter argued that ASIC allowed the client 
to 'opinion shop' and for someone who was not independent to issue an opinion. 
Moreover, the submitter informed the committee that this solicitor/auditor had already 
been accused of fraud by ASIC on another matter and yet ASIC allowed the client 
to utilise them.
57
 
15.52 The audit firm has had no response from ASIC regarding the status of its 
section 311 letter. In its view, it appears that this client has been able to get away with 
providing false and misleading information to the auditors, not assisting the auditor in 
its enquiries, falsifying information and lodging an unqualified opinion to ASIC from 
an auditor who was not the appointed auditor for the 2011 year.
58
 
15.53 Mr Peter Murray, a fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, asked 
why ASIC's response to reported breaches was so bad. Like others, he questioned why 
there are rules and regulations if they are not enforced. According to Mr Murray, 
ASIC noted that it received 10,752 complaints, resolved 57 per cent of these and 
referred six per cent for formal investigation or surveillance. Further, ASIC has 
informed him that every complaint was 'registered on ASIC's confidential database, 
acknowledged, formally assessed and personally responded to'. ASIC notified him 
that it: 
…encourages Institute members to continue to report alleged corporate 
misconduct, within ASIC's jurisdiction, to us. At the very least, your 
information will assist us in continuing to develop a significant intelligence 
tool which is used, for example, as part of our campaign and surveillance 
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targeting, licence and professional registration approval process and in the 
selection of subjects for formal investigation.
59
 
15.54 Mr Murray suggested that ASIC should 'classify the importance of allegations 
lodged with it (eg A, B, C, D) and, at a minimum, interview the submitting parties and 
the claims they make—before responding in a negative fashion'.60 
External administrators 
15.55 The Corporations Act also places an obligation on liquidators, receivers and 
voluntary administrators (external administrators) to report suspected breaches of 
the Corporations Act to ASIC. For example, sections 422, 438D and 533 of the 
Corporations Act require external administrators to report to ASIC on the activities of 
past and present company officers or members that involve, inter alia: 
 suspected breaches of the Corporations Act;  
 misapplication or retention of funds; and 
 any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust.
61
  
15.56 Reports made pursuant to these sections are referred to as statutory reports 
and are an important source of information about possible breaches of the law. 
Section 533 applies to liquidators who must lodge a report as soon as practicable and 
in any event, within six months from the time it appears to the liquidator that:  
(a) a past or present officer or employee, or a member or contributory, of 
the company may have been guilty of an offence under a law of the 
Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to the company; or 
(b) a person who has taken part in the formation, promotion, administration, 
management or winding up of the company:  
(i) may have misapplied or retained, or may have become liable or 
accountable for, any money or property of the company; or 
(ii) may have been guilty of any negligence, default, breach of duty or 
breach of trust in relation to the company; or 
(c) the company may be unable to pay its unsecured creditors more than 
50 cents in the dollar. 
15.57 Liquidators also have the discretion to lodge further reports if, in their 
opinion, it is desirable to draw the matter to ASIC's attention.
62
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61  Section 533 (for liquidators); section 422 (for receivers); and section 438D (for voluntary 
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Page 242  
 
15.58 In 2012–13, external administrators lodged 9,788 reports with ASIC. Of this 
number, initial external administrators accounted for 95 per cent or 9,254 reports. 
ASIC recorded that 81 per cent of the initial reports involved companies with fewer 
than 20 employees. The construction industry was subject to the highest number of 
reports accounting for just over 24 per cent. Of the initial external administrators' 
reports, receivers lodged one per cent under section 422; administrators lodged 3.8 per 
cent under section 438D; and 95 per cent of the reports were submitted by liquidators 
under section 533.
63
 
15.59 Importantly, external administrators alleged misconduct in more than 
two-thirds of reports (6,761) involving an overall possible 16,562 breaches. Although 
this number accounts for an average of between two and three breaches per report, 
almost 30 per cent of reports or 2,493 recorded no misconduct.
64
 ASIC asked the 
external administrator to prepare a supplementary section 422, section 438D or section 
533 report for 677 of the 6,761 reports that identified possible misconduct.
65
 
In its analysis of the statistics, ASIC explained that its request for an additional report 
is a function of its assessment of risk based on a number of factors, including, but 
not limited to: 
 the nature of the possible misconduct reported; 
 the amount of liabilities; 
 the deficiency suffered; 
 the availability of evidence; 
 prior misconduct; and 
 the advice of the external administrator that the reported possible misconduct 
warranted further investigation.
66
 
15.60 In a 2007 report, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) observed that 
given the large number of statutory reports received by ASIC each year that allege 
offences against the Corporations Act, it was appropriate that ASIC had systems in 
place to prioritise its regulatory action, through risk scoring. It found that ASIC's 
recording of statutory report information was accurate to a high degree.
67
 The ANAO 
recognised that ASIC could use a wide variety of possible remedies to deal with 
offences identified in statutory reports or other deficiencies that warranted some sort 
of regulatory action. They ranged from warning letters to directors for the less serious 
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offences to prosecution and potentially imprisonment for more serious offences. 
It noted that where ASIC identified that a statutory report raised issues of regulatory 
significance, it sought further information about the matter from the external 
administrator.
68
  
15.61 According to the ANAO report, ASIC did not always obtain that additional 
information. Based on its sample, it found that in 40 per cent of instances, ASIC did 
not obtain additional information that it had requested.
69
 The ANAO concluded:  
…the small number of statutory reports subject to regulatory action by 
ASIC each year indicates that there is opportunity for greater regulatory 
action on these reports.
70
 
15.62 Mr David Lombe, President of the Australian Restructuring Insolvency and 
Turnaround Association (ARITA) was of the view that ANAO's 2007 findings were 
still relevant and applicable.
71
 He noted the thousands of reports lodged with ASIC 
each year but not acted upon. In Mr Lombe's view, there was a 'general perception 
within the business community that, if you do certain things at a certain level, there 
will be no effective review'.
72
 He explained further: 
The difficulty that we have as official liquidators is that you get a matter off 
the court list and often that matter has no funds in it, so there are no 
available assets. Often that is a process by which directors have deliberately 
done that—it has been a deliberate course of action. If you report the matter 
to ASIC and there is no assistance from that space, there is not much you 
can do. If you felt really aggrieved by it or you felt that it was a matter that 
was of sufficient importance, you may be able to persuade a firm of 
solicitors to act on a pro bono basis, but that is very difficult. I found myself 
in that sort of situation with Babcock & Brown, where I had inadequate 
funds to be able to pursue a proper investigation. The only thing that was 
available to me was to ask creditors to fund me, which they did, which then 
allowed me to do a public examination, which brought out the conduct of 
directors and other stakeholders in that company. If you do not have funds 
in a matter, the courses are very limited.
73
 
15.63 By way of example, Mr Lombe expanded on his concerns citing the 
requirement to lodge a section 533 report, which deals with offences committed by 
directors. He explained that for the liquidator to understand what has happened, he or 
she needs to 'review the books and records, determine the transactions, try to find out 
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what assets are there, look at insolvent trading and look at preference payments and all 
those sorts of things'. The liquidator is required to file that report, which takes time. 
So, according to Mr Lombe, the reports involve both time and money, and often with 
official liquidations there are no assets at all and, if there are, creditors are effectively 
paying for the report. He noted that thousands of such reports are lodged with ASIC 
but most of them come back 'no further action'. In his view, it is frustrating for 
liquidators because they feel, 'Why am I bothering to do it?' Mr Lombe concluded that 
'you can understand someone's frustration, where they have reported offences and 
nothing happens'.
74
 
15.64 When asked whether liquidators, in their statutory reports, could assist ASIC 
to distinguish the very serious breaches from the less so, ARITA indicated that it 
'might be a useful reform'. After considering the matter further, ARITA informed the 
committee that if it were consulted, it could assist ASIC to determine a risk scoring 
profile. It explained further, however: 
But we consider that the decision on how the information required by s533 
is 'risk-scored' for action is ultimately one for the regulator and its decision 
and methods should not be publicly disclosed. For one thing, this would 
appear to give the 'green light' to the commission of certain offences that 
are deemed not serious enough to warrant action by ASIC.
75
 
15.65 ARITA also stated that 'a more co-operative approach between ASIC and 
liquidators should also be pursued'. The committee believes that ASIC and ARITA 
should work closely together to develop a more effective and efficient reporting 
mechanism that would assist ASIC to identify the alleged serious breaches from the 
less so.
76
 
Recommendation 17 
15.66 The committee recommends that ASIC, in collaboration with the 
Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association and 
accounting bodies, develop a self-rating system, or similar mechanism, for 
statutory reports lodged by insolvency practitioners and auditors under the 
Corporations Act 2001 to assist ASIC identify reports that require the most 
urgent attention and investigation. 
15.67 Clearly, many people who lodge complaints and reports of suspected 
corporate wrongdoing with ASIC, including Australia's key gatekeepers, are 
dissatisfied with ASIC's response. ASIC has left many with the clear impression that 
the regulator is unresponsive and indifferent to their concerns. In the following 
chapter, the committee considers the likely reasons for this delay or inaction. 
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Chapter 16 
ASIC's response to reports or other indications of 
wrongdoing  
16.1 Many submitters recalled their own personal experience of making a 
complaint or reporting a possible breach of the law to ASIC, or cited cases where 
ASIC should have paid attention to early indications of brewing trouble. They raised 
concerns that ASIC ignores or fails to take corrective action on emerging trends 
involving possible unscrupulous practices or corporate misconduct. The sources of 
such complaints were various and included: consumers or investors registering 
complaints with ASIC; operators within the financial services industry such as 
financial advisers alerting ASIC to poor behaviour or unsafe products; accountants 
and auditors filing statutory reports of suspected wrongdoing or misleading or 
inaccurate information; and liquidators identifying problems with the management of 
a company or conduct of directors. A number of whistleblowers also highlighted their 
concerns about ASIC failing to act effectively on their reports of possible corporate 
wrongdoing. In addition, ASIC has its own surveillance and detection programs 
designed to detect problems in the financial services industry. 
16.2 In this chapter, the committee considers some of the reasons behind the many 
complaints about ASIC's inadequate response to complaints or reports of corporate 
wrongdoing.  
Power to investigate   
16.3 One of ASIC's broad powers is to investigate corporate wrongdoing, or as the 
Governance Institute of Australia put it, 'the forensic gathering of evidence in respect 
of suspect breaches of the law'.
1
 The Rule of Law Institute of Australia referred to 
ASIC's wide range of powers to investigate, examine persons, inspect books, require 
disclosure of information, require persons to comply with an examination order, and 
tap telephones for suspected serious offences.
2
  
Adequacy of ASIC's investigative powers  
16.4 Regarding its responsiveness to early warnings of market problems, unsafe 
products or unscrupulous advisers, ASIC informed the committee that it works 
proactively to identify potential market problems in a number of ways, including: 
 gathering and using industry intelligence;  
                                              
1  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137.  
2  Submission 211. ASIC's investigation powers are listed in Chapter 3. 
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 considering every complaint made to ASIC to identify issues it needs to act 
on; 
 using formal sources of intelligence to detect individual misconduct and 
trends; and 
 conducting surveillance and proactive sectoral health checks.
3
 
16.5 Section 13 of the ASIC Act confers general powers of investigation, allowing 
ASIC to 'make such investigation as it thinks expedient'. The investigative powers 
under section 13 are triggered when there is suspicion of a contravention of the 
corporations legislation, or of a law relevant to the management or affairs of a 
company or involving fraud or dishonesty. While section 15 allows ASIC 
to investigate suspected breaches of the corporations legislation after receiving reports 
from receivers and liquidators, the provision does not compel it to do so. There is no 
statutory obligation on ASIC to investigate, or to take action following those 
investigations.
4
 
16.6 The Rule of Law Institute of Australia was of the view that ASIC's 
investigative powers were 'more than adequate' and there could be 'no excuse of lack 
of powers'.
5
 In its view: 
The problem is not a lack of power by ASIC. The various pieces of 
legislation empower ASIC, yet it is the failure to exercise them properly 
that has given rise to the issues the subject of the Inquiry.
6
 
16.7 Indeed, no one seriously suggested that legislative impediments prevented 
ASIC from performing its investigative functions adequately.  
ASIC's complaints management process 
16.8 Mr Greg Tanzer, a commissioner at ASIC, explained that ASIC receives 
information from a number of sources, including a member of the public lodging a 
complaint or concern and ASIC's own intelligence. He explained that ASIC assesses 
and records the report and makes 'sure that we track everything that comes into the 
place'.
7
 The Misconduct and Breach Reporting team, currently headed by 
Mr Warren Day, is responsible for recording and assessing every report.
8
 Each case is 
assessed on its merits following a process whereby: 
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It goes through an initial assessment by a specialist. There are triage 
arrangements for something that obviously appears to be very significant or 
very urgent. For certain types of market matters we have a standing triage 
arrangement where it just gets referred straight from Mr Day's team through 
to one of the specialist teams. A specialist team will look at that and any 
other complaint that has been through Mr Day's team and reaches, if you 
like, a reasonable threshold.
9
 
16.9 According to Mr Tanzer, ASIC has a dedicated team that considers 'particular 
small cases', so some resources are quarantined to manage those matters.
10
 
He explained that ASIC was making much greater use of this triage approach 'to try 
to focus on the most important matters, allocate resources to them and try to move 
them along'.
11
  
16.10 Clearly, under the leadership of its commissioners, ASIC recognises the 
importance of being proactive. ASIC's triage system for managing complaints also 
seems to be a sensible and correct approach. Yet as the previous chapter highlighted, 
ASIC is perceived by many retail investors and professional bodies closely associated 
with the financial services industry as being reactive rather than proactive. 
The committee now considers the possible reasons for ASIC's slow response. 
Volume of misconduct reports 
16.11 ASIC maintained that it takes reports of misconduct seriously and assesses 
each report of misconduct it receives.
12
 It highlighted the large number of reports of 
misconduct that are made, which range from failure to lodge a form to serious 
criminality. ASIC stated that it was: 
…not possible or appropriate for ASIC to launch an investigation into the 
significant majority of reports we receive. We endeavour at all times to 
resolve matters, or assist the public in other ways that are often more 
appropriate and timely compared to an investigation.
13
 
16.12 A number of submitters also noted the large volume of reports and complaints 
lodged with ASIC. They were of the view that the regulator does not have the 
resources to investigate the thousands of complaints submitted to it every year. 
For example, as cited in Chapter 5, the Consumer Credit Legal Centre (CCLC) stated 
that:  
                                              
9  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 38. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 38. 
11  Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 40. 
12  A number of submitters provided correspondence from ASIC as attachments to their 
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13  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 87. 
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ASIC cannot be expected to resolve each individual consumer dispute, nor 
would it be in the public interest. ASIC should carefully consider how to 
respond to all potential breaches of the law, but should not necessarily 
undertake a formal investigation of every individual complaint that comes 
to its attention.
14
 
16.13 The Association of Financial Advisers also noted that ASIC receives a steady 
flow of relevant and meaningful information from industry and consumers that ASIC 
can then readily act upon. In its view, the complication is ASIC most likely receives a 
huge volume of disparate data that is more complex to compile and analyse. As noted 
earlier, reports of possible misconduct come from many and various sources—in 
2012–13, ASIC received and assessed 11,682 reports of misconduct. It also received 
and assessed 6,985 statutory reports (from auditors and liquidators alleging suspicious 
activity) and 900 breach reports that related to managed investment schemes and 
AFS licensees.
15
  
16.14 The committee understands the very large number of reports and complaints 
ASIC receives and appreciates that ASIC cannot act on every one.  
Due process 
16.15 Mrs Karen Cox, CCLC, acknowledged that the amount of time ASIC takes 
to act on a matter could cause a lot of consumer harm. Even so, she stated: 
…the current regulatory options available do not give a lot of scope for 
doing anything other than following the usual process of investigation, 
gathering evidence and then finally taking action.
16
  
16.16 The Consumer Action Law Centre recognised that: 
It is difficult from the outside to know about internal ASIC processes and 
how those things are progressed, but when matters are identified by the 
stakeholder teams we deal with, there can be some time between that and 
any sort of enforcement action. Of course, they have to go through 
appropriate investigations, and that may well be the reason for the delay, 
but understanding that would be helpful.
17
 
16.17 Indeed, a lack of understanding of ASIC's processes, legal obligations and 
unrealistic expectations could likely explain what appears to some as ASIC inaction. 
For example, the need to remain silent on investigations is a major consideration for 
ASIC. In this regard, the Consumer Action Law Centre understood that ASIC must 
comply with the confidentiality provisions in section 127 of the ASIC Act, which are 
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15  Submission 45, p. 87. 
16  Mrs Karen Cox, Coordinator, CCLC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 40.  
17  Mr Gerard Brody, Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Action Law Centre, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 41. 
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'stricter in comparison to other consumer regulators such as the ACCC'. Nonetheless, 
it noted: 
While confidential investigations are necessary for procedural fairness, 
confidentiality must be balanced with the public interest resulting from the 
public and consumers being confident that the regulator is responsive to 
complaints.
18
 
16.18 The Governance Institute of Australia also referred to the confidentiality 
obligations placed on ASIC when conducting an investigation. In its view, this 
requirement may preclude 'public understanding of actions ASIC could be 
undertaking in relation to possible breaches by individuals and companies of duties 
and responsibilities'. It stated further: 
ASIC is often viewed as acting tentatively in investigating and enforcing 
matters, yet under its legislative framework, ASIC will neither confirm nor 
deny that an investigation is underway unless it is in the public interest to 
do so. Confidentiality of surveillance and investigation is central to 
preserving the integrity of the market, but it results in external public 
parties being unable to objectively evaluate ASIC's actions.
19
  
16.19 The Governance Institute noted the great deal of remedial action that occurs 
outside the public view.
20
 
16.20 The Law Council of Australia also cited the various comments or complaints 
from time to time about ASIC's approach to providing information about ongoing 
investigations. It referred to ASIC's Information Sheet 152, which outlines the 
regulator's position on making public comment. In that publication, ASIC's makes it 
clear that, in essence, ASIC's 'investigations should remain confidential unless the 
public interest requires some form of disclosure'. The Law Council pointed out that 
ASIC's usual practice is, therefore, 'not to make public comment about ongoing or 
potential investigations'. In its view: 
ASIC's approach in this regard is undoubtedly the correct one in principle 
as a matter of policy and, for the most part, the correct one in practice. 
It would be, in the view of the Corporations Committee, quite inappropriate 
for a regulator of any kind to seek to use the mere fact of an investigation 
(when by definition no factual findings had been made and no decision had 
been taken to commence enforcement action) to achieve a broader 
regulatory outcome. 
Moreover, the publication of mere allegations (that may or may not be 
ultimately proven) can be oppressive towards the individuals involved and 
damaging even if the allegations are not proven.
21
 
                                              
18  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 5. 
19  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 4.  
20  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 4. 
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16.21 Even so, the Law Council noted that, as a rule, it was true that ASIC 'should 
keep complainants informed of the progress of matters in respect of which a complaint 
has been made'.
22
 
Clarity in law 
16.22 Ms Robbie Campo, Industry Super Australia, thought that the reason in part 
for systemic risks not being properly or adequately dealt with over the last few years 
was related to 'the fact that the problematic conduct is legal'. She explained: 
The work that has been done more recently in terms of surveying the 
industry and understanding business models and drivers of conduct has 
meant that, particularly in relation to advice and super funds engagement 
with consumers, a much better job is being done. I think the key issue in 
past years is that it is hard for ASIC to engage in terms of systemic risk 
when the matters that are of most concern are actually allowed by the legal 
framework.
23
 
16.23 Mr David Haynes, Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, agreed 
that ASIC sometimes spends 'a disproportionate amount of time trying to work out 
whether particular behaviours are in fact proper and appropriate and requiring of 
investigation'.
24
 He gave the following example of the promotion of low-fee and 
no-fee products, which, in his view were neither: 
But ASIC seems to take a long time to actually come to a view about 
whether the manufacturers of those products are in fact operating 
appropriately within the regulatory framework or not. We say that there is, 
unfortunately, the opportunity for a lot of those products to be 
misrepresented for an extended period of time before there is any regulatory 
intervention.
25
 
16.24 Mr Haynes elaborated on his reasoning:  
…it is more a matter of ASIC having some difficulties in understanding 
whether or not the claims of particular products are inside or outside of the 
law. They operate sometimes in a grey area. If people make money through 
buy-sell spreads or through money being invested in related companies 
                                                                                                                                            
21  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 5. 
22  Submission 150, p. 5. 
23  Ms Robbie Campo, Deputy Chief Executive, Industry Super Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 34.  
24  Mr David Haynes, Executive Manager, Policy and Research, Australian Institute of 
Superannuation Trustees, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 34. 
25  Mr David Haynes, Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Proof Committee Hansard, 
20 February 2014, p. 34 
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where heavy fees are being paid, it is sometimes unclear whether those 
activities are outside of the law or not.
26
  
16.25 In his view, such products should clearly come under the law. He noted that 
'there is then a policy question about whether the government needs to provide more 
clarity which would then assist ASIC in its enforcement'.
27
 
ASIC's investigative capabilities 
16.26 Allowing for factors such as the volume of complaints ASIC needs to 
manage, many submitters still maintained that critical information escapes ASIC's 
attention. They argued that ASIC seems incapable of discerning from its databases the 
emergence of a potentially significant systemic or serious issue. A number of 
submitters argued that even when ASIC does take action, it is too late and the damage 
has already occurred.  
Culture of receptiveness 
16.27 Mr Lee White, the chief executive officer of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, noted that much of the work ASIC is undertaking to improve its ability 
to act effectively on complaints or reports of corporate wrongdoing was 'all around the 
mechanics and particularly the legal processes'. He understood that ASIC receives a 
lot of information from different sources but 'they are not joining up the dots as 
quickly as they should'.
28
 Mr Alex Malley, chief executive officer of CPA Australia, 
agreed with this assessment suggesting further that: 
…what is probably missing at the moment is there is not a sense that there 
is enough of that 'on the street'—having lived in business long enough—to 
know what a big issue is from a small issue; what a one-off issue is from a 
systemic issue.
29
 
16.28 Mr David Pemberton, a CPA who holds a public practicing certificate, argued 
ASIC needs to change its culture—not change its name or receive a bigger budget. 
In his words: 
ASIC needs strong, active leadership. ASIC needs to credibly reconnect 
with professionals who are its best early warning system for the 
identification of domestic threats to Australia's economy.
30
 
                                              
26  Mr David Haynes, Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Proof Committee Hansard, 
20 February 2014, p. 34. 
27  Mr David Haynes, Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Proof Committee Hansard, 
20 February 2014, p. 34. 
28  Mr Lee White, Chief Executive Officer, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 47. 
29  Mr Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 49. 
30  Mr David Pemberton, Submission 279, p. 6. 
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16.29 Clearly, an important aspect of ASIC's investigatory function is simply being 
able to pick up on disquiet in the business world. Mr Justin Brand, who has experience 
in compliance and the operations management side of the financial advice business, 
also underscored importance of ASIC being receptive to the messages coming from 
the professional bodies. He stated: 
ASIC often fail to recognise common interests and fail to engage 
effectively with licensees and advisers. The open engagement offered by 
ASIC seems to have traditionally been a lecture with a reluctance to tolerate 
dissent. On occasions, they don't even pretend to listen. In some 
circumstances, openness is inappropriate but care should be taken to ensure 
engagements are not exercises in antagonism and condescension.
31
 
16.30 In respect of his particular case, Mr Peter Burgess, an experienced financial 
planner, attributed ASIC's failures to act and to keep him and his client apprised of its 
response: 
…to a cultural lack of empathy and understanding as to what effect they can 
have to protect peoples' finances and why they ultimately do exist, which is 
to serve the public who contribute to their budget.
32
 
16.31 The Commonwealth Ombudsman, Mr Colin Neave AM, noted that all 
regulators confront the problem of developing appropriate priorities and internal 
systems. He referred to the triage system: 
…whereby there is a responsibility within an organisation to have a look at 
what is coming through the door by way of complaints or contacts with the 
organisation and then having systems in place whereby the issue which is 
raised in correspondence, by a telephone call or however else it might be 
raised is sent down what could be described as the right path. If there are 
alarm bells ringing in relation to a particular issue, then that issue…might 
go down path A. If it is an issue about fees it might go down another path.
33
  
16.32 According to Mr Neave, a key issue is training staff to recognise when matters 
'should be given attention and then sending them down that right path'. He explained: 
One of the issues which I noticed over the years, both in the public and the 
private sector, is that sometimes the culture of an organisation will not 
necessarily be welcoming to a more junior officer wandering into the office 
of the commissioner and saying, 'By the way, I've just had this telephone 
conversation with someone and it really does worry me.' I think making 
sure that culture is present is also very important.
34
  
                                              
31  Mr Justin Brand, Submission 129, p. 2. 
32  Mr Ben Burgess, Submission 190, p. 1. 
33  Mr Colin Neave, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, 
p. 12. 
34  Mr Colin Neave, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 12. 
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16.33 In his view, ultimately the following two critical elements are needed: 
 the organisation has to be structured in such a way 'as to be able to deal with 
issues when they are, first of all, recognised'; and  
 the organisation has to have a process whereby more senior people are readily 
available to deal with the issue once it is raised.
35
  
16.34 A former enforcement adviser at ASIC, Mr Niall Coburn, also underlined the 
importance of ASIC's culture, contending that ASIC appeared to lack 'a culture of 
urgency, proactivity and flexibility', with its processes driven by 'a management 
culture that has a wait-and-see attitude'.
36
 He identified the need for ASIC to have the 
right attitude as well as the right skill set. He said: 
…having the right individuals, in the right positions, who are experienced 
and know what to do if something crosses their desk. Complaints do elevate 
information quite fast. The issue I raise about complaints is in relation to 
serial issues. Do they combine those issues so that it comes up as a red flag? 
If it is a clear fraud—for example, Equity Trust was or LM was—then it 
goes to the top. It is escalated.
37
 
16.35 In Mr Coburn's words 'you do not send a chicken out to deal with a 
crocodile—ASIC are 'sending the wrong individuals to trace or deal with these wolves 
who have ripped off mums and dads and then escaped internationally'.
38
 He observed 
further: 
Often ASIC complaint staff are inexperienced in both commercial matters 
and understanding evidential issues. ASIC receives thousands of complaints 
and generally undertakes a perfunctory assessment resulting in the sending 
out of a standard letter which does not address the issues. There appears to 
be an inability to see red flags or to look at the serial offenders or 
individuals who may appear in the same group.
39
  
16.36 As an example, Mr Coburn suggested that if there were hundreds of 
complaints from individuals in a managed investment scheme, he doubted whether 
ASIC could pick up on the message or put it together and, if ASIC could, it would still 
fail to react.
40
 
                                              
35  Mr Colin Neave, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 12.  
36  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 1. 
37  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 4. 
38  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 2.  
39  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 1. 
40  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 1. 
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16.37 Mr Justin Brand likewise questioned ASIC's capability to detect brewing 
problems in the corporate world:  
ASIC do not appear to maintain an effective database of surveillances, 
findings and Notices—and certainly not one that allows interrogation and 
root cause analysis. ASIC do not retain, consider or exploit the information 
in their possession and they compound this failure with a difficulty in 
retaining corporate knowledge.
41
 
16.38 Mr Peter Murray was of the view that ASIC needs to create within the 
organisation a 'hard hitting "Eliot Ness" compact action group…comprising expert 
experienced market players and those that can initiate serious action quickly and 
aggressively'.
42
  
16.39 The Association of Financial Advisers suggested that a dedicated complaints 
channel be made available to industry stakeholders and existing financial advisers 
to enhance the flow of information to ASIC. This would enable ASIC to respond to 
significant issues in a timelier manner.
43
 
Conclusion 
16.40 ASIC relies heavily on others to watch out for, detect and report corporate 
wrongdoing; it then determines whether the information deserves closer attention. 
ASIC receives many thousands of complaints and reports and cannot possibly 
investigate them all. The committee understands that some complaints may simply be 
recorded on one of ASIC's databases. Further, the committee understands that ASIC 
must adhere to fundamental principles such as natural justice and follow due process, 
which means that ASIC cannot act precipitately.  
16.41 The committee has considered the underlying reasons that give rise to the 
concerns held by many that ASIC ignores or fails to take corrective action on early 
warning signs of market or corporate misconduct, or on reports of such misconduct. 
ASIC has acknowledged that it needs to act in a more timely way and focus on the key 
issues. It is clear that any improvements in this area should come from within ASIC 
itself. ASIC should ensure that it has a receptive and open culture that encourages its 
personnel to report what they perceive as emerging problems and that its most senior 
staff welcome such an approach. ASIC also relies on those outside the organisation 
to alert it to problems. ASIC, together with the financial system gatekeepers, should 
be looking for better reporting systems that would assist ASIC to identify potential 
problems. 
                                              
41  Mr Justin Brand, Submission 129, p. 2. 
42  Mr Peter Murray, Submission 164, p. 5. 
43  Association of Financial Advisers, Submission 117, p. 3. 
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Recommendation 18 
16.42 The committee recommends that ASIC establish a dedicated channel for 
complaints from certain key professional bodies, industry bodies and consumer 
groups, as well as for accountants and financial advisers/planners. 
Recommendation 19 
16.43 The committee recommends that ASIC examine carefully: 
 its triage system to ensure that the officers managing this process have 
the skills and experience required to identify complaints and reports of a 
serious nature requiring attention; 
 its misconduct reports management system to ensure that once identified, 
a serious misconduct report is elevated and more senior people are 
available to deal with the issue; and 
 its culture to ensure that those managing complaints and reports who 
wish to draw to the attention of senior officers what they perceive as a 
potentially serious matter are encouraged to do so; that is, for ASIC to 
foster an open and receptive culture within the organisation so that 
critical information is not siloed.  
Recommendation 20 
16.44 The committee recommends that ASIC look at the skills it needs to 
forensically and effectively interrogate its databases and other sources of 
information it collates and stores, with a view to ensuring that it is well-placed to 
identify and respond to early warning signs of corporate wrongdoing or 
troubling trends in Australia's corporate world. 
Recommendation 21 
16.45 The committee recommends that ASIC put in place a system whereby, 
after gross malfeasance is exposed, a review of ASIC's performance is 
undertaken to determine whether or how it could have minimised or prevented 
investor losses or consumer damage. Spearheaded by a small panel of 
independent, experienced and highly regarded people (with business/legal/ 
academic/public sector and/or consumer advocacy backgrounds), together with 
all ASIC commissioners, this investigation would identify lessons for ASIC to 
learn and how to incorporate them into ASIC's mode of operation. The 
committee recommends further that their findings be published including details 
of any measures ASIC should implement. 
 
  
 
Chapter 17 
ASIC's enforcement decisions 
17.1 The previous chapter considered how ASIC responds to and investigates 
reports of potential contraventions. This chapter examines the next step in the process: 
enforcement action. Concerns about ASIC's enforcement record and approach to 
enforcement were raised throughout the evidence received by the committee. Among 
other things, this chapter considers issues that may influence what enforcement 
remedy ASIC decides to pursue, the perceptions created by ASIC's decisions and how 
effective ASIC's enforcement action ultimately is.  
ASIC's overall enforcement record 
17.2 The following two tables present a statistical overview of ASIC's enforcement 
activities. Table 17.1 provides statistics on outcomes achieved over several financial 
years. Table 17.2 provides statistics on enforcement outcomes achieved in each of 
ASIC's broad areas of responsibility.
1
  
Table 17.1: ASIC's aggregate enforcement outcomes, 2006–07 to 2012–13 
Type of action 
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Litigation completed (total) 430 280 186 156 202 179 144  
Litigation completed successfully 97% 94% 90% 91% 90% 92% 95%  
New litigation commenced 148    130 134 149  
Investigations commenced     175 173 193  
Investigations completed     184 183 187  
Criminal proceedings completed 51 52 39 22 26 28 25  
Number of people convicted 42 49 34 22 25 27 22  
Number of people jailed 21 23 19 12* 16 20 9  
Non-custodial sentences/fines     9 8 13  
Civil proceedings completed 76 44 35 30 34 24 15  
Illegal schemes shut down or other action 
taken 
105 80   30 1 39  
People disqualified or removed from 
directing companies 
110 66 49 90 72 84 72  
People/companies banned from financial 
services or consumer credit 
35 49 47 22 64 54 88  
                                              
1  These statistics are only publicly available from 1 July 2011 onwards, following the first 
biannual enforcement report released by ASIC in March 2012. 
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Action against auditors/liquidators 12    5 7 7  
Number of enforceable undertakings     14 22 20  
Negotiated outcomes     24 17 17  
Recoveries, costs compensation, fines or 
assets frozen (nearest $million) 
$140m $146m $28m $302m $113m $20m $222m 
* Includes the jailing of an individual for contempt of court (civil action). 
Note: Outcomes for which data are not available are left blank.  
Sources: ASIC annual reports, various years. 
Table 17.2: ASIC's aggregate enforcement outcomes by stakeholder area, 
1 July 2011 to 31 December 2013 
Area of enforcement Criminal Civil 
Administrative 
remedies 
Enforceable  
undertakings/ 
negotiated  
outcomes 
Public 
warning 
notices 
Total 
Market integrity 29 3 32 4 - 68 
Insider trading 26 1 - - - 27 
Market manipulation 3 - 1 1 - 5 
Continuous disclosure - 1 11 1 - 13 
Market integrity rules - - 20 - - 20 
Other misconduct - 1 - 2 - 3 
Corporate governance 36 18 10 15 1 80 
Action against directors 34 14 2 2 1 53 
Insolvency 1 1 2 - - 4 
Action against liquidators 1 3 6 4 - 14 
Action against auditors - - - 8 - 8 
Other misconduct - - - 1 - 1 
Financial services 51 50 132 76 5 314 
Unlicensed conduct 2 7 - - - 9 
Dishonest conduct, misleading 
statements, unconscionable 
conduct 
28 28 27 19 1 103 
Misappropriation, theft, fraud 15* 2 17 5 - 39 
Credit 5 3 51# 19 3 81 
Other misconduct 1 10 37 33 1 82 
Small business compliance and 
deterrence 
1,172 57 167 - - 1,396 
Action against directors 1,144 - 164^ - - 1,308 
Efficient registration and 
licensing 
28 57 3 - - 88 
Total 1,288 128 341 95 6 1,858 
Notes: * Includes one outcome under appeal (as at January 2014); # Includes two outcomes 
under appeal (as at January 2014); ^ Includes 10 credit related outcomes. 
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Sources: ASIC, ASIC enforcement outcomes: January to June 2013, Report 360, July 
2013, pp. 38–39; ASIC enforcement outcomes: July to December 2013, Report 383, 
January 2014, pp. 41–42. 
17.3 As Table 17.1 indicates, ASIC has sustained a high success rate in its 
litigation. It is, however, worth considering the meaning and utility of this type of 
statistic. As litigants subject to heightened obligations that reflect community 
expectations, government agencies should be expected to maintain a high success rate. 
But what rate should be considered ideal for a regulator and law enforcement body 
such as ASIC? Statistics on overall litigation success can be interpreted and viewed in 
conflicting ways. While a low success rate would clearly attract criticism, a very high 
success rate may also be questionable: it could suggest a risk averse or even timid 
agency, one that only takes cases it is extremely confident it will win.
2
 Related to this, 
litigation success rates also do not provide information on the types of cases being 
undertaken. For example, the statistic does not indicate whether relatively 
straightforward breaches are being pursued or if the regulator is testing more complex 
matters. It also is silent on the number of cases taken (and win–loss record) against 
major entities compared to those against less well-resourced individuals and entities, 
potentially disguising the agency's inclination or ability to take on large corporations. 
Regulators may also pursue matters where the law is untested or unclear, which could 
also have implications for their litigation success rate.  
Overview of ASIC's enforcement toolbox and criteria for taking action 
17.4 Following an investigation that indicates a breach or more serious 
misconduct, the options available to ASIC include punitive action (prison sentences, 
criminal or civil monetary penalties); protective action (such as disqualifying orders); 
preservative action (such as court injunctions); corrective action (such as corrective 
advertising); compensation action; and negotiated resolution (such as enforceable 
undertakings). ASIC can also issue infringement notices for certain alleged 
contraventions. 
17.5 ASIC has published guidance on the factors it takes into account when 
deciding which enforcement remedy to use. Table 17.3 provides an extract of this 
guidance. 
                                              
2  Such an outcome has been suggested about other regulators—soon after he commenced in the 
role, the current ACCC chairman, Mr Rod Sims, observed that the ACCC's success rate in first 
instance litigation of almost 100 per cent 'is frankly too high'. Mr Sims suggested that the 
ACCC may have been too risk averse and should 'take on more cases where we see the wrong 
but court success is less assured'. Rod Sims, 'ACCC: Future Directions', Address to the Law 
Council Competition and Consumer Workshop 2011, 28 August 2011, 
www.accc.gov.au/speech/accc-future-directions, pp. 5, 6 (accessed 2 September 2013). 
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Table 17.3: Factors ASIC may consider when deciding which enforcement remedy 
to pursue 
Factors Examples 
Nature and seriousness of the 
suspected misconduct 
 Whether there is evidence that the contravention involved 
dishonesty or was intentional, reckless or negligent 
 The amount of any benefit and detriment caused as a result of 
the contravention 
 The impact of the misconduct on the market, including 
potential loss of public confidence 
 The amount of any loss caused to investors and consumers 
 Whether the conduct is continuing 
 Whether the misconduct indicates systemic compliance 
failures 
 Whether the subject has a poor compliance record (e.g. the 
subject has previously engaged in the misconduct) 
Conduct of the person or 
entity after the alleged 
contravention 
 When and how the breach came to the attention of ASIC 
 The level of cooperation with our investigation 
 Whether remedial steps have been taken 
The strength of ASIC's case  What evidence is available or is likely to become available, to 
prove the alleged misconduct 
 The prospects of the case 
The expected level of public 
benefit 
 Whether the case is likely to clarify the law and help 
participants in financial markets to better understand their 
obligations 
 The length and expense of a contested hearing and the 
remedies available compared with other remedies that may be 
available more quickly (e.g. improved compliance under an 
enforceable undertaking) 
Likelihood that: 
 the person's or entity's 
behaviour will change in 
response to a particular 
action 
 the business community 
is generally deterred 
from similar conduct 
through greater 
awareness of its 
consequences 
 The compliance history of the person or entity 
 Whether behaviour (of an entity or broader industry) is more 
likely to change if the person or entity suffers imprisonment 
or a financial penalty 
 Whether the compliance of the person or entity will improve 
if they give ASIC a public enforceable undertaking 
 Whether the behaviour is systemic or part of a growing 
industry trend 
Mitigating factors  Whether the misconduct relates to an isolated complaint and 
consumers have generally not suffered substantial detriment 
 Whether the misconduct was inadvertent and the person 
undertakes to cease or correct the conduct 
Source: ASIC, ASIC's approach to enforcement, Information Sheet 151, pp. 8–9. 
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17.6 Certain features of Australia's legal system and government enforcement 
policies influence ASIC's approach to court action and prevent some matters from 
proceeding further. They include the following: 
 ASIC is bound by the government's Legal Services Directions. The 
Directions, which do not cover criminal prosecutions and related proceedings 
unless expressly stated,
3
 require ASIC to act as a model litigant and not start 
legal proceedings unless satisfied that litigation is the most suitable method of 
dispute resolution (and then only after receiving written legal advice that there 
are reasonable grounds for starting the proceedings). 
 Although ASIC conducts the investigation, criminal prosecutions are 
generally conducted by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
(CDPP).
4
 The Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth provides guidelines 
on decision-making in the institution and conduct of prosecutions. The CDPP 
must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the case and 
that it is evident from the facts of the case, and all the surrounding 
circumstances, that the prosecution would be in the public interest.
5
 Under its 
MOU with the CDPP, ASIC is also obliged to consult with the CDPP before 
making an application for a civil penalty order.
6
 
 In cases where ASIC has not taken action, access to justice may still be 
provided by private actions or representative proceedings (commonly referred 
to as class actions). In a journal article on class actions and investor 
protection, Jason Harris and Michael Legg noted the following relevant 
comments made by Finkelstein J in the Centro class action on the role 
investor class actions can perform in the regulatory framework: 
It is often said that these actions promote investor confidence in the 
integrity of the securities market. They enable investors to recover past 
losses caused by the wrongful conduct of companies and deter future 
securities laws violations. According to the United States Supreme Court, 
they provide 'a most effective weapon in enforcement' of the securities laws 
and are a 'necessary supplement to [Securities Exchange] Commission 
action'.
7
 
                                              
3  Legal Services Directions 2005, schedule 1, part 4. 
4  With the exception of 'some minor regulatory offences'. ASIC, ASIC's approach to 
enforcement, Information Sheet 151, February 2012, p. 5. 
5  See www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy. 
6  ASIC and CDPP, Memorandum of Understanding, 1 March 2006, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 
17 October 2013), paragraph 4.1. 
7  Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (2008) 253 ALR 65; [2008] FCA 1505 at [8] citing Bateman 
Eichler, Hill Richards Inc v Berner 472 US 299, 310 (1985) and J I Case Co v Borack 377 US 
426, 432 (1964); cited in Jason Harris and Michael Legg, 'What price investor protection? Class 
actions vs corporate rescue', Insolvency Law Journal 17:4 (2009): 190. 
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General observations about ASIC's approach to enforcement 
17.7 Of the many objections put to the committee about ASIC's enforcement 
record, the most frequently recurring complaint was related to ASIC's discretion not 
to take enforcement action. Many aggrieved individuals argued that ASIC should have 
taken enforcement action in a particular matter. For example, Mr Ian Painter detailed 
boiler room scams operating out of Thailand that have 'fleeced Australians of many 
millions in the past and continue to do so due to the lack of action by not only ASIC 
but relevant authorities throughout the world'. Mr Painter argued Australia will 
continue to be 'ripe pickings' for criminals operating these scams unless action is 
taken.
8
 Ms Anne Lampe, a former ASIC employee and journalist, advised that 
although ASIC received frequent complaints about investment schemes and other lost 
investments, it was only when 'the volume of complaints and losses about a particular 
scam reached tsunami level, or investors with losses contacted a member of 
parliament, or triggered a media inquiry that ASIC seemed to spring into action'.
9
 
This perception was commented on in relation to the Commonwealth Financial 
Planning (CFPL) matter, where it was observed that ASIC's enforcement activity 
stepped up when the story broke in the media.
10
 
17.8 When ASIC did take enforcement action, submissions questioned the 
particular case that ASIC chose to pursue. For example, the committee received 
submissions about various managed investment schemes that had Wellington Capital 
Ltd was their responsible entity. ASIC has taken court action against Wellington 
Capital in relation to the Premium Income Fund, a matter that is currently before the 
High Court.
11
 However, a submitter questioned why ASIC had decided to take action 
on behalf of those investors but not on behalf of investors in other managed 
investment schemes for which Wellington Capital was the responsible entity.
12
 
17.9 A significant number of submissions referred to various aspects of ASIC's 
actions following the collapse of Storm Financial.
13
 A key area of complaint was 
ASIC's last minute settlement with the CBA instead of pursuing court proceedings; 
one submission characterised this act as 'the mother of all back-flips'.
14
 Another 
submission, from a husband and wife who requested that their name not be made 
public, stated that they feel 'ASIC has let us down when they worked a deal with the 
CBA without allowing the case to be shown for all of the facts'.
15
 ASIC's intervention 
                                              
8  Mr Ian Painter, Submission 167, p. [8]. 
9  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, p. [2]. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 70. 
11  Wellington Capital Ltd v Australian Securities & Investments Commission, S275/2013. 
12  See Mr Dennis Chapman, Submission 249. 
13  Submissions 18, 41, 42, 44, 82, 84, 87, 88, 90, 106, 149, 172, 236, 256, 278, 301 and 387. 
14  Mr Lucas Vogel, Submission 41, p. 4. 
15  Name withheld, Submission 18, p. 1. 
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in an $82.5 million settlement between former Storm Financial investors and 
Macquarie Bank brought about by a class action was also came under criticism.
16
 
Further, investors were curious as to why ASIC initiated compensation proceedings 
against the Bank of Queensland, Senrac and Macquarie on behalf of two investors but 
not other clients: 
They managed to make a deal with Macquarie for their client (Doyles) 
which ensured that no precedent was set for other investors who were 
treated equally poorly by Macquarie Bank. They (ASIC) then had the hide 
to appeal a decision, approved by the Federal Court, that saw a similar 
successful negotiation by the Class Action against Macquarie Bank 
overturned because ASIC believed that deal to be unfair. ASIC did not 
consider fairness when it negotiated a deal for the Doyles which left every 
other Storm Financial (Macquarie Bank) investor out of any consideration 
for compensation even though they suffered a similar fate to the Doyles.
17
 
17.10 The prolonged nature of enforcement action was another subject raised. 
For example, Ms Dianne Mead advised that although ASIC issued a stop order against 
a prospectus issued by Neovest Ltd in 2005, an order to wind up the company was 
only obtained in February 2008. Ms Mead's October 2013 submission to this inquiry 
noted that the company was still being wound up and the assets were being 
'squandered away on legal and liquidator's fees'.
18
 
17.11 Submissions expressed disappointment at the penalties ASIC achieved. 
For example, a Darwin accountant, Mr David Pemberton, criticised at length ASIC's 
investigation of Carey Builders Pty Ltd, a company that went into liquidation in 
March 2010. Mr Carey received a three month sentence for managing a company 
while disqualified, however, Mr Pemberton noted that this was a concurrent sentence 
with a three year sentence given to Mr Carey for being an unlicensed builder.
19
 
17.12 ASIC's enforcement priorities and the speed and urgency with which ASIC 
takes enforcement action was questioned. Ms Anne Lampe contrasted ASIC's 
response to Storm Financial and CFPL to the action it took following a hoax media 
release distributed by Mr Jonathan Moylan in January 2013:
20
 
                                              
16  Mr Peter Dunell, Submission 90, p. 1. 
17  Name withheld, Submission 88, p. 4. 
18  Ms Dianne Mead, Submission 240, p. 2. 
19  Mr David Pemberton, Submission 279. 
20  On 7 January 2013, Mr Jonathan Moylan distributed a fake media release purported to be from 
the ANZ. The media release was titled 'ANZ divests from Maules Creek Project' and advised 
that the bank had withdrawn a $1.2 billion loan from Whitehaven Coal. On 9 January 2013 it 
was reported that ASIC had seized Mr Moylan's computer and mobile phone. On 25 January 
2013 the Australian Financial Review reported that ASIC had interviewed Mr Moylan. 
See Jake Mitchell, 'ASIC questions Whitehaven hoaxer', Australian Financial Review, 
25 January 2013, p. 10. 
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By contrast to its inadequate and far too late attention to Storm's gigantic 
loss scam, and the rogue CBA Financial Planning expose, ASIC sprang to 
action and manned all its guns when a young anti mining activist, Jonathan 
Moylan, put out a mischievous press release in relation to funding 
withdrawal for a Whitehaven Coal development. The mischievous release 
fooled the market for a few minutes and Whitehaven shares fell briefly 
before recovering.  
The only people hurt by this face [sic] press release were speculators who 
sold at the short-lived lower price. Investors who did nothing suffered no 
loss. 
Yet ASIC went ballistic and felt compelled to throw the rule book at 
Moylan. Moylan is an easy target as he has no funds to defend himself, and 
because he admitted sending out the release. Moylan is an easy head on a 
stick for ASIC. It has his admission, has the press release and has on record 
the brief market movement. 
The result is that Moylan faces expensive court proceedings, a criminal 
record, a possible 10 year jail term and a fine of half a million dollars. Well 
done ASIC. Moylan will have his head spiked on a stick, but it's the wrong 
head. I could nominate 50 more suitable heads for a public spiking. But of 
course that would be a harder task for ASIC. The press release was a prank, 
but not one that lost billions of dollars of investors' or retirees' funds. 
Unlike rogue advisors and fund managers that have faced no charges, 
Moylan didn't gain from the prank, earned no bonus, hasn't thieved 
investors' money, didn't misappropriate or gamble with large chunks of 
retiree savings, didn't lend any investor money to himself or his own 
companies. Nonetheless he is being dealt with as if he had committed a 
capital offence, far more severely than any Storm advisor or director, or any 
rogue CBA advisors allowed to quietly resign.
21
 
Does ASIC take on the 'big end of town'? 
17.13 Various concerns were expressed and assertions made about ASIC's 
enforcement record against large companies or well-resourced individuals. It is 
evident that a perception that ASIC is reluctant to investigate and take action against 
big business exists. It was suggested that: 
 ASIC is reluctant to take complex court cases, and instead prefers easier 
targets; 
 ASIC does not have the resources to take on well-resourced firms or 
individuals; and/or 
 where ASIC does pursue enforcement action against large businesses, the 
result achieved generally relies on less severe remedies such as an enforceable 
undertaking, rather than court action. 
                                              
21  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, pp. [4]–[5]. 
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17.14 According to the Rule of Law Institute of Australia, the perception that ASIC 
does not investigate big business is most evident in insider trading and misleading 
information associated with takeovers. It argued that the pursuit of 'small fish' but not 
big businesses 'undermines the rule of law' and that 'the public's confidence in the 
system must be restored'.
22
 
17.15 CPA Australia told the committee: 
Last month saw the release of the enforcement outcomes July to December 
2013. They appear to indicate that there were three times the number of 
enforcement outcomes against small business in the last year than there 
were against the big end of town, reinforcing a perception, at least, that the 
regulator is targeting this sector in the context of a number of unresolved 
corporate behaviours.
23
 
17.16 Professor Bob Baxt remarked that 'ASIC just seems to be very, very reluctant 
to run…tough cases', and that ASIC 'has been too soft'. However, Professor Baxt 
observed that it 'was not always the case', as ASIC had taken 'a number of criminal 
cases earlier on in its life'.
24
 He concluded that the problem is partly attributable to 
recent approaches to regulation that encourage regulators to avoid courts due to the 
expense and time involved. They instead resolve matters by using other enforcement 
remedies such infringement notices, an enforcement tool he described as 
'abominable'.
25
 Professor Baxt added that, in his view, there was too much criticism of 
regulators such as ASIC when they lose a big, complex, case: 
…that suggests that the regulator really stuffed it up—excuse the 
expression—and that somehow or other we need new regulators or new 
people in charge in order to deal with these matters. Having been a 
chairman of a small regulator in comparison to what the ACCC is now—I 
was chairman of the Trade Practices Commission—I can assure you that it 
is a very, very difficult task to balance the way in which these matters need 
to proceed.
26
 
17.17 ASIC rejected suggestions that it does not take on big businesses. While ASIC 
noted that this perception exists, ASIC countered it by claiming that there was a 
conflicting perception that ASIC only takes on the big end of town. In a written 
statement, Mr Medcraft commented that '[o]f course neither of these assertions are 
                                              
22  Rule of Law Institute of Australia, Submission 211, p. 4. 
23  Mr Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 43. 
24  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 10. 
25  Professor Baxt criticised the infringement notice powers available to regulators such as ASIC 
and the ACCC. Although infringement notices do not involve an admission of liability, in his 
view they create a perception of guilt that can only be disproven when prosecuted by the 
regulator. Professor Baxt outlined his objection to infringement notices in detail: see 
Submission 189, pp. 1–3 and Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, pp. 10–11. 
26  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 9. 
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true', and that ASIC acts 'without fear or favour irrespective of the size of the 
organisation'. ASIC provided the results of a breakdown of its enforcement action by 
entity size undertaken in 2010 to defend its record (Table 17.4). 
Table 17.4: Percentage of investigations commenced per market sector,  
2009–10 financial year 
Market segment Investigations commenced 
Micro (0–5 employees and/or turnover of less than 
$500,000) 
33 (16%) 
Small (not a micro entity, has 6–15 employees and/or 
turnover of $500,000–$25m) 
77 (37%) 
Medium (not a micro or small entity, has 16–250 
employees and/or turnover of $25m–$250m) 
41 (20%) 
Large (not a micro, small or medium entity, has over 
250 employees and/or turnover of over $250m) 
56 (27%) 
Total 207 
Source: ASIC, Opening statement to 10 April 2014 hearing, Additional information 4, p. 6. 
17.18 Of course, such data provide limited insight into ASIC's enforcement record. 
For example, they do not indicate the severity of sanctions pursued. 
Enforceable undertakings 
17.19 ASIC's use of enforceable undertakings as a remedy for misconduct was an 
area that submissions and witnesses at the public hearings traversed in detail. 
A former enforcement adviser at ASIC expressed concern that ASIC had become too 
reliant on enforceable undertakings, particularly as a remedy for misconduct by large 
entities. In his view, often there was no correlation between the remedy and the nature 
of the misconduct: 
Enforceable undertakings have been used in de facto criminal proceedings 
and enforceable undertakings were really only introduced for compliance 
purposes. For example, recently enforceable undertakings were given to 
BNP and UBS banks where they influenced the swap index rate in Australia 
for three years. ASIC only fined them a very small amount of money, 
$1 million, which represents a very small amount compared to the crime. It 
flies in the face of their own guidelines where you are not supposed to give 
enforceable undertakings where there has been serious misconduct in 
relation to the market. Again, there are many other examples where there 
are inconsistencies.
27
 
17.20 Former ASIC media adviser Ms Anne Lampe told the committee that when 
she worked at ASIC '[n]egotiating enforceable undertakings rather than taking people 
                                              
27  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 2. 
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or companies to court was a preferred course of action when complaints reached a 
crescendo'. Ms Lampe provided the following observations about the process for 
securing an enforceable undertaking and what generally occurred once one was 
entered into: 
These undertakings were discussed and fought over, over months, by 
armies of lawyers in secret behind closed doors and few details ever 
emerged about how the damage to investors was done, how many investors 
were affected, or even whether the undertaking was adhered to. In some 
cases the companies involved undertook to write letters to affected clients 
asking them to come in and discuss their concerns. Whether these letters 
were sent, how they were worded, whether they were replied to or what 
compensation was offered stayed secret. Everything seemed to go silent 
after a brief but meticulously crafted press announcement was released by 
ASIC.
28
 
17.21 Aspects of ASIC's attitude to negotiating enforceable undertakings surprised 
the committee. The process leading to the CFPL enforceable undertaking indicates 
that ASIC may give excessive regard to the burden the undertaking could impose on a 
company that, after all, is the source of ASIC's serious concerns. In doing so, ASIC 
may be negotiating from a weakened position. The following exchange between the 
committee and ASIC, already outlined in Chapter 11, is repeated here as it is relevant 
to this issue and particularly revealing: 
CHAIR: …We had evidence from the lawyers from Maurice Blackburn, 
who handled 30 or 40 clients, to the satisfaction of all of their clients, that 
their costs per file were something like an average of $35,000. What I am 
putting to you, Mr Kirk, is that the process of review, remediation, 
reconstruction of files, was in and of itself inadequate and necessarily led to 
poor outcomes. That is what I am asking you to address. Why were you 
satisfied with that process? 
Mr Kirk: I think in the circumstances, where there was this problem with 
record keeping and inadequate files, the process put in place, in terms of a 
large, mass-scale thing, where 7,000 clients were looked at, had appropriate 
steps to try and address that problem. I am not saying that that is going to 
be perfect in every file. When documents do not exist, the situation is very 
difficult, no matter what process you adopt. 
CHAIR: Yes, but, if the problem derives from the fact that the officers of 
Commonwealth Financial Planning at first instance, with any or all of the 
7,000 clients, did not do their job properly, did not maintain records, 
falsified records, falsified signatures, so that nothing could be reconstructed 
properly, in terms of outcomes, bad luck for the Commonwealth Bank. It 
should have been instructed to do the job properly, as was done by this law 
firm in Melbourne, Maurice Blackburn. If that cost $35,000 or $40,000 per 
client, well, that is the penalty for not operating properly in the marketplace 
at first instance. 
                                              
28  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, p. [2]. 
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Mr Kirk: But doing that for 7,000 clients, at $35,000 or $40,000, would be 
a few hundred million dollars. 
CHAIR: It would. That is not your concern. It is the concern of the 
shareholders of Commonwealth Bank, the concern of the directors of 
Commonwealth Bank. Let the directors go to the meeting and explain that 
the dividend has been reduced by 10c this year because of the incompetence 
that was allowed by the senior managers. It is not your concern. That is the 
point I am trying to make. Who cares?
29
 
17.22 While enforceable undertakings as an enforcement tool were described as a 
'critical mechanism in the regulatory arsenal', after analysing undertakings accepted by 
ASIC between 1998 and 2013 Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan 
expressed a 'suspicion…that ASIC has been soft on the big end of town'. They also 
questioned whether the enforceable undertakings accepted by ASIC 'place sufficiently 
stringent conditions on organisations whose business strategies may be damaging to 
their clients' best interests'.
30
 One example given to support this argument was an 
enforceable undertaking accepted from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) 
in 2012. The enforceable undertaking was given in response to concern from ASIC 
about messages sent to CBA customers seeking their consent to receive credit card 
limit increase invitations. ASIC's media release announcing the undertaking explains 
the basis for ASIC's concern: 
New laws commencing on 1 July 2012 prohibit card issuers from sending 
unsolicited credit limit increase invitations to their customers unless the 
customer has consented. 
On 12 and 13 December 2011, CBA sent messages via its internet banking 
platform to customers notifying them of the changes to the law regarding 
credit limit increase invitations. CBA requested that customers provide their 
consent to continue to receive credit limit increase invitations. 
Approximately 96,000 customers provided their consent. 
ASIC formed the view that the messages were misleading as they: 
 suggested that if CBA's customers did not complete the electronic 
consent in response to the message they would lose the chance to 
receive credit limit increase offers  
 suggested that if they did not consent, customers would miss out on 
opportunities to access extra funds should they need them, and  
 created the impression that customers needed to act urgently, which 
may have led customers to respond without properly considering their 
options. 
In fact, under the changes to the law, customers can provide or withdraw 
their consent at any time. Further, regardless of whether they have 
                                              
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, pp. 78–79. 
30  Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan, Submission 121, p. [3] (emphasis omitted). 
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consented to being sent credit limit increase invitations, customers can 
request a credit limit increase from their financial institution at any time.
31
 
17.23 Professor O'Brien and Dr Gilligan argued that the enforceable undertaking 
only precluded the CBA from taking advantage of the consents it obtained.
32
 The only 
other obligations contained in the undertaking were for the CBA to contact affected 
customers to correct any misleading impression and inform them of their rights, and 
for the CBA to cooperate with requests from ASIC to provide documents to allow 
ASIC to assess compliance with the undertaking. Another example was provided by 
Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, who considered that the terms of the enforceable 
undertaking accepted from Leighton Holdings in 2012 were inadequate.
33
 
17.24 Submissions also argued that enforceable undertakings accepted by ASIC: 
 do not always require an independent expert to be appointed to supervise the 
implementation of the undertaking's terms (it is argued that this makes it 
difficult to prove non-compliance with the undertaking);
34
 
 may call for the development of remedial action, but do not specify what form 
the remedial action should take;
35
 and 
 where the appointment of an external expert is required, the obligations of that 
expert, what constitutes expertise and how potential conflicts of interest 
should be resolved are not specified.
36
 
17.25 The issues of expertise and potential conflicts of interest were raised in the 
context of the CFPL enforceable undertaking as PricewaterhouseCoopers, the auditors 
of the CBA, were appointed as the independent reviewer required under the 
undertaking. One of the CFPL whistleblowers, Mr Jeff Morris suggested that the 
enforceable undertaking process was flawed as neither ASIC nor the independent 
expert understood the industry: 
In their submission, ASIC say that the independent expert had relevant 
financial planning qualifications. That is not the same as being a financial 
planner. Working as a compliance person is not necessarily the same as 
                                              
31  ASIC, 'ASIC accepts enforceable undertaking from Commonwealth Bank', Media release, 
no. 12-40, 7 March 2012. 
32  Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan, Submission 121, p. [6]. 
33  Professor Kingsford Smith noted that the Leighton Holdings enforceable undertaking followed 
'a $40 million kickback, and breaches of continuous disclosure obligations (in conjunction with 
three infringement notices amounting to total fines $300,000; 0.00075% of the bribe amount)'. 
Professor Kingsford Smith added that 'no compensatory obligations were imposed for the 
$907 million reduction in market share value, though this may be because there is a class action 
in progress'. Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 17. 
34  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 17. 
35  Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan, Submission 121, pp. [6]–[7]. 
36  Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan, Submission 121, pp. [6]–[7]. 
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being a financial planner. If you actually look at the minimum requirement 
to be a financial planner, PS146, it is a ludicrously low standard.
37
 
17.26 In response to questions on the conflict of interest issue, ASIC explained that 
a tender process identified three firms and required that the firms had to address how 
conflicts would be managed. Under the terms of the undertaking, ASIC had the ability 
to veto the CBA's choice of independent expert but ASIC did not do as it was satisfied 
with the process. However, ASIC acknowledged the importance of independence and 
managing conflicts of interest, and suggested that it may act differently if faced with 
a similar situation again: 
Senator WHISH-WILSON:  I would have thought it was black and white 
that, if your independent expert was also the auditor for the entire 
organisation—and who knows how many millions that would be worth to 
them per year—you would have a very definite conflict of interest. We saw 
this during the GFC with ratings agencies, research houses and bonds and 
products. These were things that were really obvious but skipped the net. 
Mr Medcraft:  I would rather not go there at the moment. But you make a 
good point. I will last Mr Kirk to comment on that. 
Mr Kirk: There is a difficulty with organisations as big as the 
Commonwealth Bank finding a major reputable professional services firms 
that does not otherwise do work for them. Given the size of the market and 
the size of those institutions, that is a real issue. 
Mr Medcraft:  But I think you make a good point, Senator; if somebody is 
the auditor and they want them to be the independent expert, essentially you 
should have a sceptical presumption about how they are going to manage 
the independence issue, the potential conflicts of interest. There should 
always be a presumption and questioning on this particular issue. I think 
that is an important point. 
Mr Kell:  And I suspect that we would take a different approach today 
compared to the approach we took back then.
38
 
17.27 Decisions made by ASIC about the remedy it will seek following an 
investigation are significant not only for the individual or organisation facing 
enforcement action, but also because of the signal they send to other regulated entities. 
Trends in ASIC's selections can, over time, either reinforce or weaken the overall 
regulatory model. A joint submission from academics at the University of Adelaide 
Law School argued that the effectiveness of the enforcement pyramid model can be 
undermined by the regulator excessively relying on certain regulatory options with 
other options not being exercised.
39
 On enforceable undertakings, the submission 
                                              
37  Mr Jeffrey Morris, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, pp. 48–49. 
38  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 88. 
39  Dr Suzanne Le Mire, Associate Professor David Brown, Associate Professor Christopher 
Symes and Ms Karen Gross, Submission 152, p. 2. The enforcement pyramid was outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
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suggested that 'it is doubtful if the individual or the wider public is impacted by an 
undertaking as much as it would be by publicity following litigation'. It was also 
asserted that the consequences of breaching an enforceable undertaking are 'limited': 
First, if the terms are not complied with, ASIC has further discretion 
whether to pursue this through the courts. It is clear…that they do not 
automatically pursue every default in compliance. Even if they do pursue it 
through the court, the court has a very limited range of sanctions. Failure to 
comply with an undertaking given to ASIC is not contempt of court in 
itself, and the court can order the promiser to comply, or to compensate 
someone who has 'suffered loss or damage as a result of the breach'. The 
aim of the court order is to put the parties in the pre-breach position (ie give 
effect to the promise). It is not the aim of the court order to set aside or 
annul the undertaking so that the original wrongdoing can be sanctioned as 
if it had been originally pursued through litigation. 
What this means is that even someone who has breached an undertaking 
will be better off than if they had been pursued through the courts originally 
for the wrongdoing, because the court can make a much wider range of 
orders for contravention of the Corporations Act (and other legislation) than 
it can make for breach of an undertaking.
40
 
17.28 Mr Lee White of the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia (ICAA) 
suggested that enforceable undertakings accepted by ASIC have a poor track record of 
effectiveness because they have lacked transparency and an admission that something 
wrong occurred. Mr White indicated that after ASIC announced an enforceable 
undertaking: 
…everyone in the business community was left with the view, 'What's all 
that about?' because it did not say anything.
41
 
17.29 However, Mr White added that ASIC appears to have recognised that the 
language used in the undertaking needs to be improved. The written submission 
provided by Mr White's organisation developed this further: it suggested that ASIC 
has taken steps to require a clearer admission of fault in enforceable undertakings. 
The ICAA concluded that 'greater transparency around ASIC's enforcement actions 
will have the effect of boosting confidence and stability in the marketplace'.
42
 
17.30 Asked if the process for accepting and monitoring enforceable undertakings 
was transparent, and in particular whether the reports to ASIC from the independent 
experts appointed as a condition of the undertaking should be made publicly available, 
ASIC told the committee that:  
                                              
40  Dr Suzanne Le Mire et al, Submission 152, p. 4. 
41  Mr Lee White, Chief Executive Officer, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 48. 
42  Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Submission 203, p. 2. 
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…we have been having similar thoughts ourselves about trying to make that 
process more transparent—the reporting back on the implementation of the 
EU by the independent expert. Really the EU is a replacement for a court 
enforcement process, and a court enforcement process would be transparent 
and public. I think that, if we are expecting the general public to accept this 
alternative—which we think in many cases can get a lot more change and 
be more effective if it is done well—and have confidence in that, we need 
to consider how to make that more transparent and how we can not only 
have it working well but have it seen to be working well and have the 
public understand that.
43
 
17.31 Mr Medcraft agreed that there is value in considering a more transparent 
enforceable undertaking process through the publication of independent expert 
reports. Various ASIC commissioners and officials noted some potential 
complications, such as the need for the entity offering the undertaking to agree and the 
possibility that the publication of expert reports would discourage entities from 
entering into enforceable undertakings.
44
 However, Mr Kell summed up ASIC's 
position as follows:  
…I should note that our enforceable undertakings themselves are currently 
public. What we are talking about here, and what I fully agree with, is 
having the milestones about how those firms are complying with and 
implementing the requirements that come with that to be public as well, and 
the reports that come with that. I think that is what we are aiming for. That 
would be a good outcome.
45
 
Factors that may discourage ASIC from taking court action 
17.32 As this chapter has already noted, the committee received evidence from 
insiders, key stakeholders and interested observers about ASIC's perceived lack of 
vigour in pursing large companies and an inclination that ASIC may possibly have for 
resolving matters involving large companies by enforceable undertakings rather than 
through court proceedings. The committee was keen to test these views and, if they 
have merit, to consider the most plausible explanations. 
Cost of court proceedings 
17.33 An obvious challenge of enforcement action against large companies is the 
disparity in resources that a regulator could devote to the case compared to the 
targeted firm. It is clear that regulators can incur significant expenditures when 
undertaking complex legal action; for example, the Storm Financial case cost ASIC 
$50 million.
46
 However, ASIC was quick to dismiss concern that it did not have the 
                                              
43  Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader, Deposit Takers, Credit and Insurance Providers, 
ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 70.  
44  Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 70. 
45  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 71.  
46  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 28. 
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funds to pursue large companies. In particular, ASIC's chairman highlighted the 
enforcement special account that is available to ASIC.
47
 In February 2014, the special 
account had a balance of over $30 million and receives $30 million a year. ASIC is 
aiming to increase the balance to $50 million.
48
 Mr Medcraft explained how he uses 
the enforcement special account to promote ASIC's enforcement credentials: 
I have made it very clear that the government provides us with the 
enforcement special account, and I made it very clear to big corporations 
that I have got money in there and that I will take on anyone. I am telling 
you I will—if I find it, it will not make me reluctant at all. It has to be the 
right case, but that special enforcement account is really important so that 
money is not the issue…I want the public to be confident that, if there is a 
big case and no matter who you are, we will take you on. I am passionate 
about that. All the bullying by the big end of town, if it does occur, does not 
affect us. We have the money. As I always say to them: we can do this the 
hard way or we can do it the easy way. At the end of the day it is about 
being feared.
49
 
17.34 The submission from Levitt Robinson Solicitors, which criticised various 
aspects of ASIC, noted that ASIC was second only to the Australian Taxation Office 
in expenditure on legal fees, with $300 million spent by ASIC between 2008 and 
2012.
50
 
Standard of proof required by the court 
17.35 The joint submission from Adelaide Law School academics expressed 
concern about the effectiveness of the civil penalty regime for directors and officers. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the introduction of a civil penalty regime for directors and 
officers was influenced by the theory of responsive regulation's enforcement pyramid 
model of sanctions of escalating severity. However, the submission argued 'that the 
                                              
47  A special account is an appropriation mechanism that notionally sets aside an amount of 
consolidated revenue to be expended for specified purposes. The enforcement special account 
was established to 'give ASIC the flexibility to conduct major investigations into, and bring 
legal and/or administrative proceedings against individuals and corporations in relation to, 
possible corporate or financial services misconduct when required, without the need to seek 
additional Budget funding'. It was intended that the investigations and proceedings 'would 
typically relate to matters for which ASIC could not absorb the costs without significantly 
prejudicing its existing general enforcement role, and/or those matters which are critical to 
continued public confidence in the corporate regulatory framework'. Mr Medcraft explained 
that once operational expenditure on a case goes above a certain level, ASIC can apply to 
government to move funding out of the enforcement special account. Explanatory Statement, 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997: Determination 2006/31 to establish a 
Special Account, pp. 1–2; Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 28. 
48  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 28. 
49  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 28. 
50  Levitt Robinson Solicitors, Submission 276, p. 11. The figures are based on the 
Attorney-General's Department's Legal Services Expenditure Report 2011–2012. 
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current legislative framework and actions of the courts in relation to the civil penalty 
scheme have inhibited robust regulatory action'.
51
 To support this claim, the 
submission outlined the following points: 
 the courts have demanded a standard of proof higher than the balance of 
probabilities (by requiring cases to be proved to the 'Briginshaw' standard
52
); 
 defendants are not obliged to specify their defences until ASIC's case has 
closed; 
 ASIC has been criticised by a court for not acting in accordance with a duty of 
fairness as a model litigant—although this criticism was overturned by the 
High Court, the submission considers the obligation remains of 'uncertain 
dimensions';  
 the legislation does not include a 'procedural roadmap' for civil penalty 
proceedings; 
 when ASIC is successful in a civil penalty action, the penalties achieved have 
not been sufficient.
53
 
17.36 The joint submission from the Adelaide Law School academics argued that as 
a result of these factors, ASIC now was more reliant on enforceable undertakings. 
Although the submission accepted that enforceable undertakings were a legitimate 
enforcement tool, it expressed concern about ASIC's 'unfettered discretion' to accept 
an undertaking, explained only in broad terms in guidance published by ASIC, 
rather than to pursue the matter through the courts: 
There are serious consequences of ASIC choosing an undertaking rather 
than litigation, and whilst it is understandable that resources have to be 
prioritised so that enforceable undertakings are the low-cost and quicker 
option, the danger is that cost factors, or cooperation with the regulator, 
may influence that decision to the detriment of consumers and investors, 
and to the public confidence in the market.
54
 
                                              
51  Dr Suzanne Le Mire et al, Submission 152, p. 2. 
52  The Briginshaw standard refers to principles related to the civil standard of proof (on the 
balance of probabilities) expressed in the decision of the High Court in Briginshaw v 
Briginshaw. The Briginshaw standard is a general rule that as the gravity of the allegations 
increase, greater proof is required for the plaintiff to meet the civil standard of proof based on 
the balance of probabilities. In Briginshaw, Dixon J stated: 'The seriousness of an allegation 
made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the 
consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer 
to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. 
In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite 
testimony, or indirect inferences'. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362 
(Dixon J). 
53  Dr Suzanne Le Mire et al, Submission 152, pp. 2–3. 
54  Dr Suzanne Le Mire et al, Submission 152, p. 4. 
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17.37 Other witnesses alluded to the difficulties with the civil penalty regime and 
the incentive for ASIC to pursue a less severe enforcement remedy to secure an 
outcome: 
Part of the problem ASIC faces is they go to counsel, and counsel say: 
'Gee, I don't know; we mightn't be able to get a conviction here even though 
we're only going for a civil penalty. It's still going to be difficult, so 
maybe—'and they take the soft option. There are times when you have to 
take the soft option, and there are times when you have to go and get a 
ruling under the law. In my view, they do not do that enough. They have 
done it a little more in the last few years, but the history has not been 
littered with great successes here.
55
 
Time taken to get to court 
17.38 Another issue the committee is aware of relates to the significant delays that 
often occur between when complaints are made to ASIC and enforcement action 
commences. One area where delays are particularly evident is the prosecution of 
criminal offences. In this regard, it is important to examine the relationship between 
ASIC and the CDPP, as it is the CDPP that decides whether to initiate prosecutions 
and conducts any such proceedings after receiving and assessing a brief from ASIC.  
17.39 ASIC advised that, on average, between 2010–11 and 2012–13 it took the 
CDPP 42.6 weeks to assess matters referred by ASIC that ultimately led to a criminal 
prosecution being undertaken.
56
 ASIC stated that delays can arise due to: 
(a) difficulties in scheduling trials (the complexity of ASIC matters and the 
number of witnesses required may require longer periods to be set aside 
for trial); 
(b) backlogs in the court lists generally due to existing caseloads; 
(c) availability of witnesses; 
(d) adjournments of trial and hearing dates, typically due to: 
(i) case management issues, such as for a plea hearing, to obtain 
further disclosure or further evidence or where a late application 
has been made to cross-examine a witness; 
(ii) the parties' readiness for trial; 
(iii) changes to the legal counsel for the accused or for the accused to 
obtain legal advice; and 
(iv) judicial processes such as preliminary hearings as to the 
admissibility of evidence or pre-trial examination of witnesses.
57
 
                                              
55  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 13. 
56  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 129. 
57  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 129. 
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17.40 ASIC's chairman told the committee that, as a non-lawyer, he 'was a bit 
shocked by how long things take'. He acknowledged that this 'is why often…we move 
to something like an enforceable undertaking, because we can get a timely outcome 
and actually deal with an issue'.
58
 Similarly, a former ASIC enforcement adviser 
described the time taken by the CDPP to finalise charges as 'unacceptable'. The former 
ASIC officer advised that in ASIC's Kleenmaid case it took the CDPP one and a half 
years to lay charges, which was the same length of time it took ASIC to investigate 
the matter.
59
 On 1 April 2014, ASIC announced that former directors of Kleenmaid 
had been ordered to stand trial; this milestone is several years after alleged misconduct 
took place (between 2007 and 2008).
60
 
17.41 Returning to perceived problems with the civil penalty regime for directors 
and officers, Dr George Gilligan directed the committee to a study by Melbourne Law 
School conducted five years after the regime was introduced. The interviews 
conducted as part of the study indicated that the relatively infrequent utilisation of the 
provisions at the time could largely be attributed to 'the reality that ASIC had to 
interact with the [CDPP] on the legitimate priorities that the DPP has in this area'. 
Dr Gilligan noted: 
A lot of the public anger that gets directed against ASIC is usually because 
there are perceptions in relation to criminal behaviour and there is an 
assumption amongst the public that it should be ASIC that is acting against 
these individuals. That is really the rightful prerogative of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions.
61
 
17.42 The CDPP's response to questions about another referral revealed a further 
example of a prolonged assessment process: 
Senator WILLIAMS: ASIC gave a referral to the DPP on Dr Munro, who 
collected some $100 million in an investment scheme—I don't know if it 
was registered or not. That money went down to about US$65 million, 
I believe, during the Global Financial Crisis. I believe the DPP sought more 
information from ASIC and said there was no case to answer. Yet the 
Federal Court ruled in 2011 for Dr Munro to return the money to the 
appropriate investors. I find it amazing that here we are talking about 
$65 million. I actually phoned Dr Munro to ask what he is going to do 
about the court order and money and he hung up on me. Would you please 
have a close look at this very issue of Dr Munro for me. 
Mr Davidson: In May 2010 certain material was provided to the DPP in 
respect of Dr Munro. In October 2010 advice was provided to ASIC in 
relation to the material. In early December 2010 further material was 
                                              
58  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 39. 
59  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, pp. 2, 4. 
60  ASIC, 'Former Kleenmaid directors ordered to stand trial', Media Release, no. 14-064, 1 April 
2014. 
61  Dr George Gilligan, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 55. 
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provided by ASIC to the DPP, including some of the same material that had 
previously been provided together with further material. Further material 
after that was provided to us on 24 December 2010. The DPP provided 
advice to ASIC on 6 April 2011 and further advice was requested by ASIC 
in August 2011 and further advice provided by the DPP, which ended our 
involvement in particular matter in August 2011. We do not have any open 
file in relation to Dr Munro at this stage.
62
 
17.43 The CDPP was asked about its resources. The deputy director, Mr Graeme 
Davidson, advised that the CDPP is 'very busy' but 'that is not to say that we are not 
dealing with the cases that are referred to us'. Mr Davidson added that it prioritises 
cases and develops timetables to address matters within acceptable time frames. While 
the CDPP stated that prosecution decisions are not based on these considerations, 
it referred to evidence given at Senate estimates that the CDPP expects to run a deficit 
in 2012–13.63 
17.44 The CDPP also responded to the statistics given by ASIC about the average 
length of time it takes the CDPP to assess a matter that ultimately proceeds to trial. 
The CDPP explained that, as it is not an investigative body and is required to bring an 
independent mind and judgement to a brief of evidence, the CDPP often has to ask 
ASIC for further investigative work to be undertaken. Mr Davidson remarked that 
there 'can be quite robust discussions between ASIC and the DPP about that'.
64
 
17.45 Although ASIC may have some concerns about the CDPP's processes and 
responsiveness, it should be noted that the integrity of ASIC's criminal prosecution 
decision-making process and, related to this, its relationship with the CDPP, 
has previously been reviewed by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) and 
found to have some deficiencies. Under the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth 
certain agencies can conduct their own summary prosecutions for 'high volume 
matters of minimal complexity'. ASIC is one of these agencies. In 2007, the ANAO 
issued the following finding about ASIC's handling of these minor cases: 
In 1992, the CDPP and ASIC agreed a set of Guidelines under which ASIC 
was permitted to conduct prosecution of minor regulatory offences. In 2003 
the two organisations reached agreement that ASIC could prosecute 
offences under a number of explicitly nominated sections of the 
Corporations Act. In its enforcement procedures, ASIC did not pay due 
regard to the clear terms of the agreement. As a result, on 26 occasions 
between 2002 and 2006 ASIC had, without consulting the CDPP, 
                                              
62  Mr Graeme Davidson, Deputy Director, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 12. 
63  Mr Graeme Davidson, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 12. See also Mr Robert 
Bromwich SC, Director of Public Prosecutions, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Legislation Committee Hansard, Estimates, 24 February 2014, p. 94. 
64  Mr Graeme Davidson, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, pp. 15–16. 
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prosecuted offences for which it had no specific agreement to do so from 
the CDPP.
65
 
17.46 Once a matter is before the court, it is evident that it can take a significant 
time before a judgment is handed down. ASIC advised that for civil cases the average 
number of months between filing proceedings and a decision date has been steadily 
increasing, from 16.6 months in 2010–11, to 19.6 in 2011–12 and 24.8 in 2012–13. 
For criminal cases, the deputy director of the CDPP similarly observed that lengthy 
timeframes can occur as a result of the court process, although he added that the courts 
are 'very concerned about reducing those time frames'.
66
 
Committee view 
17.47 The committee acknowledges the difficult decisions that ASIC can be 
required to take when selecting a particular sanction or remedy to pursue. The 
committee also recognises the diverse challenges ASIC faces in taking court action 
with the high rate of success expected of a government agency. Nevertheless, the 
committee is of the view that the public interest would be better served if ASIC was 
more willing to litigate complex matters involving large entities. There appears to be 
either a disinclination to initiate court proceedings, or a penchant within ASIC for 
negotiating settlements and enforceable undertakings. The end result is that there is 
little evidence to suggest that large entities fear the threat of litigation brought by 
ASIC. Other remedies such as enforceable undertakings may correct behaviour within 
a particular organisation, but they do not yield the wider and more significant 
regulatory benefits that are associated with successful court action.
67
 Further, the 
public perception that 'the big end of town' is treated differently and less transparently 
to other regulated entities is inherently dangerous to ASIC's legitimacy as a regulator. 
17.48 To ensure that threats of litigation are credible, ASIC's enforcement special 
account needs to be bolstered. At present, ASIC's enforcement special account appears 
inadequate for allowing ASIC to fund large and complex cases. To provide a greater 
deterrence effect and to ensure that ASIC is not limited in any way from taking major 
litigation, the committee believes the size of ASIC's enforcement special account 
needs to be significantly increased. The committee stresses that the government will 
need to exercise restraint to ensure this is effective; the government should not access 
the funds or reduce the funding given to ASIC because its enforcement special 
account has a healthy balance. 
                                              
65  The Auditor-General, ASIC's Processes for Receiving and Referring for Investigation Statutory 
Reports of Suspected Breaches of the Corporations Act 2001, Audit Report No. 18 2006–07, 
p. 19. 
66  On this issue, Mr Davidson advised that the CDPP seeks to assist the courts as far as it can. 
Mr Graeme Davidson, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 16.   
67  For example, ASIC's chairman noted in late 2012 that ASIC 'has observed board engagement 
with disclosure has improved' as a result of the widespread publicity associated the James 
Hardie case. 
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Recommendation 22 
17.49 The committee recommends that the balance of ASIC's enforcement 
special account be increased significantly. 
17.50 The committee also recognises that there are issues outside ASIC's control 
that need to be examined. The enforcement pyramid model of sanctions of escalating 
severity is a sound foundation for enabling a regulator to address corporate 
misconduct. The application of this model to Australia's corporate laws has generally 
proven effective. However, the committee is concerned about the evidence received 
regarding the limitations of the civil penalty regime for directors' duties. This issue 
relates in part to the penalties available, which the committee will consider in 
Chapter 23. Nevertheless, the committee considers that the utility of these provisions 
should be examined further. 
Recommendation 23 
17.51 The committee recommends that the Attorney-General refer to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission an inquiry into the operation and efficacy 
of the civil penalty provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 that relate to breaches 
of directors' duties. 
17.52 The committee is also very concerned about the length of time it takes the 
CDPP to consider matters referred to it by ASIC. It is appropriate that the CDPP takes 
adequate time to carefully assess the evidence so that the highest standards are applied 
to the prosecutorial process. Delays in particular cases may also indicate that the 
CDPP has received a brief that is inadequate or that further investigative work by 
ASIC needs to be undertaken. However, ASIC advised that in recent years it has taken 
the CDPP 42.6 weeks on average to assess matters that ultimately led to a 
prosecution. This indicates a more widespread problem. The committee notes the 
evidence about the resource constraints the CDPP is facing. Although perceptions 
about ASIC's performance may be affected as a result of the CDPP, matters related to 
the resources, priorities and structure of the CDPP are otherwise beyond the scope of 
this inquiry. Accordingly, the committee has not developed recommendations on this 
issue but instead draws this matter to the government's attention. The committee urges 
the government to ensure that the CDPP has the resources necessary to ensure that 
financial and corporate crime is prosecuted efficiently and fairly. 
17.53 Notwithstanding the earlier comments about court action, enforceable 
undertakings are a legitimate enforcement tool and an important remedy that ASIC 
should utilise. They are cost-effective for the regulator, can change behaviour within 
the entity and enable outcomes and remedies that are timely and that may not be 
achievable through the courts. As a remedy for misconduct, however, the acceptability 
of an enforceable undertaking to the general public and the ability of the undertaking 
to deter misconduct within or by other regulated entities can be damaged by various 
perceived deficiencies in the undertaking. These include a lack of transparency about 
the misconduct and remedial action required; concern about the independence of the 
expert appointed to oversee implementation of the undertaking's obligation; and 
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a belief that compliance with the undertaking will not be monitored effectively and 
the terms not enforced. The committee urges ASIC to do what it can to make the 
processes surrounding the acceptance and monitoring of enforceable undertakings 
more transparent. 
Recommendation 24 
17.54 As enforceable undertakings can be used as an alternative to court 
proceedings, the committee recommends that when considering whether to 
accept an enforceable undertaking, ASIC: 
 require stronger terms, particularly regarding the remedial action that 
should be taken to ensure that compliance with these terms can be 
enforced in court; 
 require a clearer acknowledgement in the undertaking of what the 
misconduct was; 
 as its default position, require that an independent expert be appointed to 
supervise the implementation of the terms of the undertaking; and 
 consider ways to make the monitoring of ongoing compliance with the 
undertaking more transparent, such as requiring that reports on the 
progress of achieving the undertaking's objectives are, to the extent 
possible, made public. 
Recommendation 25 
17.55 The committee recommends that ASIC should more vigilantly monitor 
compliance with enforceable undertakings with a view to enforcing compliance 
with the undertaking in court if necessary. 
Recommendation 26 
17.56 The committee requests that the Auditor-General consider conducting a 
performance audit of ASIC's use of enforceable undertakings, including: 
 the consistency of ASIC's approach to enforceable undertakings across 
its various stakeholder and enforcement teams; and 
 the arrangements in place for monitoring compliance with enforceable 
undertakings that ASIC has accepted. 
Recommendation 27 
17.57 The committee recommends that ASIC include in its annual report 
additional commentary on: 
 ASIC's activities related to monitoring compliance with enforceable 
undertakings; and 
 how the undertakings have led to improved compliance with the law and 
encouraged a culture of compliance. 
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Recommendation 28 
17.58 The committee recommends that ASIC develop a code of conduct for 
independent experts appointed as a requirement of an enforceable undertaking. 
In particular, the code of conduct should address the management of conflicts of 
interest. 
 
  
 
Chapter 18 
ASIC's handling of enforcement matters 
18.1 Most of the submissions that discussed ASIC's enforcement action generally 
criticised ASIC for not taking enforcement action, or if ASIC did take action, it was 
argued that ASIC did not do this quickly enough or that the sanctions imposed were 
inadequate. However, the committee also received evidence that presented a different 
perspective on enforcement. This evidence highlighted the importance of proper 
process and the need for a government agency to act fairly and properly when 
considering and pursuing enforcement action. The committee also received evidence 
that raised questions about the capabilities and expertise of ASIC in undertaking 
enforcement action. This chapter explores these issues. 
ASIC's use of publicity 
18.2 One case of particular interest to the committee was the experience of 
Dr Stuart Fysh. Dr Fysh was an executive with BG Group, an international energy 
company involved in the exploration and production of gas. Following an ASIC 
investigation, Dr Fysh was prosecuted for insider trading. A jury found that Dr Fysh 
purchased shares in Queensland Gas Company Ltd (QGC) between 2 and 8 December 
2007 while in possession of inside information concerning QGC that was not 
generally available. On 14 November 2012, Dr Fysh was sentenced to three and a half 
years in prison with a requirement to serve a minimum term of 12 months. However, 
on 17 July 2013 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the convictions and 
Dr Fysh was released from prison that day. 
18.3 It is not the role of the committee to assess and judge the merits of this 
particular case that ASIC pursued and the CDPP prosecuted, and the comments in 
this report should not be construed as doing this. In particular, the following statement 
from Mr Robert Bromwich SC, the CDPP, is instructive: 
The prosecution bore the onus of proof in proving the charges against 
Dr Fysh. The fact that Dr Fysh was acquitted of two counts does not mean 
that those charges should never have been brought against him. It is entirely 
contrary to our entire system of criminal justice that an acquittal of itself 
means that a case should not have been commenced in the first place, and 
I reject such a proposition.
1
 
                                              
1  Mr Bromwich also stated that he accepts the decision of the Criminal Court of Appeal (CCA), 
however, he added that it is important to note 'that the CCA's observations about the Crown's 
submissions on appeal are not a criticism of the manner in which the prosecution ran its case at 
trial' and that '[i]n respect of the criminal proceedings no court has held that the case against 
Dr Fysh was fundamentally misconceived or that there was no evidence of an element of the 
offences charged'. Mr Robert Bromwich SC, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, 
answer to question on notice, no. 14 (received 22 April 2014), pp. 5, 8 and 9. 
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18.4 Nevertheless, the case does at least serve as a general reminder that a 
tremendous imbalance can exist when ASIC investigates an individual and causes 
them to be prosecuted on behalf of the Commonwealth. As Dr Fysh suggested, it is 
'a mathematical certainty' that some of the people ASIC investigates will be innocent.
2
 
Further, specific aspects associated with how this enforcement action was managed, 
such as ASIC's public comments, warrant scrutiny.  
18.5 The case taken against Dr Fysh has, in his words, had the 'truly crushing 
impact of seeing my career and reputation destroyed'.
3
 In particular, Dr Fysh was 
critical of how his reputation was damaged by ASIC's public statements prior to the 
finding of guilt at trial. In 2008, ASIC issued a media release announcing that it had 
obtained an asset preservation order against Dr Fysh and that ASIC was investigating 
his share trading. Dr Fysh argued that the freeze order was obtained with his full 
cooperation and, although this fact was in his view 'implicit' in ASIC's media release, 
this was a distinction 'not drawn by any journalist, news agency or prospective 
employer'.
4
 It is important to note that, according to Dr Fysh, it was at the end of 2010 
that the CDPP and ASIC announced that they would charge him.
5
 The trial took place 
in 2012. 
18.6 Dr Fysh provided a number of pointed criticisms of what he described as 
ASIC's 'announce early and announce big' media strategy. First, Dr Fysh highlighted 
the irreversible consequences of a public statement about an individual by ASIC: 
Considering the overwhelming asymmetry between ASIC's resources and 
those of an individual, and the enthusiasm with which the media picks up 
on the regulator's announcements, it is incontrovertible that ASIC merely 
announcing its intention to investigate a named individual, of itself amounts 
to an immediate and irreversible punishment. Indeed, in my own case and 
others I have followed, the sentencing judge noted the personal disruption, 
loss of professional standing and reduced earning capacity suffered 
throughout a lengthy (just short of five years in my case) investigation and 
pre-trial procedure.
6
 
18.7 Dr Fysh also queried the regulatory benefits arising from the statement being 
issued, compared to the implications for the individual: 
Can any possible (and, I respectfully submit, highly questionable) benefit, 
such as by way of heightened deterrence, that might flow from ASIC's 
precipitate publicity in respect of those who are ultimately proven guilty, 
warrant the crushing blow to one who is innocent?
7
 
                                              
2  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, p. 3. 
3  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, p. 3. 
4  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, pp. 2–3. 
5  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, p. 4. 
6  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, p. 1. 
7  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, p. 3. 
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18.8 The media release issued by ASIC was compared with the 'tone and tenor' of 
statements by the police to the media. Dr Fysh observed that the police would not 
name individuals they are contemplating laying charges against.
8
 To further develop 
his argument that ASIC should be more careful with its public statements, Dr Fysh 
suggested that ASIC's criminal cases are more complex than those undertaken by the 
police: 
ASIC works in a more complex space than policing agencies dealing with 
criminal cases where, by virtue of apparent facts and physical evidence, 
there will usually be little doubt that criminal conduct has occurred. The 
judgements ASIC has to make in determining criminality are more subtle 
than identifying a victim or looking for fingerprint and DNA matches.
9
 
18.9 Dr Fysh also compared ASIC's public statements in his case with ASIC's 
guidelines. ASIC policy on public comment is contained in Information Sheet 152 and 
includes the following statement: 
Importantly, if a matter is still in the investigation stage and an enforcement 
action has not commenced, it is generally accepted that a regulator such as 
ASIC must balance the public interest benefits of making a statement 
against the rights of the individual subject to the investigation.
10
 
18.10 Dr Fysh asserted: 
Categorically—clearly—that was not done, in my case. Now what I see is 
an organisation that is doing things wrongly and then wallpapering itself 
with best-practice notes, saying 'We won't do that.'
11
 
18.11 Dr Fysh also presented his hypothesis that as a result of the pre-investigation 
publicity brought by ASIC, ASIC may have 'predisposed itself to continued pursuit of 
allegations that were not supported by the facts'.
12
 
18.12 Following the conviction being overturned on appeal, some of ASIC's media 
releases about charges being laid and the finding of guilt at trial remained on its 
website without reference to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal's decision. Internet 
search results ranked the initial media release and related media coverage higher than 
any coverage of the outcome of the appeal. The appellate court's reasons for judgment 
were published in November 2013. On 11 March 2014, ASIC issued a one sentence 
media release titled 'Former BG executives [sic] insider trading conviction quashed' 
                                              
8  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, p. 4. 
9  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128, p. 5. 
10  ASIC, Public comment, Information Sheet 152, February 2012, p. 1. 
11  Dr Stuart Fysh, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 1. 
12  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128.1, p. 1. 
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with a link to the court's reasons.
13
 Dr Fysh is of the view that although he wrote to 
ASIC about the lack of an update, ASIC only issued this media release and updated its 
website because of his submission to the committee's inquiry.
14
 In any case, that ASIC 
issued a media release in March 2014, when the Court of Criminal Appeal's reasons 
for decision were released in November, does appear far from ideal. 
ASIC's response 
18.13 ASIC provided the committee with a detailed supplementary submission on 
the case taken against Dr Stuart Fysh that rejected each allegation made by Dr Fysh. 
On the use of media, ASIC provided the following summary: 
ASIC's media releases about the investigation were fair and accurate reports 
of public court proceedings and outcomes. They were issued in accordance 
with ASIC's media policy outlined in Information Sheet 152 Public 
comment (INFO 152) and reflect the fundamental principle of 'open justice'. 
… 
ASIC issued an editor's note containing the outcome of Dr Fysh's appeal the 
day after the Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW) overturned his convictions. 
In addition, at Dr Fysh's request, it issued a new media release in March 
2014 about this outcome providing a link to the Court of Criminal Appeal 
(NSW) (already publicly available) reasons for the decision.
15
 
18.14 ASIC also responded specifically to Dr Fysh's comments about the media 
release issued by ASIC in 2008 about the asset preservation order: 
On 2 December 2008, ASIC commenced civil proceedings against Dr Fysh 
in the Supreme Court (NSW) that were separate and distinct from the 
criminal proceedings subsequently brought against him. ASIC produced 
sufficient evidence to persuade the court (on an ex parte basis) to make 
short-term asset preservation orders against Dr Fysh under s1323 of the 
Corporations Act 2001. Dr Fysh was then provided with ASIC's evidence 
and afforded the opportunity of challenging any aspect of it and contesting 
the continuation of the orders, but he chose to consent to the continuation of 
the orders. Following this, ASIC issued 08-85AD on 15 December 2008, 
                                              
13  ASIC, 'Former BG executives insider trading conviction quashed', Media Release, no. 14-042, 
11 March 2014. The text of the media release simply stated: 'Dr Stuart Alfred Fysh's 2012 
conviction for insider trading was quashed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in 2013' and 
contained a link to the court's reasons with limited background information attached. 
14  Dr Fysh advised that he wrote to ASIC 'and said, "Come on, guys. You have seen what I have 
written to the Senate committee. I am really unhappy. Could you not at least acknowledge this 
on your website—you have a dozen headings up there that I am a crook. That is all that anyone 
who ever wants to deal with me is going to see." ASIC has put something up on their website. 
I suggested, "Why don't you put a link through to the findings of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal." Blow me down, they have done it. But let us not kid ourselves that they did it because 
little Dr Fysh wrote to them'. Dr Fysh suggested that ASIC acted because the committee or 
someone influential 'has said something'. Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 3. 
15  ASIC, Submission 45.4, p. 3. 
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which was a fair and accurate report of the court proceedings and 
outcome…Further, the proceedings were in open court and a matter of the 
public record (no non-publication orders were sought by Dr Fysh or 
imposed by the Supreme Court (NSW)). The publication of the advisory 
was in accordance with the fundamental principle of 'open justice'.
16
 
Evidence on ASIC's use of publicity from other stakeholders 
18.15 The committee sought and received the views of key stakeholders about 
ASIC's use of publicity and the expectations that should be held of ASIC in this 
regard. Professor Bob Baxt noted the implications of a regulator accusing an 
individual of misconduct and emphasised that the principle of a person being innocent 
until the courts find the person guilty needs to remain paramount: 
Regrettably, far too often the media seems to work on the different 
assumption that as soon as someone alleges that something bad has 
happened with a company or in relation to the way in which people have 
behaved, then somehow or other that person or that company is 
immediately guilty and the regulator should have acted yesterday in 
ensuring that the people go to jail or that some other terrible penalty is put 
on them.
17
 
18.16 Professor Baxt used an example associated with the National Companies and 
Securities Commission, the predecessor to ASIC, to warn about the consequences 
associated of unsubstantiated allegations being made public: 
There was one very famous case of a raid on the offices of a stockbroker for 
alleged insider trading as a result of media speculation. That person was 
arrested. Tremendous publicity surrounded that person's life. That person 
committed suicide. Later it was established quite clearly that that person 
had been completely innocent of any breach of the law. It is that kind of 
psychology and approach by regulators that we need to avoid. And I think 
by and large ASIC has been relatively good at making sure that it does not 
jump the gun and create impressions of guilt before any inquiry has been 
held.
 18
 
18.17 The Corporations Committee of the Law Council of Australia's Business Law 
Section advised that it considered the approach taken by ASIC in Information Sheet 
152 is 'the correct one in principle…and for the most part, the correct one in practice'. 
It emphasised the damage that allegations can have on an individual's reputation:  
It would be, in the view of the Corporations Committee, quite inappropriate 
for a regulator of any kind to seek to use the mere fact of an investigation 
(when by definition no factual findings had been made and no decision had 
been taken to commence enforcement action) to achieve a broader 
                                              
16  ASIC, Submission 45.4, pp. 3–4. 
17  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 9. 
18  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 9. 
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regulatory outcome. Moreover, the publication of mere allegations (that 
may or may not be ultimately proven) can be oppressive towards the 
individuals involved and damaging even if the allegations are not proven.
19
 
18.18 The Law Council did express some concerns about ASIC's use of publicity 
with infringement notices, where payment is not an admission of liability. 
The chairman of its Business Law Section made the following observation: 
…people may pay infringement notices for a variety of reasons quite apart 
from whether they consider the allegation justified. I hope I may be 
forgiven for saying that a company might quite rationally pay an 
infringement notice simply to avoid paying their lawyers more to contest 
the notice.
20
 
18.19 Nevertheless, the witnesses that the committee questioned on this issue 
generally considered that ASIC is conservative in its approach to publicity:  
You can compare and contrast that with, for example, Eliot Spitzer when he 
was state Attorney-General in New York, or Benjamin Lawsky, who is a 
director of the Department of Financial Services in New York at the 
moment, who is quite happy to leak the results of their investigations and to 
be quite aggressive in his use of public relations. I think the record shows 
that ASIC has actually been quite restrained.
21
 
* * * 
In fact, from time to time ASIC is actually criticised for keeping 
investigations close to its chest.
22
 
Committee view 
18.20 Public comment about ASIC's activities or matters relating to its functions is a 
key part of ASIC's role. Statements by ASIC can help promote compliance with the 
law and are in accordance with ASIC's statutory objectives regarding the confident 
and informed participation of investors and consumers in the financial system. 
It also can promote public confidence in ASIC, something that is currently lacking in 
some quarters. However, the committee expects ASIC to carefully consider the 
benefits of public comment compared to the damage that can be caused by its 
statements, particularly if the comments are premature or ill-timed, or there is little 
deterrence or regulatory benefit that can be gained by the comment. The policies in 
place appear to be appropriate, although ASIC must ensure that it is vigilant in 
ensuring that they are applied in all cases, and that any public comments are made 
with a clear regulatory objective in mind.  
                                              
19  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 5. 
20  Mr John Keeves, Chairman, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 2. 
21  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 61. 
22  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 62. 
 Page 289 
 
18.21 It is evident, however, that ASIC needs to be more alert and responsive to 
updating statements that have been previously published. The committee appreciates 
that ASIC maintains a useful historical record of its media releases. However, internet 
search engine results in particular can direct the public to out-of-date information and 
ensure ongoing reputational consequences for the individuals or organisations 
concerned. In the case of Dr Fysh, the timing of ASIC's media release advising of the 
appellate court's reasons for judgment, months after the reasons were published, 
gives the committee no reason to believe that ASIC would have its appended its 
previous media statements about Dr Fysh had it not been prompted. ASIC should also 
change how the updates to past media releases are displayed—simple changes such as 
replacing the 'editor's notes' that are buried at the bottom of the online version of the 
media release with a more prominent warning that the information is out-of-date, 
perhaps immediately below the media release's heading, would seem more appropriate 
and helpful to readers.
23
 ASIC should also put in place a procedure to ensure updates 
reflecting the outcome of an appeal are not overlooked. This issue does not appear 
isolated; the committee has found other examples.
24
 
Recommendation 29 
18.22 The committee recommends that ASIC improve its procedures for 
updating past online media releases and statements to reflect recent court 
developments, such as the outcome of an appeal or when proceedings are 
discontinued. ASIC should ensure that these updates are made in a timely 
manner and published in a more prominent position than what currently occurs. 
ASIC as a model litigant 
18.23 The committee received submissions from individuals who have been subject 
to enforcement action by ASIC and were angry about ASIC's conduct. For example, 
one submitter told the committee: 
I have grave concerns that ASIC has and is currently violating several of its 
obligations of rule-bound administration which has breached a multitude of 
serious principles including the allocation of rights and resources, 
                                              
23  In this regard, ASIC may wish to consider the approach taken by the Australian Taxation 
Office, which publishes clear warnings designed to capture the reader's attention when 
legislative changes affect the interpretation of particular provisions of the tax law. For an 
example, see www.ato.gov.au/Business/Research-and-development-tax-concession/In-
detail/Making-a-claim/175--Premium-research-and-development-tax-concession/. 
24  For example, on 7 August 2013, ASIC issued a media release announcing that charges against a 
certain individual (named in the media release) had been discontinued. However, the editor's 
notes at the bottom of the 6 June 2012 media release announcing the charges do not reflect 
this—at the time of writing, the last entry in the editor's notes on the 6 June 2012 media release 
noted that the individual had been committed to stand trial. This is significant as the first result 
of an internet search on the individual was the 6 June 2012 media release, followed by media 
articles on the charges. 
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impartiality, distributive justice, rights of the individual and model litigant 
principles.
25
 
18.24 Mr Robert Catena, a former Citigroup stockbroker, provided the following 
statement: 
In August 2008 I was advised that ASIC planned to have a hearing to 
institute a banning order against me. At the same time they also informed 
my lawyer that they had referred the matter to the…CDPP…for possible 
criminal proceedings. My lawyer then sought a stay of the proposed hearing 
until after the determination by the CDPP as to whether they would institute 
criminal proceedings against me. This was refused by the 'delegate'…(an 
employee of ASIC). 
I was advised by my lawyer that her decision put me in a position where 
I would be denied natural justice, as anything I said to ASIC in my defence 
would be passed on to the CDPP. As I wanted to defend myself, my lawyer 
asked if ASIC would agree not to pass my testimony to the CDPP, but once 
again they refused. Therefore I was left in the insidious position of not 
being able to defend myself. 
At this point I contend that…acting for ASIC denied me natural justice, 
engaged in PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS AND BREACHED THE 
MODEL LITIGANT RULES.
26
 
18.25 ASIC provided detailed answers to questions on notice in response to the 
allegations made by Mr Catena. In particular, ASIC noted that the Model Litigant 
Rules do not apply in criminal proceedings and that the CDPP conducted the 
prosecution. Nevertheless, ASIC believes that at all times both it and the CDPP 'acted 
honestly and fairly and adhered to all prosecutorial duties'.
27
 
18.26 There are examples of ASIC following its procedural fairness obligations, 
although they can raise further questions about the conduct of ASIC's investigations. 
For example, in May 2013, ASIC issued the following cryptic media release: 
ASIC today provided an update on its proceedings against former 
Westpoint officers Norman Carey and Graeme Rundle. 
ASIC alleged Mr Carey and Mr Rundle breached their duties as officers. 
The trial started in late April 2013… 
During the course of the trial, ASIC located a document relevant to the 
charges. In accordance with ASIC's procedural fairness obligations, ASIC 
immediately disclosed the document and copies were given to Mr Carey 
and Mr Rundle, and the court. 
Following an assessment of the document in the context of the prosecution's 
case, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions today advised the 
                                              
25  Name withheld, Submission 145, p. 1. 
26  Mr Robert Catena, Submission 241, p. 1 (emphasis in original). 
27  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 10 (received 19 May 2014), p. 5. 
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District Court of Western Australia that the case should proceed no further 
and filed Notices of Discontinuance.
28
 
18.27 The Rule of Law Institute provided its view on the operation of the Legal 
Services Directions across all government agencies. It argued that the model litigant 
obligations need to be enforced by the Attorney-General: 
It is not sufficient for breaches of the model litigant obligations to be paid 
for by way of costs orders made against government agencies in court 
cases, because ultimately it is the taxpayer who funds those costs. 
Government agencies must be subject to the law as much as individuals and 
organisations.
29
 
Use of expert witnesses 
18.28 The evidence of particular experts relied on in prosecutions was also sharply 
criticised in some submissions. Individuals aggrieved by the enforcement action taken 
against them queried how ASIC and the CDPP could reasonably consider that the 
expert's evidence was suitable. For example, Mr Robert Catena relayed comments 
made by a magistrate in his committal hearing about the expert witness relied on 
by ASIC: 
[Magistrate O'Day] states 'Unfortunately the expert evidence that was relied 
on with respect to the test of materiality in its present form, I don't think can 
be used by the court because it didn't adopt the test on materiality referred 
to in the Corporations Act, and therefore in my view cannot be relied on.'
30
 
18.29 Dr Stuart Fysh also outlined concerns about the expert witness relied on by 
ASIC and the CDPP in his case: 
As the [NSW Court of Criminal Appeal] has accepted, most of ASIC's 
alleged 'inside information' was well known to the market, yet ASIC's 
so-called Expert asserted that every single piece of ASIC's alleged inside 
information was both unknown to the market and highly material. The 
Expert relied upon circular logic, namely that: 'As the companies' share 
prices hadn't risen prior to his trading, the information can't have been in 
the marketplace at that time'—which only makes sense if the information is 
material, one of the key issues the Expert was asked to opine on in the first 
place. 
Well established requirements must be satisfied for an Expert to be 
accredited by the Court, in terms of relevant professional experience and 
transparent application of this experience to analysing the evidence forming 
the subject of their Expert Report. It was obvious that this Report was 
deeply flawed because it canvassed issues far outside the relevant area of 
expertise of the Expert. Unsurprisingly, the Trial Judge acceded to Defence 
                                              
28  ASIC, 'Statement on ASIC action', Media Release, no. 13-105, 14 May 2013. 
29  Rule of Law Institute of Australia, Submission 211, pp. 7–8. 
30  Mr Robert Catena, Submission 241, p. 3. 
Page 292  
 
requests to severely circumscribe the Expert's evidence—he was not 
allowed to be presented to the Jury as an Expert nor allowed to opine on the 
availability in the market of the alleged inside information. 
Expert evidence doesn't have to be called in support of Insider Trading 
prosecutions but the [Court of Criminal Appeal] concluded that in my case, 
where the charges were technically and commercially complex, lack of 
Expert evidence regarding public availability and materiality left the Jury 
without a safe basis to reason its way to a conviction. The inadequacy of the 
Expert and his report were readily apparent to the Trial Judge and [Court of 
Criminal Appeal] Justices—and must surely have been clear to both ASIC 
and DPP. Why did ASIC persist when they had failed to commission an 
Expert Report that would materially assist them? ASIC needs to consider 
closely the commercial capabilities brought to bear when investigating me, 
and the quality of ASIC's decision-making.
31
 
18.30 The former chairman of the Trade Practices Commission (now the ACCC), 
commented that regulators such as ASIC face restrictions about the money they can 
pay to secure and retain experts, both counsel and expert witnesses. He noted that the 
regulator faces strict guidelines about its resources, but can face defendants that do not 
face such limitations. He remarked that regulators are 'often prevented from hiring the 
best experts possible in order to conduct the relevant litigation'.
32
 
Staffing and organisational structure issues 
18.31 As an agency that receives far more reports of misconduct than it could 
possibly investigate, and as a government body expected to act fairly and exercise its 
powers for the public good, ASIC has to exercise discretion and good judgement 
about what to investigate and how to do it. In doing this, ASIC relies heavily on the 
conduct and assessments of its employees, and the assessments that they make. 
This section examines evidence regarding the officers at ASIC that are responsible for 
managing enforcement action. 
18.32 The committee received a small number of submissions that contained 
negative or unflattering comments about ASIC employees. Such evidence received by 
the committee can generally be categorised as questioning either the capabilities of the 
officers or their conduct and professionalism. 
18.33 The committee recognises that the comments are of varying merit. As the 
committee is examining the performance of ASIC as an organisation, and the 
committee is aware that it is difficult for current or former public servants to respond 
to such claims, the committee has generally withheld the names of ASIC staff 
members in written submissions. Further, the following comment by ASIC's chairman 
should be noted: 
                                              
31  Dr Stuart Fysh, Submission 128.1, p. 4. 
32  Professor Robert Baxt AO, Submission 189, p. 7. 
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One of the disappointing things about some of the submissions was the 
inflammatory tone of criticisms made, particularly about ASIC's staff. 
ASIC has exceptional employees. They are men and women who work for 
the good of the community. That is because they believe in the public 
interest. They are skilled and they are committed to their work. Considering 
the difficult job they do, they should receive appropriate respect. Our 
people have diverse backgrounds. They have experience in law, accounting, 
financial services and other areas. Many have invaluable industry and 
consumer advocacy experience, and this means they understand how 
markets work and issues facing investors, consumers and wider industry. 
ASIC employees also undertake ongoing internal training and have access 
to industry secondment programs, which further develop their skills.
33
 
18.34 Nevertheless, the evidence received by the committee warrants consideration 
of how enforcement could be affected by staffing issues and the organisational 
structure within ASIC. 
18.35 A strategic review of ASIC was undertaken following the appointment of 
Mr Tony D'Aloisio as chairman. That review, completed in 2008, recommended that 
the four directorates which ASIC then had (regulation, compliance, enforcement and 
consumer protection) be abolished. They were replaced by a larger number of 
'outwardly-focused stakeholder teams covering the financial economy' and multiple 
enforcement teams each tasked with specific types of misconduct.
34
 The clusters 
within which the enforcement and stakeholder teams are organised were introduced 
during 2011–12, in order 'to better reflect' ASIC's priorities.35 This approach differs to 
that taken in other jurisdictions where dedicated enforcement divisions appear to be 
standard. For example: 
 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has five divisions and an 
additional 23 internal offices. One of the divisions is dedicated to 
enforcement; the remaining four are: Corporation Finance; Investment 
Management; Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation; and Trading and 
Markets. The SEC's regional offices report to both the Enforcement Division 
and the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations.
36
  
                                              
33  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 2. 
34  ASIC, 'ASIC announces results of its strategic review', Media release, no 08-93, 8 May 2008; 
Pamela Hanrahan, 'ASIC review should make it smarter', Australian Financial Review, 12 May 
2008, p. 63. 
35  ASIC, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 2. 
36  US Securities and Exchange Commission, www.sec.gov/divisions.shtml (accessed 20 August 
2013). 
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 The new US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which enforces 
federal consumer financial laws, has a Supervision, Enforcement and Fair 
Trading Division, which includes an enforcement office.
37
 
 The new regulator of the financial services industry in the UK, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), likewise has a dedicated enforcement section (the 
Enforcement and Financial Crime Division).
38
 
18.36 The Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) advised that the 2008 
changes were 'fairly traumatic on staff at the time and caused quite a lot of defocusing 
in certain areas'. Since the 2008 restructure there 'has been a move back to a more 
coherent approach in the enforcement division', although the evidence handling unit 
within ASIC, which services multiple enforcement teams, is under significant 
pressure.
39
 Overall, the CPSU considered that morale 'crashed' following the changes, 
but that it may be now recovering: 
Staff are very focused on their job, want to achieve the best outcomes they 
can for the Australian public and are very dedicated to that. They put in lots 
of long hours, sometimes horrendous hours, to achieve that. I think morale 
has to be on the way up for that to be happening.
40
 
18.37 Ms Anne Lampe, a former ASIC employee and financial journalist, told the 
committee: 
Whilst I worked at ASIC I had nothing but the highest regard for the 
committed and hard-working investigators and lawyers in the enforcement 
section of ASIC. But there seemed to be some blockage at the top. Action 
seemed always to be taken too late.
41
 
18.38 A former enforcement adviser also commented on the commissioners and 
senior management. He focused on the qualifications and expertise of the senior 
officers, and suggested that the current composition may be impacting ASIC's 
approach to enforcement and how enforcement matters are handled: 
There seems to be a lack of experienced staff with direct experience in 
successfully investigating and prosecuting complex corporate fraud matters. 
For example, as of today, not one person at the ASIC commission level or, 
at best, one or two senior executives have actual experience in conducting a 
criminal investigation or giving evidence in a court themselves. In other 
                                              
37  US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau (accessed 
20 August 2013). 
38  UK Financial Conduct Authority, www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/fca-organisational-
chart.pdf (accessed 20 August 2013). 
39  Mr Alistair Waters, Deputy National President; Mr David Mawson, ASIC Workplace Delegate, 
CPSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 64. 
40  Mr David Mawson, ASIC Workplace Delegate, CPSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 
2014, p. 65. 
41  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, p. [2]. 
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words, how can you expect your staff to conduct a complex investigation or 
lead one when you have never done one yourself?
42
 
18.39 Another former employee suggested that ASIC loses cases because of 
financial constraints and limits on how their employees can be utilised: 
[ASIC] think that they can win court cases doing 38 hours a week, when the 
other side are doing 90 hours a week. When I put in for my overtime on 
Nomura, it was rejected, but they were happy with the result and it was 
these same people taking a lot of the credit. However, if I had not done the 
work, the case would have been a disaster.
43
 
18.40 ASIC is also required to compete with private sector firms for suitably 
qualified and talented employees 'with the disadvantage of not being able to pay 
market-equivalent salaries for people with cutting edge legal and financial expertise 
and experience'.
44
 Another challenge to attracting and retaining talented enforcement 
employees could be the nature of the work that enforcement employees are required 
to do compared to the opportunities available elsewhere. Former ASIC employee 
Mr Niall Coburn stated: 
In my team we used to mentor the younger staff coming in. Lots of young 
people at ASIC now think there is no future for them in terms of 
experience. They are not given the opportunity to go to court. They are not 
given the opportunity, say, if they were in a law firm.
45
 
18.41 The competence of particular ASIC officers or teams was commented on by 
individuals that had experienced enforcement action brought by ASIC. Dr Stuart Fysh 
argued that ASIC 'absolutely failed to bring to bear the right sort of commercial 
competence in establishing the facts against me'. He provided the following reasoning: 
…the gentleman who investigated on behalf of ASIC was a part-time 
investigator who had been brought back. He said in court, very clearly, that 
if the alleged inside information was out there, unless he could find 
evidence that BG [Group] was aware of the alleged inside information, he 
just ignored it. Of course, that is not the test. 
What was the professional competence of that person? The answer is not to 
criticise that guy; the issue for the senior management of ASIC is: what are 
the standards of competence; what is the job description of an investigator? 
I guess the issue, for me, is what governance structures exist within ASIC 
so that you do not have that end-to-end responsibility of one person with all 
the imbedded assumptions he has?
 46
 
                                              
42  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 2. 
43  Ocean Financial Pty Ltd, Submission 248, p. [1]. 
44  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 2. 
45  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 6. 
46  Dr Stuart Fysh, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 1. 
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18.42 Dr Fysh questioned the internal structures within ASIC and suggested that 
ASIC should employ someone 'whose KPI, whose bonus, depends on killing ASIC 
cases' so that ASIC do not take cases where 'they would have ended up looking 
silly'.
47
 
Committee view 
18.43 The above paragraphs indicate some disquiet about the expertise that ASIC 
brings to enforcement, both in terms of the expertise it secures through expert 
witnesses and the capabilities ASIC possesses in house. Before proceeding further, 
the committee wishes to acknowledge that ASIC's employees have committed 
themselves to public service and to achieving the best results for the Australian 
community. The committee thanks ASIC's employees for their hard work and 
dedication. Although some concerns have been considered, the committee has not 
entertained allegations that appear vexatious or simply attempt to 'name and shame' 
particular employees, rather than engage in a constructive discussion about ASIC's 
performance. 
18.44 Like other organisations, ASIC is dependent on the good judgement and 
conduct of its employees. There will be individual cases where trust is misplaced, 
expertise is lacking or where honest mistakes will be made. There will also simply be 
differences of opinion about particular matters. After reviewing both the public and 
confidential submissions received during his inquiry, it would be wrong for the 
committee to conclude that there is a significant or widespread problem within ASIC 
regarding its employees. At this time, the committee has no reason to consider that 
ASIC cannot manage any issues about the conduct of individual employees by 
regularly reviewing its supervision and performance management arrangements 
to ensure they are best practice and vigilantly applied. For the avoidance of any doubt, 
the committee is only aware of isolated complaints regarding ASIC's employees, and 
the committee is confident that the vast majority of ASIC's employees perform their 
duties appropriately and as effectively as possible. 
18.45 There are other ways to improve the expertise and skillsets of ASIC's staff. 
Increasing the use of secondments to other law enforcement agencies will allow new 
ideas about enforcement to infiltrate and be adopted within ASIC. ASIC also needs 
to be more willing to acknowledge that mistakes will occasionally be made and 
to identify ways to learn from them. When ASIC is unsuccessful in a court action, 
particularly if the court criticises how the matter was pursued, ASIC's leadership 
should mandate that a two-step assessment process be undertaken. The first step 
would be an internal review of how the case was managed. The second would be an 
independent review of the case and what went wrong, undertaken remotely from any 
officers engaged in the matter. The commission and enforcement teams would then be 
briefed on the findings and lessons identified by the independent review. The two-step 
process would allow ASIC officers to reflect on the case while also ensuring that 
                                              
47  Dr Stuart Fysh, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 1. 
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another informed perspective is sought. The independent review is particularly 
important; the committee does not believe that ASIC should rely only on its own 
self-analysis. However, by conducting an internal review in addition to the external 
review, ASIC's commissioners and senior management will be able to compare the 
findings of both and then consider whether the assessment offered by the internal 
review is frank, truly reflective and indicates a culture that is receptive to identifying 
and implementing improvements. 
Recommendation 30 
18.46 The committee recommends that when ASIC has been unsuccessful in 
court proceedings both an internal review and an independent review of the 
initial investigation and case must be undertaken. 
18.47 Finally, the committee notes that ASIC's skillset may be strengthened by other 
less direct means. A possible way to convince a greater number of talented individuals 
to undertake at least part of their career at the regulator is by an enthusiastic and 
energetic leadership at ASIC pursuing more high-profile enforcement cases, 
particularly through the courts. Building a reputation of a tough and effective agency 
will make it easier for ASIC to attract, employ and retain talented and driven 
individuals. 
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Overview of Part IV 
 
An issue that most submitters had a view on during this inquiry was ASIC's approach 
to communicating with those that interact with it. This part examines ASIC's 
communication and engagement with its large number of diverse stakeholders.  
One group of stakeholders examined is the regulated population. This part of the 
report examines the evidence received from the industry and professional associations 
regarding their perceptions about ASIC's performance and how effectively they 
consider ASIC communicates and engages with them. ASIC's performance in 
providing services that regulated entities and others may need to use is also examined. 
The second type of stakeholders examined in detail are individuals that may contact 
ASIC seeking assistance and/or to report misconduct. Many expressed frustration with 
ASIC's poor communication or apparent inaction. This part examines why this is the 
case and considers the extent of the 'expectation gap' between what individuals may 
expect ASIC to do and what ASIC's functions, powers and resources enable it to do. 
ASIC's communication and engagement with the general public, including its 
financial literacy work and its website, are also considered. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Chapter 19 
ASIC's performance: the perspective of key stakeholders 
19.1 The committee received evidence from many organisations representing 
various gatekeepers and other professionals, as well as from individual entities 
regulated by ASIC. Reflecting ASIC's broad remit, the committee heard from bodies 
representing company directors, lawyers, financial advisers and planners, the 
superannuation industry, company secretaries, accountants, auditors and insolvency 
practitioners. Evidence was also received from consumer groups, firms and specific 
entities regulated by ASIC, such as the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
19.2 Given the opportunities available to these bodies to interact with ASIC and 
other government agencies, these stakeholders have a unique and valuable perspective 
on ASIC's performance. Importantly, they can also channel the views of the industry 
or professionals they represent. This chapter examines the evidence received from 
these stakeholders regarding how ASIC works with their organisation.  
19.3 The committee received suggestions about how industry expertise can be 
better utilised by ASIC though co-regulation and secondments. Such proposals can 
encourage better regulatory outcomes, but they can also lead to concerns about 
regulatory capture or allegations of conflicts of interest within the regulator. 
This chapter also considers these issues. 
Overall views on working with ASIC 
19.4 The committee was interested in canvassing the views that professional 
bodies, industry groups and market operators had on how ASIC worked with their 
organisations. Most of the evidence received on this topic was, overall, positive. 
For example, the ASX informed the committee that it works closely with ASIC and 
that the processes set up with regular meetings and exchange of information 'work 
well'. The ASX advised that ASIC 'has shown a willingness to actively engage with 
ASX' on various issues. As an example of the benefits of this close relationship, 
the ASX pointed to improvements made by ASIC to the rulemaking process for listing 
and operating rule changes.
1
 
19.5 Superannuation industry bodies also expressed a generally favourable view on 
ASIC's performance and how ASIC works with them. Like the ASX, the Australian 
Institute of Superannuation Trustees described a 'close association' it has had with 
ASIC in past years.
2
 Industry Super Australia considered that, based on its interaction 
with ASIC over recent years, ASIC is 'fulfilling its functions reasonably effectively'. 
                                              
1  ASX, Submission 122, p. 1. 
2  Mr David Haynes, Executive Manager, Policy and Research, Australian Institute of 
Superannuation Trustees, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 31. 
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Industry Super Australia added that ASIC's capacity to regulate effectively depends on 
the legislative framework in place.
3
 
19.6 The Governance Institute of Australia expressed its support for 'the manner in 
which ASIC has engaged with stakeholders as it seeks to strengthen the regulatory 
framework in place'. As an example of how it considers ASIC communicates 
effectively, it commended how ASIC kept stakeholders informed as the regulator's 
administrative and information management systems were improved.
4
 
19.7 Two key accounting bodies were, however, sharply critical of ASIC. 
CPA Australia is of the view that ASIC, under its current management, has 
'increasingly isolated itself from its key stakeholders': 
Rather than collaborating in a genuine and constructive dialogue with 
potential partners in change, it is our view that ASIC is now defined by a 
combative, compliance focused approach which, on its Chairman's own 
admission, places a premium on "leveraging" media headlines over 
substantive outcomes…While this media driven approach is doubtless 
sometimes useful in creating a perception of action to paper over an 
otherwise unimpressive recent track record, it has unfortunately too often 
led to ASIC producing public communications that are confusing and which 
do little to tackle the risks faced in evolving capital markets and the 
corporate environment, such as insider trading and corporate failure.
5
 
19.8 CPA Australia advised that it had raised its concerns with ASIC but that the 
response 'too often reveals a regulator with a glass jaw, content with shifting blame 
rather than responding in a considered or constructive way, or in the spirit of 
cooperation which previously defined the organisation's approach'.
6
 The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Australia (ICAA) also expressed concerns about ASIC's 
method of working with professional bodies. The ICAA's chief executive officer 
concluded: 
We all share, ultimately, the same goals but in recent years it has not been 
an effective relationship.
7
 
                                              
3  Ms Robbie Campo, Deputy Chief Executive, Industry Super Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 30. 
4  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 2. 
5  CPA Australia, Submission 209, p. 1. 
6  CPA Australia, Submission 209, p. 1. 
7  Mr Lee White, Chief Executive Officer, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 42. 
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Processes for consultation and engagement 
19.9 ASIC needs to engage with stakeholder bodies to be an effective regulator. 
Established processes for consultation and discussion can provide a useful means for 
matters that most concern industry to receive the regulator's attention and for industry 
associations to seek clarification of certain issues; the regulator's response can then be 
communicated to the members of those associations. In the same vein, these processes 
also provide an opportunity for ASIC to communicate any concerns it has about recent 
developments or certain behaviour. Importantly, engagement helps ensure ASIC is 
aware of, understands and accounts for industry developments when performing its 
statutory functions, including the function of providing advice to government.
8
 
The ICAA also noted that the performance of regulators may be affected by the 
regulator's isolation from industry and that effective engagement and consultation can 
help avoid the negative implications of isolation: 
That isolation on an individual or on teams over time does negate the 
manner in which you may perform your duties. It drives you to continuing 
to do things because that is what we have done. That is why I have reached 
out and we have used the example of the ATO and what Chris Jordan is 
starting to do in his culture change. We need to protect the independence of 
the organisation—there is no question about that—but somehow you need 
to make sure there are enough fresh sets of eyes coming in to alter—back to 
your question—the nature, so that there is sense of eagerness and desire to 
change things for the right reasons.
9
 
19.10 There are at least two formal methods that ASIC utilises to consult with 
groups of stakeholder organisations. One is the ongoing general or industry-specific 
consultative committees that meet on a fixed basis. The other is by undertaking 
consultation on a specific regulatory issue. 
Regular consultation with industry and consumer associations 
19.11 ASIC currently has a number of external committees that provide it with 
a source of expertise and act as a means for stakeholder or industry feedback or 
concerns to be reported to ASIC. A consultative body that represents a cross-section 
of stakeholders is the External Advisory Panel. This panel currently comprises 
17 members and includes senior members of the financial services industry,
10
 the legal 
profession and academia.
11
 Other external consultative committees include the 
                                              
8  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, s. 12A. 
9  Mr Lee White, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 47. 
10  The current chair of the panel is Mark Johnson AO (chairman of Alinta Energy, former 
chairman of AGL Energy and deputy chairman of Macquarie Bank) and the deputy chair is 
Allan Moss AO (former managing director and CEO of Macquarie Group). For a current list of 
members, see www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/External+Advisory+Panel.  
11  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 58; 'ASIC External Advisory Panel: Purpose, Governance and 
Practices Summary', March 2012, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 8 July 2013). 
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Consumer Advisory Panel, Market Supervision Advisory Panel and the Registry and 
Licensing Business Advisory Committee.
12
 
19.12 ASIC advised that the External Advisory Panel meets on a quarterly basis 
with all of the commissioners. The other panels meet with selected commissioners, 
with the chairman attending on a periodic basis.
13
 ASIC's chairman informed the 
committee that he has strengthened the External Advisory Panel by expanding and 
rotating its membership. Mr Medcraft remarked that the senior business people on the 
panel act as 'ambassadors' for ASIC in the business community.
14
 
19.13 As the inquiry progressed, it became evident that there are a number of 
additional regular formal meetings that ASIC conducts with some stakeholders. 
The Financial Planning Association advised that in addition to ad hoc meetings that 
may be required, it has a formal meeting with ASIC on a quarterly-basis. The chief 
executive officer of that organisation remarked:  
To be quite honest, I feel like I could pick up the phone and call Peter Kell 
or Greg Medcraft at any stage, because I have dialogue with them as well.
15
 
19.14 The chief executive officer of the Association of Financial Advisers similarly 
noted that his organisation meets with ASIC on a regular basis. He made some 
additional favourable comments on the working relationship that existed between 
senior ASIC representatives and his organisation: 
We also have a regular ongoing schedule of meetings with Peter Kell and 
his team. That commenced early last year. In fact we have had Peter himself 
speak at our conferences and take part in the national road show that speaks 
to about 1,400 advisers nationally…The good thing we found was that 
conversations have been two-way. I think they are paying more respect now 
to the professional standing and to the knowledge and insight we can bring. 
Recent examples would be around the research into insurance switching 
advice.
16
 
19.15 A representative of the Corporations Committee of the Law Council of 
Australia stated that when that committee has met in Melbourne, ASIC 'has been very 
good at sending along appropriate people and quite senior people, including at times 
commissioners, to those meetings on a regular basis, which the committee as a whole 
has very much appreciated': 
                                              
12  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 58. 
13  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 90. 
14  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 90. 
15  Mr Mark Rantall, Chief Executive Officer, Financial Planning Association, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 71–72. 
16  Mr Brad Fox, Chief Executive Officer, Association of Financial Advisers, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 72. 
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It is useful because at each meeting ASIC can answer questions about their 
policy, consultation papers and things like that. That is very helpful for 
practitioners. ASIC can also hear criticism of things we do not like. That is 
something that the committee in Melbourne has very much appreciated and 
I think ASIC is to be commended for that because it is very useful, I think 
for both sides, in terms of identifying issues that are arising and addressing 
them quickly.
17
 
19.16 Consumer groups also expressed support for ASIC's approach to engagement 
and consultation. The Consumer Action Law Centre wrote favourably about the 
Consumer Advisory Panel: 
While we have some concerns with ASIC's ability to respond in a timely 
way to matters referred to it…we are overall pleased with ASIC's 
collaboration with consumer advocates, particularly through the Consumer 
Advocacy [sic] Panel (CAP). The CAP provides a direct line of 
communication between consumer advocates and senior ASIC officials 
including the Deputy Chairman Peter Kell and frequently the Chairman, 
Greg Medcraft…In our experience the discussions at CAP meetings are 
informative, frank and useful, which compares very favourably with the 
common experience of meeting with government or industry 
representatives who can be unwilling to respond openly to questions or 
concerns.
18
 
19.17 The Consumer Action Law Centre also noted that ASIC was responsive to 
suggestions for improving how the advisory panels operate. Following a 
recommendation made by that organisation, a process is now in place for ASIC 
to regularly report to consumer organisations on the progress of complaints made by 
those organisations, within the bounds of ASIC's confidentiality obligations.
19
 
19.18 Other organisations were less supportive of ASIC's current approach to 
engagement with stakeholders. In its submission, CPA Australia advised that there is 
currently 'no ongoing regular contact between ASIC and the financial services 
industry'. CPA Australia stated that in the past ASIC consulted with financial services 
industry associations and their representatives through regular forums; these forums 
were subsequently replaced by a Financial Services Consultative Committee (FSCC). 
According to CPA Australia, meetings of the FSCC 'have not been held for a number 
of years', and that engagement is now limited to consultation papers that ASIC 
releases.
20
 At a public hearing, however, it was revealed that ASIC contacted 
CPA Australia about ways to open dialogue soon after CPA Australia's submission to 
the committee was published. Mr Alex Malley from CPA Australia explained: 
                                              
17  Mr Bruce Dyer, Member, Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of 
Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 3. 
18  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 5. 
19  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 5. 
20  CPA Australia, Submission 209, pp. 3–4. 
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I have been contacted—I think several days after this submission—to open 
the door to some dialogue. I thought that was interesting timing. 
Nonetheless, I look forward to the future. If we can improve that, we would 
certainly seek to, and I know my colleague Mr White would work with us 
in that process.
21
 
19.19 In response to questions about the FSCC, ASIC advised that it was established 
in 2007 as a forum to 'deal with general financial services issues that were not specific 
to a particular industry/association'. However, the FSCC was disbanded in 2008. 
ASIC submitted that this followed the restructure of ASIC that occurred at that time as 
well as feedback from participants that suggested 'they did not feel comfortable 
raising regulatory issues in front of one another'.
22
 Nevertheless, ASIC stressed that 
regular consultation between ASIC and financial services industry bodies and firms 
occurs. It advised that ASIC's commissioners meet 'at least annually' with the boards 
of key industry groups with more regular contact undertaken at lower levels.
23
 During 
2012–13, 620 meetings between ASIC and industry associations took place.24 
Ad hoc consultation 
19.20 ASIC also engages in consultation on specific issues as required. This takes 
place formally through the release of consultation papers or draft regulatory guides for 
public comment. ASIC also meets with stakeholders to discuss specific issues of 
concern or as legislative or regulatory changes are being implemented. ASIC reported 
to the committee that in 2012–13 it issued 33 consultation papers for public comment 
with stakeholders having, on average, seven weeks to prepare a submission.
25
 
As an example, ASIC pointed to the extensive consultation processes it engaged in as 
part of the introduction of the Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) and Stronger Super 
reforms: 
It is no exaggeration to say that there were multiple meetings every week 
around those issues, around how we were going to implement the law and 
around the concerns of individual companies. Also, there were national 
public meetings around the country.
26
 
19.21 In relation to FOFA and Stronger Super, the Australian Institute of 
Superannuation Trustees advised that it has worked closely with ASIC over the past 
three years as the reforms were being designed and implemented: 
Our experience has been that ASIC's commitment to consultation has been 
evident throughout. I think it has been a challenge for government agencies 
                                              
21  Mr Alex Malley, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 44. 
22  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 6 (received 25 March 2014), p. 15. 
23  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 23. 
24  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 6 (received 25 March 2014), p. 14. 
25  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 6 (received 25 March 2014), p. 14. 
26  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 23. 
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to manage and coordinate relationships between ASIC, APRA, ATO and 
other relevant regulators on the one hand and the industry on the other. But 
ASIC has generally done so efficiently and accessibly. As we mentioned in 
our submission, we have found their staff to be of a high quality and 
responsive and helpful.
27
 
19.22 CPA Australia, however, criticised some aspects of ASIC's issue-specific 
consultation. On the FOFA consultation process, CPA Australia complained that 
ASIC did not initially consult with the accounting profession and that attempts 
to become involved were frustrated: 
Our request to be invited into the discussion when it related to the 
accounting profession and the other financial advisers were filibustered and 
delayed. We knew from talking to others in the market that they were 
having meetings, whereas we were not at the table at the time. So we had to 
kind of force our way into the discussion, and it ended with front-page 
newspaper ads.
28
 
Comparison with other agencies and jurisdictions  
19.23 CPA Australia and the ICAA were the two organisations that expressed the 
most concern about ASIC's consultation and engagement processes. The chief 
executive officers of both organisations were asked to identify the agencies that, in 
their experience, engage in more effective consultation. The responses given were the 
New Zealand Financial Markets Authority and the ATO (under the new 
Commissioner of Taxation, Mr Chris Jordan AO).
29
 The following remarks were 
made about the approach taken by the ATO: 
Mr White: …the early engagement that both organisations are now having 
with Chris Jordan, the commissioner of the ATO, is a real breath of fresh 
air. His approach to smarter and more effective regulation is admirable, and 
we want to work much more with him. 
Mr Malley: I would simply concur with that, because we have had the same 
experience with the tax office.
30
 
19.24 Consultation can also be built into the statutory obligations and structure of 
the regulator. For example, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is required by 
statute to 'make and maintain effective arrangements for consulting practitioners and 
consumers on the extent to which [the FCA's] general policies and practices are 
                                              
27  Mr David Haynes, Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 31. 
28  Mr Paul Drum, Head of Policy, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, 
p. 45. 
29  Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 42, 44. 
30  Mr Lee White, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia; Mr Alex Malley, CPA Australia, 
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consistent with its general duties…'31 These arrangements must include a Practitioner 
Panel and a Consumer Panel, and the FCA must have regard to any representations 
made to it by these panels.
32
 The FCA has also established a Smaller Business 
Practitioners Panel and Markets Practitioner Panel.
33
 The consumer panel, which is 
known as the Financial Services Consumer Panel, is examined further in Chapter 20. 
Collaboration and whether there should be greater co-regulation 
19.25 Collaboration between industry and ASIC that leads to regulatory issues or 
areas of concern being promptly and effectively addressed, either without additional 
state-imposed regulation or by such regulation being better targeted and implemented, 
is clearly a desirable outcome. For example, on measures to improve consumer 
protection, CPA Australia noted that the best way to achieve results 'is to build a 
relationship with the stakeholders who actually deliver the product and service to the 
consumer'.
34
 Industry and professions can also perform effectively some of the tasks 
that the regulator may otherwise have to undertake; in Australia, the existence of such 
co-regulation is evident through external dispute resolution schemes, codes of conduct 
and disciplinary bodies. 
19.26 The chief executive officer of the ICAA, Mr Lee White, argued that 
Australia's financial services regulatory framework could be made more efficient and 
effective through greater co-regulation. In his view, a co-regulatory model 'is a 
wonderful goal that we could substantially do now, if we have the intent', and that 
co-regulation could result in matters being addressed 'in a much more timely manner 
than they are'.
35
 He noted that New Zealand has elements of a co-regulatory model. 
The ICAA's submission concluded: 
While there will always be a need to maintain a clearly delineated 
separation of function and accountability between ASIC and external 
stakeholders, we believe there is a pressing need for ASIC to engage in 
greater regular collaboration with industry and professional bodies in order 
to achieve the most effective and efficient regulatory outcomes possible. To 
date, ASIC has not maximized the opportunity that is presented by a strong 
working relationship with co-regulatory stakeholders. There has been an 
apparent lack of willingness on ASIC's part to work in an open and shared 
manner in order to secure the right outcomes in the marketplace.
36
 
                                              
31  Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), s. 8. 
32  Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), ss. 9, 10. 
33  Financial Conduct Authority, Corporate governance of the Financial Conduct Authority, April 
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19 February 2014, p. 47. 
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19.27 Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith argued that co-regulation could perform 
a role, however, in her view 'clear regulatory messages from the state' are required so 
that professional and industry associations: 
have external legitimacy for bringing their good values forward, too, and 
doing the kind of work that they do, whether that is disciplinary tribunals, 
codes of conduct or dispute resolution for disenchanted financial 
consumers, and so on.
37
 
19.28 Professor Kingsford Smith suggested that ASIC does not have adequate 
powers under the legislation it administers to engage with professional bodies to the 
degree it may want to.
38
 
19.29 Organisations representing financial advice professionals expressed either 
supportive or qualified views on co-regulation. The Financial Planning Association of 
Australia argued that legislation should facilitate the establishment of co-regulatory 
approaches, particularly as legislation such as the Corporations Act is overarching and 
not-industry specific, whereas professional obligations are industry specific and better 
address the roles, services and consumer interactions of participants in that industry.
39
 
The Association of Financial Advisers noted some of the benefits of associated with 
co-regulation, but it questioned whether greater co-regulation would lead to additional 
external dispute resolution that could leave financial advisers subject to several 
dispute and disciplinary procedures.
40
 
19.30 When questioned about suggestions for greater or more formal co-regulation, 
ASIC's deputy chairman, Mr Peter Kell, advised that ASIC does look at co-regulation 
in various sectors. As an example of co-regulation, he cited the external dispute 
resolutions schemes such as the Financial Ombudsman Service and Credit 
Ombudsman Service, organisations that are 'integrated into the way [ASIC] would 
approach retail financial services'. However, Mr Kell added that ASIC assesses the 
risks and desirability of co-regulation on a sector-by-sector basis, to ensure that 
co-regulation or self-regulation is relied on only in sectors where it is effective. 
Mr Kell suggested that the financial advice sector was one area that, in ASIC's view, 
is not ready for co-regulation at the moment.
41
 
19.31 Others expressed some misgivings about the level of trust associated with 
co-regulation. Professor Justin O'Brien pointed to Australia's experience of surviving 
the global financial crisis relatively unscathed to warn that there is a 'danger of 
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succumbing to hubris'. He added that the global financial crisis demonstrated that 'it is 
no longer enough to rely on stated trust—it has to be warranted': 
Yes, it is true, none of our major banks collapsed, but we have seen 
widespread bad behaviour within the marketplace. We have seen the failure 
of boutique investment companies; we have seen the failure of managed 
investment funds. We have seen identified problems in this marketplace 
and we are beginning to see through the LIBOR and the currency 
manipulation scandals basically also Australian banks being implicated in 
that process. So I think it is essential that we utilise a hearing like this to 
really think through what are the weak points in our regulatory system, to 
what extent we can professionalise that regulatory system and to what 
extent we can actually introduce responsibility and restraint within it so that 
self-regulatory or co-regulatory initiatives have the opportunity to work.
42
 
19.32 Professor O'Brien added that if 'industry really wants co-regulation, it has to 
actually accept its responsibility for the integrity of that co-regulatory structure rather 
than leave it simply to ASIC'.
43
 
Industry secondments 
19.33 Secondments between the regulator and industry can be an effective way for 
the regulator to gain 'real world' expertise and awareness of industry developments 
and current thinking. Several industry associations and other key stakeholders 
highlighted the benefits of secondments and suggested that ASIC should utilise them 
more. Industry Super Australia recommended that ASIC adopt a formal secondment 
process with ASIC employees working in the industry. It argued that this would 
ensure that ASIC's employees have 'a deeper understanding of the industry which it 
regulates, including market developments and culture'. Industry Super Australia added 
that 'it may also assist the industry to better understand the approach taken and the 
challenges and opportunities facing the regulator'.
44
 Finally, Industry Super Australia 
noted that the secondment program would ideally connect ASIC with graduate and 
leadership programs operated by major institutions.
45
 
19.34 A representative from another superannuation body, the Australian Institute of 
Superannuation Trustees, reported that he had seen 'continuous improvements' in 
ASIC's staff engagement with, and understanding of, the superannuation industry. 
Nevertheless, he suggested that ASIC should establish a formal process for ASIC 
employees to be seconded to superannuation funds 'so they get a better appreciation of 
                                              
42  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 60. 
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the practical and operational aspects of running funds, as well as a better appreciation 
of the member focus of the not-for-profit sector'.
46
 
19.35 CPA Australia suggested that a strengthened secondment program could 
address gaps in ASIC's industry knowledge and provide ASIC officers with ideas on 
how ASIC could engage with industry better: 
…I think when you go into the organisation at various levels and talk to 
people that what is probably missing at the moment is there is not a sense 
that there is enough of that 'on the street'—having lived in business long 
enough—to know what a big issue is from a small issue; what a one-off 
issue is from a systemic issue. It is about being blooded in a market. So 
perhaps…we need a rotational model that says for two years some of the 
future leaders of ASIC go out and work in business on a secondment and 
learn about how that world looks and breathes and feels, so that when they 
come in they are informed by that behaviour and perhaps know how to deal 
with it and engage it better.
47
 
19.36 The ICAA and the Governance Institute of Australia noted that suitable 
secondment programs could improve decision-making within ASIC; in particular, 
they suggested that more consistent decisions could be a result of such programs.
48
 
19.37 The Corporations Committee of the Law Council of Australia's Business Law 
Section also supported secondments between ASIC and law firms. It argued that the 
Takeovers Panel utilises secondments with 'great success', and that in the United 
States a secondment with the Securities and Exchange Commission 'is viewed as 
valuable career stepping stone'.
49
 The senior secondments used by the UK regulator 
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were also cited. However, ASIC's resource constraints were noted, with one of the 
Law Council's representatives observing that 'there is no free lunch'.
50
 
19.38 While industry groups and professional associations were supportive of 
increased secondments, the committee received submissions that expressed concern 
about such arrangements. Some were based on a perception that ASIC is too close to 
the industries that it is supposed to regulate, and that the movement of employees 
between ASIC and the private sector supports this contention.
51
 However, the 
committee also received evidence from a former ASIC employee alleging that 
conflicts of interest were not appropriately managed during a secondment. 
Allegations of conflicts of interest influencing ASIC's actions 
19.39 A former employee of ASIC, Mr James Wheeldon, gave evidence to the 
committee about the lead up to regulatory relief being granted for online 
superannuation calculators in 2005. Mr Wheeldon alleged that ASIC was unduly 
influenced by the wishes of a key industry organisation and that the process for 
providing the relief was outside ASIC's stated procedures and had a pre-determined 
outcome. According to Mr Wheeldon, the relief granted as a result allowed online 
calculators to be offered that did not comply with the reasonable basis for advice 
obligation that was in place in the Corporations Act at the time. In his view, the 
calculators could simply be used by firms 'as a marketing tool to get people into their 
financial adviser network', by gathering information and not reflecting the impact of 
fees. He used a calculator offered by one firm as an example: 
…it had no capacity for modelling fees in it; it acted as if fees did not exist. 
In fact, it would ask the user a bunch of very intrusive questions: how old 
are you? How old is your spouse? What is your income? What are your 
superannuation savings? How long do you plan on working for? And so on. 
Then it would come up with a projection which would not really have much 
to do with reality at all. Then, on the next page, it would say, 'Put in your 
phone number and your email address and we'll have a financial adviser call 
you'.
52
 
19.40 Mr Wheeldon also advised that the individual he was required to report to was 
a secondee from a firm that was a member of the industry organisation. Although the 
individual disclosed a potential conflict of interest, Mr Wheeldon advised that ASIC 
kept the secondee on the calculator relief project. Mr Wheeldon stated: 
I have looked high and low for information about ASIC's policy of 
accepting secondees. If you go to the website you cannot find anything. If 
you go through their annual reports, which I have done for the last 10 years, 
there is effectively zero disclosure of the secondees from industry coming 
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to ASIC…I also note that Mr Medcraft spoke to the Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services on Friday and he said, 'We are very 
careful about secondments. If we do secondments clearly we have to be 
sure that they are not into an area where they are regulating their own firm, 
for example.' Mr Medcraft said that there were very strict rules governing 
secondments. That was absolutely not true when I was working 
there…I think having secondments into the policy branch—you just cannot 
do it that way. ASIC need to have their own people who are doing that. 
That cannot be the only way that you get the skill in. If they want somebody 
who has got experience working for an investment bank or a top law firm, 
they should hire somebody and they should become members of the 
Australian Public Service and bound by the Public Service code of conduct 
and owing a fiduciary duty only to the Public Service and to the Australian 
people. But instead you had a fellow who I assume owed a duty primarily 
to his employer and he was representing his employer's interests within 
ASIC, and ASIC tolerated it.
53
 
19.41 The class order made by ASIC was a disallowable legislative instrument; 
that is, it was a form of delegated or subordinate legislation made by the executive that 
either House of Parliament could potentially, within a limited timeframe, disallow. 
Mr Wheeldon questioned the explanatory statement associated with the class order 
that was tabled in Parliament. He advised that the reason given in the explanatory 
statement for the lack of public consultation prior to relief being granted was because 
the relief was of 'a minor and machinery nature'. Mr Wheeldon alleged that the 
statement was 'deliberately misleading'.
54
 
ASIC's response 
19.42 ASIC responded at length to Mr Wheeldon's testimony.55 It 'completely' 
rejected the allegations that Mr Wheeldon made. ASIC described online calculators as 
'a common and popular tool' and stated that without the legal relief granted by ASIC, 
both retail and industry superannuation funds may have been unable to provide such 
calculators. ASIC described the situation as 'an unintended result of broader reforms 
to the financial services law implemented in 2002, which meant generic super 
calculators could be caught under the personal advice requirements': 
So instead of being free and easily accessible, consumers wanting to use 
these online calculators would have to see a financial planner for personal 
advice, which can be expensive and time consuming. This clearly was not a 
sensible or desirable situation, and ASIC initially provided public guidance 
to the industry in May 2004 to help with the provision of these calculators. 
                                              
53  Mr James Wheeldon, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 22. 
54  Mr James Wheeldon, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 19. 
55  See ASIC, 'Opening statement made by ASIC at a public hearing held in Canberra on 10 April 
2014', Additional Information 4, pp. 7–9 and ASIC, Submission 45.5. 
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However, significant uncertainty remained, which the Government at that 
time publicly recognised in its 2005 consultation paper on Refinements to 
Financial Services Regulation. The Government noted ASIC would provide 
guidance or legal relief for the provision for online calculators to 'promote 
their use'. 
In May 2005, ASIC announced it would grant legal relief to the whole 
industry (what we call class order relief), and in June that year we issued 
this relief for super calculators following consultation with a range of super 
industry bodies. We extended this relief to other investment calculators 
later that year following further public consultation.
56
 
19.43 ASIC emphasised that because every fund could use the legal relief 
irrespective of the industry association they belonged to, there was 'no special 
treatment'. The conditions attached to the relief required that the assumptions 
underpinning the calculators needed to be reasonable and that clear and prominent 
statements about the purpose and limitations of the assumptions were displayed. 
Further, ASIC argued that the law against misleading and deceptive conduct still 
applied.
57
 
19.44 In a supplementary submission, ASIC provided further information about the 
process associated with this class order. ASIC stated that the industry association was 
not required to lodge a formal relief application as formal applications are only 
required where an individual seeks relief from the law as it applies to them.
58
 On how 
the secondee's potential conflict of interest was managed, ASIC noted that the 
secondee was bound by ASIC's general conduct requirements of employees, including 
the APS Code of Conduct. ASIC advised that there was 'awareness' of the potential 
conflict and that the secondee was not a decision maker, was closely supervised by 
a senior manager and worked on the issue as a member of a team.
59
 ASIC emphasised 
that the decisions were made by senior officers:  
Both the initial decision to grant relief applying to superannuation 
calculators and the subsequent decision to extend the relief were made by 
ASIC's Regulatory Policy Group, over a series of meetings in 2005. ASIC's 
Regulatory Policy Group meets approximately every fortnight and 
considers new or revised regulatory policy, law reform and novel 
applications for relief. Its membership comprises Commissioners and senior 
leaders from across ASIC. In other words, proposals for relief of this type 
are not decided only by the team directly responsible for developing the 
work.
60
 
                                              
56  ASIC, Additional Information 4, pp. 7–8 (emphasis omitted). 
57  ASIC, Additional Information 4, p. 8. 
58  ASIC, Submission 45.5 pp. 4, 7–8. 
59  ASIC, Submission 45.5, pp. 11–12. 
60  ASIC, Submission 45.5, p. 7. 
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19.45 ASIC added that the examination of the relevant files to date does not enable 
it to confirm whether the employee amended internal issues papers or drafted emails 
to the industry body, although any internal papers or emails 'would have been settled 
by a senior ASIC officer'.
61
 
19.46 When asked about Mr Wheeldon's assertion that the online calculators were 
primarily used as a marketing tool, ASIC dismissed the concerns: 
No, it is a condition of the class order relief provided to superannuation 
funds that the calculators are not used to market particular products and that 
they must spell out the assumptions that are underpinning the calculations 
and the clear limitations of the calculators are also set out. We take that 
very seriously. It is also the case that firms providing these calculators to 
their fund members have to satisfy the ASIC Act requirements not to 
mislead or deceive. So we do not believe they are being used as marketing 
tools in that way. In fact, how we see them being used generally is as very 
useful tools to help consumers provide a guide for themselves about the sort 
of amount they will end up with in retirement.
62
 
19.47 However, ASIC was also questioned about a particular online calculator 
available after the relief was granted, but which was later removed from the firm's 
website. Specifically, ASIC was asked how the calculator modelled fees, how the 
effects of the fees were presented to the user and whether the calculator could be 
considered primarily to be a marketing tool to attract people to the firm's financial 
adviser network. ASIC's response was that it is not in a position to comment on the 
online calculator as it did not review it.
63
 
Committee view 
19.48 It is evident that, overall, the industry associations and consumer groups that 
deal with ASIC on a regular basis are generally supportive of ASIC's approach to 
consultation. ASIC should be commended for this. In particular, the committee is 
pleased that ASIC has been responsive to suggestions for improving consultation and 
the flow of information between it and other groups, such as those made by the 
Consumer Action Law Centre. The committee acknowledges the consultative bodies 
ASIC currently utilises and recognises that ASIC has managed to secure the 
involvement of experienced and talented individuals as participants on these 
committees. The committee considers that these processes should provide ASIC with 
a valuable source of expertise and an effective means for two-way communication 
between the regulator and key stakeholders. 
19.49 ASIC's relationships with all of the major professional and industry 
associations matter. When ASIC suggests that an industry needs to address a 
                                              
61  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), pp. 18–19. 
62  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, pp. 91–92. 
63  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 20. 
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particular issue, the nature of that response—constructive or otherwise—can depend 
on whether that industry respects and has a sound relationship with ASIC. Within the 
accounting profession there were clearly strong concerns about ASIC's approach, 
although it must be acknowledged that the two accounting bodies the committee 
received evidence from are in the minority: most industry and professional 
associations gave favourable evidence about their engagement with ASIC. 
Nevertheless, the committee appreciates the frank evidence it received from CPA 
Australia and the ICAA. Given accountants are key gatekeepers in Australia's 
financial system, CPA Australia's and the ICAA's descriptions of the relationship they 
have with the regulator are troubling. The committee is not particularly interested in 
which side is at fault; the relationship between ASIC and the accounting bodies 
simply needs to be repaired. 
Recommendation 31 
19.50 The committee recommends that the accounting bodies and ASIC work 
to repair their relationship and commit to a more constructive approach to 
discussing regulatory issues. The committee requests that ASIC provide a written 
report to the committee in six months' time informing the committee of progress 
achieved in strengthening this relationship.  
19.51 The evidence in support of greater co-regulation was of interest to the 
committee. Effective and low-cost ways to improve conduct in particular sectors 
should be identified and taken into account in regulatory design, and if it is 
demonstrated that co-regulation proposals meet this test, they should be considered. 
ASIC appears to be aware of the benefits and difficulties associated with co-regulation 
on a sector-by-sector basis. The committee does not consider that the case has been 
made during this inquiry for the ASIC Act to be amended to require greater 
co-regulation. The committee notes that this may be an issue that the Financial System 
Inquiry will consider, particularly as it is tasked with assessing the effectiveness and 
need for financial regulation and the roles of government and its financial regulators. 
Other recommendations made by the committee in this report may also support more 
effective self-regulation and co-regulation. 
19.52 In addition to co-regulation, more practical and effective regulatory outcomes 
can also be promoted by providing ASIC employees with greater awareness of how 
the industries ASIC regulates actually function. Secondments are one way to achieve 
this, and the committee encourages ASIC to utilise them. However, the committee 
notes the concern in some segments of the community about the perception that ASIC 
is too close to the entities it is supposed to regulate, and that secondments can 
intensify suspicions about ASIC's conduct. ASIC needs to be careful to avoid undue 
influence being exercised on its actions as a result of the secondment process. 
Importantly, ASIC also has to be seen to be careful that the integrity of its decision-
making is not undermined by secondments. ASIC needs to be more transparent about 
the secondment processes it has and the policies in place for managing possible 
conflicts of interest. 
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Recommendation 32 
19.53 The committee recommends that ASIC publish on its website information 
about its secondment programs and the policies and safeguards in place that 
relate to these programs. 
19.54 Finally, the committee wishes to comment on the allegations made by a 
former ASIC employee about ASIC being unduly influenced by an industry 
association as a result of a secondment.  
19.55 The committee's comments will be of a general nature as it has considered this 
evidence in the context of broader questions about ASIC's performance and 
accountability. It would be more appropriate for the specific allegations to be 
considered by the Commonwealth Ombudsman, either after receiving a complaint 
from Mr Wheeldon or on an 'own motion' basis. The committee understands that 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman would be able to consider the allegations (other than 
the allegation that Parliament was misled), although as the allegations relate to events 
that occurred ten years ago, an investigation may face a number of practical 
impediments. The committee recognises that the Commonwealth Ombudsman is an 
independent statutory officer and that any investigation would be at the Ombudsman's 
discretion. The committee notes that, for future allegations, the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 2013 provides a process for public officials to report suspected 
wrongdoing in the Australian public sector. The committee's recommendation 
regarding greater transparency about ASIC's secondment processes should also help 
instil confidence that ASIC is aware of these issues and manages potential conflicts of 
interest appropriately. 
Recommendation 33 
19.56 The committee requests that the Commonwealth Ombudsman consider 
undertaking an own-motion investigation into the allegations related to the 
process that resulted in ASIC granting regulatory relief for generic online 
calculators in 2005. An investigation undertaken by the Ombudsman should, 
in particular, consider whether the process was undermined because ASIC did 
not adequately manage a conflict of interest identified by a person on 
secondment from a financial services firm. 
19.57 The committee agrees with ASIC that online calculators are an important 
educational tool for consumers. However, the committee is concerned that after 
it made the class order granting relief, ASIC did not review the calculators the 
industry designed and published. This is a further example of ASIC not displaying 
sufficient scepticism of the industry it regulates and not monitoring compliance with 
an arrangement it has authorised. 
19.58 ASIC's ability to grant exemptions or modifications to the operation of the 
Corporations Act and certain other legislation is a significant power that should be 
exercised carefully. It is essential that both the process leading to relief being granted 
and the compliance monitoring that occurs afterwards are sound. In future, 
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the committee urges ASIC to monitor more actively and assess compliance with 
the conditions of the relief it grants. It may assist the Parliament, regulated entities and 
other interested persons if the explanatory statement associated with class orders 
specifically advises that ASIC will be monitoring compliance. 
Recommendation 34 
19.59 The committee recommends that after exercising its discretionary powers 
to grant relief from provisions of the legislation it administers, ASIC should 
ensure that it puts in place a program for monitoring and assessing compliance 
with the conditions of the relief. 
 
  
 
Chapter 20 
Community expectations and financial literacy 
20.1 Many submitters who expressed disappointment with ASIC's performance 
assumed that ASIC had the authority and the resources to act on their behalf. In this 
chapter, the committee examines the expectations that investors and other consumers 
of financial services hold when it comes to what ASIC can and cannot do. It seeks 
to establish whether there are gaps between community expectations of what ASIC 
can or should do and ASIC's actual statutory functions and powers. 
20.2 The committee also takes the opportunity to consider financial literacy in 
Australia and the way in which ASIC disseminates information.  
Expectation gap 
20.3 A number of major institutions and academics expressed their concerns about 
the extent to which investors believe that ASIC is able to protect their interests. 
For example, the Financial Planning Association of Australia was concerned about the 
'misalignment between consumer perception of the role ASIC should play in assisting 
them when things go wrong versus what ASIC can actually deliver'.
1
 The Association 
of Financial Advisers shared this view, maintaining that only a limited proportion of 
consumers appreciated ASIC's role.
2
 Along similar lines, the Corporations Committee 
of the Law Council of Australia's Business Law Section wrote: 
It is possible that some financial consumers misunderstand the difference 
between a prudential regulator such as APRA and a conduct regulator such 
as ASIC. In other words, people may think that ASIC can give comfort to 
financial consumers in the same way APRA may be taken to protect the 
interests of depositors or policy holders.
3
  
20.4 The Corporations Committee recognised that ASIC has 'neither the mandate 
nor the resources to perform such a role', and suggested that 'perhaps more needs to be 
done to ensure that an "expectation gap" does not exist in this regard'.
4
 Likewise, 
the Australian Institute of Company Directors stated: 
…ASIC is often placed in a difficult position due to the unrealistic 
expectations of the government, media and general public. There seems to 
                                              
1  Financial Planning Association of Australia, Submission 234, p. 6. 
2  Association of Financial Advisers, Submission 117, p. 3. See also Mr Jason Harris, 
Submission 116. 
3  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 4.  
4  Submission 150, p. 4. 
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be a general misunderstanding as to what ASIC can reasonably achieve as a 
regulator.
5
 
20.5 With regard to unrealistic expectations, the Governance Institute referred to 'a 
strong public perception that the regulator should be proactive in stopping…corporate 
misconduct from occurring in the first place'. Mr Jason Harris from the University of 
Technology, Sydney (UTS) Faculty of Law, explained: 
Criticisms based on a failure to prevent corporate scandals or collapses 
represent a misunderstanding of the focus of corporate regulation in 
Australia. Australia's corporate regulatory framework is based largely on 
the disclosure paradigm. Rather than vetting documents (such as prospectus 
documents and annual reports) ASIC is merely the body that receives 
copies of those documents. It is up to investors to read the information and 
make a complaint if they discover a problem. I'm sure ASIC does act 
proactively where it has reason to do so, but with over 2 million companies 
to deal with ASIC cannot read and assess every document.
6
 
20.6 This expectation gap is evident in complaints lodged with the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman. Of the complaints he receives about ASIC, 'a frequent point of dispute 
appears to be the reporter's perception of ASIC's role as regulator and the expectation 
of a specific outcome from making a report, compared with ASIC's stated broader 
public benefit purpose'. The Ombudsman quoted from ASIC's published guidance on 
how it deals with complaints of misconduct, where ASIC advises that: 
All reports of misconduct that we receive provide us with valuable 
information, but not every matter brought to our attention requires us to 
take action. Under the laws we administer, we have the discretion to decide 
whether to take further action on reports of misconduct that we receive. 
Generally we do not act for individuals and we will seek to take action only 
on those reports of misconduct where our action will result in a greater 
impact in the market and benefit the general public more broadly.
7
 
20.7 As shown in previous chapters, a significant number of submitters held the 
expectation that ASIC should have investigated their complaint. The Ombudsman was 
of the view that 'early management of expectations about what ASIC can or will do 
and the provision of better explanations of decisions to complainants should lead to 
a decrease in the number of complainants seeking an internal review of decisions by 
ASIC, as well as the number of complaints to the Ombudsman about ASIC'.
8
 
                                              
5  Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission 119, p. 3. See also Submission 150. 
6  Mr Jason Harris, Submission 116, pp. 1–2. 
7  ASIC, How ASIC deals with complaints of misconduct, Information Sheet 153; cited in 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 8. 
8  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 16. 
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Licensed financial services providers, credit providers and registered 
companies 
20.8 ASIC's licensing regime was one particular area where many people held a 
false notion about the extent of ASIC's power. Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith 
noted that: 
Assessments of ASIC's performance are sometimes subject to 
misconceptions: perhaps the most common is that ASIC closely supervises 
the Australian Financial Services License (AFSL) holders it regulates.
9
 
20.9 She noted that ASIC does a certain amount of surveillance of AFS licence 
holders when it is alerted to problems but observed further: 
There is an expectation that licensing means that ASIC has some control 
over licensees' businesses. Likewise Australian investors expect that ASIC 
supervises licensees regularly. When losses occur there is anger and 
bewilderment that except in the limited area of market operators, 
participants and securities dealers ASIC does not have the power or the 
resources for ongoing supervision.
10
  
20.10 In Professor Kingsford Smith's view, such expectations demonstrate that 
Australians mistakenly assume that ASIC has a regulatory toolkit with the types of 
tools that APRA has at its disposal.
11
 Similarly, Ms Anne Lampe, a journalist and 
former employee of ASIC's media unit, referred to clients who often believe that, 
because advisers are licensed, they have passed some kind of integrity and 
competence screening process and that ASIC has provided a stamp of approval. 
She stated: 
They couldn't be more wrong. The licensing process is simply a tick all 
boxes procedure and regulation of financial advisors and fund managers 
who invest the money appears to be ineffective.
12
  
20.11 Indeed, ASIC argued that the relatively low threshold for obtaining an AFS 
licence and the relatively high threshold for removing a licence was not well 
understood by retail investors. It stated: 
Licensing, therefore, may give retail investors a sense of security which is 
inconsistent with the settings of the regime. There is a perception amongst 
some consumers that an AFS licence means that the licensee has been 
approved by ASIC or that it signifies the high quality of the financial 
services provided by the licensee. For example, in submissions to the 
                                              
9  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 3.  
10  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 4. 
11  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 4. 
12  Ms Anne Lampe, Submission 106, p. 1. 
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Inquiry, some former Storm clients have stated that 'Storm was approved by 
ASIC'.
13
 
20.12 The matter of ASIC's licensing powers, including the effectiveness of ASIC's 
screening processes for licence applicants and its ability to cancel licences, is 
examined in chapter 24.    
20.13 The committee took first hand evidence from people who thought that ASIC 
was in a position to provide sound advice and guidance about the integrity or 
competence of a financial service provider or the viability of a business. Many drew 
on their experiences of the Storm Financial collapse. For example, Mr Spencer 
Murray was of the belief that ASIC was appointed by the Australian government 
to prevent Australian citizens from fraud by financial institutions.
14
 Another submitter 
claimed that ASIC was the regulator who gave Storm Financial approval to run its 
business. 
20.14 Mr Sean Mcardle stated that in 2006–07 and prior to becoming a signatory to 
the Storm Financial scheme, he sought ASIC's advice about any 'concerns it may have 
about this financial planning company'. He stated that he specifically sought 'to find 
out if there was anything that, as a retail investor, he should be aware of regarding 
Storm Financial'. This information included 'the strategy they were selling, or its 
director Emmanuel Cassimatis by way of complaints or anything else that as the 
regulator they knew and could warn me about in regards to investing with them'. 
Mr Mcardle informed the committee that he phoned ASIC twice and both times was 
advised that 'ASIC were unable to say anything about any company, its directors or 
the product, stating that if they did, they may get sued'.
15
 
20.15 Mr Ron Jelich was also under the impression that ASIC had given its stamp of 
approval to the Storm Financial model: 
Chief among the reasons for finally deciding to join Storm were (a) ASIC's 
'green light' report into the operations of Storm and ASIC's endorsement of 
Storm's investment model; and (b) the fact that Storm's investment home 
loans, margin loans and the creation of exclusive Storm-badged funds were 
overseen by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the country's biggest 
and most highly respected bank.
16
  
20.16 Mr Peter Rigby, who invested in Trio Capital on the basis that it was a 'Fund 
of Hedge Funds' and hence under the impression that it one of the safest and most 
diverse ways of investing, clearly thought ASIC should have prevented investor 
losses. He stated: 
                                              
13  ASIC Submission 378 to the PJCCFS Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia, 
August 2009, p. 26. 
14  Mr Spencer Murray, Submission 23, p. 1. 
15  Mr Sean Mcardle, Submission 87, p. 1. 
16  Submission 172 and see also Submission 18 (name withheld). 
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…these funds were regulated by the government watchdog ASIC, so it was 
reasonable to consider that the funds were being run and administered 
properly. If this is not the role of ASIC, what is it?
17
 
20.17 There were also misunderstandings regarding managed investment schemes 
approved in principle as 'tax effective' schemes by the ATO and Treasury.
18
  
20.18 The Australian Institute of Company Directors observed that, unlike some 
overseas jurisdictions, in particular the US, there was a pervading cultural bias in 
Australia against failure. It explained: 
This bias has led to an expectation that the government can prevent 
corporate failures through greater regulation and that, where companies do 
fail, it is necessarily due to the fault of the company and/ or its directors and 
executives. This will inevitably impact negatively on ASIC's ability to 
properly prioritise its enforcement actions, as it is being constantly called 
on to investigate any and all corporate failures, notwithstanding the actual 
risks that they present or whether a breach of law is involved.
19
 
20.19 ASIC informed the committee that its regulatory role 'does not involve 
preventing all consumer losses or ensuring full compensation for consumers in all 
instances where losses arise'. It stated: 
Our underpinning statutory objectives, regulatory tools, and resources are 
not intended to prevent many of the losses that investors and consumers 
will experience. This is true of every financial market regulator. 
This is a very important issue that goes to the heart of what financial market 
regulation is intended to achieve, and thus to expectations about ASIC's 
performance. Unlike prudential regulators, market conduct regulators such 
as ASIC do not have the same focus on preventing institutional collapse and 
the losses this may bring. In addition, our market-based system for 
investment and for capital raising, which has served Australia's 
development well, inevitably involves investors assuming an amount of risk 
in order to make a return.
20
 
20.20 Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan cited an interview related to 
ASIC's 2012 enforcement report during which Mr Medcraft, emphasised that 'you get 
what you pay for'. Mr Medcraft went on to stress that:  
ASIC had only 26 staff to cover 25 investment banks; the 135 insurers are 
reviewed only once every seven years; although the big four audit firms are 
reviewed once every 1.5 years the remaining 72 audit firms are reviewed 
less than once a decade; and that although the top 20 financial planners are 
reviewed once every 1.7 years, for the next 30 largest it is only once every 
                                              
17  Mr Peter Rigby, Submission 364, p. 1. 
18  Burke Bond Financial Pty Ltd, Submission 98, p. 1. 
19  Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission 119, p. 3. 
20  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 17. 
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3.8 years. This is the actuarial reality of contemporary Australian 
regulation.
21
 
20.21 Mr Medcraft told the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services (PJCCFS) that Australia has a system that is 'based on 
self-execution and relies on people to do the right and it was about time people 'were 
realistic about what we do and what we cannot do'.
22
 In his view, it was important for 
ASIC to be 'transparent, to show Australians what we do in terms of engagement, 
surveillance, guidance and enforcement'.
23
 As another example of ASIC's limited 
capacity, Mr Kell told the committee that ASIC simply cannot visit all financial 
advisers. A complete set of figures on the number of years it would theoretically take 
ASIC to cover the entire regulated population through 'high intensity' surveillances 
(those lasting more than two days), based on the number of surveillances conducted 
during 2012–2013, were outlined in Chapter 4.  
20.22 This evidence clearly shows the limitations placed on ASIC's capacity 
to monitor and survey the people its licenses and regulates. But this message does not 
appear to be reflected in public expectations of ASIC's role. For example, a submitter 
advised that before subscribing to a trading information service he 'verified that the 
company is registered with ASIC in order to make sure if something goes wrong 
I have an official authority to protect my rights as a consumer/customer'. After further 
investigation, he alleged that the company was engaging in fraudulent phoenix 
activity. The submitter expressed concern that before a company registration occurs, 
ASIC does not check what products the company offers and whether these products 
are regulated by ASIC or not.
24
 
Financial literacy 
20.23 The perception that ASIC is able to provide a guarantee about the soundness 
and integrity of a financial service provider, a company or a product is further 
complicated by the level of literacy and numeracy skills in Australia. Australia's 
National Financial Literacy Strategy defines financial literacy as: 
…a combination of financial knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours 
necessary to make sound financial decisions, based on personal 
circumstances, to improve personal financial wellbeing.
25
 
                                              
21  Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan, Submission 121, p. 15. 
22  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, PJCCFS Hansard, Oversight of ASIC, 12 September 
2012, pp. 14–15. 
23  Mr Greg Medcraft, PJCCFS Hansard, Oversight of ASIC, 12 September 2012, p. 15. 
24  Mr Mustaffa Abu Sedira, Submission 427, pp. 1–2. 
25  Financial Literacy Board, submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 28 March 2014,   
http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/Financial_Literacy_Board.pdf. 
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20.24 According to the Financial Literacy Board, financially literate consumers are 
'more likely to make informed financial decisions and less likely to choose unsuitable 
products, thus potentially reducing the degree of regulatory intervention required'.
26
 
Many organisations in the industry, however, cited the growing complexity of 
financial products over the past decade. For example, an OECD policy brief noted that 
the growing sophistication of financial markets means that: 
…consumers are not just choosing between interest rates on two different 
bank loans or savings plans, but are rather being offered a variety of 
complex financial instruments for borrowing and saving, with a large range 
of options. At the same time, the responsibility and risk for financial 
decisions that will have a major impact on an individual's future life, 
notably pensions, are being shifted increasingly to workers and away from 
government and employers. As life expectancy is increasing, the pension 
question is particularly important as individuals will be enjoying longer 
periods of retirement.
27
 
20.25 The Consumer Action Law Centre referred to the current disclosure-based 
regulatory approach in Australia, which, in its view, 'fails to address many of the 
consumer problems in credit and financial services'. It suggested that more disclosure 
is often a bad thing and noted also that: 
 credit and financial products are extremely complex and non-experts will 
frequently misunderstand even the most important elements; 
 people do not necessarily choose between products 'rationally', they make 
quick decisions using mental shortcuts when dealing with unfamiliar topics or 
when limited by time; and 
 people typically have trouble calculating costs and risks, especially when the 
cost or risk is temporally remote.
28
  
20.26 Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith also drew the committee's attention to 
research showing there were 'serious reasons to doubt the regulatory efficacy of 
disclosure when as much reliance is placed on it'. She maintained: 
In essence the literacy and numeracy skills of the majority of Australians 
are not adequate for reading and analysing disclosure material for common 
retail financial products including superannuation. There are also indelible 
behavioural biases in financial decision making which can lead to unwise 
                                              
26  Financial Literacy Board, submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 28 March 2014,   
http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/Financial_Literacy_Board.pdf. 
27  OECD, 'The Importance of Financial Education', Policy Brief, 2006, www.oecd.org/finance/ 
financial-education/37087833.pdf. See also OECD, Financial Literacy and Consumer 
Protection: Overlooked Aspects of the Crisis, OECD Recommendation on good practices on 
financial education and awareness relating to credit, June 2009, 
www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/43138294.pdf. 
28  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 7. 
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decisions. Often disclosure documents seem more apt to protect the issuer 
or adviser than to inform the investor.
29
 
20.27 She underscored the important link between consumer behaviour and 
financial literacy: 
The low level of financial literacy in Australia leads to an investor 
propensity to assess advice on 'the advisor's confidence, approachability, 
friendliness or professional manner' without looking too critically at the 
technical aspects or content of the statement of advice. This is one of the 
behavioural biases that can lead to unwise investment decision-making 
…Senior citizens are seen as more vulnerable consumers, and account for 
up to 30% of investment fraud victims.
30
 
20.28 Many of the personal accounts before the committee, especially those drawn 
from the two case studies, demonstrate the harm that can result from investors or 
consumers placing too much trust in their adviser and in not asking questions or 
seeking second opinions. A former ASIC enforcement adviser, Mr Niall Coburn, 
suggested that ASIC needs to review how it responds to individuals and their 
expectations. In his view ASIC 'needs to get out into the community a lot more than it 
does and explain', before people invest, that they 'do not put 100 per cent in a 
managed investment scheme': they do not put all their 'eggs in one basket'.
31
 
The Consumer Credit Legal Centre strongly recommended that: 
…ASIC consider adopting a 'campaign approach' to enforcement like that 
used by the ACCC. In this approach, the regulator takes a multi-pronged 
approach to the issue by issuing media releases about concerns, guides 
about best practice conduct, investigations, negotiations with affected 
businesses and enforcement. We are aware that ASIC conducts all of these 
activities but suggest they could do more to coordinate them in a strategic 
and publicly overt manner to maximise the combined effect.
32
 
20.29 The Governance Institute of Australia observed that there was a wealth of 
useful information on the ASIC and MoneySmart websites, yet the messages were 
'usually only understood by those who operate in corporate circles'. It noted that 'the 
expansion in the number of incorporated entities over the past 20–30 years, with 
which retail investors and consumers are involved through superannuation, securities 
trading, and employment, for example, means that ASIC is now just as relevant to 
them as the ATO is'.
33
 It noted further that many in the broader community do not 
know what ASIC does because it does not widely advertise its functions. It therefore 
recommended that ASIC: 
                                              
29  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, pp. 7–8. 
30  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 24 (footnotes omitted). 
31  Mr Niall Coburn, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, p. 7.  
32  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Submission 194, p. 13. 
33  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 8. 
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…should consider engaging in a broader and more prominent marketing 
and advertising campaign to promote the regulatory framework which it 
oversees, the intellectual property which it creates to guide those who are 
regulated, retail investors, and consumers, and the other various services it 
provides in administering the regulatory framework. 
ASIC's role as an educator for the private and corporate sector is pivotal to 
its ongoing functions and the effective regulation of the sector.
34
 
20.30 The Law Council suggested more should be done to correct the public belief 
that ASIC, by licencing financial services providers, is like APRA and can act 
to protect the interests of individuals.
35
 
Committee view 
20.31 In Chapter 5, the committee recommended that ASIC consider adopting a 
multi-pronged campaign to educate retail customers about the care they need to take 
when entering into a financial transaction and where they can find assistance and 
affordable and independent advice when they find themselves in difficulties because 
of that transaction. The committee's findings in this chapter further underline 
the importance of ASIC's role in financial education, especially when considering the 
unrealistic expectations that many consumers have of ASIC's main functions. ASIC 
may licence persons, but it cannot endorse their business model nor their 
trustworthiness.  
20.32 The committee has also recommended that ASIC review the information 
provided on the search results and extracts from its registers. To help avoid any 
misunderstanding about ASIC's role in approving the operations of various entities, 
on these documents ASIC should more clearly explain its role and what the extracts 
mean. 
Recommendation 35 
20.33 The committee recommends that ASIC include on all registry search 
results and extracts a prominent statement explaining ASIC's role and advising 
that ASIC does not approve particular business models. 
Recommendation 36 
20.34 The committee recommends that in bringing together the multi-pronged 
campaign to educate retail customers outlined in Recommendation 1, ASIC have 
regard to the fact that: 
 many retail investors and consumers have unrealistic expectations of 
ASIC's role in protecting their interests; and  
                                              
34  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 8. 
35  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 4. 
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 financial literacy is more than financial knowledge but also incorporates 
the skills, attitudes and behaviours necessary to make sound financial 
decisions. 
20.35 Before concluding this chapter on expectations and financial literacy, the 
committee considers the role of the Consumer Advisory Panel (CAP).  
Consumer Advisory Panel 
20.36 Established in 1999, CAP's role is to advise ASIC on current consumer 
protection issues and give feedback on ASIC policies and activities. It also advises 
ASIC on key consumer research and education projects. The Consumer Credit Legal 
Centre informed the committee that it has an open and constructive working 
relationship with ASIC through its participation on the CAP.  
20.37 The Consumer Action Law Centre was also pleased with ASIC's collaboration 
with consumer advocates, particularly through the CAP. It noted that the recent 
introduction of a CAP 'matters register' would enable progress of matters referred to 
ASIC from CAP members to be tracked at each meeting. Nonetheless, it suggested 
that consideration could be given to whether:  
 ASIC could do more to prioritise the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
consumers; and 
 ASIC's consumer protection outcomes may be improved by enhancing the 
responsibilities of the CAP to more closely resemble the UK's Financial 
Services Consumer Panel.
36
 
20.38 Established under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), 
the Financial Services Consumer Panel (FSCP) is an independent statutory body set 
up to represent the interests of all groups of financial services consumers in the 
development of policy for the regulation of financial services. Its membership must be 
such 'as to give a fair degree of representation to those who are using, or are or may be 
contemplating using, services other than in connection with business carried on by 
them'. According to the FSCP, it works 'to advise and challenge' the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) from 'the earliest stages of its policy development' to ensure 
it takes into account the consumer interest. It also takes a keen interest in broader 
issues for consumers in financial services where it believes it can help achieve 
beneficial change/outcomes for consumers'. Its duties include: 
 meeting regularly with the FCA and being available for consultation on 
specific high-level issues;  
 actively bringing to the attention of the FCA issues which are likely to be of 
significance to consumers; 
                                              
36  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 12. 
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 commissioning such research as it considers necessary in order to help it 
to fulfil its duties under these terms of reference;  
 requesting access to information from the FCA which it reasonably requires 
to carry out its work; and 
 requesting regular access to the FCA chairman, board, chief executive and 
senior executives of the FCA.
37
 
20.39 In its submission, the Consumer Action Law Centre noted that the FSCP 
describes its role as:  
…bringing a 'consumer perspective to aid effective regulation', supporting 
or challenging the FCA where required and acting 'as an independent 
counter balance' to parallel boards which represent the interests of 
industry.
38
 
Committee view 
20.40 The committee is of the view that ASIC could do more to prioritise the needs 
of consumer interests and should consider whether it could improve the work of the 
CAP by introducing some of the features of the Financial Services Consumer Panel. 
Recommendation 37 
20.41 Recognising the importance of giving priority to the needs of consumers 
when ASIC develops regulatory guidance and provides advice to government, the 
committee recommends that ASIC should consider whether its Consumer 
Advisory Panel could be enhanced by the introduction of some of the features of 
the United Kingdom's Financial Services Consumer Panel. 
20.42 In this chapter, the committee considered public expectations and financial 
literacy with an emphasis on educating people so that they are in a stronger position 
to protect their interests. The committee also recognised the importance of ASIC 
giving priority to consumer protection and suggested a more involved CAP could help 
achieve this objective.  
20.43 In the next chapter, the committee continues its examination of ASIC's 
engagement and relationship with retail investors and consumers by considering how 
ASIC converses with those who are making a complaint or seeking ASIC's assistance. 
                                              
37  UK Financial Services Consumer Panel, www.fs-cp.org.uk/about_us/what_is_the_panel.shtml 
(accessed 12 May 2014). 
38  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 12. 
 
  
 
Chapter 21 
Communication and complaints management  
21.1 The committee has referred to the many cases where submitters felt that ASIC 
simply did not listen to or did not care about their report of alleged misconduct and 
expressed extreme disappointment with ASIC's response to their concerns. 
Their complaints about ASIC centred on three broad areas: delays in response or 
failing to respond; inadequacy of response; and the tone of the response. In this 
chapter, the committee considers the way in which ASIC manages complaints lodged 
with it and communicates with retail investors and consumers seeking the regulator's 
assistance.  
21.2 Paragraph (d) of the inquiry's terms of reference directed the committee 
to examine ASIC's performance in relation to its complaints management policies and 
practices. The term 'complaint' has been interpreted to include both misconduct 
reports, that is when a complaint potentially involves a contravention of the legislation 
ASIC administers, and complaints made about ASIC. 
Timeliness 
21.3 Delays in responding to requests and poor feedback, including a failure 
to keep a complainant informed of progress, were among the numerous concerns that 
submitters raised with the committee. Extracts from selected submissions are provided 
below to illustrate some of the objections the committee received about the timeliness 
of ASIC's handling of misconduct reports: 
Unfortunately it is difficult to monitor what progress is being made, if any, 
with complaints forwarded to ASIC. Generally, it has been difficult to get 
ASIC officers to even acknowledge the receipt of complaints and to get 
responses to other matters presented.
1
 
* * * 
On October 2007 I submitted 3 complaints against the Nab to ASIC. These 
complaints were forwarded to ASIC with all the printouts put on discs. 
ASIC later informed me that they have recorded the information in its 
confidential internal database and will be of assistance to them should they 
receive further similar complaints. On the 29th February 2008 I received an 
Email from ASIC that (Nab) has advised that the changing of my family's 
account type will be looked into and finalised by September 2008. Who is 
ASIC kidding, a further 7 months.
2
 
* * * 
                                              
1  Name withheld, Submission 213, attachment 1, p. 6. 
2  Ms Muriel McClymont, Submission 425, p. [2]. 
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There was no discernible response in my situation from ASIC until letters 
were written by Members of Parliament.
3
 
* * * 
(the following is an extract of a letter to ASIC's chairman) Furthermore it is 
obvious your staff do not respond to telephone calls that are made regarding 
this subject of systemic problems. I have been told by your staff members 
that the call I made was logged on and it would be replied to in 2 days. Two 
weeks have passed and still no answer!
4
 
21.4 The Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) was of the view that: 
ASIC needs to respond to consumer complaints in a timely fashion and, 
where timeliness is not practical, keep consumers (and their advocates) 
informed in some appropriate way.
5
 
21.5 Mr Gerard Brody, the chief executive officer of the Consumer Action Law 
Centre, informed the committee that his organisation makes around 40 or so detailed 
complaints a year to ASIC where it is acting for a client as well as less detailed 
complaints of an allegation of misconduct where the consumer is happy to talk to the 
regulator directly. The Centre was of the view that improved communication about 
complaints would 'encourage ASIC to be more timely in enforcement actions'. More 
broadly, this might also be improved with an enhanced consumer advisory role within 
ASIC.
6
 
21.6 Mr Brody stated that the Centre encouraged regulators to consider 'providing 
better and timely feedback to those who make complaints about potential misconduct'. 
While he recognised that ASIC had limitations on what it can say about ongoing 
investigations, he noted that there was a danger in regulators not saying anything. 
In his view: 
It can mean consumers and consumer organisations have reduced 
motivation to complain and that evidence that regulators need to take 
enforcement action is not forthcoming. We are pleased that ASIC has taken 
up this recommendation and is now reporting to consumer organisations 
about complaints and progress made.
7
 
Clarity in response  
21.7 Timeliness was not the only problem. The Commonwealth Ombudsman also 
informed the committee that complainants often say that even after ASIC informs 
                                              
3  Mrs Jan Braund, Submission 244, p. 4. 
4  Mrs M Woolnough, Submission 346, p. [3]. 
5  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Submission 194, p. 2. 
6  Mr Gerard Brody, Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Action Law Centre, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 39. 
7  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 39. 
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them of its decision, they do not understand why ASIC arrived at its conclusion. 
According to the Ombudsman, this was particularly the case when the decision related 
to the exercise of ASIC's discretion, such as the discretion not to investigate a report 
of misconduct or waive late fees. In this regard, the Ombudsman noted that it accepted 
that ASIC was 'best placed to determine its priorities and what may be in the broader 
public interest'. Even so, the Ombudsman observed that complaints received by his 
office regarding ASIC's decisions not to investigate reports of misconduct were 
'usually resolved only after a more detailed and better explanation of the decision has 
been provided'. The Ombudsman explained: 
…where we do investigate a complaint, the remedy provided in the 
majority of cases is a further explanation of the decision by ASIC. In these 
cases, our investigations typically lead us to conclude that ASIC's decision 
was not unreasonable or administratively flawed, but that ASIC's decision 
simply required further and better explanation.
8
 
21.8 He concluded: 
Although ASIC is a specialist independent regulator with market 
knowledge and expertise which informs its decision making, the fact that 
complaints are usually resolved through ASIC's internal review process or 
where ASIC (or this office) provides a better explanation to the 
complainant suggests that ASIC could improve the explanations of its 
decisions in the first instance.
9
 
21.9 The Ombudsman observed that the results of the 2013 ASIC stakeholder 
survey suggested that one of ASIC's perceived limitations was that it does not clearly 
communicate what it is doing. In the Ombudsman's view, early management of 
expectations about what ASIC can or will do and the provision of better explanations 
of decisions to complainants should lead to a decrease in the number of complainants 
seeking an internal review of decisions by ASIC and of complaints to the Ombudsman 
about ASIC. Such improvements would benefit ASIC by reducing its complaint 
handling workload, as well as reassuring staff and complainants that problems have 
been dealt with in the appropriate manner and have not been allowed to fester.
10
 
Tone of communication 
21.10 Many submitters expressed frustration with ASIC's poor communication or 
apparent inaction following a report about possible breaches or complaints. One of the 
lasting impressions that retail investors were left with from ASIC's response to their 
complaint was that ASIC does not care. Ms Anne Lampe, a former financial journalist 
and former employee of ASIC's media unit, referred to what she held to be ASIC's 
'consistent failure to adequately protect, seemingly care, or bother to take action when 
                                              
8  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 15. 
9  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 16. 
10  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, pp. 15–16. 
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small investors and self-funded retirees are stripped of their life savings'.
11
 Making a 
similar observation, Mr Bill Doherty stated: 
The ASIC complaints handling procedure is a total failure. People do not 
wish to be told that their Complaint will be added to a data base when they 
contact ASIC at their wits end. They do not wish to be advised to get a 
lawyer when they are impecunious because of ASIC failings. I personally 
referred a complaint about Ariff about 6 mths after ASIC commenced Civil 
Action against him and I got the Robotic response yet again.
12
 
21.11 Many investors and consumers who wrote to the committee believed that they 
had strong evidence of maladministration in lending or misconduct by advisers or 
directors but when they contacted ASIC for assistance, it failed to act on their 
complaint in any effective way.
13
 A number referred to their disappointment in 
receiving a 'flick letter' or generic response, 'scripted or form letter', 'a boilerplate or 
robotic reply'.
14
 Indeed a number of submissions referred to ASIC's insensitive 
or indifferent response to their circumstances. Submitters were particularly galled, 
in the face of financial ruin, by ASIC's advice to seek a lawyer.
15
 In this regard, 
one submitter described ASIC's response to his concerns about Storm as: 
One of the best bits of advice, that ASIC have to offer, is for Bank Clients 
to get themselves a Lawyer, when they know, only too well, that affected 
victims have been reduced to being almost penniless by the deliberately 
orchestrated plan by Banks to gain control of the life savings of victims.
16
 
Other concerns 
21.12 Submitters also expressed frustration about the effort involved in preparing 
their complaint, compiling supporting documentation and answering queries from 
ASIC, all to no avail. In its ultimate response to a complaint from Mr Trevor Eriksson, 
ASIC wrote that it had limited powers in relation to commercial lending contracts and 
that ASIC did not generally intervene in private commercial disputes. Mr Eriksson 
advised, however, that when he initially discussed his complaint with ASIC officers, 
they were enthusiastic about investigating the matter and suggested that there could be 
contraventions. Ultimately, in the face of ASIC's apparent loss of interest, 
Mr Eriksson argued that 'ASIC should not have misled the writers of complaint; they 
should have known that they did not have the power to investigate and said so 
upfront'.
17
 ASIC's approach to investigating complaints from individuals, and how this 
                                              
11  Submission 106, p. 1. 
12  Mr Bill Doherty, Submission 138, p. [3]. 
13  See for example, Submission 71.  
14  Submissions 1, 21, 26, 106, 110, 213, 279, 365 and 400. 
15  Submissions 82, 106, 131 and 138. 
16  Name withheld, Submission 82, p. 1. 
17  Mr Trevor Eriksson, Submission 212, p. [4]. 
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is reflected in ASIC's 'no further action' letters, was also objected to in other 
submissions: 
 (the following is an extract of a 2010 letter to ASIC's then chairman) 
…ASIC is neglecting its responsibilities under s.12 of its Act for business 
to business unconscionability in financial services. Worse, it is persistently 
turning away supplicants whose complaints should be taken seriously. 
Frankly, it is difficult to take seriously the claims in some letters in 
response from ASIC staff that the complainant's case has been properly 
examined.
18
 
* * * 
On April 15th 2013, a response to my complaint was written and signed by 
Warren Day, Senior Executive Leader Stakeholder Services. I appreciate 
that some investigation was made regarding some my allegations. However, 
there was no effort to contact me in order to clarify matters. As a result, 
there is considerable presumption in their response. For instance, they 
presumed that the matter regarding the bank providing a loan based on 
'house and land' value yet selling our property 'for land value only' on the 
grounds that the house was 'illegal', had been dealt with in court. If they had 
bothered to contact me, I could have explained that this was impossible as 
the hearings were all held before the bank sold our property. Of course, if 
they had thought about it, common sense would have brought them to that 
conclusion all by themselves. 
ASIC pointed out that a few of my complaints can only be dealt with 
through other avenues, and I accept that. However, they are completely 
wrong in some of their other responses. The overall result is that though the 
letter appears to address my complaints, by the end of it, ASIC have 
successfully deflected every bit of responsibility toward any of the issues.
19
 
* * * 
I am not directly involved in a tangle with ASIC. The extent of my 
experience concerns the extreme time and energy I have put in trying to 
stop a friend from committing suicide…He turned to ASIC for help and 
was summarily dismissed. For whatever reason, ASIC was not interested in 
his case, giving him the impression that the sum involved was too low for 
ASIC to investigate. He was devastated by their response.
20
 
21.13 Submitters objected to receiving unsigned replies from ASIC.21 One submitter 
advised that after receiving such a letter they were unable to contact anyone to discuss 
the matter further: 
                                              
18  Dr Evan Jones, Submission 295, attachment 1, p. 1. 
19  Ms Susan Field, Submission 75, p. 2. 
20  Mr Dan McLean, Submission 105, p. 1. 
21  For example, see Name withheld, Submission 20.2, p. 1 and Mrs Caroline Baker, 
Submission 49, p. 1. 
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I later got a letter from ASIC with no name at the bottom and signed 
"Misconduct and Breach Reporting". When I called the phone number 
provided I was then repeatedly told no one knows anything about this 
matter.
22
 
21.14 One aggrieved individual concluded that the aim of ASIC's complaints 
processes 'seems to be to let the dissatisfied victim—who has had little help in 
actually seeing justice done—let off some steam and then be left to pick up the pieces 
of their shattered life while ASIC neatly files the complaint'.
23
 
Standards for handling misconduct reports and complaints 
21.15 It is clear that ASIC receives a substantial volume of queries, complaints and 
misconduct reports. In 2012–13, ASIC's client contact centre received over 700,000 
telephone calls. ASIC's annual report for that year notes that over 80 per cent of calls 
were answered on the spot with the remainder referred to specialist staff.
24
 Also in 
2012–13, ASIC received and assessed 11,682 reports of alleged misconduct, 
11,320 statutory reports and 1,214 breach reports.
25
 
21.16 ASIC governs its complaints handling processes by a service charter. 
The charter sets targets for ASIC to provide various services or undertake certain 
functions. Table 21.1 summarises the service charter targets and ASIC's results in 
2012–13 against these targets 
                                              
22  Mr Owen Salmon, Submission 368, p. 3. 
23  Dr Peter Brandson, Submission 232, p. 7. 
24  ASIC, Annual Report 2012–13, p. 51. 
25  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 4. 
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Table 21.1: ASIC's service charter results, 2012–13 
Service Service target 2012–13 performance 
General telephone queries ASIC aims to answer telephone queries 
on the spot 
Of telephone queries handled 
directly by the contact centre 
(716,382), 80.5% (576,513) were 
answered on the spot and 19.5% 
(139,869) were referred to specialist 
staff 
General email queries ASIC aims to reply to email queries 
within two business days 
77% (111,399 of 144,204) 
General correspondence 
about the public database 
and registers (including 
fee waivers) 
ASIC aims to acknowledge receipt 
within 14 days of receiving it, with full 
response within 28 days 
85% (17,387 of 20,478) 
Registering a company ASIC aims to complete company 
registrations within one business day 
98% (200,326 of 204,035) 
Updating company 
information and status 
ASIC aims to enter critical changes to 
company information in the corporate 
register within two business days 
98% (995,676 of 1,013,048) 
Registering as an auditor ASIC aims to decide whether to register 
an auditor within 28 days of receiving a 
complete application 
92% (123 individual applications 
and 16 authorised audit companies) 
Registering as a 
liquidator 
ASIC aims to decide whether to register 
a liquidator or official liquidator within 
28 days 
100% of liquidator applications 
(37 of 37 applications) and 98% for 
official liquidators (44 of 45 
applications) 
Applying for or varying 
an AFS licence 
ASIC aims to decide whether to grant 
or vary an AFS licence within 28 days 
79% of licences granted within 
28 days (374 of 472 applications) 
83% of licence variations decided in 
28 days (649 of 784 applications 
Registering a managed 
investment scheme 
By law ASIC must register a managed 
investment scheme within 14 days of 
receiving a complete application 
100% (205 of 205) 
Applying for or varying a 
credit licence 
ASIC aims to decide whether to grant 
or vary a credit licence within 28 days 
83% of licence applications (313 of 
375) and 91% of licence variations 
Applying for relief For applications for relief from the 
Corporations Act that do not raise new 
policy issues, ASIC aims to give an 
in-principle decision within 21 days of 
receiving all necessary information 
71% of in-principle decisions (1,935 
of 2,744 applications) 
Complaints about 
misconduct by a 
company or individual 
For reports alleging misconduct by a 
company or an individual, ASIC aims 
to respond within 28 days of receiving 
all relevant information (target: 70%) 
76% (8,828 of 11,682) 
Source: ASIC, Submission 45.2, pp. 71–72. 
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21.17 Although ASIC has set a target for responding to general correspondence 
about its public database and registers and misconduct reports, ASIC does not have a 
target set for responding to other general correspondence. ASIC's service charter 
provides the following explanation: 
For other general correspondence, the exact timing and content of our 
response will depend on each case and the request. 
In some cases, it may not be appropriate for us to fully respond to 
correspondence, or be reasonable to expect us to do so. For example, 
correspondence about surveillance, investigations and enforcement may 
involve sensitive and highly confidential matters that will restrict what we 
can say, or prevent us from replying at all.
26
 
21.18 The committee compared ASIC's approach to those adopted by other 
regulators and law enforcement agencies. The ACCC's service charter states that 
it aims to respond within 15 business days of receipt to letters or webforms that 
request a response.
27
 APRA aims to reply to email queries from members of the public 
within two business days and all other correspondence within 15 business days.
28
 
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) aims to provide a substantive response to 
correspondence received from consumers and firms within 12 business days of 
receipt, for which it has set a target of 90 per cent. During the period 1 October 2012 
to 31 March 2013, the FCA responded to 96.1 per cent of consumer correspondence 
and 94.1 per cent of correspondence from firms within the 12 business day 
timeframe.
29
 The service charter of the AFP does not include timeframe targets, noting 
that the 'nature of investigating criminal activity makes it difficult to provide specific 
timeframes for completion of the investigations that we undertake'. However, the AFP 
does commit to advising relevant parties of the progress of investigations at 
'reasonable intervals', except where the investigation may be jeopardised by doing 
so.
30
 
21.19 The Commonwealth Ombudsman informed the committee that complainants 
often report long delays when waiting for a response from ASIC about their 
complaint, which can 'be a source of frustration, especially when delay results in lost 
revenue'. The Ombudsman's Better Practice Guide to Complaint Handling states that 
                                              
26  ASIC, ASIC Service Charter, September 2012, p. 4. 
27  The ACCC's service charter adds: 'We receive a lot of contact from people simply providing us 
with information. In those circumstances, we will record your information but we may not 
provide a response'. ACCC, Service Charter, www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-
competition-consumer-commission/service-charter (accessed 10 October 2013). 
28  APRA, 'APRA Service Charter', www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Publications/Pages/APRA-
Service-Charter.aspx (accessed 10 October 2013). 
29  UK FCA, 'Our Performance: Communications', www.fca.org.uk/about/governance/our-
performance/standards/communications (accessed 10 October 2013). 
30  AFP, 'AFP service charter for the Australian community' www.afp.gov.au/about-the-
afp/service-charters/afp-service-charter.aspx (accessed 10 October 2013). 
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once a complaint has been made to an agency, the complaint should be resolved as 
quickly as possible in order to prevent irritation or fatigue which 'can thwart 
successful complaint handling'.
31
 
21.20 Service charters and quantifiable performance benchmarks are useful, but care 
should be taken in analysing the results. Further, some individuals who have 
interacted with ASIC expressed suspicion about how the performance targets could be 
met: 
The email inquiry response service is useless for anything that is not 
'routine'. My experience is to receive an automated response notification. 
Then, if I am very lucky, a proforma response weeks later. Invariably, that 
second response does not address the issue, or may promise that another 
area or officer will follow-up. In reality, that proforma response is sufficient 
for ASIC to mark the enquiry as concluded. Needless to say any promised 
follow-up does not materialise.
32
 
Assessment of ASIC's processes 
21.21 In assessing ASIC's performance at managing misconduct reports and 
complaints, the committee has paid particular regard to the evidence from ASIC 
and the Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
ASIC's response 
21.22 ASIC advised that although it has 'a good record' of meeting its service charter 
targets, it has been 'making continual efforts to improve the way we handle reports of 
misconduct and our communication with persons who have made a report'.
33
 ASIC 
has recently been publishing additional information about how it assesses 
complaints—in October 2012 and July 2013 ASIC released a number of information 
sheets on how it approaches commonly reported matters.
34
 In its main submission, 
ASIC reported that over the past two years it has developed a 'customer engagement 
framework'. Key aspects of the framework include a protocol for handling reports of 
misconduct, clear communication objectives as the report of misconduct is handled 
and efforts to provide clear information about reporting misconduct on ASIC's 
website.
35
 Under the customer engagement framework: 
 personal telephone contact (or two attempts) is now made with the person 
who lodged the report of misconduct to ASIC within three business days of 
receipt for all reports (except for market matters, which are responded to 
                                              
31  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Better Practice Guide to Complaint Handling, April 2009, p. 14. 
32  Name withheld, Submission 263, p. 5. 
33  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 88. 
34  ASIC, 'ASIC releases new information sheets on dispute resolution and misconduct', Media 
Release, no. 13-181, 18 July 2013. 
35  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 95. 
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immediately due to the sensitivities of the matters raised in these reports of 
misconduct); 
 two new report-handling streams have been developed, as follows: 
 'rapid handling'—for matters outside of ASIC's jurisdiction or are 
appropriate for rapid resolution by way of a telephone call and targeted 
information; and 
 'expedited communication'—for matters within ASIC's jurisdiction and 
which ASIC will collect information on, but where ASIC cannot directly 
resolve the person's particular concerns; 
 the 'how to complain' section on ASIC's website has been redesigned; and 
 customer service principles have been adopted for the handling of reports of 
misconduct.
36
 
21.23 Mr Medcraft informed the committee that ASIC had taken significant steps 
to improve transparency and communication. He acknowledged, however, that despite 
all its efforts, ASIC officers have heard the clear message from the submissions—'we 
need to communicate more and we need to communicate more effectively about our 
work and our decisions'. He stated that this was 'an ongoing goal of the commission'.
37
 
21.24 It is also necessary to acknowledge another aspect of complaints handling. 
Government agencies such as ASIC are often contacted by distressed individuals who 
have few options for having the wrong, or perceived wrong, that they have suffered 
remedied. Guidance published by the Commonwealth Ombudsman observes that these 
complainants can exhibit unreasonable behaviour and be unwilling to accept decisions 
taken about their complaint. They can present employees with various difficulties: 
These complainants often tend to be angry, aggressive and abusive to staff 
members. They threaten harm, they are dishonest or intentionally 
misleading in presenting the facts, or they deliberately withhold relevant 
information. They flood agency offices with unnecessary telephone calls, 
emails and large amounts of irrelevant printed material. These complainants 
tend to insist on outcomes that are clearly not possible or appropriate, or 
demand things they are not entitled to. At the end of the process they are 
often unwilling to accept decisions and continue to demand further action 
on their complaint.
38
 
21.25 The committee is aware of cases where ASIC is required to deal with 
individuals that have unrealistic expectations either about what ASIC can do or the 
degree of access that they should have to ASIC employees. Further, there is clearly 
                                              
36  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 96. 
37  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 2.  
38  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Better Practice Guide to Managing Unreasonable Complainant 
Conduct, June 2009, p. 1. 
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scope for aggrieved individuals to take up a disproportionate amount of ASIC's 
resources.
39
 
Evidence from the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
21.26 The Commonwealth Ombudsman advised that in 2012–13 it received 
338 complaints about ASIC (representing 1.9 per cent of the total complaints received 
by the Ombudsman). By contrast, the Ombudsman received 55 complaints about the 
Australian Financial Security Authority, 35 complaints about the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority and 17 complaints about the ACCC.
40
 
21.27 The largest category of complaints received about ASIC in 2012–13 related to 
problems associated with the implementation of the new business names register. 
The Ombudsman advised that the remaining main areas of complaint about ASIC 
related to ASIC's discretionary decision to investigate a report of misconduct; ASIC's 
decision to not waive late fees; and accessibility, including difficulties making contact 
with ASIC, delays in receiving a response, and the usability of ASIC's online 
services.
41
 Another issue commonly raised in complaints is that there is uncertainty 
about how to complain to ASIC about ASIC: 
While ASIC's website contains a clear heading, "how to complain", the 
subsequent list of links does not offer a clear and explicit opportunity to 
make a complaint about ASIC.
42
 
21.28 The Commonwealth Ombudsman, Mr Colin Neave AM, told the committee 
that ASIC has taken steps to improve its website and is working to increase the 
capacity of its call centre. However, he considers that there are further ways that ASIC 
could improve, including by simplifying the complaints process and making it more 
accessible, particularly by delineating the process for complaining about ASIC from 
misconduct reporting. Mr Neave noted that his office had been engaging with ASIC 
about these issues and that 'overall ASIC has been responsive and cooperative'.
43
 
                                              
39  For example, ASIC advised that just five individuals have sent it approximately 400 separate 
pieces of correspondence since 2009 regarding a particular complaint. Further, over 
100 requests under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 have been lodged or reviews of 
decisions made under that Act taken place. Involved at various times in assessing the 
correspondence, requests and reviews were members of ASIC's Misconduct and Breach 
Reporting team, its Investment Managers and Superannuation stakeholder team, Chief Legal 
Office, and the Senior Executive Leader responsible for Stakeholder Services. ASIC's actions in 
this matter have also been reviewed by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. ASIC, answer to 
question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), pp. 38–39. 
40  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 5. 
41  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 3. 
42  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 3. 
43  Mr Colin Neave AM, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 
2014, p. 12. 
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21.29 The Ombudsman's Better Practice Guide to Complaint Handling suggests that 
when a decision has been made regarding a complaint, an explanation of the decision 
should be presented in a style the complainant can understand and should deal with 
each concern raised by the complaint.
44
 Further, Mr Neave suggested that handling 
complaints only in writing 'is not always the best way' and that consideration should 
be given to explaining the organisation's decision orally as well as in writing: 
…when someone is terribly upset about something having gone wrong, if 
the letter does not deal with reasonable precision with the elements of the 
complaint, that only makes it a lot worse for the institution, whether it is a 
private sector institution or ASIC itself. There are all sorts of reasons why 
this cannot happen. There might be some duty of confidentiality, there 
might be some privacy problems or there might be some other issue, but my 
recommendation to any organisation which is dealing with complaints is: if 
you get a chance to sit down with the person who is making the complaint 
and talk it through with them, the whole communication dynamic changes 
quite significantly.
45
 
21.30 Mr Neave was asked whether consideration should be given to conducting an 
external audit of ASIC's complaints-handing processes. In his view, recent initiatives 
following the problems associated with the business names register have improved 
ASIC's capacities and processes. Mr Neave provided the following testimony:  
I think the progress which has been made recently, which we have been 
heavily involved with ourselves, has led to a point where it seems to be 
working quite well, but it is certainly something that we will be keeping a 
watchful eye on. When the business name issue arose, that is when the 
office became very interested in ASIC. We have been having meetings 
every couple of months with them ever since then in order to work on 
improving the complaint-handling processes. As I said before, we are also 
doing—and this goes across Commonwealth agencies and departments—
doing surveys and investigation. There will be some recommendations 
coming out of that which I think will assist not just ASIC but all 
Commonwealth departments and agencies. There is quite a deal of work 
going on.
46
 
Committee view 
21.31 The committee has received a significant number of submissions from 
individuals aggrieved by how ASIC managed their report of misconduct. There are 
examples where such reports were handled poorly, or could have been handled better. 
The committee does, however, recognise that it is only likely to be contacted by 
individuals who consider that their complaint did not receive sufficient attention or 
was otherwise not handled appropriately, not those satisfied with ASIC's performance 
                                              
44  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Better Practice Guide to Complaint Handling, April 2009, p. 25. 
45  Mr Colin Neave AM, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 14. 
46  Mr Colin Neave AM, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 15. 
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in this area. Further, the committee acknowledges that, at times, ASIC also has to deal 
with unreasonable complainants. 
21.32 Nevertheless, the committee does consider that ASIC needs to improve how it 
manages misconduct reports and complaints. In particular, ASIC must strive to be 
more responsive and sensitive to the concerns of consumers and retail investors, while 
adequately managing expectations about what it can do. The committee considers that 
ASIC should review how it manages and responds to misconduct reports from 
members of the public, particularly those from vulnerable and disadvantaged 
consumers. 
Recommendation 38 
21.33 The committee recommends that ASIC undertake an internal review of 
the way in which it manages complaints from retail investors and consumers 
with the aim of developing training and professional development courses 
designed to:  
 have ASIC officers more attuned to the needs of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged consumers and to enhance ASIC's consumer advisory 
role;  
 devise strategies and protocols for responding to retail investors and 
consumers registering a complaint, many of whom are at their wits end 
and in desperate need of help;  
 ensure that ASIC officers, when advising a consumer to transfer their 
complaint to the relevant external dispute resolution scheme, make that 
transfer as seamless and worry-free as possible while conveying the sense 
that ASIC is not discarding their complaint; and 
 acknowledge the advantages of making a return call to the complainant 
and provide guidance for ASIC officers on the times when making a 
return call would be appropriate. 
 
  
 
Chapter 22 
Service delivery and access to information 
22.1 As Australia's corporate, markets and financial services regulator, ASIC is 
contacted by and provides services to a large number of varied stakeholders. 
In particular, ASIC's registry services, such as those for company documents and 
business names, effectively require the entire business community to deal with ASIC. 
22.2 The committee received submissions critical of ASIC's registry services and 
approach to handling information. In fact, ASIC's performance at both ends of the 
information supply process was questioned; that is, stakeholders expressed displeasure 
at the processes for providing information to ASIC and the information ASIC makes 
available to the public. For example, industry participants and interested observers 
such as academics have an interest in accessing data held by ASIC so that they can 
better understand, consider and scrutinise industry developments. However, they 
outlined concern about the current impediments to accessing such data. This chapter 
considers these issues. The websites operated by ASIC, which perform a key role in 
the provision of ASIC's services as well as being an important source of information 
for members of the public and regulated entities, are also considered in this chapter.  
ASIC's registries and client services 
22.3 While most of the submissions that criticised ASIC's interactions with the 
public related to the handling of misconduct reports, the committee also received 
submissions regarding other aspects of ASIC's client services, such as the databases it 
is required to maintain. There are instances where miscommunication and inflexibility 
can lead to businesses suffering. One example was provided by Mr Graeme Hay, 
a director of a company based in Asia but also registered in Australia so that it can 
compete for government contracts. Section 201A of the Corporations Act requires that 
a proprietary company must have at least one director and that director must ordinarily 
reside in Australia. In his submission, Mr Hay advised that his sister was nominated as 
a director to satisfy this requirement. However, after his sister passed away, ASIC 
continued to address correspondence to her. Mr Hay submitter that letters sent to his 
address were not received because his address was entered into ASIC's database 
incorrectly by ASIC. Mr Hay provided a summary of how these events impacted his 
business: 
In April 2013, [Sub-Sea and Pipeline Protection International (PPI)] had 
won a significant contract with Charles Darwin University. Our company 
required an additional business name, operating bank accounts, and internet 
domain names. In order to obtain these, I needed a corporate key for the 
ASIC portal. I contacted ASIC for a corporate key for the ASIC portal. 
Despite a number of attempts by phone and email, I was unable to speak to 
any living person. As matters became dire, I instructed my Australian 
consultants to do the best they could until I was able to ascertain the ASIC 
information. 
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It was around this time that I was able to contact ASIC, and I was informed 
that PPI had been listed for de-registration! I was really quite shocked and 
was in disbelief. Our company prides itself on its successful operations and 
high integrity. PPI does not even owe any money to any creditors anywhere 
in the world. To be informed that a government statutory body had deemed 
our company to be in default for any reason was a genuine surprise. Initially 
I assumed there had been a misunderstanding or clerical error. I later 
learned that ASIC, had sent important documents to my sister's address 
after her passing. ASIC had actual knowledge that my sister had passed 
away. As aforementioned, ASIC claimed to have sent these 
communications to our Thailand office. These were never received. My 
Bangkok address has remained the same since 1987. The same address was 
noted on our original ASIC registration. A data entry error by ASIC meant 
all correspondence were not received.
1
 
22.4 Despite paying the fee required by ASIC, Mr Hay was informed that a notice 
of ASIC's intention to de-register the company would be placed on the register, 
'despite no de-registration occurring': 
This notice remains on the public record. In 30 years of business, PPI has 
never had one mark against our good name or our international reputation. 
The only mark now is this notice by ASIC. 
In May 2013 I was contacted by one of the world certification bodies. I was 
informed that there were concerns about PPI as PPI was "Under 
investigation by ASIC". This was untrue. I have since had ongoing trouble 
in business relations with long term vendors, accreditation organizations, 
international banks and a number of other institutions who, in the ordinary 
course of commerce have undertaken the usual prudent checks, only to find 
this unwarranted ASIC mark against our company's name. As the notice 
appears in the insolvency notices on the ASIC site, I am of the 
understanding that some credit reporting agencies have listed our company 
on their register. I am unable to find the words to describe how incredulous 
this makes me feel knowing that this is the result of (a) my sister's death, 
which was followed by a great period of family mourning, and (b) a 
clerical/administrative error of ASIC. It is very unreal.
2
 
22.5 ASIC was questioned about this matter at a public hearing. It advised that the 
notice was removed from the website on 10 May 2014. ASIC's interpretation of events 
was given as follows: 
…The background of the matter is that Mr Hay's company was listed for 
deregistration for not having paid its annual return fee that had been 
outstanding for over 12 months. The process is that we then publish a notice 
of deregistration as required by the law and separately write to all of the 
office holders at their home addresses that this is the process that is being 
undertaken. Mr Hay tells us that that is the first time that he heard about this 
                                              
1  Sub-Sea & Pipeline Protection International, Submission 404, pp. [1]–[2]. 
2  Sub-Sea & Pipeline Protection International, Submission 404, p. [2] (footnotes omitted). 
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deregistration process. There would have been a previous notice both to 
remind of the need to pay the annual fee at the time that it was due and a 
subsequent reminder, but the registered office Mr Hay tells us had changed. 
We had not been informed of that change. Subsequently, however, we 
became satisfied that there were reasons that suggested that it was not 
appropriate to proceed with the deregistration. Chief among them was that 
he paid the annual return fee, but also that there had been some 
communication that the previous registered office was no longer the right 
registered office. In fact, the sole Australian director had died and their 
spouse had advised us that she was no longer accepting mail at that 
particular address but we had no other address to follow up. Therefore it has 
been removed.
3
 
22.6 Another area of complaint about ASIC's registers related to how effectively 
they are integrated with other government databases. Mr David Pemberton, an 
accountant based in Darwin, questioned why ASIC's register of banned or disqualified 
persons does not include undischarged bankrupts. He advised that the response given 
to him by ASIC was that ASIC did not have the resources to update its registers with 
the details of individuals listed on the registers operated by the bankruptcy regulator, 
the Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA).
4
 
22.7 Based on their experiences of using ASIC's registry services and contacting 
ASIC, a small businesses owner suggested that ASIC has 'little, if any, understanding 
of small business'. The small business owner provided the following statement on 
their experience telephoning ASIC's call centre: 
Telephone inquiries can result in a wait of some 30 minutes up to 
90 minutes for connection. The call-centre operators I have encountered are 
disinterested in providing basic customer service, have little knowledge, 
read from prepared scripts, and have no interest in, or incentive to, 
providing a solution, provide no 'ownership' of an inquiry, or interest in any 
form of 'follow-up'.
5
 
22.8 The small business owner contrasted ASIC's call centre with private sector 
call centres they have encountered. From their experience, they consider that ASIC's 
call centre staff are unable to respond to more complex inquiries that are beyond the 
standard call centre scripts. The small business owner also advised that ASIC's call 
centre employees are not tasked with 'ownership' of an enquiry: 
I could relate numerous examples with a range of suppliers—particularly 
banks, share registries, and energy and internet providers—where such 
ownership has resulted in call-backs to keep me informed of the progress 
with an issue, a resolution and, often, a post-event call to gauge my 
                                              
3  Mr Greg Tanzer, Commissioner, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 105. 
4  Mr David Pemberton, Submission 279, p. 5. 
5  Name withheld, Submission 263, p. 5. 
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satisfaction with that resolution. In my experience such a concept is alien to 
ASIC.
6
 
22.9 The same submitter also argued that ASIC places 'the onus on small 
businesses to do ASIC's job': 
An example; 'If you have not received your annual statement within 5 days 
after the review date you should contact us'. Could you [imagine] you[r] 
electricity supplier putting on their web site: 'If you haven't got you bill 
5 days after it was due to be issued contact us'. Really.
7
 
22.10 The Commonwealth Ombudsman, which receives and investigates complaints 
about Australian government agencies such as ASIC, addressed the issues faced by 
small businesses. The Ombudsman provided some examples of its investigations 
to illustrate the difficulties clients experienced. Two examples are outlined below: 
Mr A attempted to register a business name online using ASIC Connect. 
His application was automatically rejected, as the name he was attempting 
to register was too similar to an existing registered business name. The 
existing registered business name was the name of Mr A's existing business 
and the purpose of his application for a new business name was to rename 
this business.  
Mr A successfully contacted ASIC by phone to explain the situation and to 
seek advice. In response, ASIC sent an email to Mr A with a link to a form 
for an application for review of the decision to reject the application. Mr A 
claimed that the link in the email did not work, and that after searching 
ASIC's website, most of the relevant links on the website were also broken. 
Mr A emailed ASIC explaining that the links were broken and that he still 
required assistance. After waiting a further 9 days without a response, Mr A 
contacted ASIC by phone. Mr A claimed that ASIC told him it was still 
unable to provide a response and that he would need to wait. Following 
this, Mr A tried on several occasions to contact ASIC by phone to check the 
progress of his matter. Mr A claimed he was either told that he would need 
to wait up to 2 hours in the phone queue or received a "busy 
announcement" message which advised that he should call back later. 
Three months after Mr A applied for the business name, Mr A complained 
to the Ombudsman that he had still not received a response from ASIC and 
that he was now unable to contact ASIC to discuss the matter. The 
Ombudsman transferred the complaint to ASIC pursuant to the complaint 
transfer agreement, and the matter was resolved.
8
 
* * * 
Ms G had a registered company. Ms G discovered that a competitor to her 
business registered a substantially similar business name to that of her 
company. Ms G believed that she had been losing revenue since this 
                                              
6  Name withheld, Submission 263, p. 6. 
7  Name withheld, Submission 263, p. 5. 
8  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, pp. 6–7. 
 Page 351 
 
occurred, as some customers were confusing the competitor's business with 
her own. 
Ms G complained to ASIC about the registration of the substantially similar 
business name. Despite numerous phone calls to ASIC, the matter was still 
not resolved over 5 months later. Ms G complained to the Ombudsman that 
ASIC had not resolved the issue within a reasonable time period. 
The Ombudsman investigated Ms G's complaint. ASIC cancelled the 
registration of the substantially similar business name, and apologised to 
Ms G for its delayed and insufficient communication. ASIC informed the 
Ombudsman that the delay in responding to Ms G was largely attributable 
to the high number of enquiries received by ASIC about business names 
following the introduction of the [business names register], and that 
systems and processes for dealing with business name conflicts and reviews 
were still in development.
9
 
22.11 The Commonwealth Ombudsman noted the results of ASIC's 2013 
stakeholder survey, which indicated that 23 per cent of small businesses that had 
interactions with ASIC considered ASIC to be 'very' or 'somewhat' difficult to deal 
with.
10
 
Committee view 
22.12 The committee is concerned by the evidence it has received about the 
experiences small businesses have had when dealing with ASIC. The committee notes 
that many of the issues relate to the implementation of the national business names 
register, and that ASIC has continued to improve the services related to that register. 
Nevertheless, the results of ASIC's own stakeholder engagement survey indicates that 
small businesses have the least positive view on how easy it is to deal with ASIC. 
There are also other examples of problems small businesses have had with ASIC. 
The committee urges ASIC to continue to improve its delivery of services to small 
businesses. 
Access to information collected by ASIC 
22.13 Given that ASIC gathers significant amounts of information and collects 
further information as a result of its regulatory activities, a number of witnesses were 
critical of ASIC's failure to publish much of this material. For example, a submission 
from several academics at the Adelaide Law School expressed concern about 'the 
relative lack of statistics and data for researchers, stakeholders and the wider public'. 
The group noted that ASIC receives and stores prescribed information under 
legislation and, while acknowledging that some of it cannot be made public, argued 
that anonymous and aggregate statistics could be made public if ASIC chose 
                                              
9  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 14. 
10  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 13 (footnote omitted). 
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to do so.
11
 The group contrasted ASIC's approach to that of other government 
agencies, such as the AFSA and the ATO: 
ITSA (now called AFSA) publishes far more information and interprets its 
received data in a way that provides a clear and detailed analysis of trends, 
for example in its Profile of Debtors. As another example the ATO makes 
1% of its tax files available for research and analysis, on an anonymous 
basis of course. ATO even sets out on its website how this research benefits 
the ATO and the public.
12
 
22.14 The group of Adelaide Law School academics was firmly of the view that 
ASIC's statutory functions 'go far beyond merely collecting mandatory information 
and storing it'. They argued that to promote 'informed participation' in the market, 
ASIC should make material accessible and present it in an informative way. As an 
example, they cited information relating to insolvency appointments, where such 
information would be of use 'not just to academics but to market analysts, economists, 
the business media, the insolvency and legal professions and professional bodies'.
13
 
22.15 Other submitters also criticised ASIC for not producing instructive statistics. 
Mr Jason Harris, a senior lecturer in corporate law at UTS, informed the committee 
that the lack of data, particularly relating to enforcement and insolvencies, stifles 
debate as 'we are unable to determine exactly what it is that ASIC does aside from 
what it tells us; but, more importantly, we are unable to work out what it is ASIC is 
failing to do'. He stated further that ASIC's reports are 'almost marketing material', 
providing broad based percentages without producing real numbers. As an academic 
and a researcher: 
…it would be useful to be able to look at exactly what ASIC does in that 
space…It talks about banning directors. It gives us numbers over a number 
of years. When you dig down into the enforcement reports, the detail is 
lacking. We do not know if ASIC is actually taking action against phoenix 
company directors even though insolvency practitioners will tell you they 
…are seeing the same people coming back again and again with regard to 
insolvency. They are submitting reports to ASIC. We have well over 10,000 
companies going under every year. We have something like 11,000-odd 
reports from liquidators and other insolvency practitioners going in every 
year, and the numbers of enforcement statistics that we are getting from 
ASIC just in terms of director bannings—they do not tell us what they are 
banning the directors for—are looking at a very small number. It is 20 or 30 
directors across a very broad range of activity. They do not relate it back to, 
for example, insolvent companies.
14
 
                                              
11  Dr Suzanne Le Mire, A/Prof David Brown, A/Prof Christopher Symes and Ms Karen Gross, 
Submission 152, p. 5. 
12  Dr Suzanne Le Mire et al, Submission 152, p. 6. 
13  Dr Suzanne Le Mire et al, Submission 152, p. 6. 
14  Mr Jason Harris, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, pp. 25–26. 
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22.16 Mr Harris provided some further examples, such as the discussion on 
non-compliance outcomes in ASIC's annual report. ASIC provides only the numbers 
of orders but does not publish the total numbers of non-compliance. Mr Harris made 
the following observation: 
Obtaining 26 civil orders and 46 criminal convictions is an unhelpful 
statistic without knowing how many cases of non-compliance were 
involved. For example, if 5,000 companies failed to lodge their reports 
(a conservative figure based on the more than 2 million registered 
companies), then 72 orders seems a low figure.
15
 
22.17 The figures published in ASIC's half yearly enforcement reports were also 
criticised for being general in nature. Mr Harris noted: 
For example, the category of 'insolvency' is almost meaningless given Ch 5 
of the Corporations Act (which covers insolvency) comprises several 
hundred provisions. Similarly the category of 'small business compliance 
and deterrence' is too vague. The report for July 2013–December 2013 
includes 42 administrative remedies against directors and 181 criminal 
orders against directors, both for small business compliance and deterrence. 
No detail of what contraventions or what sanctions were imposed is 
included, neither is any information on how many matters were 
commenced/investigated/completed in this category. This is a very 
unhelpful statistic. The media releases provided in Appendix 2 do not 
include small business compliance and deterrence, which means the 
overwhelming majority of sanctions go unreported to the public. This is 
totally unsatisfactory. If there are privacy concerns then these can be 
addressed by removing personal information, but there is no reason why 
information concerning enforcement action is not made public.
16
 
22.18 According to Mr Harris, ASIC was in possession of this information but 
needed to produce better statistics. Mr Harris provided further examples of 
information that he, and other academics he consulted, would like ASIC to release. 
He informed the committee that there was a team of academics happy to go in as free 
labour and extract that data and provide a usable database. Mr Harris informed the 
committee that academics had been discussing this matter for many years and have 
had meetings with 'very senior people inside ASIC'.
17
 
22.19 The Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 
(ARITA) also drew attention to the amount of prescribed information that ASIC 
receives and stores under legislation. ARITA explained that much of the material is 
supplied by insolvency practitioners in their reports and lodgements with ASIC'. 
According to that organisation 'much information is collected but less is published'.
18
 
                                              
15  Mr Jason Harris, answer to question on notice, no. 8 (received 17 April 2014), p. 1. 
16  Mr Jason Harris, answer to question on notice, no. 8 (received 17 April 2014), p. 2. 
17  Mr Jason Harris, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 27. 
18  Insolvency Practitioners Association (now ARITA), Submission 202, p. 5. 
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Mr Michael Murray, Legal Director, ARITA, also compared ASIC's statistics with 
those of the bankruptcy regulator: 
[AFSA] produce good statistics which inform the law reform process in 
bankruptcy. We do not have that sort of information in corporate 
insolvency.
19
 
22.20 According to ARITA, ASIC had improved its collection and publication of 
data but needed to do more. Mr David Lombe, President, ARITA, gave an example of 
the limitations imposed on researchers: 
ARITA gives a research prize so that someone can do research. One of our 
prize-winners was looking at deeds of company arrangement. When you go 
into voluntary administration, there is a decision about whether you go into 
liquidation or a deed of company arrangement. He was trying to work out 
how many companies go into deeds of company arrangement and how 
successful those deeds of company arrangements are. He wanted to get 
access to information from ASIC to be able to do that very important 
research. It would have cost thousands of dollars and ASIC just said, 'We 
can't give that information to you.'
20
 
22.21 He noted, however, that ASIC may be prevented from waiving fees or giving 
out that information.
21
  
22.22 Dr Suzanne Le Mire and her colleagues were of the view that ASIC has ample 
power to devote more resources to making information and data publicly available. 
They suggest that the ASIC Act could be improved by making this duty more explicit. 
As an example, they cited section 455 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (NZ), which places 
a specific duty upon the regulator to make insolvency statistics available for research 
purposes (for example, searching the insolvency index in New Zealand).
22
 
ASIC's response 
22.23 The committee sought ASIC's views on whether the current approach to 
accessing and publishing information stored by ASIC promoted informed 
participation in the financial system. ASIC explained that the information it collected 
and how it was made available to the public, including the fees it charged, was 
prescribed by legislation. ASIC advised that it had 'little discretion' in administering 
the fees charged for accessing information on ASIC's registers, although certain 
information and statistical data could be accessed without charge on its website. 
ASIC also asserted that its annual report contained 'a wide range of statistical data'.
23
 
                                              
19  Mr Michael Murray, Legal Director, ARITA, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 40. 
20  Mr David Lombe, President, ARITA, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 40. 
21  Mr David Lombe, President, ARITA, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 40. 
22  Dr Suzanne Le Mire et al, Submission 152, p. 6. 
23  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 14. 
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22.24 ASIC described how it handles customised requests for information from 
members of the public: 
Any such request will be directed to the relevant business area. The request 
will be assessed as to whether the legislation will permit the release of the 
data, and whether ASIC's data storage systems can support such a request. 
If the customer's request can be provided, the fee is determined according to 
the accessibility of the data and the work involved in producing it. For 
example, if copies of documents are requested then the number of 
documents provided will impact the prescribed fee.
24
 
22.25 According to ASIC, in 2013 it provided customised data in response to 
53 requests from customers including academics, information brokers, and 
government bodies. The cost incurred by these customers ranged from $9 to $1,100, 
with the average cost being $276. ASIC reported that 41 other requests were not 
proceeded with due to the unavailability of the requested data, legislative restrictions 
or the customer deciding not to proceed with payment. ASIC stated that these 
customised requests for data were 'particular to the specific needs of the customer' and 
were 'usually one-off in nature'. ASIC informed the committee, however, that the 
statistical data it published was responsive to public demand, adding that: 
If there were sufficient demand for certain types of statistical data, and its 
release satisfied legislative and technological parameters, ASIC would 
certainly consider making it readily available.
25
 
Committee view 
22.26 The committee is of the view that ASIC should interrogate its databases and 
extract and publish critical information that would allow academics, professional 
bodies and interested members of the public to gain a greater understanding of what is 
happening in the financial world. This requirement to analyse the various databases 
would also provide ASIC employees with the means to develop and test their 
analytical skills and capability. 
22.27 The issue of releasing data reaches beyond simply publishing statistics. 
As identified elsewhere in this report, ASIC does not respond promptly to warning 
signs of brewing trouble. A part solution to this problem could well reside in ASIC's 
ability to analyse its databases and other vital information that it gathers and records. 
In the committee's view, ASIC should do more than simply record, collate and publish 
such information. If ASIC were to undertake serious research and critical analysis of 
the information it receives, it would provide its employees with the opportunity 
to apply and further hone their skills. They would be well placed to interrogate ASIC's 
databases in order to discern any troubling trends or identify areas that appear to 
warrant close scrutiny. In addition, by making available a rich source of statistics and 
importantly its own analysis of that material, ASIC would benefit from allowing 
                                              
24  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 14. 
25  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 14. 
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academics and other stakeholders to subject its analysis to further scrutiny and 
in-depth analysis and to receive informed feedback.     
Recommendation 39 
22.28 The committee recommends that ASIC promote 'informed participation' 
in the market by making information more accessible and presented in an 
informative way. 
ASIC's websites 
22.29 ASIC operates its main website www.asic.gov.au and a consumer advice 
website MoneySmart www.moneysmart.gov.au. The MoneySmart website was 
launched in March 2011 as part of the National Financial Literacy Strategy. 
The website contains information on several consumer finance key topics. 
For example, it provides general guidance about what to take into account when 
considering credit, it explains how superannuation works, and highlights various 
finance-related scams. The website also contains several calculators and tools such as 
budget and retirement planners, and mortgage, superannuation and credit card 
calculators. ASIC provided the following information about the MoneySmart 
website's success: 
 It regularly gets over 400,000 unique visitors a month and has been visited by 
over 6.9 million people since its launch. 
 ASIC's research indicates that 89 per cent of users rate the site as 'useful', and 
90 per cent of users said they had taken specific action with their finances as a 
result of visiting the website. 
 The website was named 'best service delivery website' at the 2012 Excellence 
in e-Government Awards, and 'Best in Class' at the 2012 Interactive Media 
Awards in two categories (Government and Financial Information). 
 In 2011, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
rated the website as 'outstanding' and gave it a five out of five rating.
26
 
22.30 Stakeholders commended ASIC for its work on the MoneySmart website. 
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia described the MoneySmart 
website as 'an excellent initiative' that contains 'exceptional information'.
27
 State Super 
Financial Services Australia advised that it has taken ideas from the website to 
develop educational material to assist their clients to understand financial concepts.
28
 
The Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) stated that while it often provides 
constructive feedback about certain parts of the website, 'overall it is a very 
comprehensive and useful resource for consumers—especially the numerous 
                                              
26  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 36. 
27  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Submission 155, p. 3. 
28  State Super Financial Services Australia, Submission 126, p. 1. 
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calculators and other practical information available to assist people consider their 
financial options'.
29
 
22.31 However, similar praise for the main website ASIC operates was not 
forthcoming. One small business owner described the homepage of www.asic.gov.au 
as an 'exercise in how not to design' such a webpage. The submitter added that 
it appears to be a website 'primarily to promote ASIC, not to access services': 
Most of the ASIC home page is filled with a list of ASIC's 
actions/successes. As a small-business operator I don't go to the site for a 
news service to promote ASIC. The poorly thought-through home page is 
typical of the whole site that is shaped to serve ASIC's needs, not to be an 
efficient access portal for small business, or others, to access database 
services.
30
 
22.32 The small business owner also objected to the 'complicated' nature of the 
website and that the information on the website, once it has been located, supplies 
'overwhelming detail in some areas and little or none in others'.
31
 They argued that the 
website should be completely reworked with a 'fundamental rethink' of the purpose of 
the website and who it is intended to serve undertaken. 
22.33 Academics also commented on ASIC's website. Mr Jason Harris described the 
search engine of ASIC's website as 'totally inadequate…almost unusable and 
unhelpful, generating hundreds of hits with very little ability to refine searches'.
32
 
22.34 The Commonwealth Ombudsman suggested that ASIC's website could be 
improved. In particular, the Ombudsman identified a need to more clearly articulate 
ASIC's complaints process and to simplify the information provided to users. 
The Ombudsman noted that ASIC's 2013 stakeholder survey revealed that small 
businesses rated the website negatively.
33
 
22.35 ASIC has taken some steps to improve the useability of its website in relation 
to insolvency notices. In mid-2012, a standalone website for publishing insolvency 
notices commenced operation.
34
 This website followed a 2008 recommendation by the 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee to limit the publication of notices in 
the print media.
35
 
                                              
29  Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Submission 194, pp. 3–4. 
30  Name withheld, Submission 263, p. 5. 
31  Name withheld, Submission 263, p. 5. 
32  Mr Jason Harris, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 25. 
33  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 188, p. 13 (footnote omitted). 
34  ASIC, Annual Report 2012–13, p. 50. 
35  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Issues in external administration, November 
2008, p. 81. 
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Committee view 
22.36 A great number of people visit and rely on ASIC's main website 
www.asic.gov.au for information about matters relevant to them. However, when 
compared to the website of other Australian government agencies or ASIC's 
international counterparts, in most cases ASIC's website appears cluttered and not 
user-friendly. Rather than providing easy access to the most requested information and 
services, ASIC's homepage heavily emphasises ASIC's recent media releases. 
Also, the information presented elsewhere is not tailored to its different audiences: 
members of the public are left to navigate the same webpages as regulated entities.
36
 
As this report has indicated elsewhere, there is a need for ASIC to improve how it 
communicates with consumers and other groups. In sum, ASIC's main website 
appears to be another symptom of this wider problem.  
22.37 It is important that ASIC's website is functional and provides a satisfactory 
user experience. Although ASIC's website is likely targeted to those it regulates, 
it should provide useful information for members of the public. Given the confusion in 
the community about the respective roles of various government regulatory 
agencies,
37
 the website should clearly describe ASIC's role, preferably on the 
homepage. ASIC should explain how it undertakes this work and provide general 
information about the regulation of the financial system to members of the public. 
As the website of a regulatory agency, it should provide easy access to relevant and 
up-to-date information that assists regulated entities to comply with their obligations. 
As a law enforcement agency, the website also needs to encourage people to come 
forward and report matters to it. At present, it does not appear that any group of users 
is particularly satisfied with ASIC's website. 
Recommendation 40 
22.38 The committee recommends that ASIC consider the aims and purposes of 
its website and redesign its website so that these aims and purposes are achieved. 
Particular consideration should be given to: 
 explaining ASIC's role clearly on the website's homepage; 
 providing a 'for consumers' category of information; and 
 redesigning the homepage to give greater prominence to key information 
and services and less prominence to recent media releases. 
                                              
36  The website of the UK's financial services regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, provides 
clear links to information designed for consumers and information for firms on its homepage. 
37  For example, consumers are often confused as to which agency has responsibility for financial 
services consumer protection: ASIC, APRA or the ACCC. 
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Overview of Part V 
 
An examination of ASIC's performance has necessarily been, to a large extent, 
retrospective. Parts II, III and IV of this report have examined past events or 
considered the regulatory regime as it is at present. 
This final part of the report uses the evidence that committee has received and draws 
on the lessons from past experience to identify various changes that would encourage 
better regulatory outcomes in the future. These changes either relate to ASIC itself, 
the legislation it administers or the regulatory framework it operates in. 
Some of the changes identified are complex and would require further careful 
consideration. It may be some time before all of the changes can be developed and 
introduced. However, the committee believes it is essential to start acting on these 
changes now. Without a fairer and more responsive regulatory system, the future will 
simply bring more stories of suffering and injustice with the same issues identified as 
the culprits. 
 
 
  
  
 
Chapter 23 
Options for encouraging better enforcement outcomes 
23.1 Several chapters throughout Parts II and III of this report have focused on 
ASIC's approach to enforcement. Recommendations were made about steps ASIC 
could take to improve the enforcement outcomes it achieves. This chapter examines 
the evidence received by the committee that argued there were more fundamental 
problems with enforcement beyond ASIC's control, either because of the legislation 
that ASIC administers or due to the law enforcement framework of which ASIC is a 
part. 
Civil and criminal penalties 
23.2 The penalties available to ASIC was an issue discussed in several submissions 
and at the committee's public hearings. Overall, most considered that the current 
penalties were generally insufficient. For example, former ASIC enforcement adviser 
Mr Niall Coburn stated: 
If thinking of lawbreakers is a tussle between fear versus greed, then we 
need penalties to amplify the fear and smother the greed. We need penalties 
that create a fear that overcomes any desire to take risks and break the law.
1
 
23.3 As discussed in Chapter 17, some academics and observers argued that ASIC 
faces a number of difficulties in pursuing remedies available through the civil penalty 
regime for directors' duties. Although several reasons were put forward as possible 
contributors to these difficulties, the current penalty amounts was often cited. A group 
of academics from Adelaide Law School argued that despite a recommendation by 
Finkelstein J in ASIC v Vizard that the $200,000 upper limit on pecuniary penalties be 
reviewed,
2
 this has not been addressed. The academics added: 
More worryingly, recent cases show that the courts are paying considerable 
regard to reputational damage as a substitute for significant pecuniary 
penalties. So in ASIC v Healey the non-executive directors were not 
subjected to any pecuniary penalty at all despite being found to have 
contravened ss 180(1), 344(1) and 601FD(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) and the court 'taking into account the seriousness of the offences'. In 
the James Hardie litigation the Court of Appeal reduced the pecuniary 
                                              
1  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 3. 
2  On the maximum penalty of $200,000 available for civil proceedings, Finkelstein J wrote: 
'This is despite the fact that a contravention holds great potential for profit and may cause much 
harm. In a criminal prosecution (and after 13 March 2000 there could be both a civil and 
criminal prosecution for the same conduct: see s 1317P of the Corporations Law), the 
maximum penalty was more severe, namely imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years 
plus a fine not exceeding $200,000'. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v 
Vizard (2005) 145 FCR 57 at 63–64 [27]. 
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penalties imposed by the trial judge from $30 000 to $25 000 for the 
Australian directors and to $20 000 for the US directors. The influence of 
the parity principle (that similar breaches should attract similar penalties) 
and the doctrine of precedent means that it is unlikely that the courts will 
feel free to depart from the approaches in these cases without legislative 
intervention to raise the upper limit of the pecuniary penalty for an 
individual above the current level of $200 000.
3
 
23.4 CPA Australia also advised it believed the upper limit of $200,000 was 
insufficient. When asked what the limit should be, Mr Malley explained that, 
depending on the nature of the offence 'it has to be of such an ilk that it really does 
make people think twice': 
You need to understand that, if you are dealing in markets where potentially 
people earn large amounts of money and the penalty in material terms is not 
material, perhaps that is not necessarily a deterrent. I think society deserves 
to be protected. 
I would also add that there are many directors working in Australia under 
some very tough legislation. It is our view—and I should say this in 
balance—that there are elements of the Corporations Law that pertain to 
directors that are far more difficult here than they are in other countries and 
in some ways impractical. I think there needs to be a review of that. But, on 
the basis that there is a review, there should also be higher penalties if there 
is a fairer scenario for directors in the marketplace.
4
 
23.5 ASIC argued that a holistic review of penalties across the corporations 
legislation is required. It advised that the current penalties have been in place for 
extended periods, with criminal penalties reviewed in a piecemeal way since they 
were enacted and civil penalties unchanged since 1992.
5
 ASIC concluded that the 
current civil penalties under the corporations legislation: 
 have not kept pace with inflation (they are not linked to penalty units); 
 regardless of the above, the penalties 'are proportionately low given the 
seriousness and impact of civil penalty matters', and when compared with 
the penalties available in other jurisdictions such as the UK and US; and 
 are inconsistent with the penalties in other legislation ASIC administers, such 
as the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009.
6
 
                                              
3  Dr Suzanne Le Mire, Associate Professor David Brown, Associate Professor Christopher 
Symes and Ms Karen Gross, Submission 152, pp. 2–3 (footnotes omitted). 
4  Mr Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 48. 
5  ASIC noted that the civil penalties were extended in 2004 to include bodies corporate, with a 
maximum penalty for a body corporate of $1 million. ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 169. 
6  ASIC, Submission 45.2, pp. 169–70. 
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23.6 To illustrate its concern about the size of penalties available in Australia, 
ASIC pointed to the fines totalling over $6 billion that JP Morgan received as part of 
the 'London Whale' trading scandal. These fines consisted of £138 million by the 
UK FCA; US$200 million by the US SEC; US$200 million by the US Federal 
Reserve; US$309 million by the US CFPB; and US$300 million by the US Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency. However, ASIC advised that under the Corporations 
Act, the maximum penalty applicable for an offence is $1 million. Further, due to 
the 'totality principle': 
multiple offences arising out of the same course of conduct will not usually 
give rise to a substantially greater penalty than a single offence. 
Accordingly, multiple offences cannot attract remotely comparable civil 
penalties in Australia, even assuming that the maximum penalty is applied.
7
 
23.7 On 20 March 2014, ASIC released a comparison of penalties available to 
ASIC and those available to its foreign counterparts, other Australian regulators and 
across the legislation ASIC administers. It concluded that: 
 while ASIC's maximum criminal penalties are broadly consistent with those 
available in other countries, there are significantly higher prison terms in the 
US, and higher fines in some overseas countries for breaches of continuous 
disclosure obligations and unlicensed conduct—for example, the fine for 
individuals for unlicensed conduct in Australia is $34,000, whereas in 
Hong Kong it is $720,000; in Canada it is $5.25 million; in the United States 
it is $5.6 million; and in the United Kingdom there is no limit on the 
maximum fine;
8
 
 there is a broader range of civil and administrative penalties in other 
countries, and the penalties are higher (see Table 23.1); 
 the maximum civil penalties available to ASIC are lower than those available 
to other Australian regulators and are fixed amounts, not multiples of the 
financial benefits obtained from wrongdoing; and 
 across ASIC's regime there are differences between the types and size of 
penalties for similar wrongdoing (for example, ASIC noted that providing 
credit without a licence can attract a civil penalty up to ten times greater than 
the criminal fine for providing financial services without a licence).
9
 
                                              
7  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 170. 
8  ASIC, Penalties for corporate wrongdoing, Report 387, March 2014, p. 17. The currency 
conversion to Australian dollars is based on the daily exchange rate published by the RBA as at 
31 December 2013. 
9  ASIC, 'ASIC reports on penalties for corporate wrongdoing', Media Release, no. 14-055, 
20 March 2014; ASIC, Report 387, pp. 16–17. 
Page 366  
 
Table 23.1: Comparison of civil and administrative penalties for individuals ($AUD) 
Country Insider trading 
Market 
manipulation 
Disclosure 
False 
statements 
Unlicensed 
conduct 
Inappropriate 
advice 
Australia Civil: $200,000 Civil: $200,000 Civil: $200,000 – – Civil: $200,000 
Canada Administrative: 
$1.05 million 
Administrative: 
$1.05 million 
Administrative: 
$1.05 million 
Administrative: 
$1.05 million 
Administrative: 
$1.05 million 
Administrative: 
$1.05 million 
Hong 
Kong 
Administrative: 
unlimited 
– Civil: $1.12 
million 
– – Administrative: 
greater of 
$1.4 million, or 
3 times the 
benefit gained 
United 
Kingdom 
Civil and 
administrative: 
unlimited 
Civil and 
administrative: 
unlimited 
Administrative: 
unlimited  
Civil and 
administrative: 
unlimited 
– Administrative: 
unlimited 
United 
States 
Civil: 3 times 
the benefit 
gained* 
Civil: greater 
of $111,000, or 
the benefit 
gained 
Civil: greater 
of $111,000, or 
the benefit 
gained 
Civil: greater 
of $111,000, or 
the benefit 
gained 
Civil: greater 
of $111,000, or 
the benefit 
gained 
Administrative: 
$83,850 
Notes: 
*  For control persons, the maximum non-criminal penalty is the greater of 
$AUD1.1 million or three times the benefit obtained. 
The currency conversion to Australian dollars is based on the daily exchange rate 
published by the RBA as at 31 December 2013. 
Source: ASIC, Penalties for corporate wrongdoing, Report 387, March 2014, p. 19. 
23.8 In addition to its suggestion that civil penalties be set significantly higher 
to better reflect the seriousness of breaches, ASIC argued that the penalties should 
adopt the disgorgement feature of the civil penalties imposed in the UK and the US, 
where the benefit attributable to the commission of the breach is removed.
10
 
23.9 ASIC concluded that a 'stronger' penalty regime would improve the 
cost-effectiveness of enforcement action by maximising the impact and deterrent 
effect of such action.
11
 However, some witnesses suggested that reputational issues 
carry more weight than the size of the penalty. For example, the chairman of the 
Business Law Section of the Law Council of Australia made the following 
observation: 
It is true that a person weighing up the risks of compliance and 
non-compliance would be thought to have regard for the size of the penalty. 
I find with the people I deal with that is not the way they think. The people 
we tend to be involved with, and there may well be some segmentation, are 
                                              
10  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 171. For criminal matters, action can be taken under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002.  
11  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 169. 
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more concerned about reputational issues than the size of a penalty. By and 
large, the vast majority of Australians involved in financial markets and 
business are trying to do the right thing. I use the example of continuous 
disclosure by listed companies, which is a very, very difficult area. There 
are judgements that have to be made, and it is very difficult sometimes to 
be certain what the right thing to do is because you have to juggle a number 
of interests—the interests of the investors in having the information but also 
making sure that the information is clear and understandable.
12
 
23.10 The reputational aspect of deterrence was also noted by other witnesses who 
questioned whether larger financial penalties imposed on corporations would impact 
the reputation of the entity involved. Professor Justin O'Brien used the JP Morgan 
case to support his view that only imprisonment provides a deterrent based on 
reputational consequences: 
…JP Morgan agrees to a settlement with the US regulatory authorities for 
$13.5 billion; Jamie Dimon gets an 89 per cent pay increase. To what extent 
did that impact on his reputation? Well, arguably, you can make the point 
that he deserved that increase in his compensation because he reduced the 
actual litigation that he might have faced. So even in the United States 
where you have huge penalties it does not really have a reputational effect; 
what ends up happening is that it becomes part of the price of settlement, 
and it privileges what Judge Jed Rakoff, who we brought out to Australia 
last year, calls 'the facade of enforcement'. So what really will act as a 
reputational restraining force? The threat of jail.
13
 
23.11 Others were not convinced that higher penalties were necessary. Although 
Professor Baxt acknowledged that there may be specific areas where an increase in 
penalties could be warranted, he rejected ASIC's call for greater penalties. In his view, 
ASIC 'is not even trying to get the penalties that it can get under the current law in a 
sufficiently aggressive and satisfactory way in many of the problem areas that exist'.
14
 
Committee view 
23.12  It is important that the penalties contained in legislation provide both an 
effective deterrent to misconduct as well as an adequate punishment, particularly if 
the misconduct can result in widespread harm. Insufficient penalties undermine the 
regulator's ability to do its job: inadequately low penalties do not encourage 
compliance and they do not make regulated entities take threats of enforcement action 
seriously. The committee considers that a compelling case has been made for the 
penalties currently available for contraventions of the legislation ASIC administers 
to be reviewed to ensure they are set at appropriate levels. In addition, consideration 
                                              
12  Mr John Keeves, Chairman, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 9. 
13  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 61. 
14  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Proof Committee Hansard, 21 February 2014, pp. 11, 17. 
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should be given to designing more responsive monetary penalties, such as multiple of 
gain penalties or penalties combined with disgorgement.  
Recommendation 41 
23.13 The committee recommends that the government commission an inquiry 
into the current criminal and civil penalties available across the legislation ASIC 
administers. The inquiry should consider: 
 the consistency of criminal penalties, and whether some comparable 
offences currently attract inconsistent penalties; 
 the range of civil penalty provisions available in the legislation ASIC 
administers and whether they are consistent with other civil penalties for 
corporations; and 
 the level of civil penalty amounts, and whether the legislation should 
provide for the removal of any financial benefit. 
Addressing overlaps in jurisdiction and improving the working 
relationship with other enforcement agencies 
23.14 The inquiry's terms of reference directed the committee to consider ASIC's 
collaboration, and working relationships, with other regulators and law enforcement 
bodies. To ensure the law enforcement framework works as it should, the working 
relationships between agencies need to be well-functioning and any overlaps in 
jurisdiction managed effectively. As the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia 
noted, this is an issue that has received some attention: 
In recent years there have been a number of cases where regulatory 
agencies are seen to lay responsibility for poor regulatory outcomes at the 
feet of other agencies, rather than being seen to operate as one cohesive 
group of law enforcement agencies. Effective regulation in today's modern 
cross-border business environment will require a much greater degree of 
engagement and collaboration between regulators than has perhaps been the 
case in the past. 
23.15 The ASIC Act15 and the memorandums of understanding ASIC has entered 
into with numerous domestic
16
 and international
17
 agencies provides a legal and 
                                              
15  Section 127 of the ASIC Act also allows for the sharing of confidential information with the 
minister and specified government officers or bodies, and allows for the ASIC chairman to 
authorise information sharing with other Commonwealth agencies or the government or 
agencies of a state, territory or foreign country. 
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practical framework for ASIC's working relationship with other regulators and law 
enforcement agencies. From the evidence the committee has received, it appears that 
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the agency ASIC is most likely to encounter 
overlaps in jurisdiction with. Mr Chris Savundra of ASIC explained: 
We investigate serious financial crime where it pertains to our jurisdiction, 
so we are not limited to taking action under the Corporations Act; we can 
take action under state and federal criminal laws, and we do. Equally, the 
AFP takes corporations law action, such as insider trading. So, the AFP has 
previously taken action under the Corporations Act, for both insider trading 
and breaches of director's duties, and the reason is the difference in the use 
of powers and that issue we raised on the last occasion around the sharing 
of information.
18
 
23.16 Foreign bribery is one area where ASIC has been subject to scrutiny and 
criticism regarding both its enforcement of relevant provisions in the Corporations Act 
and how effectively it works with the AFP. The AFP is responsible for investigating 
foreign bribery offences,
19
 although directors' duties under the Corporations Act can 
also be relevant. In particular, two of the principles expressed in the Federal Court's 
Centro decision
20
 are pertinent to allegations of foreign bribery. These principles are 
scepticism (directors must question the information put to them) and accountability 
                                                                                                                                            
16  ASIC has entered into an MOU with: the Australian Charities and Not-for-profit Commission 
(June 2013); ACCC (December 2004); AFP (October 2013); APRA (May 2010); ASX 
(October 2011); ATO (May 2007); Chi-X Australia Pty Limited (October 2011); Clean Energy 
Regulator (1 June 2012); CDPP (September 1992); Financial Reporting Council (June 2004); 
Private Health Insurance Administration Council (October 2011); Members of the Council of 
Financial Regulators (joint MOU agreed to September 2008); and the RBA (March 2002). 
ASIC is also a party to the MOU on Standard Business Reporting (an MOU between various 
Commonwealth, state and territory departments and agencies). ASIC, www.asic.gov.au 
(accessed 19 September 2013).  
17  ASIC has entered into a multilateral memorandum of understanding with IOSCO and bilateral 
agreements with the European Securities and Markets Authority and the securities regulatory 
agencies, companies registrar and/or auditing oversight bodies of 51 countries and dependent 
territories. See www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/OIR%20-%20Memorandum% 
20of%20Understandings. 
18  Mr Chris Savundra, Senior Executive Leader, Markets Enforcement, ASIC, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 11. 
19  The bribery of foreign public officials is made an offence by division 70 of the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code. As with other offences in the Criminal Code, extensions of criminal 
responsibility such as attempts to commit an office apply (division 11), as does corporate 
criminal responsibility (division 12). 
20  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291. 
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and control (an obligation to ensure that systems, protocols and control exist to ensure 
sound corporate governance).
21
 
23.17 Allegations that two subsidiaries of the RBA, Note Printing Australia Limited 
and Securency International Pty Ltd, engaged in foreign bribery during the 1990s in 
attempts to secure polymer banknotes contracts have resulted in criminal charges 
being brought by the AFP against the companies and several employees. 
In March 2012, ASIC announced that it had decided not to proceed with an 
investigation into the Note Printing Australia/Securency allegations. It released the 
following statement: 
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has provided ASIC with material 
relating to bribery allegations concerning Securency International Pty Ltd 
and Note Printing Australia Limited. 
ASIC considers a range of factors when deciding to investigate and 
possibly take enforcement action. 
In line with its normal practice, ASIC has reviewed this material from the 
AFP for possible directors' duty breaches of the Corporations Act and has 
decided not to proceed to a formal investigation. 
ASIC intends to make no further comment on this matter.
22
 
23.18 An episode of the ABC's Four Corners program broadcast on 
30 September 2013, however, suggested that ASIC did not investigate the directors of 
these companies for corporate misconduct. In its response to Four Corners, ASIC 
stated that its decision not to investigate followed 'a thorough assessment of the 
information', with 'more than 10,000 pages of documents including several detailed 
witness statements' reviewed.
23
 ASIC subsequently issued a clarification advising that 
its assessment only related to alleged conduct in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and 
Nepal, and that it would consider the Iraq allegations raised in the program. However, 
ASIC added that 'it must be stressed that a six-year statute of limitations applies to 
civil penalty cases'.
24
 In an October 2013 interview, the ASIC chairman added that the 
two RBA subsidiaries were propriety companies and that ASIC does not 'normally' 
pursue contraventions of the Corporations Act that relate to propriety companies: 
                                              
21  Greg Medcraft, 'Setting the record straight: ASIC, bribery and enforcement action', Address to 
the AmCham Business Leaders Lunch, 11 October 2013, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 
14 October 2013), p. 4. The third principle expressed in the Centro decision relates to 
accounting knowledge. 
22  ASIC, 'Statement on Securency International and Note Printing Australia', Media Release, 
no. 12-47, 12 March 2012. 
23  ASIC, 'ASIC's response to ABC TV's Four Corners' questions', 30 September 2013, 
http://abc.net.au/4corners/documents/RBA2013/ASIC_response.pdf (accessed 1 October 2013), 
p. 1. 
24  ASIC, 'ASIC clarification – 1 October 2013' www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/ 
ASIC+clarification+–1+October+2013?openDocument (accessed 2 October 2013). 
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Our focus is on listed public companies where in fact, you know, if we see 
lots of people losing lots of money into retail investors and there is a 
significant market impact, that is where we give priority, where in fact there 
is a significant impact on the market or on significantly on retail investors 
losing a lot of money.
25
 
23.19 Another alleged instance of foreign bribery has also recently been a matter of 
public interest. In February 2012, Leighton Holdings Limited announced that it was 
aware of possible contraventions of Australian laws relating to payments that may 
have been made in connection to work on facilities for Iraq's crude oil exports, and 
that it had alerted the AFP.
26
 A series of media articles published in October 2013 
alleged that internal documents of Leighton Holdings revealed a corporate culture that 
resulted in bribery, corruption and cover-up being 'rife' and known to certain directors 
and senior management.
27
 In response, Leighton issued a statement advising that 
it continues to cooperate with the AFP and that it was 'not aware of any new 
allegations or instances of breach of our ethics'.
28
 The Leighton allegations have 
resulted in commentators questioning the approach taken by ASIC and how 
effectively it works with the AFP, particularly given the concerns about this 
relationship in the context of the Securency/Note Printing Australia matter.
29
  
23.20 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Working Group on Bribery conducts a cycle of reviews to monitor and assess the 
structures established by parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, such as 
Australia. The most recent report on Australia was released in October 2012. 
The Working Group concluded that it had 'serious concerns that overall enforcement 
of the foreign bribery offence to date has been extremely low' in Australia. It provided 
the following reasoning: 
Only one foreign bribery case has led to prosecutions. These prosecutions 
were commenced in 2011 and are on-going. Out of 28 foreign bribery 
referrals that have been received by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), 
21 have been concluded without charges.
30
 
                                              
25  Greg Medcraft, ABC Lateline, 11 October 2013, www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2013/ 
s3867665.htm (accessed 14 October 2013). 
26  Leighton Holdings, 'Leighton cooperating fully with AFP on possible breach of Code of Ethics', 
Media Release, 13 February 2012. 
27  Nick McKenzie and Richard Baker, 'Wal King "approved Iraq bribe"', Australian Financial 
Review, 3 October 2013, p. 1. 
28  Leighton Holdings, 'Response to allegations in newspaper articles in Fairfax media', Media 
Release, 3 October 2013, p. 1. 
29  See, for example, Malcolm Maiden, 'ASIC must act fast on graft claims', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 4 October 2013, p. 28. 
30  OECD, Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia, 
October 2012, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf (accessed 
4 October 2013), p. 5. 
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23.21 The OECD Working Group also expressed concern about communication 
between the AFP and ASIC, suggesting that miscommunication 'may have left 
important aspects of foreign bribery cases uninvestigated'.
31
 It recommended that the 
AFP and ASIC should develop a clearer written framework that outlines each agencies 
responsibilities and how the agencies would work together on foreign bribery cases: 
The AFP has MOUs with other agencies (e.g. the CDPP) but not with ASIC 
that would apply to the referral of foreign bribery cases. At various points 
in [the] on-site visit, the AFP stated that the Securency/NPA was referred to 
ASIC because these matters were "better managed by ASIC", that they 
were "better fit" for ASIC, or that ASIC could obtain "a better outcome". 
Why referral was "better" was not explained in concrete terms. In any 
event, these statements by the AFP and ASIC at the on-site visit about case 
referral and acceptance are not clearly reflected in written policies or 
agreements between the two bodies.
32
 
23.22 The OECD Working Group made recommendations regarding ASIC, noting 
that ASIC is 'in a prime position to interact with companies that may commit foreign 
bribery' and that 'its experience and expertise in investigating corporate economic 
crimes' should be utilised to assist the AFP to prevent, detect and investigate cases of 
foreign bribery.
33
 In a submission to this inquiry, Associate Professor Kath Hall of the 
Australian National University's Faculty of Law argued that ASIC should take a more 
active role in corporate corruption, noting that ASIC has stronger powers in relation to 
directors' duties than the US or UK regulators.
34
 
23.23 Since the OECD report, ASIC has signed an MOU with the AFP that 
addresses investigations of alleged foreign bribery.
35
 Also, in a speech given in 
October 2013, the ASIC chairman responded to concern about ASIC's role in 
investigating allegations of foreign bribery. The chairman described much of the 
media reports as being 'ill-informed in describing ASIC's role'
36
 and emphasized that 
ASIC would not act in a way that would jeopardise an AFP criminal investigation. 
In his speech, the ASIC chairman: 
                                              
31  OECD, Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia, 
p. 26. However, ASIC observed that the report did not provide evidence of miscommunication. 
See Mr Greg Medcraft, ASIC, Senate Economics Legislation Committee Hansard, Estimates, 
20 November 2013, p. 25. 
32  OECD, Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia, 
p. 26. 
33  OECD, Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia, 
pp. 5, 20. 
34  Dr Kath Hall, Submission 123, p. 1. 
35  Greg Medcraft, 'Setting the record straight: ASIC, bribery and enforcement action', Address to 
the AmCham Business Leaders Lunch, 11 October 2013, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 
14 October 2013), p. 4. 
36  Greg Medcraft, 'Setting the record straight', p. 3. 
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 stated that directors' duties investigations would ordinarily occur after any 
criminal investigation given that defendants in prosecutions have a 'right to 
silence' which is protected by courts delaying any civil proceedings until the 
criminal case is completed; 
 argued that the prison term and fine available under the Criminal Code (along 
with the automatic ban from being a director that comes with conviction) is a 
greater deterrent than proceedings initiated under the Corporations Act; and 
 noted that parallel investigations are difficult to manage.
37
 
23.24 However, Mr Medcraft did outline the circumstances in which ASIC would 
run a parallel bribery investigation examining alleged breaches of directors' duties. 
In addition to the factors ordinarily considered when deciding whether to take 
enforcement action—namely the extent of the harm or loss, the cost versus the 
regulatory benefit and the available evidence—specific factors ASIC would consider 
when assessing whether to proceed with a bribery investigation are: 
 if there is a risk the six year time limitation for civil proceedings will prevent 
ASIC bringing proceedings; 
 the impact of the conduct on the market and retail investors, including 
whether the conduct is ongoing or the relevant directors are still on the board; 
 if the bribery materially damages the company; 
 if the bribery involves a publicly listed company; 
 if ASIC's investigation will not adversely impact AFP's criminal investigation; 
and 
 whether ASIC considers that AFP action alone is an appropriate response.
38
 
23.25 Mr Medcraft told the committee that in his view, the problem with pursuing 
foreign bribery cases is not the particular agency that pursues the matter, but obtaining 
the evidence in the foreign jurisdiction.
39
 
                                              
37  Greg Medcraft, 'Setting the record straight', p. 5. 
38  Greg Medcraft, 'Setting the record straight', p. 6. 
39  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 13. 
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Proposal for a Serious Fraud Office 
23.26 One proposal that provoked discussion at the committee's public hearings was 
the suggestion that a Serious Fraud Office be established in Australia.
40
 Serious Fraud 
Offices exist in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and it was pointed out that a 
similar model could be adopted here. Potentially, a Serious Fraud Office could address 
the overlap in responsibilities between ASIC and the AFP and, given the AFP's 
priorities in other areas of law enforcement, could ensure that white collar crime cases 
receive sufficient attention from specialist staff. 
23.27 When questioned about the proposal, Mr Greg Tanzer of ASIC identified that 
an advantage of the Serious Fraud Office model is that resources are quarantined 
to target a particular activity, instead of an agency with diverse responsibilities being 
required to prioritise its resources. However, Mr Tanzer suggested that the framework 
could lead to 'hand offs', where cases are referred between various law enforcement 
agencies.
41
 Mr Medcraft added that establishing another agency creates the risk of 
fragmentation and that, assuming additional funding is not available, the funding for 
the new organisation would have to come from the existing agencies such as ASIC.
42
 
ASIC's preferred model is a whole-of-government response using existing agencies, 
such as Project Wickenby.
43
 
23.28 The potential adverse consequences associated with fragmentation were also 
addressed by other witnesses. During her appearance before the committee, Professor 
Dimity Kingsford Smith concentrated on how ASIC's enforcement role can inform its 
other regulatory tasks: 
Very often a regulator can lead with new policies, new supervision, new 
focuses, and risk-weighting of which kind of financial organisation needs 
more scrutiny. That can come from the data they collect from complaints 
and their experience of enforcement. If there was to be restructuring of 
ASIC's enforcement activity it would have to be, very carefully, on the 
basis that the learning that ASIC can obtain from the undertaking of 
investigations and the execution of enforcement is not lost to them.
44
 
23.29 Other academics also mulled over Australia's framework of law enforcement 
agencies for financial crime. Professor Justin O'Brien acknowledged that there are 
                                              
40  Although the proposal was generally not specifically raised in written submissions, in its 
submission the Governance Institute of Australia presented the committee with a list of several 
options that could be considered further to increase the efficacy of white collar crime 
investigations and prosecutions. One of these options was the formation of a separate 
prosecutorial body dedicated to pursuing white collar crime. Governance Institute of Australia, 
Submission 137, p. 5. 
41  Mr Greg Tanzer, Commissioner, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 12. 
42  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 13. 
43  Mr Chris Savundra, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 39. 
44  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 57. 
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examples of protocols that have not been effective, however, in his view there is not 
necessarily a problem with different agencies having overlapping responsibilities if 
effective protocols can be developed.
45
 He also noted that following the Libor scandal 
in the UK it has been recognised that the Serious Fraud Office did not have the 
'expertise or the competence' in financial markets matters. As a result a process of 
secondments between the Financial Conduct Authority and the Serious Fraud Office 
has commenced.
46
 
23.30 As this inquiry progressed, the creation of a Serious Fraud Office was also 
discussed in other forums. In a paper presented in October 2013, Justice Mark 
Weinburg of the Supreme Court of Victoria's Court of Appeal, and a former 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, expressed his view that the creation 
of a Serious Fraud Office would be 'an entirely retrograde step': 
The [Serious Fraud Office] both investigates, and prosecutes, cases 
involving serious or complex fraud, bribery and corruption. Its record in 
that regard is somewhat mixed. It has always seemed to me to be highly 
desirable that the investigative and prosecutorial functions be kept entirely 
separate from each other…My experience as a former Commonwealth 
Director was that even the most able of investigators could find themselves 
caught up in the fervour of a case, with which they may have had close 
involvement for months and perhaps years, and therefore unable to consider 
objectively the prospects of a successful prosecution. I should add that, in 
my opinion, prosecutors seldom make good investigators.
47
 
Committee view 
23.31 The committee is pleased that the AFP and ASIC have entered into a new 
memorandum of understanding. While these agreements may simply reflect existing 
arrangements, they promote public confidence by demonstrating that a formal 
framework designed to foster a sound and cooperative relationship between these 
agencies now exists, and that both agencies, through the process of developing the 
memorandum of understanding, have considered how they can work together more 
effectively.  
23.32 Proposals for changing the current institutional framework for investigating 
and prosecuting certain offences were contemplated by the committee. Such proposals 
need to be studied carefully: fragmented and unclear arrangements can create further 
overlaps in jurisdiction and undermine established acceptable principles associated 
with prosecutions. The creation of a Serious Fraud Office could have some benefits, 
                                              
45  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 56. 
46  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 56. 
47  Justice Mark Weinberg, 'Some Recent Developments in Corporate Regulation – ASIC from a 
Judicial Perspective', Paper presented to the Monash University Law School Commercial CPD 
Seminar, Melbourne, 16 October 2013, http://assets.justice.vic.gov.au/scv/resources/8ba39daa-
0868-4e5f-b9ef-8bd2469ae95a/recentdecorpregcpdseminar.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014), p. 2. 
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particularly if doing so resulted in a more effective law enforcement response to 
serious or complex fraud, bribery and corruption. It is evident, however, that even 
with a Serious Fraud Office appropriate protocols and frameworks for sharing 
expertise and staff still need to be in place. It appears to the committee that the 
problems identified with the current framework that relate to the resources and 
priorities of the existing agencies are not issues that the creation of an additional 
agency would solve.  
23.33 As the committee has been tasked with the examining the performance of one 
agency, ASIC, the committee is not recommending the establishment of a Serious 
Fraud Office. This proposal would require the entire law enforcement institutional 
framework to be considered. Nevertheless, the committee is of the view that there 
needs to be a shake-up of how complex fraud, bribery and corruption is addressed in 
Australia. There has been considerable public discussion about the perceived failure of 
ASIC and the AFP to address such cases effectively. Instead of having a deterrent 
effect, the committee is concerned that the current arrangements send the wrong 
message about the likelihood of these cases being pursued. It is essential that the law 
enforcement framework promotes confidence in Australia's corporate and financial 
institutions. Australia's growing pool of superannuation savings provides an attractive 
target for fraud and the amounts involved can be significant: the Trio Capital fraud 
alone resulted in losses of around $176 million.
48
 The current size and likely growth 
of Australia's financial sector, the importance of this sector to all Australians and the 
complexity and time-consuming nature of serious fraud and corruption investigations 
compared to other criminal cases means that it is imperative that the government 
clearly demonstrates that it has zero tolerance for financial crime.  
23.34 The committee urges the government to consider these issues further and, in 
the interim, to ensure that relevant enforcement agencies, the CDPP and the courts are 
adequately resourced to meet the community's expectations of law enforcement and to 
facilitate the swift delivery of justice. The establishment of a Project Wickenby-type 
multi-agency taskforce might be an ideal start. 
 
                                              
48  Treasury, Review of the Trio Capital Fraud and Assessment of the Regulatory Framework, 
2013, p. 9. 
  
 
Chapter 24 
Financial advisers and planners 
24.1 As indicated by the Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL) case 
study outlined earlier in the report, issues related to financial advice featured 
prominently during this inquiry. This was recognised by ASIC, which advised that it 
'has long been concerned about the quality of financial advice provided to consumers 
and about conflicts of interest in the financial advice industry': 
ASIC's concerns were not limited to a few 'bad apples' in the industry, or 
even a few bad firms. Instead, they reflected broad systemic problems with 
the financial advice industry, driven by conflicted remuneration structures 
and compounded by weaknesses in the regulatory system.
1
 
24.2 ASIC informed the committee that it continues to have concerns about the 
sector, which others also share. The 2013 survey of ASIC's stakeholders found that 
only 23 per cent of respondents agreed that financial advisers act with integrity. 
In ASIC's view, although the Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms 'should go 
a considerable way in improving the long-term quality of advice provided to 
investors', there were still some regulatory gaps that limited ASIC's ability to promote 
high standards in the industry and fulfil its statutory objectives.
2
  
24.3 In its main submission, ASIC outlined certain recommendations that it 
considered would address these regulatory gaps. This chapter considers these 
recommendations and other issues related to the regulation of the financial advice 
industry. The committee's findings are outlined at the end of the chapter. 
Proposal for a national financial adviser examination 
24.4 ASIC argued that the current system for training and assessing advisers is 
inadequate and that standards need to be lifted. ASIC advised that the 
Corporations Act requires Australian financial services (AFS) licensees to ensure that 
their representatives are adequately trained and are competent to provide financial 
services, and that ASIC publishes regulatory guidance on minimum training standards 
in Regulatory Guide 146 Licensing: Training of financial product advisers (RG 146). 
Despite this, ASIC reported that its surveillances 'have consistently found that many 
advisers are not adequately trained or competent to deliver financial advice to 
investors'.
3
 
                                              
1  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 142. 
2  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 153. 
3  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 154. 
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24.5 The training standards outlined in ASIC's RG 146 specify different 
requirements depending on whether the adviser gives general or personal advice and 
the products on which advice is given. RG 146 proceeds on the basis that advisers 
who provide advice on Tier 1 products (which are, broadly speaking, more complex 
products) must meet the standards at a different educational level from those advisers 
who provide advice on Tier 2 products (simpler products).
4
 Despite this framework, 
ASIC advised that there: 
…are numerous and fragmented approaches to interpreting and 
implementing the requirements in RG 146 and training courses vary 
significantly in terms of content and quality. There is no consistent measure 
of adviser competency.
5
 
24.6 To help address this issue of competence, ASIC proposed a new framework 
for the assessment and professional development of advisers based on a national 
examination. ASIC argued that a national examination would be 'the most transparent 
and effective' way to demonstrate whether an adviser had met a minimum standard of 
competency.
6
 
24.7 A national exam was first proposed by ASIC in 2011. At a public hearing, 
Mr Medcraft indicated that the idea was informed by his experience in the 
United States. After returning to Australia, Mr Medcraft observed that: 
…the training regime here…was really fragmented. Frankly, we should not 
be micro-managing training. It should not be our job. My view is that we 
should focus on outcomes…if you get through the national exam, whether 
you have got there through no study or an e-learning module, or some 
training course, that is fine; at least you sat that exam. Everyone in America 
has that confidence that you have sat the series 7 and you have passed a 
six-hour exam. I learnt more about muni securities than I ever wanted to, 
but it was really important. You learnt about client account dealing 
et cetera. That is really where I got the idea of proposing it. I proposed it 
about four or five years ago. I have been endeavouring to socialise the idea 
because I do think it is a far more efficient and a far more equitable 
system.
7
 
24.8 ASIC's deputy chairman commented that the national examination proposal 
seeks to address two key issues regarding competency and educational levels: 
One is: what is the level that needs to be set? The second is: how do you 
test that? Our proposal, which we have been consulting on with industry 
very extensively in the last few months, is that there should be a 
requirement that anyone providing personal advice has a tertiary 
                                              
4  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 154. 
5  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 154. 
6  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 155. 
7  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 15–16. 
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qualification and that, in addition to that, to help ensure that you have 
demonstrated your ability to do that, you would sit at a national exam. 
So there is the level, which is a tertiary qualification, and the exam 
supporting that.
8
 
24.9 Some academics supported the proposal. Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith 
remarked that the national exam was 'a very good example of a fine, well-thought-out 
proposal as far as the regulator could do so without really any powers to push that 
proposal forward—except in a policy proposal'. She remarked further that for no good 
reason she could discover, the proposal 'came to nothing'. She added: 
My very diligent students have assembled a table…which shows you that 
every other respectable regulatory jurisdiction has a national exam and 
some of them have, every three years or so, a renewal of the exam.
9
 
24.10 Industry groups did not support the proposal. The Financial Planning 
Association (FPA) questioned the benefits that would flow from the exam: 
We are not supportive of the proposal for the three-year examination, 
mainly because we think it is overreach of a regulator to be providing and 
certifying education which does not happen in any other profession. ASIC's 
resources are already stretched. We are not sure that they have the expertise 
or the resources to be able to deliver such an examination.
10
 
24.11 CPA Australia also argued against the proposal. Its chief executive officer, 
Mr Alex Malley, noted that the proposal was based on the model adopted in the US 
despite there being no evidence that the model 'had been a roaring success': 
In 2011 ASIC proposed a new national exam for all financial planners. 
It was presented as a concept that would be introduced because it had been 
adopted in the United States, a market that has not fared well compared to 
our domestic economy. When quizzed about the reasoning, the process to 
be followed and the communication plan to be laid out, it became evident 
there was little substance behind the commentary. Needless to say, it has 
not been implemented, and ASIC communication has paused for some 
time.
11
 
24.12 Mr Malley added that he has 'no issue in and of itself with exams; it is those 
who perhaps have no qualification to set them or understand what they are trying 
to achieve that I have an issue with'.
12
 
                                              
8  Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 16. 
9  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 59. 
10  Mr Mark Rantall, Chief Executive Officer, Financial Planning Association, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 69. 
11  Mr Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 43. 
12  Mr Alex Malley, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 44. 
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24.13 Although the FPA does not support the proposed national examination, 
it submitted that planners 'should have to go through proper certification and 
education and experience'. The FPA subsequently indicated that the minimum 
education standards set by RG 146 are the problem: 
Under RG146, a person can undertake a short course to gain 'generic 
knowledge on products and markets' and be able to become an Authorised 
Representative permitted to provide personal financial advice to consumers. 
The minimum standards required under RG146 are inadequate for the 
delivery of quality advice and therefore create a risk of consumers acting on 
information provided by providers who are not appropriately or 
professionally qualified, may not have the skills required to explain 
complex concepts, and may pass on inappropriate advice without 
consideration of the principles of financial planning.
13
 
24.14 The FPA has recently called for the introduction of a requirement that 
financial advisers and planners must meet minimum education standards consisting of 
a relevant university degree and three years' experience over a five year period. 
It also envisaged minimum continuing professional development requirements. 
According to the FPA, it is unclear how ASIC's proposed national examination would 
improve education in the absence of an enhanced education framework.
14
 The FPA 
added that, if an examination was being considered for new entrants, then the exam: 
…should be left to the professions that have the practical knowledge and 
know-how and are experienced at running educational programs to run 
them.
15
 
24.15 ASIC was questioned about how a national examination would operate. 
ASIC proposed that the examination would be 'industry-driven':  
The questions are practical and really deal with issues that you would face 
as an adviser. So it should be driven by the industry. It can be delivered 
across the country in testing stations at $300 a head. That is what I am 
envisaging. Frankly, I think it would really help a great deal. For $300, it is 
well worth it for what we have in terms of the savings of our country.
16
 
24.16 Mr Medcraft suggested that a further benefit in introducing a national 
examination would be in facilitating greater mutual recognition between the US and 
                                              
13  Financial Planning Association, The Future of the Financial Planning Profession: White Paper 
of the Financial Planning Association of Australia, May 2014, http://fpa.asn.au, p. 3. 
14  Financial Planning Association, The Future of the Financial Planning Profession: White Paper 
of the Financial Planning Association of Australia, May 2014, p. 4. 
15  Mr Mark Rantall, Financial Planning Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 
2014, p. 70. 
16  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 16. 
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Australia 'which would mean it would try and streamline that access between two 
countries in terms of the US capital markets'.
17
 
Reference checking and employee adviser register 
24.17 ASIC argued that there were currently insufficient controls on 'bad apple' or 
problem advisers that have not otherwise come to ASIC's attention. Two problems 
related to this were identified. The first stems from inadequate reference checking—
ASIC advised that problem advisers 'typically change employment when they are 
identified, moving from one AFS licensee to another'. According to ASIC, this is 
achieved because in many cases the new licensee either failed to conduct a proper 
reference check or the former license did not provide accurate and honest feedback.
18
 
24.18 The second problem related to practical difficulties ASIC experiences in 
tracking problem advisers. ASIC argued that its current financial services registers 
should include all individuals authorised to give personal advice on Tier 1 products, 
not just AFS licensees and authorised representatives. The following reasoning was 
provided: 
Under the current financial services regulatory regime, authorised 
representatives must be registered with ASIC; however, there is no central 
register for employee representatives. This means that ASIC has no direct 
oversight of employee adviser representatives, including those who provide 
personal advice, and must rely on licensees to ensure the competence and 
integrity of these representatives. This can result in very real difficulties in 
ASIC's ability to locate and take action against bad apples in the financial 
services industry…ASIC has had considerable practical difficulties in 
tracking problem advisers, following the collapses of several financial 
planning businesses. Where the advisers have moved to new financial 
planning businesses as employee representatives, we are unable to track 
them because they do not appear on our register.
19
 
24.19 ASIC also noted that the lack of such a register makes it difficult for investors 
to ensure that that they are dealing with properly authorised advisers: 
Given the complexities of the financial services industry, it is important that 
ASIC can emphasise certain consumer messages. One of our traditional 
messages has always been that investors should only obtain advice from 
properly licensed or authorised advisers. Before the commencement of the 
Financial Services Reform Act 2001, we could tell investors that before 
dealing with a purported adviser, they should check the person's name on 
the licensees and representatives register. 
                                              
17  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman; Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 16. 
18  Or did not agree to provide feedback at all—ASIC noted that this is 'sometimes out of 
apprehension of liability for making defamatory statements'. ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 156. 
19  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 158. 
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This simple message is no longer possible. Investors cannot easily check 
whether someone holding themselves out as a financial adviser is properly 
able to do so. They may be an employee of a licensee and the only person 
that can verify that is the relevant licensee.
20
 
24.20 Mr Medcraft remarked that he believed 'industry very much welcomes the 
idea of, say, having a national register of all employer representatives'.
21
 Mr Medcraft 
added that the US equivalent provides an effective means of tracking advisers and 
holding them accountable; he noted that the US register receives 16 million hits a year 
from consumers and employees.
22
 
24.21 ASIC's evidence was generally supported by other witnesses. For example, 
the CBA argued that ASIC and AFS licence holders should: 
…have visibility at all times of where licensed financial planners are 
practising. CFP believes there is a risk that financial planners who do not 
adhere to appropriate standards of advice enter the industry, or move within 
it between [AFS licence] holders, and for professional misconduct not to be 
taken fully into account.
23
 
Recognition of financial advisers and planners 
24.22 The FPA argued that the regulatory system should be designed 'to encourage 
the establishment of professional bodies to impose appropriate and enforceable 
professional standards that exceed the law, on financial product providers, research 
houses, and other industries in the gatekeeper space'.
24
 It noted that financial planners 
should be subject to 'a series of inter-locking obligations' based on regulatory 
requirements, licensee requirements and professional requirements. The FPA has 
binding professional obligations through a code of conduct and rules of professional 
conduct, supported by a public complaints system, an investigation process and an 
active professional disciplinary panel.
25
 Even so, it argued that: 
Without formal recognition and encouragement of adherence to 
professional obligations, there is a gap in the regulatory design as applied to 
individual providers of financial services to consumers, and consumer 
                                              
20  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 159. 
21  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 15. 
22  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 16. 
23  CBA, Submission 261, p. 16. As another example, Mr Mark Rantall of the Financial Planning 
Association stated that 'We think that having a register of advisers is important—there is not 
one at the moment…' Mr Mark Rantall, Chief Executive Officer, Financial Planning 
Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 69. 
24  Financial Planning Association, Submission 234, p. 31. 
25  Financial Planning Association, Submission 234, pp. 33, 35–37. 
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protection becomes reliant on the limitations of regulatory and licensee 
obligations alone.
26
 
24.23 Accordingly, the FPA maintained that the terms 'financial planner' and 
'financial adviser' should be restricted to 'only those that have the highest level of 
education, competency, ethics and standards, and are a member of a regulator 
prescribed professional body'. It argued that this would strengthen consumer 
protection and facilitate a more effective regulatory framework 'based on cooperative 
co-regulation'.
27
 The FPA noted that a precedent for this exists, as the use of the terms 
stockbroker, futures broker, insurance broker, general insurance broker, and life 
insurance broker are currently restricted under section 923B of the Corporations Act. 
In the FPA's view: 
…it is unclear why some expressions are restricted by s923B and not 
others. Why do such terms carry more weight under law than that of 
financial planner/adviser considering the role financial planners play in 
assisting consumers with vital financial matters? 
24.24 The FPA provided additional reasoning to support its case for legislative 
amendments to restrict the use of the terms financial planner and financial adviser: 
The terms financial planner/advisers are increasingly being used in 
marketing and promotional material by persons who provide non-traditional 
ancillary services, such as realtors, property spruikers, sales agents of 
various investment vehicles, and other unlicensed advisers. Consumers are 
continuing to be influenced by advice provided by those outside the 
Regulator's reach. This issue has become evident in the SMSF sector with 
many property spruikers influencing the use of SMSFs to purchase 
property. It has also been exacerbated by the commentary on financial 
matters provided by media outlets who are exempt from licensing 
obligations under section 911A(2) of the Corporations Act yet play a highly 
influencing role in consumer decision making. 
A lack of restrictions on the use of the terms financial planner/adviser is, 
among other things, a significant gap in consumer protection. It leaves 
trusting consumers open to influence by individuals incorrectly representing 
themselves to consumers as financial planners/advisers without holding the 
specific competency, training, license, professional standing required. This 
significantly erodes consumer protection. The lack of constraint on 
individuals calling themselves financial planners puts consumers at risk of 
receiving poor advice from incompetent providers. A key role of effective 
regulatory design should be to enable consumers to be able to clearly 
identify providers they can trust in the marketplace.
28
 
                                              
26  Financial Planning Association, Submission 234, p. 8. 
27  Financial Planning Association, Submission 234, p. 14. 
28  Financial Planning Association, Submission 234, pp. 14–15. 
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24.25 Further, the FPA noted that ASIC was already relying on professional 
associations to improve training and competence in the sector, at least among the 
members of these associations: 
RG146 states that ASIC has 'set minimum training standards only and 
encourage industry and professional associations to build on the training 
standards. [ASIC] recognise[s] industry's important role in the development 
and promotion of best practice relating to training and competence'. The 
fact that ASIC's minimum standards are intended to drive the financial 
sector to establish higher standards gives further support to the 
recommendation to make membership of a professional body mandatory for 
financial planners.
29
 
24.26 In 2013, the previous government introduced a bill that would have restricted 
the use of these terms or terms of like import 'in relation to a financial services 
business or a financial service, unless the person is able under the licence regime 
to provide personal financial advice on designated financial products'.
30
 
The explanatory memorandum identified property spruikers who represent that they 
are genuine providers of financial product advice as a group that would be targeted by 
the amendments.
31
 However, the bill lapsed at the end of the 43rd Parliament. 
ASIC's licensing tests 
24.27 A matter related to raising standards in the financial advice industry is the 
licensing process. ASIC argued that one of the regulatory barriers or gaps it faces 
were the tests currently in legislation for determining whether an AFS licence or credit 
licence must be granted. As ASIC issues AFS and credit licenses, it is understandable 
that the licensing powers should enable the regulator to, as ASIC put it, 'prevent those 
that do not warrant [public] trust from operating within the industry'. Licensing 
regimes will not prevent all undesirable businesses or individuals from operating, 
particularly those that demonstrate competence but 'go rogue'. However, in ASIC's 
view licensing processes should: 
…provide an effective screening process to exclude persons who do not 
have the appropriate skills, experience and qualifications to provide 
services with honesty and integrity, or who are not of good character, from 
operating within the financial services and credit industries.
32
 
                                              
29  Financial Planning Association, The Future of the Financial Planning Profession: White Paper 
of the Financial Planning Association of Australia, May 2014, p. 4. 
30  Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Simple Corporate Bonds 
and Other Measures) Bill 2013, paragraph 2.9. 
31  Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Simple Corporate Bonds 
and Other Measures) Bill 2013, paragraphs 2.8, 2.11. 
32  ASIC, Submission 45.2, pp. 164–65. 
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Recent developments 
24.28 During the 2009 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services (PJCCFS) inquiry into financial products and services, ASIC raised 
concern about its ability to protect consumers by restricting or removing from the 
industry participants who might cause or contribute to investor losses. It informed the 
PJCCFS that once a licence was granted, ASIC only had the power to suspend or 
cancel a licence in limited circumstances. At that time, ASIC could only suspend 
or cancel a licence immediately on application by the licensee or where the licensee 
was insolvent, ceased to carry on the business, was convicted of serious fraud, or was 
incapacitated. ASIC could suspend or cancel a licence after a hearing where: 
 the licensee had not complied with its obligations; 
 ASIC had reason to believe the licensee would not comply with its obligations 
in the future; 
 ASIC was no longer satisfied that the licensee was of good fame or character; 
 a banning order was made against the licensee or a key representative of the 
licensee; or 
 the application was materially false or misleading or omitted a material 
matter. 
24.29 At that time, ASIC was of the view that the government should assess whether 
the following modifications to ASIC's licensing and banning power would enhance 
ASIC's ability to protect investors: 
 minor changes to the licensing threshold so that ASIC can refuse or cancel 
a licence where a licensee may breach (rather than will breach) its obligations; 
 clarification that ASIC can ban individuals who are involved in a breach of 
obligations by another person; and 
 'negative licensing' of individuals so that ASIC can ban individuals who are 
not fit and proper and may not comply with the law.
33
 
24.30 The PJCCFS noted ASIC's concerns and recommended that:  
 section 920A of the Corporations Act be amended to provide extended powers 
for ASIC to ban individuals from the financial services industry; and 
 sections 913B and 915C of the Corporations Act be amended to allow ASIC 
to deny an application, or suspend or cancel a licence, where there was 
a reasonable belief that the licensee 'may not comply' with their obligations 
under the licence. 
                                              
33  ASIC Submission 378 to the PJCCFS Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia, 
August 2009, p. 24. 
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24.31 The then government supported both recommendations and in April 2010 
indicated that it would introduce a reform package to strengthen ASIC's powers in 
relation to the licensing and banning of individuals from the financial services 
industry. In announcing proposed legislative changes, the then government stated: 
In relation to licensing, ASIC will be able to take into account a broader 
range of matters when determining whether to issue a licence, or whether to 
cancel or suspend a licence. ASIC's powers to remove persons from the 
industry will also be enhanced, as it will be able to take into account a 
wider range of matters at the banning stage.
34
 
24.32 The legislation implementing this reform received the royal assent on 
27 June 2012. In summary, the new law made the following amendments to ASIC's 
licensing and banning powers: 
 the licensing threshold was changed so that ASIC can refuse or 
cancel/suspend a licence where a person is likely to contravene (rather than 
will breach) its obligations; 
 the statutory tests were extended so that ASIC can ban a person who is not of 
good fame and character or not adequately trained or competent to provide 
financial services (in essence they are not a fit and proper person); 
 ASIC can now consider any conviction for an offence involving dishonesty 
that is punishable by imprisonment for at least three months, in having 
a reason to believe a person is not of good fame and character for licensing 
and banning decisions. 
 the banning threshold was changed so that ASIC can ban a person if they are 
likely to (rather than will) contravene a financial services law; and 
 it was clarified that ASIC can ban a person who is involved, or is likely to be 
involved, in a contravention of obligations by another person.
35
 
24.33 It should be noted that ASIC's powers remain subject to: 
…the broader principles of administrative law that would underpin the 
exercise of its powers. This includes that the decision must be within its 
power, and that only relevant considerations must be taken into account. 
Further, the exercise of ASIC's powers must be for a proper purpose and not 
in bad faith, with facts based on sufficient evidence, and any decision taken 
by ASIC must be reasonable and with procedural fairness afforded.
36
 
                                              
34  The Hon Chris Bowen MP (Minister for Financial Services, Superannuation and Corporate 
Law), 'Overhaul of Financial Advice', Media Release, no. 36 of 2010, 26 April 2010.  
35  Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) 
Bill 2012, paragraph 1.26. 
36  Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) 
Bill 2012, paragraph 1.28. 
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24.34 The committee is aware that many of the cases contained in submissions 
predate the enactment of the FOFA reforms that enhanced ASIC's banning powers.  
24.35 While ASIC welcomed the amendment made by the FOFA reforms, 
it outlined the problems it sees with the 'negative assurance test' that requires ASIC 
to grant a licence unless it has material 'that would form the basis for ASIC having 
the necessary belief about future misconduct by the applicant': 
The legislation does not provide significant guidance to allow us to take 
into account all relevant factors in coming to this belief about the applicant. 
An important aspect of our licensing assessment involves consideration of 
whether the applicant and its responsible officers are of 'good fame or 
character'. Section 913B(3) sets out some of the matters that are relevant to 
considering whether an applicant is of good fame or character. While a 
non-exhaustive list, it nominates convictions, suspensions or cancellations 
of a licence or banning or disqualification order against the person as being 
relevant to consider. 
However, often we may have concerns about an applicant that do not relate 
to recorded convictions, cancellations or banning orders, but to their past 
conduct more broadly, particularly their involvement in financial services 
businesses where misconduct has occurred—for example, as an employee 
representative with a significant role in the business, or otherwise as a 
manager, director or officer of the licensee. Nevertheless, without the 
legislation indicating an intent that such matters are relevant for 
consideration in the licensing process, our decision to refuse a licence 
according to such criteria may be more likely to be reversed on merits 
review.
37
 
24.36 These issues could also be relevant to credit licences, as ASIC noted that 
the tests in place for credit licences under the National Consumer Credit Protection 
Act 2009 are very similar to the tests for AFS licences.
38
 
24.37 ASIC outlined a number of changes that could strengthen its licensing tests. 
These included: 
 changing the 'no reason to believe' test to one where ASIC grants a licence 
where it is 'satisfied' that the applicant would not be likely to contravene 
the AFS/credit licensee obligations;
39
  
                                              
37  ASIC, Submission 45.2, pp. 165–66. 
38  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 166. 
39  According to ASIC, this 'would place the onus on applicants to provide ASIC with sufficient 
material to satisfy us that they will have appropriate people, systems and resources at their 
disposal in order to ensure that they will provide financial services or credit services efficiently, 
honestly and fairly, and otherwise comply with their obligations as licensees. This change 
would provide greater facility to ASIC to refuse applicants where these elements of the 
business are not up to standard…' ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 166. 
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 amending the licensing test to insert additional criteria to the 'good fame and 
character' test, such as whether ASIC has a reasonable belief that the applicant 
held a material role in the management of a financial services business that: 
 had its licence cancelled; and 
 did not pay determinations made by an approved external dispute 
resolution scheme of which it was a member; 
 replacing the 'ASIC must grant a licence if…' test to an ASIC may grant a 
licence test, or otherwise providing ASIC with the discretion not to grant 
a licence.
40
 
Banning and disqualification  
24.38 In some cases, the reports of corporate wrongdoing made to ASIC are of such 
a serious nature that deferring action could result in further harm to investors and 
consumers. A quick and effective means of putting a stop to corporate misconduct or 
the availability of unsafe products is to suspend or ban the wrongdoer or the product. 
The committee has referred to ASIC's slowness in responding to problems. There are 
many instances, especially from the perspective of the retail investor, where ASIC 
should have stepped in much sooner to prevent consumer losses. ASIC has a range of 
administrative actions available to it, including powers to: 
 ban a person from acting as a director for up to five years; 
 ban (including permanently ban) a person from providing financial or credit 
services; 
 issue a stop order for defective disclosure documents (e.g. prospectuses and 
Product Disclosure Statements); and 
 give a direction to a market to suspend dealing in a financial product if it is 
necessary or in the public interest.
41
 
24.39 In this section, the committee considers the options for banning a financial 
service provider. 
24.40 A number of submitters referred to the harm caused by rogue advisers. 
For example, Mr Peter Francis, who works as an expert witness in stock markets and 
market related transactions, cited a particular case where people had lodged 
complaints with ASIC about a particular adviser but did not receive a satisfactory 
response. He explained that about ten years ago he started to get cases about this 
                                              
40  ASIC noted that an alternative drafting approach would be to include a catch-all discretion 
under the 'must grant a licence' requirement, such as 'ASIC must grant a licence if the following 
conditions are met…unless there is any other reason which in ASIC's reasonable opinion 
justifies the refusal of the application'. ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 166. 
41  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 118. 
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adviser, which over the next years amounted to over 50 cases from more than ten 
different lawyers. According to Mr Francis: 
In that time this advisor had moved from Epic Securities to Macquarie 
Securities to BNP Paribus to Citigroup Wealth Management to Tricom 
Securities…From these 50+ cases, all were eventually settled by the 
Defendants once the correct documentation was discovered and an Expert 
Opinion produced.
42
 
24.41 He informed the committee that the adviser was subsequently found guilty of 
fraud and convicted. Mr Francis noted, however, that: 
…over the six years many 1,000s of people had lost a good proportion of 
their savings or superannuation funds in some instances as a result of this 
one advisor.
43
 
24.42 This case was not an isolated one. The committee has referred to the financial 
planners at CFPL, who continued to practice in the industry even after ASIC became 
aware of their wrongdoing. With regard to the unscrupulous conduct of a financial 
adviser or planner, ASIC was asked about its powers to stop them from working in 
the industry. In response, ASIC outlined the banning powers it currently has, although 
to ban someone it must establish proof and conduct a hearing. The hearing, which 
includes the cross-examination of witnesses, allows the adviser or planner to be heard 
and respond to the evidence.
44
 ASIC was asked about the merits of it being given the 
power to suspend a financial planner immediately where substantial evidence of 
wrongdoing existed. Mr Medcraft did not think the suggestion was unreasonable, 
subject to natural justice.
45
 Mr Medcraft noted that the law already reflects situations 
where protective action is necessary to stop damage to individuals.
46
 
24.43 In a written question on notice, ASIC was asked to reflect further on this 
proposal. ASIC responded by observed that there 'would clearly be benefits for 
consumers if ASIC had the ability to quickly remove advisors that were engaging in 
serious misconduct, most particularly in preventing further loss or damage'. ASIC 
added, however, that there were a number of complicating factors when considering 
such a power, including: 
 a person's right to be heard before a significant decision is made; 
 the need to carry out information gathering and investigative work and then 
adequately brief a person authorised to exercise ASIC's powers, a process that 
would affect 'the immediacy with which the power could be exercised'; and 
                                              
42  Ocean Financial Pty Ltd, Submission 248, p. 2. 
43  Ocean Financial Pty Ltd, Submission 248, p. 2. 
44  Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader, Strategy Group, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 19. 
45  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 19. 
46  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 19. 
Page 390  
 
 the type of conduct the power should be used for—ASIC noted that the power 
could be useful for misuses of client funds, but less useful 'where the conduct 
involved complex factual and legal questions about whether advice provided 
was above or below the necessary legal standard'.
47
 
24.44 Clearly concerned about the impact individual rogue advisers can have on 
public perceptions of the overall financial advice/planning industry, the FPA recently 
called for ASIC to be given a suspension power: 
ASIC should have suspension powers for financial planners/advisers 
suspected of material and systemic breaches of the best interests duty. ASIC 
must have a justifiable position and the financial planner/adviser has the 
right to appeal at the AAT.
48
 
Banned advisers remaining active in the industry  
24.45 One particular aspect of ASIC's banning powers that the committee believes 
warrants closer attention goes to banned advisers continuing to be involved in 
businesses providing financial advice.  
24.46 Concern about financial advisers remaining active in financial services while 
banned is not a new issue. In June 2012, in response to a question about the activities 
of Peter and Anne-Marie Seagrim, Mr Kell informed the PJCCFS that the couple had 
been banned from providing financial services for a period of three years. 
He acknowledged that there had been some media commentary around the couple, 
for example, describing their business as operating in a manner that was 'business as 
usual'. He explained that from ASIC's perspective the ban was currently in force and 
the Seagrims were banned from providing financial advice to clients or dealing in 
financial products on behalf of clients. They had lodged an appeal. Mr Kell 
emphasised that although the ban was in place in relation to their ability to provide 
financial advice or deal in financial products, the law did not prevent them from acting 
as directors.
49
 He went on to state, however, that: 
…the Corporations Act does not prevent the Seagrims from acting as 
directors of a corporate authorised representative of a financial services 
licence holder. In that capacity they may still undertake activities. However, 
we have been very clear that business as usual certainly does not mean that 
they are able to provide that financial advice or deal in financial products on 
behalf of clients.
50
 
24.47 This matter of a banned adviser still allowed to manage a company was raised 
during this current inquiry. For example, Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith noted: 
                                              
47  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 56. 
48  Financial Planning Association, The Future of the Financial Planning Profession: White Paper 
of the Financial Planning Association of Australia, May 2014, p. 19. 
49  PJCCFS Committee Hansard, 22 June 2012, p. 8. 
50  PJCCFS Committee Hansard, 22 June 2012, p. 7. 
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Even if a person is banned they may continue to be influential in a licensed 
firm as a director, officer or a significant shareholder. The tests for bans and 
director/officer disqualification are different, and consideration should be 
given to prohibiting a banned person acting as a director or officer. 
Similarly, consideration should be given to empowering ASIC to exclude 
from management a shareholder who is banned. ASIC should have express 
power to consider the fitness for a license of a firm where a banned person 
has a significant shareholding.
51
 
24.48 The committee asked ASIC whether any impediments existed to extending the 
ban on advisers to being a director of, or a person occupying a position of influence in, 
a financial services company. ASIC informed the committee that while it has powers 
to cancel an AFS license or credit licence, or to ban a person from providing financial 
services or credit services, 'a missing element was a power to prevent a person from 
having a role in managing a financial services business or credit business'.
52
 
It explained that the law as currently drafted means that ASIC can have 'difficulty in 
removing these managing agents who do not themselves provide a financial service 
but are integral to the operation of a financial services business'. ASIC explained that 
it had: 
…seen instances where we cancel the AFS licence of an advisory business 
due to poor practices or other misconduct, but those responsible for 
managing the business move to another licensee's business, or apply for a 
new licence with new responsible managers. 
If such managers are not themselves directly providing financial services or 
credit services in that new role, ASIC may not be able to prevent them from 
continuing to operate in the industry, even where there were serious failings 
in the previous business.
53
 
24.49 In its main submission, ASIC recommended amending the law to provide 
ASIC with the power to ban a person from managing a financial service business or 
credit business. The FPA advised that it supports this recommendation. It provided 
the following reasoning: 
If you have been banned as a financial planner there are usually very good 
reasons for it, and if you were then to be supervising and managing 
financial planners or a financial planning company were would see it as 
inappropriate—depending on the circumstances, of course. Obviously it 
would need to be a serious breach, not a minor breach.
54
 
                                              
51  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 8. 
52  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 160 and answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 
2014), p. 13. 
53  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 160. 
54  Mr Mark Rantall, Financial Planning Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 
2014, p. 69. 
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Committee view 
24.50 The committee recognises that steps need to be taken to improve standards in 
the financial advice sector and perceptions about that sector. Doing so would provide 
several benefits. Higher barriers to entry and better mechanisms for dealing with 
problem advisers will assist ASIC in its regulation of the sector. In turn, the improved 
reputation of the sector that should result will encourage more Australians to seek 
financial advice; encouraging investors to become more informed about their 
circumstances and investment options appropriate to them will assist ASIC to achieve 
its statutory objectives. 
24.51 The committee emphasises two points. Firstly, to ensure the measures are 
as effective as possible, they should be developed by ASIC working closely with 
industry. Secondly, the measures for improving standards should be funded by the 
industry and to the extent possible operated by the industry. The committee notes that 
the national examination would require amendments to the Corporations Act that 
stipulate that representatives of AFS licensees must have passed the national 
examination to be deemed competent. 
24.52 The committee appreciates ASIC's evidence about the need to ensure that the 
licensing tests specified in legislation set an appropriately high bar to entry. 
A licensing process that works as effectively as is reasonably possible to prevent 
people from entering the financial services and credit industries who should not be in 
these industries is clearly a desirable regulatory goal. The changes proposed by ASIC 
would make ASIC more responsible for carefully screening people seeking to enter 
these industries. The changes would also provide ASIC with a better chance of 
meeting existing community expectations about the people that should be trusted with 
such licences.  
24.53 ASIC's proposed amendments to the AFS and credit licensing tests were not 
addressed in detail in the evidence the committee received from key stakeholders. 
The committee is of the view that the government should assess these proposals and 
initiate a targeted public consultation process limited to this issue, ideally with draft 
legislative amendments available for stakeholders to comment on. 
24.54 The committee considered a proposal for ASIC's powers to be strengthened 
to immediately suspend financial advisers and planners suspected of egregious 
misconduct causing widespread harm to clients. This report has identified that ASIC is 
often slow to react and to exercise the powers it already has. The CFPL matter is a 
stark, but not isolated, example. The committee is also mindful of the need to ensure 
procedural fairness. Sound decision-making usually requires the decision-maker 
to have both sides of the story; enabling ASIC to make a decision that prevents an 
adviser or planner from working without providing them with the opportunity 
to respond to the evidence would be a significant departure from current practice. 
On the other hand, the current options for preventing a problem adviser from causing 
continued harm may be deficient. 
 Page 393 
 
24.55 Should ASIC be given the power to suspend an adviser suspected of 
malfeasance that, if allowed to continue, would cause detriment to his or her clients or 
potential clients, the committee believes that robust safeguards must be in place. 
The committee considers that the suspended adviser or planner would: 
 need to be informed of the complaint against them; 
 have the right to reply to the complaint; 
 have the right to appeal ASIC's decision to the AAT;  
 the suspension would not be publicised until a subsequent banning order was 
made; and 
 the decision to issue the suspension would be taken at a senior level in ASIC. 
24.56 The power should also only be available in limited cases that do not involve 
complex questions of law, such as where client funds are clearly being misused. 
Recommendation 42 
24.57 The committee recommends that financial advisers and planners be 
required to: 
 successfully pass a national examination developed and conducted by 
relevant industry associations before being able to give personal advice 
on Tier 1 products; 
 hold minimum education standards of a relevant university degree, and 
three years' experience over a five year period; and 
 meet minimum continuing professional development requirements. 
Recommendation 43 
24.58 The committee recommends that a requirement for mandatory reference 
checking procedures in the financial advice/planning industry be introduced. 
Recommendation 44 
24.59 The committee recommends that a register of employee representatives 
providing personal advice on Tier 1 products be established. 
Recommendation 45 
24.60 The committee recommends that the Corporations Act 2001 be amended 
to require:  
 that a person must not use the terms 'financial adviser', 'financial 
planner' or terms of like import, in relation to a financial services 
business or a financial service, unless the person is able under the licence 
regime to provide personal financial advice on designated financial 
products; and 
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 financial advisers and financial planners to adhere to professional 
obligations by requiring financial advisers and financial planners to be 
members of a regulator-prescribed professional association. 
Recommendation 46 
24.61 The committee recommends that the government consider whether 
section 913 of the Corporations Act 2001 and section 37 of the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009 should be amended to ensure that ASIC can take all 
relevant factors into account in making a licensing decision. 
Recommendation 47 
24.62 The committee recommends that the government consider the banning 
provisions in the licence regimes with a view to ensuring that a banned person 
cannot be a director, manager or hold a position of influence in a company 
providing a financial service or credit business. 
Recommendation 48 
24.63 The committee recommends that the government consider legislative 
amendments that would give ASIC the power to immediately suspend a financial 
adviser or planner when ASIC suspects that the adviser or planner has engaged 
in egregious misconduct causing widespread harm to clients, subject to the 
principles of natural justice. 
  
 
Chapter 25 
ASIC's responsibilities and funding: problems with the 
current framework and suggested changes 
25.1 This chapter considers two issues fundamental to ASIC's performance as 
a regulator: its functions and responsibilities and the resources available for it 
to perform these tasks. Successive governments have given additional responsibilities 
to ASIC at various times since it was established. In recent years there has been a 
marked increase in the functions ASIC has acquired.
1
 This chapter considers the 
implications of this and, in light of the issues raised in previous chapters, the extent to 
which ASIC's growing list of functions and responsibilities has affected the agency's 
performance.  
25.2 When considering the responsibilities given to ASIC, it is helpful, indeed 
necessary, to examine the resources given to ASIC to perform these tasks. 
Accordingly, this chapter also considers the amount of funding ASIC receives and 
whether the mechanism in place for funding ASIC should be changed.  
Is ASIC overburdened and underfunded? 
25.3 There is clearly a correlation between the list of responsibilities ASIC has, the 
funding it receives and the outcomes it can achieve. ASIC's submission contained 
the following statement on this relationship: 
What we are able to achieve also depends on our level of funding. Ensuring 
ASIC has adequate resources affects the strength and integrity of the 
financial system and the confidence of investors. 
ASIC can only achieve what it is resourced to do. Funding levels should be 
set by reference to Government and community expectations of what ASIC 
should deliver and, as a result, what level of resilience they want in the 
financial system.
2
 
25.4 Figure 25.1 outlines ASIC's operating revenue, expenses and staff numbers 
since the 2000–01 financial year. Between 2000–01 and 2012–13, ASIC produced an 
operating surplus for eleven of the 13 financial years, averaging a $16.7 million 
surplus each year. 
                                              
1  See Appendix 4 for a timeline of changes to ASIC's responsibilities. 
2  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 11. 
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Figure 25.1: ASIC's operating revenue, expenses and staff levels, 
2000–01 to 2012–13 
 
Source: Figures for operating revenue and expenses taken from research prepared by the 
Parliamentary Library, based on cash flow statements contained in ASIC's annual reports, 
various years. Figures for staff levels are taken from ASIC's annual reports, various years. 
Note: Total operating revenue includes appropriation revenue and other cash received. 
25.5 A 2012 report prepared by staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
argued that ASIC 'has rightfully earned its reputation as an effective and credible 
enforcer of market regulation, but would benefit from increased resources and 
budgetary flexibility'. The IMF staff argued that: 
…ASIC is hampered in its ability to fully carry out proactive supervision 
because of the lack of budgetary resources. A significant amount of ASIC's 
funding is non-core funding earmarked for specific projects, and the share 
of non-core funding has been increasing in the last few years. To supervise 
a large number of financial services licensees, ASIC uses desk-top, rather 
than on-site, reviews for initial risk-based assessments, reflecting in part its 
resource constraints. In determining the target and intensity of its 
supervisory actions, ASIC relies heavily on its initial risk-based 
assessments, self-reporting of breaches of regulatory requirements and third 
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party notifications. It is important that ASIC be given more resources and 
flexibility over its operational budget.
3
 
25.6 Many individuals and organisations agreed that ASIC is currently 
underfunded. A view also frequently expressed was that ASIC's expanded regulatory 
remit had negatively affected ASIC's performance. This was either as a logical 
consequence of ASIC having a longer and more diverse list of responsibilities, 
or because the additional funding provided to supplement specific new responsibilities 
has been insufficient. The following extracts from the evidence taken by the 
committee illustrate some of the concerns: 
In recent years, two trends regarding ASIC have emerged. Firstly, ASIC has 
been given increasing responsibility for important areas of corporate and 
financial regulation, including stock market regulation, financial services 
licensing, consumer protection in financial services, business names 
registration and credit regulation. These matters add to ASIC's already full 
regulatory brief covering general corporate regulation and administrative 
matters (document lodgments, searches and maintenance of registers). 
During this time while ASIC's funding has increased, much of the funding 
has been tied to particular projects (such as key investigations into HIH and 
other high profile matters), and the numbers of staff working at ASIC has 
only increased from 1221 in 2000 to 1738 in 2012 (according to ASIC's 
Annual Reports). The increases in funding and staffing are wholly 
inadequate to account for exponential increase in ASIC's responsibilities.
4
 
* * * 
…the increase in ASIC's mandate over the last decade has not been 
matched by financial appropriations and has stretched its personnel.
5
 
* * * 
…the constant accrual of functions and services by ASIC has played some 
part in reducing the ability of ASIC to devote resources to its legislative, 
surveillance and investigative responsibilities.
6
 
* * * 
Our sense is that the problem ASIC has is complexity of legislation, huge 
areas of responsibility and resources that are too limited. It is not a lack of 
powers, it is a lack of resources, really, and the practical ability to make 
things happen.
7
 
                                              
3  International Monetary Fund, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF Country 
Report, no. 12/308, November 2012, pp. 25–26. 
4  Mr Jason Harris, Submission 116, p. 1. 
5  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 5. 
6  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 6. 
7  Mr Bruce Dyer, Member, Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of 
Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 6. 
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* * * 
In our view, any deficiencies in ASIC's performance and effectiveness are 
more likely to be caused by a lack of adequate funding and resources to 
allow ASIC to fulfil its role as a corporate regulator. Being well-funded and 
resourced is essential for a regulator to be able to effectively use its powers 
and discharge its duties. Relevantly, being adequately resourced allows a 
regulator to be more pro-active and therefore maximise the chances of 
ASIC being able to properly enforce existing legislation. Company 
Directors has long called for and supported moves to provide appropriate 
funding to ASIC and other regulators to meet the increasing demands that 
they face, and we continue to believe that this is the best way to increase 
ASIC's performance as a regulator. 
This lack of funding is likely, at least in part, to be due to the fact that 
ASIC's role as a regulator has been increased significantly over time and its 
resources have been stretched as a result. In addition to increasing the 
existing funding and resources of ASIC, going forward ASIC's roles should 
only be added to or extended where there is also a commensurate increase 
in ASIC's funding and resources.
8
 
* * * 
The finance world is increasingly complicated with emerging risks and 
challenges. It is essential that ASIC is adequately funded and resourced to 
carry out its duties. We would not support any proposals to cut ASIC's 
funding.
9
 
25.7 Members of the public that had dealt with ASIC also called for ASIC 
to receive more funding: 
ASIC needs more funding to go after criminals and credit providers. ASIC 
should have enough funding that it can anticipate rorts and take steps to 
protect people…There is a perception in the community that ASIC is 
reluctant to take a stand possibly because of lack of funding.
10
 
25.8 Others were less sure. Levitt Robinson Solicitors argued that 'ASIC's failures 
cannot be blamed on budgetary constraints, given ASIC's apparent profligacy in the 
deployment of public money spent on, or in outsourcing legal services'.
11
 
CPA Australia noted that ASIC is possibly overworked, but it considered other 
problems with ASIC's approach were more significant: 
                                              
8  Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission 119, p. 2. 
9  Industry Super Australia, Submission 201, p. 12. 
10  Name withheld, Submission 135, p. 1. 
11  Levitt Robinson Solicitors, which criticised various aspects of ASIC, noted that ASIC was 
second only to the ATO in expenditure on legal fees, with $300 million spent by ASIC between 
2008 and 2012. The figures are based on the Attorney-General's Department's Legal Services 
Expenditure Report 2011–2012. Levitt Robinson Solicitors, Submission 276, p. 11. 
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I think there has been a lot of commentary by ASIC to say that they are 
very stretched with their resources and there is more to do. There may be an 
element of truth in that argument. I think the bigger issue is that their sense 
of priority needs to be revisited.
12
 
25.9 The Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia (ICAA) noted that all 
organisations face financial pressure and need to ensure they use the resources they 
have as efficiently as possible. The ICAA argued that ASIC is currently undertaking 
work which 'generally has very little effect but consumes quite a lot of resources'.
13
 
On this issue, the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) acknowledged that 
every organisation needs to focus on and review whether it is undertaking activities in 
the most efficient way. However, the CPSU argued: 
…if you are not actually reinvesting in the work that is needed to be done, 
and having that investment being made then you are likely to see the 
services slip. And I think we sometimes confuse at the moment 
conversations about productivity and effectiveness with cuts.
14
 
25.10 It is evident that funding issues are not just relevant to ASIC; rather they are 
something that all regulators encounter. The former chairman of the Trade Practices 
Commission, the predecessor to the ACCC, argued that there 'is a fundamental flaw in 
the way in which our regulators are funded': 
Having acted as chairman of the Trade Practices Commission (TPC)…I can 
say with complete confidence that the level and nature of funding provided 
to the TPC at the time to conduct its various activities was well below what 
was needed to properly and adequately undertake its tasks. This was 
certainly the case in the context of community and media (and some 
politicians') expectations of the role of the regulator. The apparent 
unwillingness of the TPC to undertake certain investigations or to pursue 
certain court actions was often misunderstood, because the critics did not 
appreciate the problems that the regulator faced due to its inadequate and 
restricted use of its funding.
15
 
                                              
12  Mr Alex Malley, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
19 February 2014, p. 46. 
13  Mr Lee White, Chief Executive Officer, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Proof 
Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 46. In its submission, the ICAA argued that 'there 
are many examples where ASIC initiates a specific regulatory program that targets particular 
areas of focus in the marketplace, but then continues to allocate resources to the same program 
even when many would argue that the impact (or relevance) in the marketplace of the work that 
continues to be done has significantly diminished'. The ICAA used ASIC's accounts 
surveillance program as an example; in the ICAA's view that program 'was initially very 
effective in lifting the standard of financial reporting in Australia. However, many stakeholders 
in the capital markets would question whether ASIC's work continues to have a major impact 
on the quality of financial information in the marketplace, given that many of ASIC's initial 
objectives have now been met'. Submission 203, p. 3. 
14  Mr Alistair Waters, CPSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 63–64. 
15  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Submission 189, pp. 6–7. 
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25.11 Professor Baxt added that regulators also have 'inadequate' resources to bring 
cases that challenge well-resourced defendants that 'usually enjoy deep pockets and 
are not burdened by significant restrictions in the way in which they operate in 
defending the relevant matter'.
16
 
25.12 Whether ASIC has sufficient resources to adequately supervise the entities 
it regulates can also be considered by reviewing the number of staff ASIC allocates to 
each group of the regulated population. As noted in Chapter 4, ASIC publishes figures 
on the number of staff members allocated to each of its stakeholder teams, the number 
of regulated entities they oversee and the number of years it would theoretically take 
to conduct surveillance on every regulated entity. These figures highlight the 
challenges ASIC faces in fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities with its current 
resources. For example, ASIC has 29 staff members that oversee 3,394 AFS licensees 
authorised to provide personal advice as well as 1,395 AFS licensees authorised 
to provide general advice. Approximately 65 staff members oversee: 173 authorised 
deposit-taking institutions; 141 insurers; 641 licensed non-cash payment facility 
providers; 13 trustee companies; and 5,688 non-ADI credit licensees with 28,201 
credit representatives. These figures were outlined in full in Chapter 4 (refer to 
Table 4.1). 
25.13 However, striking figures on supervision coverage and an imbalance between 
the regulator's financial resources and those of the large firms it regulates are not 
unique to ASIC. For example, in recent fiscal year budget requests to the United 
States Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has given the 
following bleak assessments of its resources and capacities: 
…during the past decade, trading volume in the equity markets has more 
than doubled, as have assets under management by investment advisers, 
with these trends likely to continue for the foreseeable future. A number of 
financial firms spend many times more each year on their technology 
budgets alone than the SEC spends annually on all its operations. Similarly, 
SEC enforcement teams bring cases against firms that spend more on 
lawyers' fees than the agency's annual operating budget.
17
 
* * * 
Currently, the average transaction volume cleared and settled by the seven 
active registered clearing agencies is approximately $6.6 trillion a day. Yet 
the SEC only has approximately sixteen examiners devoted to them, with 
limited on-site presence in only three of the seven.
18
 
* * * 
Seven years ago, the SEC's funding was sufficient to provide nineteen 
examiners for each trillion dollars in investment adviser assets under 
                                              
16  Professor Bob Baxt AO, Submission 189, pp. 6–7. 
17  US Securities and Exchange Commission, FY 2014 Congressional Budget Justification, 
www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf, p. 4 (accessed 19 September 2013). 
18  US Securities and Exchange Commission, FY 2014 Congressional Budget Justification, p. 6. 
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management. Today, that figure stands at ten examiners per trillion 
dollars.
19
 
How do ASIC's responsibilities compare with foreign regulators? 
25.14 The breadth of responsibilities entrusted to ASIC compared to regulators in 
other jurisdictions was noted by witnesses and used to argue that a review of ASIC's 
responsibilities was warranted: 
At the moment ASIC has an incredibly broad remit in comparison to most 
securities regulators globally. If there was that reduction in supervisory 
capacity or its responsibilities perhaps it would allow it to focus more 
specifically on some of the issues which concern so many of the people 
who made submissions to the inquiry and the members of this committee.
20
 
25.15 Even a cursory comparison of Australia's framework of regulators and those 
of other key jurisdictions indicates that the breadth of ASIC's responsibilities is 
significantly greater than those of its foreign counterparts. In the UK, for example, 
ASIC's securities and markets regulation functions are undertaken by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). The FCA also has responsibility for market supervision 
and governance (through the UK Listing Authority, a division of the FCA). The FCA 
also is tasked with financial products and services regulation and credit and financial 
services licensing. However, the FCA does not have responsibility for matters relating 
to the corporations law generally, such enforcing directors' duties or regulating 
auditors and insolvency practitioners. Company registration is performed by 
Companies House, an executive agency of the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills. 
25.16 In the US, ASIC's securities and markets regulatory counterpart is the SEC, 
with some functions also performed by the Federal Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and state authorities. However, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) is tasked with financial products and services regulation, 
and credit and financial services licensing is undertaken by state authorities. 
The regulation of auditors is carried out by the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), although this is overseen by the SEC. Reflecting the chapter 11 
bankruptcy and reorganisation system in place in the US, corporate insolvency is dealt 
with by specialist bankruptcy courts with an office in the Department of Justice 
(the US Trustee Program) responsible for overseeing the administration of bankruptcy 
cases. 
25.17 In Canada, provincial and territorial regulators are responsible for securities 
and markets regulation and market supervision. The Financial Consumer Agency of 
Canada (FCAC) supervises financial institutions' compliance with consumer 
                                              
19  US Securities and Exchange Commission, In Brief: FY 2013 Congressional Justification, 
www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf, p. 2 (accessed 19 September 2013). 
20  Dr George Gilligan, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 52. 
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protection obligations and promotes increased financial literacy. Financial advice is 
regulated by provincial and territorial agencies. The federal registration of companies 
is administered by Corporations Canada with provincial agencies registering other 
companies. The Canadian Public Accountability Board deals with auditors. 
Should ASIC lose some of its functions? 
25.18 Following on from the previous discussion, this section examines the 
evidence received by the committee that questioned the wisdom of one agency being 
given numerous important regulatory and law enforcement functions as well as other 
administrative responsibilities. During the course of the inquiry, various possible 
changes that could be considered were suggested or noted by stakeholders. 
These options, which are discussed in the following paragraphs, include: 
 transferring ASIC's corporate and business name registry functions to another 
government agency, or privatising these functions; 
 splitting ASIC into smaller regulators along the lines of its broad business 
areas; and 
 transferring responsibility for consumer protection to the ACCC or creating a 
new consumer protection agency. 
Corporate registration and other administrative functions 
25.19 Since ASIC was established it has been responsible for the administration of 
corporate registration. However, in 2012 ASIC also gained responsibility for the 
registration of business names after this function was transferred from the states and 
territories to the Commonwealth. ASIC also maintains a register of SMSF auditors. 
Stakeholders questioned whether it was necessary for these functions to be performed 
by a regulator such as ASIC.  
25.20 The devolution of ASIC's registry function to another body was noted by the 
Governance Institute of Australia as a possible change that could allow ASIC 
to devote resources to its other legislative, surveillance and investigative 
responsibilities. To facilitate this, an equivalent of the UK's Companies House could 
be established in Australia.
21
 
25.21 The committee is not aware of an example of an advanced economy where the 
company registration function is undertaken by the securities and markets regulator. 
In a newspaper article published in 2010, former ASIC chairman Alan Cameron was 
reported as identifying Pakistan as the only other country where these roles are 
combined.
22
 When asked about ASIC's registry responsibilities, the current ASIC 
chairman described them as a 'technology business' and 'not really a regulatory 
business'. Mr Medcraft also considered there were a number of opportunities 
                                              
21  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 6. 
22  Stuart Washington, 'ASICs powers put to the test', The Age, 5 June 2010, p. 4. 
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to leverage economies of scale and to create a better user experience by transforming 
ASIC's registry function. As an example, he referred to merging ASIC's corporate 
register with other government registries: 
The Siebel system we have has, currently, six million names on it. Verizon 
use the Siebel system in the States for telephones. They have 70 million 
customers on it. So I think there are huge benefits in actually separating out 
that registry business and merging it with other government registries to 
leverage the economies of scale from the Siebel management system. 
Basically, it has enormous capacity. 
What that also means from a consumer perspective is that you end up with a 
one-stop shop for financial services and even other registry things you go 
to. If you want to update, you want to go to one place et cetera. And you 
have to think about the massive opportunity for extracting revenue from the 
metadata that actually comes from that.
23
 
25.22 Mr Medcraft explained that although ASIC has its newest registers24 operating 
on the more advanced system, ASIC does not have the resources to invest in the 
corporate register. Mr Medcraft opined that there 'is cash there for somebody':
25
 
…at the moment we have only two registers on the Siebel management 
system. We have the business names and we have the self-managed super 
funds. We have not got the capital to invest to bring the corporate register 
onto that. If I were in the private sector, I would finance it as a banker 
because that $70 million, by moving those registers onto Siebel, would 
allow things like person search so every Australian could log on and check 
everything a person has to do with ASIC—whether they are deregistered or 
whatever. It also allows for online company registration. That $70 million, 
if you were in private enterprise, you would invest because the cash flow 
you would get out of it would pay back. It is 10-year payback in simple, 
straight cash. It removes all the duplication across the registers. 
There are economies of scale. Potentially, an investment in that could 
eventually yield $350 million of benefits to small businesses outside of that. 
So I think the registry is one that probably would be better moved out, 
aggregated with other registries to provide a one-stop shop for 
Australians.
26
 
25.23 A small business owner similarly observed that ASIC's corporate and business 
names registers do not appear to have a regulatory role 'beyond maintaining up-to-date 
information and not registering conflicting names'. After expressing criticism about 
the fees levied on small businesses to fulfil their obligations to provide information, 
the fees imposed to access information, and ASIC's performance at managing 
                                              
23  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 33–34. 
24  The registers for business names and SMSF auditors. 
25  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 38. 
26  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 33–34. 
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the register, the small business owner concluded that a commercial enterprise could 
undertake ASIC's registry functions for less than 'one tenth of the fee ASIC charges'.
27
 
Other submissions also noted the cost of accessing information on ASIC's register, 
such as $18 to obtain each current and historical extract of a company.
28
 
25.24 The Governance Institute of Australia observed that ASIC's registry and other 
administrative functions, including its call centre, do not utilise senior or experienced 
ASIC staff; in fact it indicated that 'call centre staff appear to be trained only to the 
extent of referring callers to the ASIC website in situations where there is uncertainty 
about the interpretation of specific provisions'. The Institute argued that: 
…there may be service efficiencies to be gained by ASIC outsourcing its 
administrative function in a bid to broaden its educative function. That is, it 
might be cost-effective for ASIC to use a commercial operator to run its 
administrative function rather than maintaining these responsibilities 
inhouse.
29
 
25.25 The CPSU was asked about the possibility of certain functions being 
separated from ASIC and privatised. The CPSU argued that, as the registries raise 
'a reasonably significant source of income and would appear to be a monopoly 
service', it would be in the public interest for an Australian government body to be 
tasked with the function, rather than the function being privatised.
30
 
25.26 Academics also commented on how privatising ASIC's registry function could 
affect the provision of information for research purposes. Mr Jason Harris, 
in consultation with other academics, recommended that if ASIC's registry was 
privatised, that this only occur with a requirement that information continue to be 
provided for research and accountability purposes.
31
 
25.27 In May 2014, as part of the 2014–15 Budget, the government announced that 
a scoping study would be undertaken into future ownership options for ASIC's 
registry function.
32
 
Split along clusters or tasks 
25.28 Stakeholder organisations and academics also identified other possible 
changes to Australia's framework of regulatory institutions. One of the options for 
consideration identified by the Governance Institute of Australia was dividing ASIC 
into smaller agencies with specific tasks: 
                                              
27  Name withheld, Submission 263, pp. 3, 8. 
28  See Mr Jeffrey Knapp, Submission 274, pp. 3, 6, 8 and 9. 
29  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 6. 
30  Mr Alistair Waters, CPSU, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 64. 
31  Mr Jason Harris, answer to question on notice, no. 8 (received 17 April 2014), p. 4. 
32  Australian Government, 2014–15 Budget—Budget Paper No. 2, May 2014, p. 117. 
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[A] number of smaller regulators could be established to manage the wide 
range of regulatory functions currently allocated to ASIC, leaving ASIC 
focused solely on its original regulatory functions or more limited 
regulatory functions than it is currently tasked to manage.
33
 
25.29 CPA Australia suggested that thought could be given to restructuring ASIC 
and setting clear priorities: 
I think it is worth a conversation and some questions perhaps around 
splitting ASIC into some segments that can focus on particular things. 
When you have a regulator on Monday chasing a corporate, on Tuesday 
charging a small business and on Wednesday giving marriage cost advice, 
that says that perhaps we need to pause for a moment, set the agenda for the 
year, tell the public what they can expect and let's see how accountable you 
are, because that is what you keep telling others they have to be.
34
 
25.30 Associate Professor David Brown noted the committee's 2010 report that 
recommended that ASIC's insolvency functions be transferred to the Insolvency & 
Trustee Service Australia (ITSA), since renamed the Australian Financial Security 
Authority. Professor O'Brien added that:  
…a lot of the rules for that body would come from the best practice of 
ITSA, which had shown itself to be a more effective regulator in that area, 
because 'insolvency' was in its title as opposed to it being one of the many 
functions of ASIC…35 
Consumer protection responsibilities 
25.31 Some witnesses suggested that the division of consumer protection 
responsibilities between ASIC, which has responsibility for consumer protection in 
financial products and services, and the ACCC, which has responsibility for consumer 
protection in the remaining sectors of the economy, should be reviewed.
36
 
Other submissions outlined different proposals. For example, many individuals 
dissatisfied with their treatment by ASIC and external dispute resolution schemes 
called for the creation of an agency dedicated to consumer protection in financial 
services.
37
 A former ASIC employee argued that ASIC has too much work and that 
this detracts from ASIC's ability to protect retail investors: 
These are the working Australians—the millions of people who are putting 
the money into the superannuation system and are least empowered to 
protect themselves. They are the ones who need the most protection. I think 
they are the ones who have been let down the most by ASIC, and I think the 
                                              
33  Governance Institute of Australia, Submission 137, p. 6. 
34  Mr Alex Malley, CPA Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 51. 
35  Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 55. 
36  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 55–56. 
37  For example, see Submissions 51.1, p. 1; 199, p. 1; 254, p. 1; 351, p. [3]. 
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only way that you can really get them protected is with an agency that is 
dedicated to nothing but protecting retail investors.
38
 
25.32 In reaching its recommendation that responsibility for consumer protection in 
financial services should be transferred from the ACCC to the agency that ultimately 
became ASIC, the Wallis Inquiry considered alternative approaches. In particular, the 
Wallis Inquiry noted concerns put to it that without a dedicated consumer protection 
agency for financial services 'consumer protection would otherwise become 
subservient to other objectives'. However, the report concluded that: 
…this risk is more likely to arise where consumer protection is combined 
with the functionally different task of prudential regulation. The tasks of 
consumer protection, market integrity and corporations regulation are more 
complementary than conflicting.
39
 
25.33 The approach taken following the Wallis Inquiry was queried at the time40 and 
more recently. In 2008, the Productivity Commission found that the financial services 
carve out from the general consumer law occasionally leads to uncertainty about 
whether the ACCC or ASIC had jurisdiction. The Productivity Commission 
recommended that the economy-wide jurisdiction of the ACCC for consumer 
protection be restored but with ASIC continuing to be the primary regulator for 
financial services.
41
 Around the time of the Productivity Commission inquiry, 
a former ACCC chairman and a former editor of the Australian Financial Review 
wrote in various newspaper opinion articles that '[t]he natural home of financial 
consumer protection is the ACCC, not the carve-out to ASIC created by Wallis';
42
 
ASIC had a 'noted lack of consumer zeal to date'; and the government should consider 
making the ACCC the sole consumer regulator, including for financial services as 
'[c]arving out these powers for ASIC has not worked'.
43
 Concerns about the current 
framework remain; for example, in late 2013 a Monash University forum on the 
government's upcoming review of competition policy suggested that the review 
                                              
38  Mr James Wheeldon, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 23. 
39  Financial System Inquiry, Final Report, March 1997, p. 244. 
40  A research paper produced soon after the Wallis Inquiry report was released surveyed the 
arguments opposing some of the key conclusions and recommendations. See Phil Hanratty, 
'The Wallis Report on the Australian Financial System: Summary and Critique', Parliamentary 
Library Research Paper, no. 16 1996–97, www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ 
Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9697/97rp16 (accessed 20 August 2013) 
(footnotes omitted). 
41  Productivity Commission, Review of Australia's Consumer Policy Framework, vol. 1, report 
no. 45 (30 April 2008), p. 24. 
42  Allan Fels and Fred Benchley, 'Consumer watchdog tipped to get more bite as Rudd revolution 
gains pace', The Age, 5 April 2008, p. 2. 
43  Fels and Benchley, 'Consumer watchdog tipped to get more bite as Rudd revolution gains pace', 
p. 2; 'Rudd's consumer activism over the top', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 2009, p. 4. 
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should consider whether the ACCC's and ASIC's consumer law functions 'should be 
jointly administered by a single separate body'.
44
 
25.34 It is noteworthy, however, that recent reforms undertaken in other countries 
have not resulted in responsibility for financial services consumer protection being 
taken from the securities regulator and given to the general consumer protection 
agency. For example, in the United Kingdom the opposite has occurred.
45
 
Proposal for a user-pays funding model 
25.35 In addition to suggestions that some of ASIC's responsibilities be transferred 
to other bodies, the committee explored how ASIC is funded and whether the current 
funding model encourages better regulatory outcomes.  
25.36 Although ASIC collects fees, charges and fines on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, this substantial revenue ($717 million in 2012–13) is returned by 
ASIC to consolidated revenue.
46
 With the exception of some cost-recovery 
arrangements,
47
 the majority of ASIC's funding has no relationship with the revenue 
collected by ASIC.
48
 Nevertheless, the fact that ASIC collects significantly more 
revenue than its operating expenses was noted in submissions.
49
 Further, although the 
growth in revenue from Corporations Act fees appears steady, Treasury's submission, 
received in October 2013, noted that ASIC's funding was projected to decline.
50
 
In May 2014, the government announced that it would achieve savings of $120.1 
million over five years by reducing funding given to ASIC, with ASIC's funding 
reduced in the first year by $26 million. The impact of the savings announced by the 
government and the termination of various measures are outlined in Table 25.1. 
                                              
44  Monash Business Policy Forum, Agenda for National Competition Policy Inquiry (2013), 
November 2013, www.buseco.monash.edu.au/mbpf/agenda.pdf (accessed 21 November 2013), 
p. 18. 
45  On 1 April 2014, responsibility for the regulation of consumer credit was transferred from the 
Office of Fair Trading, the UK's general consumer protection regulator, to the Financial 
Conduct Authority. Further, in the US, the creation of the CFPB consolidated the 
administration of federal consumer financial protection laws, a responsibility previously shared 
by various agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission. 
46  As required by section 81 of the Constitution. 
47  Operators of domestic licensed financial markets regulated by ASIC and some market 
participants are subject to an annual levy. Levies collected by the APRA and the ATO also 
cover some of the costs of ASIC. See APRA, Annual Report 2013, p. 81; Treasury, Submission 
154, p. 4. 
48  Treasury, Submission 154, p. 4. 
49  For example, see Industry Super Australia, Submission 201, p. 11. 
50  Treasury, Submission 154, p. 4. 
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Table 25.1: Projected funding for ASIC, 2013–14 to 2017–18 ($ million) 
($ million) 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 
Changes announced in 2014–15 Budget 3.0 –26.0 –32.5 –32.1 –32.4 
Total annual department expenses* 366.28 321.25 306.04 303.40 306.29 
* This funding relates to ASIC's annual departmental expenses under for its main 
functions (in the Budget papers, this is Programme 1.1 under Outcome 1). That is, 
ASIC's expenses for the administration of unclaimed money from banking and deposit 
taking institutions and life insurance institutions are not included. 
Source: Australian Government, 2014–15 Budget: Budget Related Paper No. 1.16, 
Treasury Portfolio Budget Statements, May 2014, p. 159. 
25.37 The committee reviewed the funding arrangements in place for foreign 
regulators. As with ASIC, the US SEC collects fees and has funding linked to 
government appropriations. However, the arrangement is different in that there is 
more of a direct link between revenue raised and funding.
51
 Another US agency, 
the CFPB, primarily receives its funding from the Federal Reserve. Subject to 
statutory rules and limits, the CFPB determines the amount of funding necessary 
to fund its operations. The funding is not subject to review by Congress.
52
 While these 
arrangements attract some controversy,
53
 it does provide the CFPB with a relatively 
stable source of funding. 
25.38 An alternative model of funding a regulator already utilised in Australia and 
prevalent internationally is based on cost-recovery levies. In Australia, industry levies 
are used to fund APRA and, as noted earlier, a small proportion of ASIC's functions. 
ASIC's chairman noted that, internationally, levies are the predominant means by 
which regulators are funded.
54
 Examples of foreign regulators that receive funding 
                                              
51  The fees collected by the US SEC offset the appropriation it receives, and in recent years total 
fees have been a similar amount to the funding the SEC receives through appropriations 
resulting in most appropriated funds being returned. US SEC, Fiscal Year 2012 Agency 
Financial Report, November 2012, www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2012.pdf (accessed 
18 September 2013), p. 36. 
52  The CFPB can also request from Congress discretionary appropriations if the amount received 
from the Federal Reserve is insufficient, however, it has not yet needed to make such a request. 
See US CFPB, Fiscal Year 2013: CFPB budget in brief, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20 
12/02/budget-in-brief.pdf (accessed 19 September 2013), p. 1. 
53  These funding arrangements have been criticised by some members of Congress: see US House 
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, 'CFPB Lacks Oversight and 
Accountability', Media Release, 18 June 2013, http://financialservices.house.gov/news/ 
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=339512 (accessed 19 September 2013). 
54  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 29. 
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from industry levies include the UK FCA
55
 and the New Zealand Financial Markets 
Authority. ASIC also identified that regulators in Canada, France, Hong Kong and 
Malaysia are funded through various forms of levy arrangements.
56
 Other foreign 
professional bodies such as the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
which oversees audit standards and quality, are similarly funded through levies 
imposed on main accountancy firms based on their market size.
57
 
25.39 While not necessarily advocating that ASIC should be funded by 
industry-based levies, Industry Super Australia outlined some of the benefits and 
disadvantages it considered such arrangements would have: 
It would ensure that the cost of the regulatory framework is borne by those 
who give rise to the greatest regulatory burden, so that the funding is not 
just borne out of general revenue. That is obviously a clear advantage. 
ASIC raises a reasonable amount of revenue in its activities, particularly in 
markets. In terms of the disadvantages I suppose it changes the nature of the 
relationship that ASIC has with industry. If there are parts of industry that 
are providing a greater level of funding, it might alter the perception of the 
independence of the regulator from those parts of the industry.
58
 
25.40 ASIC was questioned about its funding patterns and alternative funding 
models such as a levy-based arrangement. Mr Medcraft outlined how, in his view, 
ASIC's expanding responsibilities had created a 'problem' with ASIC's funding model. 
He explained that when ASIC was established as a corporate regulator, the fees 
collected and costs incurred were 'reasonably correlated'; that is, in the early 1990s it 
cost ASIC around $127 million a year (in nominal terms) to regulate corporations but 
it collected around $189 million in revenue on behalf of the Commonwealth. 
However, over time this connection has become weaker. ASIC's costs for regulating 
corporations have fallen in real terms to about $142 million, largely as a result of 
technological advancements. The revenue from company regulation and business 
names registration is now around $680 million, 80 per cent of which comes from 
small businesses.  
25.41 Reflecting the expansion in ASIC's responsibilities since it was established, 
ASIC now allocates the majority of its financial resources to its non-registry 
                                              
55  The estimated amount required to fund the FCA's budgeted costs for the year ending 31 March 
2014 is £432.1m which is the figure used when determining the fees that will be charged. FCA, 
Business Plan 2013/14, www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/business-plan/bp-2013-14.pdf, 
pp. 53, 55 (accessed 17 September 2013). The New Zealand Financial Markets Authority is 
funded by a mixture of cost recovery fees and direct government funding. NZ Financial 
Markets Authority, 'How we are funded', www.fma.govt.nz/about-us/who-we-are/how-we-are-
funded (accessed 24 March 2014). 
56  See Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 33 and ASIC, Submission 45.7, p. 8. 
57  Professor Justin O'Brien, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 53. 
58  Ms Robbie Campo, Deputy Chief Executive, Industry Super Australia, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 32. 
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functions. ASIC's overall costs are currently around $350 million. The approximately 
$260 million in costs that do not relate to corporate regulation are attributable to three 
areas of responsibility ASIC has gained over time: financial services; consumer credit; 
and markets. Mr Medcraft explained that of these three growth areas, ASIC has only 
received additional revenue associated with the markets function (about $30 million), 
and even then only ASIC's frontline costs are recovered.
59
 Therefore, despite the 
significant financial services and markets functions ASIC now performs, it could be 
considered that the revenue streams from Corporations Act fees effectively results in 
the burden of funding ASIC disproportionally falls on small business. 
25.42 To further bolster its argument that the current framework may not be fairly 
allocating the burden associated with funding ASIC's regulatory functions, ASIC's 
chairman advised that: 
 auditors cost ASIC about $6 million a year to regulate but only pay $425,000 
in fees (also, regardless of any difference in the allocation of resources 
necessary to regulate large audit firms compared to small firms, both large 
and small firms pay $146);
60
 and 
 AFS licensees cost ASIC $108 million a year to regulate but only pay 
$3.7 million in fees.
61
 
25.43 The following diagrams summarise ASIC's evidence about how the revenue it 
collects on behalf of the government and the cost of performing particular regulatory 
activities have changed over ASIC's history. 
                                              
59  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 29, 30. 
60  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 31–32. 
61  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 33. 
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Figure 25.2: Revenue and costs—companies, business names and searches  
1991–2013 (nominal terms) 
 
Figure 25.3: Revenue and costs—all other sectors 1991–2013 (nominal terms)  
 
Note: Figures are estimates only, and are not adjusted for inflation. Costs include 
depreciation. In Figure 25.2, revenue is from companies, business names and searches; 
costs are from regulating companies, including administering business names and searches. 
In Figure 25.3, 'Other sectors' includes insolvency practitioners, AFS licensees, credit 
providers, exchange market operators, market participants and consumers. 'Financial 
services' includes financial advisers, insurers, responsible entities, superannuation fund 
trustees, deposit takers, investment banks, consumers and custodians. 
Source: ASIC, Submission 45.7, pp. 2–3. 
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25.44 Mr Medcraft stated that he is 'a very big believer in user-pays'. 
After reflecting on his evidence about how ASIC's costs and its responsibilities have 
changed over time, Mr Medcraft observed that 'those that generate the need for 
regulation should pay for that regulation', and that user-pays systems are 'far more 
transparent'.
62
 In addition to arguments based on fairness and accountability, ASIC's 
chairman also argued that a user-pays levy model could lead to better outcomes for the 
financial system. According to Mr Medcraft, a well-designed levy system could 
encourage better self-regulation and lead to more efficient regulatory outcomes: 
The fundamental concept here—from my days in banking—is that frankly 
if you provide somebody with the free option, they will take as much of it 
as they can get. That is why I think we have to put an incentive into the 
system to discourage the use of our resources and that drives an efficient 
outcome.
63
 
25.45 ASIC subsequently expounded on the argument that a sector-based user-pays 
system designed to discourage the use of ASIC's resources could lead to better 
outcomes: 
At present, there are also no economic incentives (price signals) in the 
market for the use of ASIC's resources. Stakeholders acting rationally will 
seek to efficiently allocate their own resources and may choose low-cost or 
no-cost ASIC services over other, more costly, alternatives available in the 
market (e.g. private legal advice). 
Price signals associated with the use of ASIC's resources would allow 
business to identify the cost of regulation required to achieve the desired 
regulatory outcome. If industry can deliver the Government's desired policy 
outcomes more efficiently and effectively through co-regulation or 
self-regulation, and therefore require less use of ASIC's resources and cost 
less to regulate, they would have an incentive to allocate resources to 
undertake part or all of the regulation themselves. This would ensure that 
the desired policy outcomes are delivered in the most economically 
efficient way. However, these price signals are not currently in place.
64
 
25.46 Mr Medcraft observed that the financial incentive such a framework creates 
also 'incentivises industry groups': 
…I know from running an industry group that one of the biggest challenges 
you have is demonstrating your value as an industry group to your 
members. If an industry group can actually say to its members, 'Look, if 
you sign onto our industry standards and you do a good job and we enforce 
the industry standards, we should end up with a lower cost from ASIC 
because actually we are achieving the outcomes that government desires.'
65
 
                                              
62  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 29. 
63  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, pp. 31–32. 
64  ASIC, Submission 45.7, p. 4. 
65  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 32. 
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25.47 The committee explored how a levy-based system would operate. 
Mr Medcraft outlined a model of levies that would be sector-based and adjusted 
periodically. Any adjustment would be based on the costs incurred by ASIC in 
regulating that sector to achieve an outcome determined by the government. 
Mr Medcraft provided the following reasoning: 
If you want to have a system that works you really want to have it such that 
it is at a sufficiently granular level that, if the industry does a good job, it 
should be adjusted both downwards and upwards. Let's take the audit 
sector, for example. The government might say, 'We want to make sure that 
at least no more than five per cent of audits are poor quality. If the sector is 
not achieving that then it needs more effort from ASIC, therefore more 
resources.
66
 
25.48 ASIC put forward a proposal where $286.55 million (based on its 2012–13 
costs) would be recovered from industry through a combination of: 
 fees for service of $37.84 million, where charges are directly linked to the 
cost of ASIC delivering a particular service, such as takeover approvals; and 
 sector-based levies of $248.71 million, where sector participants pay an 
annual fee based on 'volume-related metrics'.
67
 
25.49 The equity argument put forward by ASIC found some support. Dr Suzanne 
Le Mire remarked that ASIC's point on equity 'is well made' and that a levy system 
'has some appeal'. Dr Le Mire noted that the development of levies for ASIC could be 
informed by the WorkCover model: 
…where you could increase levies for those who step out of line. Using a 
model whereby levies are higher for those who break the rules and lower 
for those who are consistently compliant would have some appeal and 
perhaps give ASIC some purchase that it does not currently have without 
pursuing more serious options.
68
 
25.50 Dr George Gilligan was relatively supportive of the concept of introducing 
a levy-based funding system, although he indicated that the mechanism for 
determining the levies would require careful consideration: 
I think from the perspective of equity that it was a fairly powerful argument 
when it stated the proportion of the fees that were generated by lower-scale 
firms and the amount of regulatory activity or attention that those firms 
actually require or receive from the regulator. So there is the sense that 
                                              
66  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 31. 
67  For example, ASIC envisaged that for financial advisers, the cost of regulatory activities would 
be recovered 'as part of an AFS licence sector levy based on the size of financial adviser groups 
as determined by the number of authorised and employee representatives. Tiered models would 
be used to distribute the industry levy between industry participants'. ASIC, Submission 45.7, 
pp. 6–7. 
68  Dr Suzanne Le Mire, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 53. 
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there should be greater proportionality, one would have thought, in terms of 
the user pays model. Philosophically, it would be hard to argue against that. 
The mechanics may be a little more problematic but, certainly, one would 
have thought that there could be different scales of registration or licensing 
fees, for example, for the different actors who participate within the 
industry, depending on the size scale and, of course, the profits that they 
generate from the privilege of having the licence to operate in the 
industry.
69
 
25.51 Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith also recognised that a user-pays levy 
would support a regulatory regime that was self-executing. However, Professor 
Kingsford Smith cautioned that it was necessary to ensure the public interest was 
reflected in any changes: 
If you have the entire regulatory revenue coming from levies, particularly in 
a concentrated market such as Australia where a lot of the levy income 
might come from a very few players, you have to watch out for undue 
influence coming from those who pay. 
I also would encourage us to do a little bit more research into the notion 
that big players always cost more in regulatory resources. I have had some 
experience in the UK as well, and there, with their user pays system, 
particularly at the compensation-fund end, the big players are always 
complaining that it is the smaller players who are having the compensation 
payouts from the fund and that because they are big players they pay the 
levies but the moneys go out to the clients of the smaller players, who are a 
bit harder to keep in line compliance-wise. 
So it is not an open and shut case by any means. But having some of ASIC's 
income derived from levies could be something very seriously to 
consider.
70
 
Committee view 
25.52 This report has highlighted specific instances where ASIC could have 
performed better and considered ways that ASIC could undertake its tasks more 
effectively in the future. Some of the problems identified were linked to ASIC's 
approach to enforcement, failures to utilise evidence to establish links and problems 
with complaints management and stakeholder communication. The committee 
considers these are matters that ASIC can largely address on its own initiative. 
However, ASIC's long list of regulatory tasks and the resources available to ASIC 
to perform these tasks clearly act as constraints on its ability to meet expectations the 
public and stakeholders may have. Neither of these matters are in ASIC's control; they 
are matters determined by the government and the Parliament. To the extent that 
a problem with ASIC relates to its funding, it would be unfair to criticise ASIC. 
                                              
69  Dr George Gilligan, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 52. 
70  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 53. 
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25.53 Evidence before the committee strongly indicates that ASIC is unfocused and 
over-stretched with an evident weakness in consumer/investor protection. ASIC has 
always had a significant role in the Australian corporate world, however, over many 
years successive governments have entrusted ASIC with additional important 
functions. ASIC is now firmly established as one of Australia's key financial 
regulators. However, one outcome of this is that it is increasingly difficult to identify, 
articulate and prioritise what ASIC's key regulatory functions and priorities should be. 
ASIC would have a clearer mandate if it was relieved of some of its functions.  
25.54 The committee noted earlier that in the 2014–15 Budget, the government 
announced that it would fund a scoping study to consider options and provide 
recommendations on the optimal ownership arrangements for ASIC's registry 
function. The scoping study is intended to inform the government on key strategic 
policy and implementation issues for consideration before commencing a sale, 
licensing or external management process.  
25.55 The committee has independently considered suggestions of re-positioning the 
function elsewhere. Although these ideas were developed in parallel (one through a 
public inquiry process and the other through confidential budget processes), they both 
point towards a common point that the operation of a sophisticated IT database is 
a mere enabling function for ASIC and not core to its regulatory role.  
25.56 The committee does not consider that it would be appropriate to make a final 
decision on where those IT functions should go before the findings of the scoping 
study are known. The purpose of scoping studies on government assets is generally 
to identify the most efficient and effective ways of delivering a service to the public, 
without a predisposition for any particular model. The committee fully endorses the 
work of the scoping study that is examining future ownership options for ASIC's 
registry function as an important first step toward relieving ASIC of its registry 
function.  
Recommendation 49 
25.57 The committee recommends that the scoping study examining future 
ownership options for ASIC's registry function take account of the evidence that 
has been presented to the committee. 
25.58 The amount of funding allocated to ASIC through the annual appropriations 
process was considered by the committee. For the health of the financial system it is 
clearly necessary that ASIC receives an amount of funding that enables proactive 
regulation and meaningful law enforcement. However, governments have competing 
priorities and the committee recognises the difficulties associated with increasing 
ASIC's funding due to the present fiscal circumstances. In any case, the issue is not 
limited to the quantum of funding; it is also apparent that the current model for 
funding ASIC is outdated and does not promote efficient outcomes. ASIC regulates 
many different sectors of the financial system but its funding does not account for 
differences in the cost of regulating each sector. It does not provide an incentive 
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through a price signal for sectors to take action to limit the amount of resources ASIC 
allocates to regulating them.  
25.59 The committee considers that ASIC should be funded on a user-pays principle 
like many of its international counterparts. To implement this, a framework of 
sector-based levies should be introduced to provide the majority of ASIC's funding. 
By making regulated entities more accountable for the cost of regulating their sector, 
a clear incentive would be provided for these entities to minimise the number of 
problems that the regulator has to deal with. This feature of a well-designed levy 
system could, over time, promote more efficient regulatory outcomes through better 
self-regulation, resulting in more resources being available, within existing financial 
constraints, for the regulator to investigate misconduct reports and deliberate 
non-compliance. The levies would be reviewed periodically to ensure they are set at 
appropriate levels and to provide greater transparency of how ASIC manages its 
resources. ASIC would need to justify why it requires the amount of funding 
it proposes and industry would have the opportunity to respond to ASIC's assessment. 
However, as ASIC would no longer be funded through the Budget process, the levies 
should ensure that ASIC's core funding is more stable on a year-by-year basis and that 
ASIC has sufficient resources to undertake proactive regulatory activities. 
25.60 A further advantage of a levy model for funding ASIC is that it could provide 
a revenue-neutral means for the government to reduce the fees charged for lodging 
and inspecting information and documents. The committee considers that the fees 
currently charged to the public for accessing information held by a government body 
are too high. These fees effectively act as a barrier to accessing information and 
potentially counteract efforts to inform the marketplace and promote the confident and 
informed participation of investors and consumers in the financial system. The public 
interest would be better served if the size of these fees were significantly reduced. 
Increased efficiencies resulting from the committee's recommendation regarding 
the transfer of ASIC's registry responsibilities to another agency could also allow the 
fees to be reduced further. 
Recommendation 50 
25.61 The committee recommends that the current arrangements for funding 
ASIC be replaced by a 'user-pays' model. Under the new framework, different 
levies should be imposed on the various regulated populations ASIC oversees, 
with the size of each levy related to the amount of ASIC's resources allocated to 
regulating each population. The levies should be reviewed on a periodic basis 
through a public consultation process. 
25.62  The government should commence a consultation process on the design 
of the new funding model as soon as possible. 
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Recommendation 51 
25.63 Following the removal of ASIC's registry responsibilities and the 
introduction of a user-pays model for funding ASIC outlined in 
Recommendations 49 and 50, the committee recommends that the government 
reduce the fees prescribed for chargeable matters under the Corporations (Fees) 
Act 2001 with a view to bringing the fees charged in Australia in line with the fees 
charged in other jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 26 
Accountability and governance structure 
26.1 As an independent Australian government statutory authority entrusted with 
significant powers, it is essential that ASIC is subject to robust accountability 
processes. The accountability framework must also require the regulator to exercise its 
powers fairly and transparently. As Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith observed that 
ASIC's legitimacy as a regulator: 
…comes partly from ASIC being transparent and accountable in a number 
of ways: financially, procedurally, and substantially. Ultimately, ASIC is a 
public institution, which works best when its decisions and processes are 
seen by the public.
1
 
26.2 It is also essential, however, that the accountability framework applied to 
ASIC recognises, and safeguards, the autonomy needed for ASIC to have legitimacy 
among the regulated population and in the broader community. The importance of 
accountability to agencies such as ASIC is recognised in the terms of reference for this 
inquiry, which directs the committee to examine the accountability framework to 
which ASIC is subject, and whether this needs to be strengthened. The means for 
applying external accountability to ASIC is one of the issues considered by this 
chapter. 
26.3 ASIC's performance can also be influenced by its internal governance 
framework. To ensure high-quality public governance, efficiency and good 
decision-making it is essential that ASIC's internal governance framework is 
appropriate and works effectively. This chapter considers the model of governance 
currently applied to ASIC by the ASIC Act and possible alternatives. 
ASIC's lines of accountability 
26.4 ASIC is subject to several formal and informal accountability mechanisms. 
The following paragraphs describe these processes. 
Relationship with government 
26.5 As is the case with other independent statutory authorities, the government, 
through an assigned minister,
2
 retains responsibility for the administration of ASIC. 
The relationship between the government and ASIC is evident in several ways, but 
perhaps most notable are that the government appoints ASIC's statutory office holders 
                                              
1  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 11. 
2  Currently, the Assistant Treasurer is responsible for the administration of ASIC. 
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(i.e. the chairperson, deputy chairperson and other commissioners)
3
 and that ASIC 
relies on funds appropriated by the Parliament. The ASIC Act also outlines the 
following specific areas where ASIC and the minister may interact:  
 ASIC has the function of advising the minister if ASIC considers that changes 
to the corporations legislation (other than the excluded provisions)
4
 or other 
legislation that confers on ASIC functions and powers are needed to 
overcome, or to assist in overcoming, problems that ASIC has encountered 
while performing or exercising its functions and powers;
5
 and 
 sections 12 and 14 of the ASIC Act enable the minister to give ASIC a written 
direction relating to ASIC's policies or priorities, or directing that a particular 
matter be investigated.
6
 
26.6 As a prescribed agency under the Financial Management and Accountability 
Act 1997 (FMA Act), ASIC's management of finances and property are governed by 
the framework provided for by that Act.
7
 In particular, as a chief executive of an 
FMA Act agency, the chairman of ASIC must manage the affairs of ASIC in a way 
that promotes proper use of the Commonwealth resources.
8
 Further, under the FMA 
Act both the responsible minister and the Finance Minister may request any reports, 
documents and information that they may require.
9
  
                                              
3  ASIC's chairperson, deputy chairperson and commissioners are appointed by the 
Governor-General on the advice of the minister: Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001, ss. 9, 10. 
4  The excluded provisions are section 12A and division 2 of part 2 of the ASIC Act. Section 12A 
outlines ASIC's other functions and powers, including ASIC's functions and powers under 
legislation other than the ASIC Act and the Corporations Act (e.g. the Insurance Contracts Act 
1984) and its monitoring and promoting market integrity and consumer protection functions in 
relation to the Australian financial system and the payments system. Division 2 of part 2 deals 
with unconscionable conduct and consumer protection in relation to financial services. 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, s. 5. 
5  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, ss. 11(2)(b), 12A(5). 
6  Section 12 directions relate to policies that ASIC should pursue or priorities it should follow in 
performing or exercising any of its functions or powers under the corporations legislation (other 
than the excluded provisions). Section 14 directions may be given where, in the minister's 
opinion, it is in the public interest that particular matters be investigated (although the minister 
cannot give a direction about a particular case). See Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001, s. 14(2). Only one ministerial direction has been given to ASIC—in 
1992 a direction was given regarding collaboration and consultation between ASIC and the 
CDPP. International Monetary Fund, Australia: IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation—Detailed Assessment of Implementation, IMF Country Report, no. 12/314, 
November 2012, p. 33; Australian Government, 'Statement of Expectations for the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission', 20 February 2007, p. [5]. 
7  On 1 July 2014, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 will replace 
the FMA Act. 
8  Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, s. 44. 
9  Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, s. 44A. 
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Parliamentary oversight 
26.7 Two key mechanisms for ongoing parliamentary oversight of ASIC are the 
scrutiny associated with proposed government expenditure through the budget process 
and the requirement that an annual report on ASIC's activities be presented to the 
Parliament. This dedicated inquiry into ASIC demonstrates another way that ASIC is 
responsible to Parliament for its operations. Further, the Auditor-General, an 
independent officer of the Parliament supported by the Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO), audits financial statements of government agencies and conducts 
performance audits. These reports assist the Parliament to perform its functions.
10
 
26.8 ASIC is subject to ongoing parliamentary oversight via two committees:  
 the Senate Economics Legislation Committee, which examines all Treasury 
portfolio agencies including ASIC as part of Senate estimates (generally three 
times a year) and reviews the annual reports of these agencies; and 
 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
(PJCCFS)—a committee established under the ASIC Act charged with 
inquiring into the activities of ASIC and the operation of the corporations 
legislation, as well as reviewing the annual reports of bodies established under 
the ASIC Act. 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
26.9 The PJCCFS was established by the Australian Securities Commission Act 
1989. The decision to create a dedicated parliamentary committee to oversee ASIC 
and the corporations legislation followed concern about the complexity of the 
corporations legislation and ASIC's power to modify or suspend the application of 
legislation to individuals or classes.
11
 In 1989, a parliamentary joint select committee 
concluded that a permanent committee should be established to 'monitor the work and 
activities' of the bodies now known as ASIC and the Takeovers Panel. That committee 
wrote: 
                                              
10  In its submission, the ANAO outlined the financial and performance audits of ASIC it has 
undertaken, advising that ASIC has been involved in seven performance audits since 2005 (five 
were cross-agency and two related specifically to ASIC). The ANAO is currently conducting a 
performance audit of the administration of the business name register which includes ASIC and 
will be tabled in late 2013–14. ANAO, Submission 114, p. 2. 
11  In a submission to a parliamentary committee considering the Australian Securities 
Commission Bill 1988, the National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC), which 
was subsequently replaced by the ASC and then ASIC, advised that 'the main rationale for 
making specific statutory provision for such a Parliamentary Committee can be found in the 
extensive nature of the legislation, the established need for frequent amendment of it, the 
powers of the ASC to modify or suspend the impact of the legislation on individuals or classes 
and the implications of the adjudicative decisions of these bodies so far as future legislation is 
concerned'. Joint Select Committee on Corporations Legislation, Report, April 1989, p. 71. 
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The Committee believes that if the powers of such a Parliamentary 
Committee are carefully drafted and imaginatively employed they will 
enable the Committee to identify important issues and inquire into and 
report on these matters and make a positive contribution to the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the ASC and its associated bodies.
12
 
26.10 The PJCCFS's duties are outlined in section 243 of the ASIC Act. Among 
other things, the PJCCFS's tasks include inquiring into the activities of ASIC and 
examining its annual report.
13
 In fulfilling these statutory duties, the PJCCFS conducts 
regular public hearings with ASIC.
14
 The PJCCFS also conducts wider inquiries that 
gather written and oral evidence and lead to detailed reports. Particularly notable 
inquiries conducted in recent years include those into the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, financial products and services (also known as the Ripoll Inquiry after 
committee's then chair Mr Bernie Ripoll MP), and the collapse of Trio Capital. 
The PJCCFS has also been tasked with reviewing significant legislative changes, such 
as the 2012 Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) legislation. 
Other accountability mechanisms 
26.11 A number of other formal and informal accountability mechanisms exist. 
Certain decisions made by ASIC under the ASIC Act, Corporations Act and other 
Acts can be reviewed by the AAT or the Takeovers Panel.
15
  Decisions can be subject 
to judicial review. ASIC is also required to comply with other legislation or policies 
that are applied to government bodies generally, including: 
 the Freedom of Information Act 1982; 
 the Legal Services Directions 2005, which includes a requirement to act as a 
model litigant in the conduct of litigation, as well as policies on the 
procurement of Commonwealth legal work;
16
 
                                              
12  Joint Select Committee on Corporations Legislation, Report, April 1989, Parliamentary Paper 
No. 117/1989, p. 72. 
13  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, s. 243(a)(i) and (b). 
14  In recent years, ASIC has been called up to four times a year to give evidence. 
15  The Takeovers Panel may review decision made by ASIC to exempt a person from the 
provisions of chapter 6 of the Corporations Act, or modify the application of that chapter to that 
person. During a takeover bid, the Takeovers Panel may also consider decisions by ASIC under 
chapter 6C. Chapter 6 contains the takeover provisions of the Corporations Act and chapter 6C 
requires information to be provided about the ownership of listed companies and managed 
investment schemes. ASIC's regulatory guidance states that the discretionary power is intended 
to address cases where a proposed acquisition does not fall within the terms of the exceptions 
already provided for in the Corporations Act. ASIC, Takeovers: Exceptions to the general 
prohibition, Regulatory Guide 6, June 2013, p. 7. 
16  Appendix F of the Legal Services Directions 2005 specifies that an FMA Act agency may use 
only approved providers of Commonwealth legal work. The approved list (the Legal Services 
Multi-use List), of external legal providers is determined by the Office of Legal Services 
Coordination within the Attorney-General's Department. 
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 the Commonwealth Procurement Rules; and 
 as ASIC's staff must be employed under the Public Service Act 1999, ASIC is 
bound by that Act, including the directions about employment matters made 
by the Australian Public Service Commissioner. ASIC's employees must also 
abide by the Australian Public Service (APS) Code of Conduct and Values.
17
  
26.12 The Commonwealth Ombudsman, which investigates complaints alleging 
unfair or unreasonable treatment by an Australian government department or agency, 
can investigate complaints about how ASIC has handled a particular administrative 
matter. Effective informal scrutiny of ASIC's activities can also be provided by the 
media and academics. 
Upcoming and possible changes to the current accountability framework 
26.13 Some changes to the whole-of-government accountability framework are 
already scheduled to be implemented and further changes that specifically relate to 
ASIC may also be under consideration. The Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) will reform the financial framework that applies 
to all Commonwealth entities. The PGPA Act will replace the FMA Act and the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 on 1 July 2014. 
26.14 In March 2014, the parliamentary committee with responsibility for oversight 
of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) commenced an 
inquiry into the jurisdiction of ACLEI. Among other things, that inquiry will consider 
the desirability and feasibility of extending the jurisdiction of the ACLEI to include 
oversight of ASIC (and certain other government agencies).
18
 This follows concern 
expressed by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement in 2013 about 
ASIC being able to gain access to a national repository of criminal intelligence 
without being subject to ACLEI oversight.
19
 
                                              
17  These are outlined in sections 10 and 13 of the Public Service Act 1999. Under section 14, 
agency heads and statutory office holders (subject to any regulations) are bound by the code of 
conduct in the same way as APS employees. 
18  See Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement, 
'Inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity: 
Terms of Reference', www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Australian_ 
Commission_for_Law_Enforcement_Integrity/Jurisdiction_of_ACLEI/Terms_of_Reference 
(accessed 11 March 2014). 
19  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, Inquiry into the gathering and use of 
criminal intelligence, May 2013, Parliamentary Paper No. 119/2013, p. 93. 
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Views on the current accountability framework 
26.15 Several submissions from aggrieved individuals and other observers argued 
that ASIC is not being held accountable. Some examples are below: 
There is no accountability when a regulator does nothing in the face of 
years of evidence of bad loans. There is nothing in ASIC's annual reporting 
obligations that requires it to explain actions it has taken to prevent and put 
an end to corrupt and immoral business practices. Banks should be required 
to disclose the number and value of loans they have foreclosed, the number 
and value of properties they have repossessed, and the number of customers 
they have placed in bankruptcy. Where these exceed a very low threshold, 
ASIC should be required to automatically investigate, and all these statistics 
should be reported to Parliament.
20
 
* * * 
ASIC is subject to no accountability whatsoever. There is the razzmatazz of 
Senate sub-Committee hearings, and the formal reporting requirements—
but these are just going through the motions. ASIC's Annual Report is 
annually an exemplar of managerialist blah, a box-ticking waste of paper.
21
 
26.16 Others suggested that there appears to be sufficient oversight of ASIC, but 
that 'whether it is effective depends upon the powers and performance of the 
overseers'. With the exception of dedicated inquiries such as that being conducted by 
this committee, it was argued that the Commonwealth Ombudsman is best placed 
to oversee ASIC on an ongoing basis.
22
 
26.17 Organisations and stakeholders that engage with ASIC on a regular basis, and 
academics, had few concerns with the current accountability arrangements. For 
example, the Association of Financial Advisers stated that oversight of ASIC by the 
Australian Parliament is the most appropriate accountability mechanism, and it does 
not consider there is a need for any significant change.
23
 The Law Council's 
Corporations Committee similarly considered that the current accountability 
mechanisms are 'satisfactory and effective'. It suggested that 'an evidence-based case 
would need to be made to suggest additional mechanisms or structures'.
24
 The 
Australian Shareholders' Association advised that it has no evidence that suggests 
there is a need to strengthen ASIC's accountability framework.
25
 Dr Marina Nehme 
also argued that the overall accountability framework does not need to be changed. 
                                              
20  Mr Stephen Tyrrell, Submission 179, p. 1. 
21  Dr Evan Jones, Submission 295, p. 5 (footnote omitted). 
22  Mr Adrian Cox, Submission 91.3, p. 4. 
23  Association of Financial Advisers, Submission 117, p. 2.  
24  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 7. 
25  Australian Shareholders' Association, Submission 151, p. 1. 
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Dr Nehme highlighted the principles underpinning the current system and the risks 
associated with any potential amendments: 
[The framework] currently provides a good balance between ensuring the 
accountability and the independence of ASIC. It is essential that the 
independence of this regulator is not eroded in any way to enable it to 
achieve its objectives efficiently.
26
 
26.18 ASIC addressed the issue of accountability in its main submission. While it 
noted the criticism in some submissions about ASIC not being held accountable, 
ASIC countered that it is accountable 'for all aspects of our work', and that the current 
accountability framework is 'extensive, multi-layered, and rigorous', and works well in 
practice.
27
 
26.19 While there was minimal support for significantly altering ASIC's 
accountability framework, some minor enhancements that could be considered were 
identified. Dr Nehme and CPA Australia commented on a past practice of the 
government issuing ASIC with a public statement of expectations and requiring ASIC 
to respond with a public statement of intent.
28
 CPA Australia called for the practice 
to be reinstated; it argued that the process had the effect of making ASIC accountable 
and constrained by the statement of intent it made: 
By articulating an annual plan and agreement with the government, a 
regulator such as ASIC can ensure that it works towards meeting the 
Government's expectations and appropriately manages its resources…This 
requirement is not only good policy but increases the transparency and 
certainty for the market, consumers and government. Good regulatory 
policy is based on outcomes, not on the volume of rules a regulator 
produces.
29
 
26.20 In April 2014, the government issued a new statement of expectations to 
ASIC.
30
 
Committee view 
26.21 The committee notes that the government has recommenced the practice of 
issuing statutory agencies such as ASIC with statements of expectations. However, 
to ensure this framework is as effective as possible, consideration should be given to 
how adherence to the statement of intent could be monitored. Given that ASIC is 
subject to ongoing oversight by the PJCCFS, that committee may be well-placed 
                                              
26  Dr Marina Nehme, Submission 140, p. 9. 
27  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 57. 
28  Dr Marina Nehme, Submission 140, p. 9; CPA Australia, Submission 209, p. 1. 
29  CPA Australia, Submission 209, pp. 1–2. 
30  The April 2014 statement of expectations can be viewed here: www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/ 
byheadline/Statement-of-expectations--April-2014?openDocument.  
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to review these statements and question ASIC about them on a regular basis. 
This process could inform the development of the next statements. 
26.22 The committee has not received compelling evidence that suggests the 
mechanisms currently in place for providing external oversight of ASIC's activities 
need to be reviewed. Undertaking external oversight of an agency such as ASIC will 
be inherently difficult regardless of the model in place for doing so. Over the years, 
the PJCCFS has performed its challenging task commendably, with a number of 
landmark inquiries such as the Ripoll Inquiry leading to substantial reforms and 
continuing to influence policy discussions today. 
26.23 The PJCCFS may wish to consider whether it can pivot its oversight function 
towards emerging risks. It is evident that many PJCCFS inquiries have reacted to 
a number of events, such as Storm Financial, Opes Prime and Trio Capital. Sadly, 
inquiring into collapses such as these that lead to personal misery and significant 
financial losses has been a necessary function of parliamentary committees, 
particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis. However, in addition to 
undertaking inquiries that assess what went wrong after the fact, the PJCCFS could 
place greater pressure on ASIC about emerging issues and industry developments with 
a view to limiting the number of minor issues that become major scandals. It may be 
necessary for the PJCCFS to question ASIC about the matters raised by individual 
complaints, as this committee has done with a number of submissions. As a first step, 
the PJCCFS may wish to consider dedicating one of its ASIC oversight hearings each 
year to emerging issues and early warning signals that, if appropriate and timely 
action were taken in response, could limit the potential for widespread investor losses 
or major fraud. The PJCCFS would also be well-placed to develop inquiries into the 
lifting of professional, ethical and educational standards in the financial services 
industry, a recurrent theme in this review of ASIC 
Recommendation 52 
26.24 The committee notes that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services could be well-placed to monitor ASIC's 
performance against the government's statement of expectations and ASIC's 
statement of intent. The committee recommends that the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee consider this as part of its statutory ASIC oversight function.  
Recommendation 53 
26.25 The committee recommends that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services consider how it could undertake its 
statutory duties in a way that places a greater emphasis on emerging issues and 
how action could be taken to pre-empt widespread investor losses or major 
frauds. As a first step the Parliamentary Joint Committee could, on an annual 
basis, reserve a public hearing to emerging issues, taking evidence from both 
ASIC and relevant experts. 
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Recommendation 54 
26.26 The committee recommends that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services inquire into the various proposals which 
call for a lifting of professional, ethical and educational standards in the financial 
services industry. 
ASIC's governance structure 
26.27 As is the case with large organisations generally, having in place a 
governance structure that encourages good decision-making with the most appropriate 
people involved is fundamental to ASIC fulfilling its objectives. Given the 
independent status ASIC enjoys and the significant powers it is entrusted with 
exercising, a sound governance structure is needed to promote stakeholder and public 
confidence in ASIC's operations and protect against inappropriate conduct. 
26.28 The commission that governs ASIC is comprised of a chairperson, a deputy 
chairperson and between one and six other members. The commission meets on 
a monthly basis, although more frequently if required, to make decisions about matters 
'within ASIC's regulatory functions and powers that have strategic significance', 
to provide input about matters of significance and to oversee and to ensure that ASIC's 
statutory objectives are being met. The commission also oversees the management and 
operations of ASIC as a Commonwealth agency.
31
 Specific commissioners are 
allocated executive responsibility for groups of ASIC's stakeholder and enforcement 
teams.
32
 Senior Executive Leaders (SELs) manage these teams and exercise various 
powers and functions delegated to them by the commission.
33
 A number of internal 
and external committees and bodies assist the commission to carry out its functions.
34
 
The ASIC Act includes procedures for ASIC's chairman and commissioners 
to disclose and manage conflicts of interest.
35
 However, unlike other regulators such 
as the ACCC,
36
 ASIC does not publish a code of conduct for its commissioners.  
26.29 It is evident that there are different models in place for governing regulatory 
agencies. Like ASIC, the ACCC is similarly governed by a commission. However, 
                                              
31  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 14. 
32  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 14. 
33  ASIC, Annual Report 2012–13, p. 142. 
34  Internal bodies include the Enforcement Committee, Emerging Risk Committee and the 
Regulatory Policy Group. External bodies include the External Advisory Panel, Consumer 
Advisory Panel, ASIC's Audit Committee, Market Supervision Advisory Panel and the Registry 
and Licensing Business Advisory Committee. The external panels were discussed in 
Chapter 19. ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 58; 'ASIC External Advisory Panel: Purpose, 
Governance and Practices Summary, March 2012', www.asic.gov.au (accessed 8 July 2013). 
35  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, ss. 123, 124. 
36  See www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Code%20of%20Conduct%20for%20Commission%20 
Members%20and%20Associate%20Members%202012.pdf. 
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while the ACCC's commissioners may chair internal committees that relate to 
particular areas of the ACCC's remit, they are not formally aligned with particular 
work areas and teams. The ACCC's commission also appears to be collectively 
involved to a significant extent in decision-making; according to its published 
guidance, the commission usually meets on a weekly basis to make decisions about 
investigations and regulatory matters.
37
 The ACCC previously had a separate 
chairman and chief executive officer, however, the chief executive officer position has 
been recently abolished.
38
 
26.30 APRA is governed by an executive group comprised of the chairman and the 
other members appointed (in total, the executive group consists of between three and 
five members). APRA's executive group meets at least on a monthly basis but also 
meets with senior management weekly 'for high-level information sharing and 
decisions on more routine supervisory and organisational matters'.
39
 
26.31 Board structures can be used as a governance structure for regulators, 
although they are more common is other countries. The RBA has two boards: the 
Reserve Bank Board and the Payments System Board. The Governor of the RBA 
chairs the boards and has responsibility for managing the RBA. The UK's Financial 
Conduct Authority is governed by a board of executive and non-executive members, 
with separate chairman and chief executive officer positions. The New Zealand 
Financial Markets Authority has a non-executive board.  
Views on ASIC's governance structure 
26.32 The public perception of an agency's performance, accountability and 
legitimacy can be affected by the governance model in place and the composition of 
the governing body's members.
40
 Aggrieved borrowers in particular criticised recent 
appointments made to ASIC; for example, one submission objected to past and 
present chairmen and commissioners having banking backgrounds or entering the 
banking sector after leaving ASIC.
41
 Levitt Robinson Solicitors suggested that 
the United States system of Senate confirmations for certain executive appointments 
should be adopted in Australia for ASIC office-holders.
42
 
                                              
37  ACCC, 'Decision making processes', www.accc.gov.au/about-us/australian-competition-
consumer-commission/decision-making-processes (accessed 23 April 2014). 
38  See Mr Rod Sims, Chairman, ACCC, Senate Economics Legislation Committee Hansard, 
Estimates, 26 February 2014, p. 74. 
39  APRA, 'APRA's governance', www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/Governance.aspx 
(accessed 23 April 2014). 
40  Demonstrating this, the committee received several submissions opposed to the composition of 
the boards that govern FOS and COSL because the boards include directors with financial 
services industry backgrounds. For example, see Submission 26. 
41  Mr and Mrs Neil and Deb Toplis, Submission 6.1, p. 1. 
42  Levitt Robinson Solicitors, Submission 276, p. 1. 
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26.33 The committee sought views on ASIC's governance structure and tested the 
advantages and disadvantages of different governance models. Professor Dimity 
Kingsford Smith highlighted how the accountability of a regulator can be shaped by 
the governance structure by reviewing various foreign regulators: 
In the US the Securities Exchange Commissioners are overtly political 
non-executive appointments: the GFC suggests that this model may make a 
commission more susceptible to political or industry influence. In New 
Zealand the Financial Markets Authority has a CEO and a non-executive 
board from industry and related groups. In the UK the Financial Conduct 
Authority has an executive chair and CEO and a non-executive board from 
industry and consumer groups. These models rely on individual executives 
being expert in a broad range of financial activities, immune to industry 
influence through board composition and fearless 'lone-wolf' decision-
makers.
43
 
26.34 Professor Kingsford Smith concluded that the commission-based models 
adopted by agencies like ASIC are 'more robustly independent and provide a better 
spread of expertise'. However, she added that ultimately the structure of an 
organisation 'is less influential than the calibre of personnel appointed'.
44
 
26.35 When asked about ASIC's governance structure, Mr Douglas Gration of the 
Governance Institute of Australia identified two issues: ASIC's ability to draw on 
industry experience and the independence of those overseeing ASIC. Mr Gration 
observed that the existing model allowed ASIC to gain industry experience, as ASIC's 
past and present chairmen and commissioners have had private sector experience at 
senior levels. However, Mr Gration remarked that the issue of independence is not 
addressed in the current structure: 
[ASIC] is like a company that is composed entirely of executive directors. 
The ASX corporate governance principles that we have been heavily 
involved with others in developing very much value the presence of 
independent directors on a corporate board. It is not obvious why ASIC 
would not benefit similarly from the expertise of having commissioners 
who were not, in effect, full-time executives and employees of ASIC as 
well.
45
  
26.36 Mr Gration concluded that the lack of expertise from outside the organisation 
could result in ASIC 'very much living in its own world and in its own cocoon'.
46
 
He also highlighted how ASIC could suffer as a result of the governance framework 
not encouraging the contestability of ideas: 
                                              
43  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 5. 
44  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 5. 
45  Mr Douglas Gration, Director, Governance Institute of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 
10 April 2014, p. 64. 
46  Mr Douglas Gration, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 64. 
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Undoubtedly, the private sector recognises that there is value in having 
independent directors, independent non-executive directors, on the board of 
a company who are not employees. It is an odd arrangement that you have 
the chair of the commission, and in one sense all the other commissioners 
are beholden to the chair. It makes it quite difficult to have an independent 
line of thinking there. If you have got a terrific chair, that is okay; but even 
a terrific chair can benefit from that sort of independent thinking.
47
 
26.37 Other witnesses also commented on the influence of ASIC's chairman in 
ASIC's current governance structure. Dr Stuart Fysh, an individual prosecuted as 
a result of an ASIC investigation and later acquitted, pointed to the changes in 
approach that have occurred as a result of the latest change in chairmanship. Dr Fysh 
concluded that 'the organisation is too imprinted with the stamp of the guy at the top' 
and as a result 'the culture of the organisation swings around'.
48
 Dr Fysh commented 
on his experience at BG Group, an international energy company involved in gas 
exploration and production, to demonstrate the benefits that a board structure at ASIC 
could provide: 
For example, in BG Group they would largely be functions of the group 
executive, which of course exist in—but half a dozen times a year human-
resource policy would be discussed with the board. If we had killed 
somebody because we had an incompetent operator in place—which is kind 
of what ASIC has done—the board would want to understand: 'Was that 
just an accident? Was this guy some sort of nut? How did he get through 
our system?' They would spend a day looking at the core competencies that 
we want in investigators or gas operators…If I were on the board of ASIC 
I would be saying to them, 'Look we've just lost this Fysh case. Could you 
chaps just come in—and don't just bring in all your senior people; bring 
some of the junior people in, so we get a look at the horseflesh in the 
organisation—and run me through the flow chart of how a prosecution 
happens. I want to spend a couple of hours with you really kicking it 
around. I want to know what went wrong.'…That is what I think a board 
would do.
49
 
26.38 Dr Fysh added: 
In any large enterprise we all benefit from someone standing back and 
advising us. I do not think anyone is quite as good as they would need to be 
to be doing a great job. Look at the brittleness in ASIC. I have referred to it; 
you have seen it. We have the chairman's bloody travel schedule on the web 
site of our national regulator. Don't tell me it is not a brittle organisation!
50
 
                                              
47  Mr Douglas Gration, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 64. 
48  Dr Stuart Fysh, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 4. 
49  Dr Stuart Fysh, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, pp. 3–4. 
50  Dr Stuart Fysh, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 5. 
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26.39 ASIC was questioned about its governance structure. Mr Medcraft noted that 
with 30 years' experience in investment banking, he has had significant exposure to 
the private sector approach to governance. Mr Medcraft emphasised that ASIC has 
access to independent experts through its External Advisory Panel. Mr Medcraft 
provided the following testimony regarding that panel: 
We use that external advisory panel as a key reference body. We tell them 
what we are doing, but we also get their views. The external advisory panel 
are people taken from across the sectors that we regulate. For example, one 
member is the current CEO of Google because I was keen that we have 
somebody in technology. We can provide you a list of the external advisory 
panel members. They include people such as David Gonski. We have 
established an arrangement with the Business Council of Australia that 
whoever is the chairman—it was Tony Shepherd—is a continuing member 
of the external advisory panel so that we have that strong connection with 
the Business Council. We are basically across the sectors. We essentially 
have very senior people and it includes key consumer representatives as 
well. That external advisory panel is actually quite important. In addition to 
all the other governance mechanisms we have, that is quite important.
51
 
26.40 ASIC commissioner Mr Greg Tanzer noted that APRA previously had a board 
structure, but that this was removed following the royal commission into the collapse 
of HIH Insurance. Mr Tanzer also noted that the non-executive advisory board utilised 
by the UK Financial Services Authority, the predecessor to the FCA, did not prevent 
criticism of the agency's performance through the global financial crisis.
52
 
Committee view 
26.41 In theory, a commission-structure of governance such as that applied to ASIC 
by the ASIC Act appears sound. A commission approach to governance encourages 
collective decision-making and responsibility. It can lead to better decision-making by 
drawing in the opinions and scrutiny of others and limiting the power of individuals. 
It potentially filters from the decision-making process the inclinations, peculiarities 
and flaws that an individual decision-maker could possess. However, the committee is 
concerned that the current governance framework has led to ASIC operating in silos 
with individual commissioners performing executive functions. ASIC's commission 
sets ASIC's priorities and strategic objectives, but the same commission, and 
individual commissioners, are also responsible for exercising ASIC's powers. As a 
result, any internal monitoring of ASIC's performance or challenge to how ASIC 
operates relies on the willingness and ability of the commissioners to scrutinise the 
decisions they have made. Although ASIC engages external persons through groups 
such as its External Advisory Panel, these groups focus on current areas of interest 
that relate to ASIC's regulatory work. They are not well-placed to scrutinise ASIC's 
performance or how the agency operates. 
                                              
51  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 89. 
52  Mr Greg Tanzer, Commissioner, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 89. 
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Conclusion and recommendation 
26.42 One suggestion discussed during the public hearings was that ASIC be 
governed by the equivalent of an executive and non-executive board. The committee 
has taken particular care when contemplating possible recommendations about ASIC's 
governance structure. The committee wishes to avoid disruptive changes that could 
potentially destabilise ASIC and distract it from its core functions. The committee is 
of a firm view, however, that ASIC's governance structure is not serving the agency 
well. 
26.43 Over time, ASIC's performance may well be improved by replacing its 
commission structure of governance with an executive and non-executive board to 
which management would report. Introducing a board as the governing body for ASIC 
would create a stronger foundation for internal oversight. The board would provide 
leadership to the agency and assess management's performance. A board could 
provide ASIC's management with access to a range of experienced individuals and 
allow this informed group to scrutinise cases where things went wrong, particularly if 
they had access to ASIC's employees and internal policies. A chief executive officer 
would assume executive responsibility for ASIC's operations, although the board 
would provide guidance and challenge the chief executive officer where necessary. 
The responsibilities of the chairman and chief executive officer would not be 
performed by the same individual. 
26.44 However, the committee has made a number of recommendations in this 
report that are intended to: 
 improve the overall regulatory environment and allow ASIC to focus on areas 
of most concern; 
 encourage ASIC to become more of a self-evaluating and self-correcting 
organisation; and 
 provide insight into the conduct and draw on the knowledge, experience and 
expertise of people in the corporate world. 
26.45 The committee considers that these recommendations should be adopted, 
monitored and allowed time to work before any further consideration of ASIC's 
governance framework takes place. A fundamental restructure of ASIC would be a 
major reform and require extensive consultation. By the end of two years, 
the committee's recommendations and ASIC's internal reform process should have had 
time to take effect. At that time, if the need for further reform is apparent, ASIC's 
governance arrangements and the extent to which they affect the agency's 
performance should be revisited. 
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Recommendation 55 
26.46 The committee recommends that at the end of two years, the government 
undertake a review of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 that would consider ASIC's governance arrangements, including whether 
ASIC should be governed by a board comprised of executive and non-executive 
members. 
26.47 Should the government decide that the governing body of ASIC be changed 
from a full-time commission to an executive and non-executive board, the word 
'commission' would need to be removed from ASIC's name. This would also be an 
appropriate time to consider whether ASIC's current name suitably describes its 
responsibilities. As ASIC's chairman observed, ASIC is a financial services and 
markets regulator. In his view ASIC's current name, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, 'means nothing to the average person'.
53
 A possible new 
name is the Financial Services and Markets Authority. 
26.48 Although the committee has concluded that its other recommendations should 
have had time to take effect before ASIC's governance arrangements are considered 
further, the committee does urge ASIC to take steps to increase the transparency of its 
internal accountability arrangements. Simple changes such as publishing internal 
policies and guidelines on matters such as the management of conflicts of interest 
could strengthen public confidence in how these issues are addressed and demonstrate 
that they are taken seriously within ASIC.  
Recommendation 56 
26.49 The committee recommends that ASIC publish a code of conduct for its 
statutory office-holders. 
                                              
53  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 33. 
 
  
 
Chapter 27 
Unresolved matters 
27.1 This chapter addresses two important but unrelated questions the committee 
has encountered during this inquiry and previous inquiries. The first question is 
whether the current approach of products being available to unsophisticated retail 
investors regardless of the suitability of these products for those individuals is 
appropriate. The second relates to the regulation of the insolvency profession and the 
current laws governing corporate insolvencies; in particular, whether Australia's 
framework is appropriate for restructuring a large business and minimises value 
destruction.  
27.2 These issues strike at fundamental aspects of Australia's financial services and 
corporate law frameworks. Addressing them in detail in this report would be beyond 
the scope of an inquiry focused on the performance of ASIC. Nevertheless, ASIC's 
performance and perceptions about its performance are clearly influenced by the laws 
in place. The submissions that have expressed the most dissatisfaction with ASIC's 
performance often relate to financial products that should not have been available 
to retail clients or badly managed liquidations. Similarly, other inquiries the 
committee undertakes often attract submissions that lead to these issues being 
discussed. Addressing the matters raised in this chapter could potentially lead to better 
outcomes for the entire economy and help protect individuals from suffering and 
distress. 
27.3 Another important matter considered in this chapter relates to boiler room 
investment scams. 
Unsafe financial products 
27.4 In Chapter 20, the committee discussed some of the implications of the low 
levels of financial literacy in Australia. When this is combined with Australia's current 
disclosure-based regulatory approach, retail investors and consumers may be further 
disadvantaged when deciding on a financial product. In this context, the Consumer 
Action Law Centre cited a number of further complicating factors that pose a risk to 
the consumer. These included: 
 extremely complex credit and financial products that non-experts would 
frequently misunderstand (including even the most important elements); 
 people not necessarily choosing between products 'rationally', instead making 
quick decisions using mental shortcuts when dealing with unfamiliar topics or 
when limited by time; and 
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 people typically having trouble calculating costs and risks, especially when 
the cost or risk is temporally remote.
1
  
27.5 The experiences of many of the investors or borrowers who wrote to the 
committee indicated that they had not been properly informed of, or understood, the 
complexity, or inherent high risk of their investment or loan.   
27.6 The Financial Planning Association (FPA) noted that ASIC does not have 
legislative obligations for regulating financial products, only for the oversight of 
product providers. This responsibility focuses on 'matters of corporate governance and 
disclosure, and in the main not on the design and other issues related to the products 
they sell to consumers'. It suggested that: 
Problems with products should be addressed through product regulation. 
Legislation must enable ASIC to effectively and proactively regulate 
product providers and the products they develop and sell to consumers. 
Product providers should be held accountable for failing to deliver on 
product benefits due to dishonest conduct, fraud or insolvency, or if there 
are fundamental flaws in products.
2
  
27.7 The Australian Shareholders' Association gave the example of the issuing of 
prospectuses where ASIC considers whether all relevant and required information is 
provided. According to the Association, it does not appear that ASIC checks or tests 
the information contained in the document 'resulting in outcomes which disadvantage 
investors'. It explained further: 
If claims are made in a prospectus or an advertisement we believe they 
should be tested and justified. ASA accepts that investors are responsible 
for their decisions but have less opportunity to carry out investigative work. 
It would appear that ASIC waits for complaints before it acts. While it is 
difficult to measure, ASA has the impression that overseas regulators are 
able to act more quickly to assess a situation, take action and reach a 
conclusion than in Australia where it seems litigation, or the threat of such, 
delays these steps. It appears actions such as withdrawing a product or 
suspending/banning an individual take too long.
3
 
27.8 The Australian Shareholders' Association argued:  
If, in the view of ASIC, any matter which comes to their attention would 
impact on or influence investors or intending investors then that should be 
made known. Simply announcing that ASIC had asked for more 
information or was investigating a product or distribution channel would 
aid investors.
4
 
                                              
1  Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 120, p. 7. 
2  Financial Planning Association of Australia, Submission 234, p. 26. 
3  Australian Shareholders' Association, Submission 151, p. 2. 
4  Australian Shareholders' Association, Submission 151, p. 2. 
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27.9 Mr David Haynes, Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, referred to 
low-fee, no-fee products. He believed that ASIC should step in and be able to stop the 
promotion of such products. He explained: 
…because they [the fees] are hidden and they are significant, and because 
they involve a misrepresentation of the product to consumers, who think 
that they are getting something for nothing when clearly that is not the 
case.
5
 
27.10 In his view, the appropriate response by ASIC to such products would be 
to say, 'We do not believe that the promotion of these products is consistent with the 
spirit of the law or appropriate consumer protection and should make representations 
along those lines up the tree to government'.
6
 
27.11 The Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) would like some sort of 
recognition of an essentially unsafe product. Mrs Cox explained that other areas 
of consumer protection have such recognition but not so in credit and financial 
services-type products.
7
 She stated that one matter that was particularly discouraging 
over the years was the need 'to argue misleading and deceptive conduct': 
…when the problem is that the actual product is so poor that you would 
have to be misled to enter into it. I find it quite frustrating that we do not 
have more sophisticated tools for dealing with that situation.
8
 
27.12 Mr Brody of the Consumer Action Law Centre very much agreed that unsafe 
products should be identified. He stated that in addition 'to having a blackout system, 
there could be a system to restrict access to particular types of challenging products'.
9
 
27.13 The consumer advocacy associations agreed that unsafe products should be 
identified and 'there could be a system to restrict access to particular types of 
challenging products'.
10
 The Consumer Action Law Centre favoured an approach that 
would empower ASIC to regulate financial and credit products, which in its view 
would give ASIC more power to respond quickly to emerging problems before 
widespread consumer detriment occurred. The Law Centre was of the view that 
investment lending has been instrumental in facilitating some spectacular investment 
failures with catastrophic results for many consumers. It suggested that ASIC could 
play a role in identifying the extent to which problems in this area persist, in order 
                                              
5  Mr David Haynes, Executive Manager, Policy and Research, Australian Institute of 
Superannuation Trustees, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 25. 
6  Mr David Haynes, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 35. 
7  Mrs Karen Cox, Coordinator, Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 41. 
8  Mrs Karen Cox, Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 40. 
9  Mr Gerard Brody, Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Action Law Centre, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 41. 
10  Proof Committee Hansard, 20 February 2014, p. 41. 
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to inform any future reform program.
11
 It referred to the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) model which allows the FCA to suspend or ban potentially harmful 
products.  
27.14 Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith cited the Westpoint and Storm collapses 
and the associated investor losses from transactions that were relatively complex when 
analysed in full. In her view, 'in some other countries they would have been limited to 
sophisticated investors but in Australia they could be offered to consumers'.
12
 
She explained further: 
In particular, the Westpoint documentation contained omissions and 
inferences that only detailed further investigation could have uncovered the 
significance of, and which took legal training to fully understand. The 
Storm Financial statements of advice were very long and contained 
financial worksheets which were not easy to follow. In both cases the 
benefits of the investment were given much greater prominence than the 
risks. In both cases, as in the Opus [sic] Prime matter which involved a 
stock broker offering margin borrowing and stock-lending services, the 
types of transactions involved were traditionally seen as sophisticated or 
professional investor transactions, and not those usually recommended to 
retail investors. The risk levels, the complexity, the consequent opacity of 
the advice and the fact that investors did not really understand the 
significance of the recommendations for their longer term financial welfare, 
all diminished the capacity of investors to make good investment decisions 
with properly informed consent.
13
 
27.15 Professor Kingsford Smith also cited the FCA. She noted that ASIC's powers 
were directed to regulating the conduct of licensees while the FCA was empowered 
to regulate financial and credit product themselves. In her submission, Professor 
Kingsford Smith noted that:  
In Britain the 'Treating Clients Fairly' program of the Financial Conduct 
Authority allows the regulator to intervene in the design of the product, not 
just place a stop order on disclosure. We think there is also room for ASIC 
to exercise powers to prohibit the issue of certain products in retail markets, 
if it is thought they are too complex, risky or leveraged to be appropriate.
14
  
27.16 With the same idea in mind, the Law Council of Australia suggested that: 
…'merits' regulation of financial products for unsophisticated investors may 
need to be considered in Australia. That is, unsophisticated investors might 
need to have a limited range of investment choices that are limited to 
                                              
11  Submission 120, p. 8. 
12  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'ASIC regulation for the investor as consumer', Company and 
Securities Law Journal 29:5 (2011), p. 336.  
13  Dimity Kingsford Smith, 'ASIC regulation for the investor as consumer', p. 336. 
14  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 8. 
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investments that are appropriate to their needs and circumstances or that 
have been approved by a regulator such as ASIC.
15
 
27.17 The Rule of Law Institute of Australia argued that it is 'insufficient for 
government regulators to tell consumers and investors to be careful and self-educate 
themselves in the complex area of financial services, particularly when the ASIC Act 
itself was nearly 400 pages in length'. It also referred to the information asymmetry 
between vulnerable consumers and large financial corporations, which in its view, 
was 'too great for this kind of approach'.
16
 
27.18 The Financial Planning Association recommended that the laws be amended 
'to oblige ASIC to take a larger role in the regulatory oversight of financial products 
before they are released for consumer investment'.
17
  
27.19 Finally, Mr Richard St. John's report on compensation arrangements for 
consumers of financial services noted the new focus by the international regulatory 
community on the adequacy of conduct and disclosure regimes. He noted the 
consideration being given 'to the possibility of a more interventionist approach with 
product issuers'. In his words, the aim would be 'to catch problems early on in a 
financial product's life cycle as a means of preventing widespread detriment to 
consumers'.
18
 He stated: 
More fundamentally, it may be timely to review the adequacy of the 
underlying conduct and disclosure approach to the regulation of financial 
product issuers as the means of protecting consumers. There has now been 
some ten years' experience of the current approach which relies largely on 
the disclosure of information to consumers and sets some standards for the 
quality of that information. Any additional measures would be aimed at 
reducing the risk to consumers that they acquire financial products that are 
not suited to their needs. They would be preventative measures that aim to 
reduce consumer loss, and the eventual need for consumer compensation.
19
 
27.20 Mr St. John suggested that: 
As a matter of strategic approach, it would be timely to review the present 
light-handed regulation of certain product issuers, in particular managed 
investment schemes, including the possible need, in accord with 
                                              
15  Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Submission 150, 
p. 4.  
16  Rule of Law Institute of Australia, Submission 211, p. 7. 
17  Submission 234, p. 31.  
18  Mr Richard St. John, Compensation arrangements for consumers of financial services, April 
2012, p. 104. 
19  Mr Richard St. John, Compensation arrangements for consumers of financial services, p. 104. 
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developments at the international level, to move to a somewhat more 
interventionist approach.
20
 
27.21 In his view, it would make sense in the course of any such review 'to direct 
more attention to the responsibilities of licensees who provide financial products for 
retail clients. He recommended that as a first step, consideration might be given to 
measures along the following lines by which product issuers would be expected 
to assume more responsibility for the protection of consumers of their products: 
 Subject product issuers to more positive obligations in regard to the suitability 
of their product for retail clients. Such obligations might be applied in 
particular to managed investment schemes in issuing products to the retail 
market, and would apply at each stage of a product's life cycle including its 
distribution and marketing. 
 Among other things, the product issuer might be required to state the 
particular classes of consumers for whom the product is suitable and for 
whom the product is unsuitable, and the potential risks of investing in the 
product. 
 Consider the development of standardised product labelling so that financial 
products, particularly managed investment schemes, are described on a 
consistent and more meaningful basis.
21
 
ASIC's response to product regulation 
27.22 Mr Medcraft recognised the problem of innovation outstripping regulation. 
He noted that this innovation was in complex products that are often manufactured 
overseas and then distributed worldwide.
22
 He said that ASIC would continue to take a 
harder line on operators that pushed complex products onto unsophisticated retail 
investors. In his view, the regulator would also be forced to take a more vigilant 
approach to market regulation as the complexity of the market had increased 
significantly with the advent of market competition.
23
 
27.23 With regard to acting quickly to stop an unsafe product, Mr Medcraft 
explained that ASIC issues stop orders on prospectuses, where it determines that: 
'Look, this isn't good enough. I'm sorry; you want to raise money but it is not good 
enough until you fix it'.
24
 
                                              
20  Mr Richard St. John, Compensation arrangements for consumers of financial services, p. 123. 
21  Mr Richard St. John, Compensation arrangements for consumers of financial services,  
pp. 113–14.  
22  Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 36.  
23  Thomson Reuters, Special Report: ASIC: The Outlook for Enforcement 2012–13, p. 10. 
24  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Proof Committee Hansard, 19 February 2014, p. 19. 
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27.24 ASIC accepted that there were inherent limitations in a regulatory approach 
that relies solely on disclosure to address some of the problems investors face in 
financial markets. The effectiveness of disclosure can be undermined because:  
 people may not read or understand mandated disclosure documents, due to 
factors such as inherent behavioural biases or a lack of financial literacy 
skills, motivation and time; and 
 the complexity of many financial products may mean that disclosure for such 
products can also be lengthy and complex, or excessively simplified and 
generalised. 
27.25 ASIC noted that, internationally, regulators were looking for 'a broader 
toolkit' to address problems associated with the marketing of unsafe products to retail 
investors. For example, in some cases, action could involve 'merits' regulation of 
financial products. In this regard, ASIC understood that the UK FCA would continue 
with initiatives begun by its predecessor, the Financial Services Authority, towards 
'product intervention'. The FCA would 'periodically review particular financial 
services market sectors and examine how products are being developed, and the 
governance standards that firms have in place to ensure fairness to investors in 
the development and distribution of products'. To assist this process, the FCA has a 
spectrum of temporary 'product intervention' powers, to address problems seen in 
a specific product. These may include rules:  
 requiring providers to issue consumer or industry warnings; 
 requiring that certain products are only sold by advisers with additional 
competence requirements; 
 preventing non-advised sales or marketing of a product to some types of 
consumer; 
 requiring providers to amend promotional materials; 
 requiring providers to design appropriate charging structures; 
 banning or mandating particular product features; and 
 in rare cases, banning sales of the product altogether.
25
 
27.26 According to ASIC, while these tools range in degrees of intervention and, 
in serious cases, could include a ban on products or product features, it understands 
that the use of the most interventionist tools is likely to be rare. According to the FCA, 
the extent and intrusiveness of the rules it would make would 'be based on finding the 
type of intervention best fitted to the problem' it identified. It would look to find 
a proportionate response to the problem, based on the perceived risk to: 
 consumers; 
                                              
25  Rules could apply to specific products, or a class of products, and may remain in place for 
12 months. ASIC, Submission 45.2, pp. 55–56.  
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 competition failings; and/or 
 market integrity issues.
26
 
27.27 Having access to this range of different types of regulatory approaches, 
however, allows the FCA to design and implement targeted responses that are suited 
to achieving a particular market outcome. In ASIC's view, having a broader and more 
flexible regulatory toolkit would 'enhance its ability to foster effective competition 
and promote investor and consumer protection'. It noted that regulating product 
suitability was 'one type of approach that has been adopted internationally'. 
ASIC concluded: 
As the FCA's regulatory approach is relatively new, at this stage, it is 
difficult to draw any settled conclusions about the positive or negative 
aspects of such an approach. However, the Government may wish to 
consider whether such a broader regulatory toolkit would be appropriate in 
the Australian financial regulatory system.
27
 
27.28 ASIC cited recent reforms to the Australian system of financial regulation, 
whereby the national consumer credit regime requires credit providers and 
intermediaries to assess the suitability of credit for consumers before lending takes 
place. A similar requirement applies under the financial services regime to margin 
lending facilities. ASIC suggested that the government may wish to consider 
extending such an approach more broadly, to encompass other financial products. 
Committee view 
27.29 The committee fears that Australia is out of step with international efforts 
to implement measures that would address problems associated with the marketing of 
unsafe products to retail investors. The evidence before the committee suggests 
strongly that urgent attention should be given to providing ASIC with the necessary 
toolkit that would, in Mr St John's words, 'catch problems early on in a financial 
product's life cycle as a means of preventing widespread detriment to consumers'.
28
 
Recommendation 57 
27.30 The committee recommends that the government give urgent 
consideration to expanding ASIC's regulatory toolkit so that it is equipped 
to prevent the marketing of unsafe products to retail investors.  
27.31 As a first step in this staged process, the committee notes that the current 
Financial System Inquiry may have a role.  
                                              
26  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 56. 
27  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 11. 
28  Mr Richard St. John, Compensation arrangements for consumers of financial services, April 
2012, p. 104. 
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Recommendation 58 
27.32 The committee recommends that the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) 
carefully consider the adequacy of Australia's conduct and disclosure approach 
to the regulation of financial product issuers as a means of protecting consumers. 
In particular, the FSI should: 
 consider the implementation of measures designed to protect 
unsophisticated investors from unsafe products, including matters such 
as: 
 subjecting the product issuer to more positive obligations in regard 
to the suitability of their product; 
 requiring the product issuer to state the particular classes of 
consumers for whom the product is suitable and the potential risks 
of investing in the product; 
 standardised product labelling;  
 restricting the range of investment choices to unsophisticated 
investors;  
 allowing ASIC to intervene and prohibit the issue of certain 
products in retail markets; and 
 assess the merits of the United Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority 
model which allows the Authority to suspend or ban potentially harmful 
products.  
Wholesale and retail clients 
27.33 The previous discussion about unsafe financial products being available to 
unsophisticated retail investors also highlights the importance of retail investors being 
classified appropriately. Professor Kingsford Smith suggested there is an 'urgent need 
to review the definitions of "wholesale investor", "sophisticated investor" and "retail 
investor" under the legislation, so that any changes to ASIC's toolkit in the retail area 
can be directed at the right class of investor'.
29
 Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith also 
noted: 
Using wealth as a proxy of financial literacy is suitable in some cases but 
not in others. For example, individuals who suddenly acquire inheritance 
money or superannuation lump sums could be placed in a position where 
they might be legally classified as sophisticated clients, irrespective of their 
financial experience.
30
 
                                              
29  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 8. 
30  Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith, Submission 153, p. 19. 
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27.34 In April 2014, Ms Joanna Bird of ASIC told the committee that there was 
'significant legal uncertainty' about what constitutes 'wholesale'.31 Indeed, more 
recently the Stockbrokers Association of Australia informed the Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee that the definitions of retail and wholesale clients are crucial to 
'the whole structure of the regulation of financial services and financial advice'. 
It registered its concern that three years after submissions closed on an options paper, 
no final or interim proposals from the 2011 review have been announced.
32
 
27.35 The committee sought ASIC's advice on the requirement for a consumer to be 
informed of their classification as either a retail or wholesale investor and the 
consumer protections that go with their classification. ASIC informed the committee 
that a client's awareness of such a status was an issue raised in Treasury's 2011 options 
paper Wholesale and Retail Clients Future of Financial Advice. ASIC suggested that 
this issue 'should be considered in any changes the government may make to the law 
in this area following the conclusion of this review'.
33
 
Recommendation 59 
27.36 The committee recommends that the government clarify the definitions of 
retail and wholesale investors. 
Recommendation 60 
27.37 The committee recommends that the government consider measures that 
would ensure investors are informed of their assessment as a retail or wholesale 
investor and the consumer protections that accompany the classification. 
This would require financial advisers to ensure that such information is 
displayed prominently, initialled by the client and retained on file. 
Insolvency laws 
27.38 Concerns about various aspects of the insolvency profession have been 
brought to the committee's attention during this inquiry and previous inquiries. Issues 
commonly raised relate to the independence of practitioners; their competence; the 
fees charged and whether they represent value for money; and concerns about related 
transactions. The committee conducted a comprehensive inquiry into the profession in 
2010.
34
 Particular liquidations and receiverships were also examined in the 
                                              
31  Ms Joanna Bird, Senior Executive Leader, Financial Advisers, ASIC, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 10 April 2014, p. 97.  
32  Stockbrokers Association of Australia, Submission 4 to the Senate Economics Legislation 
Committee's Inquiry into the Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future of Financial 
Advice) Bill 2014 [Provisions], p. 4. 
33  ASIC, answer to question on notice, no. 12 (received 21 May 2014), p. 12. 
34  Senate Economics References Committee, The regulation, registration and remuneration of 
insolvency practitioners in Australia: the case for a new framework, September 2010, 
Parliamentary Paper No. 179/2010,. 
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committee's 2012 inquiry into the post-GFC banking sector. However, concerns were 
again raised in this inquiry, this time coupled with concern about ASIC's approach to 
investigating allegations of misconduct. For example, the submission from Dorman 
Investments Pty Ltd alleged that a particular liquidator 'acted improperly' and asserted 
that ASIC's investigation was inadequate: 
All ASIC asked us for was correspondence between us and the 
liquidator…This limited amount of correspondence could in no way 
highlight the failure to follow procedure which resulted in the liquidator 
auctioning property which belonged to us and giving the proceeds to 
creditors.
35
 
27.39 Of all the various groups of gatekeepers in the financial system, in a 2013 
survey of ASIC's stakeholders insolvency practitioners received the lowest rating for 
perceived integrity.
36
 The survey noted that small businesses 'were particularly 
negative about the integrity of insolvency practitioners'.
 
When asked how well ASIC 
is holding insolvency practitioners to account, only 26 per cent rated ASIC positively. 
The survey results note that while there was a substantial 'don't know' response to that 
question (30 per cent), the 'poor' or 'very poor' rating was also the second highest.
37
 
27.40 The committee received evidence on developments since the 2010 inquiry. 
In its main submission, ASIC outlined some of its recent activities that relate to the 
insolvency profession. In 2011 and 2012, ASIC completed 180 transaction reviews, 
32 reviews of a registered liquidator's entire practice, 146 reviews of declarations of 
relevant relationships and 64 reviews of remuneration reports. An industry-wide 
review of professional indemnity insurance policies held by registered liquidators was 
also undertaken to assess compliance against ASIC regulatory guidance. Further, 
ASIC has commenced publishing a series of annual reports on ASIC's regulation of 
registered liquidators.
38
 ASIC also summarised its enforcement action. During this 
period it has obtained court orders prohibiting a Melbourne liquidator from being 
registered as a liquidator for five years; taken action to cancel another liquidator's 
registration; and has accepted four enforceable undertakings from registered 
liquidators.
39
  
27.41 The Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 
(ARITA), previously known as the Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA), also 
provided the committee with an update on the work it has undertaken since the 
committee's 2010 inquiry: 
                                              
35  Dorman Investments Pty Ltd, Submission 246, p. [1]. 
36  Susan Bell Research, ASIC Stakeholder Survey 2013: Report to the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, September 2013, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 7 May 2014),  
pp. 47–48.  
37  Susan Bell Research, ASIC Stakeholder Survey 2013, p. 53. 
38  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 43. 
39  ASIC, Submission 45.2, pp. 29, 43, 119–120. 
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…we have this year (2013) conducted a second major review of our IPA 
Code of Professional Practice, which was first issued in 2008, and which 
was reviewed for its second edition in 2011. This review for the 3rd edition 
followed an extensive consultation with our members, AFSA and ASIC, 
and the ATO, and other government and industry stakeholders. The Code 
continues to provide detailed guidance on remuneration, independence, 
communications, timeliness etc, which apply to all our members whether 
they work in corporate or personal insolvency or both. We had particular 
regard to recommendation 16 of the Committee's 2010 report, and have 
revised our remuneration report template and otherwise continued to refine 
our guidance to members on remuneration claims.
40
 
27.42 KordaMentha advised the committee that it believes there is adequate 
regulation and scrutiny of registered liquidators at present. However, it added that it 
would support changes to ASIC's powers to act on complaints against registered 
liquidators or to enhance the registration process if there were identified limitations to 
or inadequacies with these processes.
41
 
27.43 The committee received submissions that called for more fundamental 
changes to how large corporate insolvencies are undertaken. Levitt Robinson 
Solicitors argued that Australia should adopt the US framework known as chapter 11
42
 
that 'puts recovery ahead of burial'. Levitt Robinson provided the following 
description of the process: 
Under the US Bankruptcy legislation, using Chapter 11, the directors of an 
insolvent company may submit a Plan of Reorganisation to the unsecured 
creditors to be approved by the US Bankruptcy Court. The Court then 
supervises compliance with the Plan. So long as the security of the secured 
creditors is protected, the secured creditors (usually banks) are bound by the 
Plan of Reorganisation and have to stand back. 
Where the Plan of Reorganisation fails, a trustee may be appointed in 
Chapter 7, to assume a role like that of a liquidator. Even then though, the 
trustee is more regularly and genuinely accountable to the Courts than an 
Australian liquidator is in practice.
43
 
27.44 The chairman of ARITA, Mr David Lombe, noted that the previous 
government considered some reforms intended to harmonise regulation and give more 
powers to creditors. However, he commented that the proposal did not deal with 
significant issues, such as whether a chapter 11 framework should be considered in 
Australia, or ipso facto clauses in contracts that can prevent an insolvent business 
                                              
40  Insolvency Practitioners Association (now ARITA), Submission 202, p. 2. 
41  KordaMentha, response to Submission 276, correspondence to the committee dated 
10 December 2013, p. 2.  
42  Chapter 11 refers to chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which provides for the 
reorganisation of a corporation or partnership.  
43  Levitt Robinson Solicitors, Submission 276, p. 1. 
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from being sold or restructured.
44
 In his view, major insolvency reform proposals 
'could be higher on ASIC's list of things that they are looking at'.
45
 
27.45 At a Senate estimates hearing conducted while this inquiry was underway, 
ASIC was asked about the chapter 11 framework. Mr Medcraft described chapter 11 
as 'a very good system': 
Having lived for a decade in the United States and worked as a banker, 
I will say that basically the difference between our current regime, 
fundamentally, and chapter 11 is that chapter 11 retains management with 
the company, as opposed to handing the management to an insolvency 
expert. It also means that basically everything is frozen—labour contracts, 
financial contracts—such that the company's management can go away and 
negotiate and try to put the company back on a solid footing…frankly, 
I believe it is a very good structure. I have always been a supporter of it, 
because I think it significantly mitigates the loss of value that results from 
essentially going in and just selling up whole entities. Also, I think it is far 
less harmful in terms of job losses and general destruction of value…But 
the most important thing is that you retain the management. Often we see 
with companies that the issue is its financial structure, not necessarily its 
management. And I know from my time as a banker that often the company 
may be being lumbered with too much leverage or contractual 
commitments. This gives a chance for that to be sorted out.
46
 
27.46 Mr Medcraft added that an impediment to considering a framework based on 
chapter 11 in Australia was the court system, as the courts would need judges with 
'good commercial experience to be able to undertake this'.
47
 The chairman of ARITA, 
however, disagreed with the assessment about the court's expertise: 
I would refer you to a matter that I was involved in. The organisation was 
called United Medical Protection, which was a medical insurer who insured 
about 60 per cent of Australian doctors. Basically, medical services ceased 
at that particular point. In relation to that matter, it was a chapter 11 in 
Australia, being run by me as a provisional liquidator using the provisional 
liquidation regime and being carried out by a Supreme Court judge, Justice 
Austin. That was very much a situation where, effectively, for all intents 
and purposes you had a chapter 11 running in Australia…I have found first 
hand, in dealing with Justice Austin, that our judges are very capable of 
                                              
44  Mr Lombe explained that ipso facto clauses in contracts can 'cause the liquidator or the 
voluntary administrator to lose the power to have a lease in respect of a store or a property, 
which then means that you cannot sell the business or restructure it'. 
45  Mr David Lombe, President, ARITA, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 31. 
46  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Senate Economics Legislation Committee Hansard, 
Estimates, 26 February 2014, p. 30. 
47  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Senate Economics Legislation Committee Hansard, 
Estimates, 26 February 2014, p. 30. 
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dealing with it. In the US they have a separate bankruptcy court, but I do 
not believe that that is a major issue.
48
 
27.47 ARITA outlined some of the arguments commonly made against a chapter 11 
framework, with its chairman noting that chapter 11 was 'not necessarily a popular 
thing' in Australia's insolvency profession. Potential problems include that the 
chapter 11 process can be very expensive. Also, different attitudes to corporate failure 
in Australia compared to the US may make it difficult to leave a company in the hands 
of the existing management or directors, the people clearly associated with the 
company's difficulties, while restructuring occurs.
49
 However, in Mr Lombe's view, 
the process could work effectively in Australia and that 'we do not need to adopt 
holus-bolus the situation in the US'.
50
 
27.48 Possible options for improving the operation of the current regulatory regime 
were also suggested. ARITA argued that inconsistencies in the approach of the two 
regulators most relevant to its members, ASIC and the Australian Financial Security 
Authority (AFSA), should be addressed. ARITA provided the following insight into 
insolvency practitioners' experience in dealing with ASIC and AFSA: 
In daily practice, around 200 of our members are regulated by AFSA in 
relation to personal insolvency, and around 600 of our members are 
regulated by ASIC in relation to corporate insolvency. A significant portion 
of these members are regulated by both ASIC and AFSA. Each regulator 
has its own guidance and regulatory requirements, which are not 
necessarily consistent, or at least which are issued without reference to the 
other. Our members are the subject of separate file audits and review by 
each of ASIC and AFSA.  
While this is to an extent dictated by the separate laws that Australia has for 
personal and corporate insolvency, many of the regulatory issues are 
common to both, for example remuneration, independence and 
communications with creditors. It is also a regulatory burden on our 
members.
51
 
27.49 Another issue raised was the fees charged by liquidators. Mr Medcraft 
recently suggested that there is 'a lot of logic' to capping fees charged in relation to 
small businesses. He explained: 
At the big end of town it is about basically trying to avoid destruction of 
value. I think at the small end of town it is about making sure small 
creditors are protected…[I]t is a matter of policy for government…But I 
think some form of scaled fees should be something that should be 
considered, because, when you think about it, any bankruptcy is a function 
                                              
48  Mr David Lombe, President, ARITA, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 32. 
49  Mr David Lombe, President; Mr Michael Murray, Legal Director, ARITA, Proof Committee 
Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 32. 
50  Mr David Lombe, President, ARITA, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 April 2014, p. 32. 
51  Insolvency Practitioners Association (now ARITA), Submission 202, p. 3. 
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of the size of assets, the number of employees. If you look at it, there is 
clearly correlation between what should be the activity that is undertaken 
and what you have to deal with. So I think there should be some analysis, 
and I think if you have scaled-free arrangement, then you have swings and 
roundabouts for insolvency practitioners. They might not make a lot of 
money on one, and they might make money on the other. But at least that 
gives some certainty to creditors that there is some form of rationale to the 
fee. And I think also it encourages efficiency in terms of the process. And 
we have scaled fees in other areas, so I do think it is something that is worth 
examining. Frankly, it is not rocket science. You should be able to work out 
a scaled fee based on the main metrics related to the work. It is sort of 
common sense.
52
 
Committee view 
27.50 Clearly, the conduct of liquidations in Australia is still subject to strident 
criticism and the source of much dissatisfaction. In response to a 2010 inquiry into 
insolvency practitioners conducted by this committee, the previous government 
prepared draft legislation aimed to modernise the current regulatory framework. 
The committee urges the current government to progress these reforms and to consider 
whether further legislative changes are required. 
27.51 In addition, the committee is of the view that further consideration should be 
given to the overall structure and intent of Australia's corporate insolvency laws 
and whether the current laws are appropriate for encouraging turnarounds and 
restructuring in large corporate insolvencies. Particular consideration should be given 
to elements of the chapter 11 regime in place in the United States that could work in 
the Australian environment, and whether it would be desirable to adopt some of that 
framework here.  
Recommendation 61 
27.52 The committee recommends that the government commission a review of 
Australia's corporate insolvency laws to consider amendments intended to 
encourage and facilitate corporate turnarounds. The review should consider 
features of the chapter 11 regime in place in the United States of America that 
could be adopted in Australia. 
                                              
52  Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman, ASIC, Senate Economics Legislation Committee Hansard, 
Estimates, 26 February 2014, p. 31. 
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Boiler room scams 
27.53 The committee received a number of submissions from victims of boiler room 
scams that operated from overseas jurisdictions. One victim, Mr Ian Painter told the 
committee: 
My funds were lost as part of a scheme run by a Group known as the 
Brinton Group which operated very successfully until they were subject to a 
raid by Thai SEC authorities on 26 July 2001. Official estimates of losses 
for the Brinton Group scam alone were in excess of $100 million. Based on 
the work done by me the number is much greater than this and is, in my 
view, probably well in excess of $200 million.
53
 
27.54 The Brinton Group were cold calling victims in Australia and selling them 
non-existent shares. Payment for the shares were made to an account in Hong Kong.
54
  
Most of these victims never saw their money again. 
27.55 ASIC was first made aware of the Brinton Group in 1999 and did take a 
number of steps to warn the public about this and other boiler room scams.  
These included issuing 18 media releases between 1999 and 2002, attending 
investment expos and working with overseas authorities in Thailand, Hong Kong and 
the United States to encourage them to take action against those responsible for the 
scams.
55
 
27.56 Despite these measures there is a perception among some victims that ASIC 
could or should have done more to assist in the investigation and the recovery of lost 
funds. These concerns were discussed during the committee's public hearing on 
10 April 2014: 
Senator XENOPHON: What my constituent told me, and I think he spent a 
lot of time on this, is that he managed with a group of private individuals 
who were scammed in the Brinton scam to get the funds frozen in Hong 
Kong and he ultimately received some of the lost funds back, along with the 
group of people who worked together. I guess their complaint that has been 
put to me, and I want to put this fairly to you, is that they managed through 
their own efforts to recover some of the funds but they felt that ASIC was 
unwilling or unable to do so. That is the nature of the criticism. I wanted to 
put that to you so that you could have a chance to respond to it.  
Mr Mullaly: I think perhaps the critical word that you used there is 'unable' 
as opposed to 'unwilling'. Our view and the view on advice that we received 
was that we were unable recover the funds from Hong Kong. That has been 
the case in other matters as well. As I say, we investigated another quite 
sophisticated cold-calling scam between January 2006 and March 2007 in 
which the perpetrators opened up seven different entities to undertake the 
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fraud. In that matter we were able to freeze money in Australia and we were 
able to get people arrested in various countries, including in Hong Kong. 
We were able to recover some money from Singapore and from Malaysia 
but we were not able to recover the funds that were frozen in Hong Kong.
56
 
27.57 ASIC explained that a major impediment to it taking action to recover money 
on behalf of the victims is the requirement that only parties to a contract have standing 
to bring a civil action in Hong Kong.
57
 
27.58 It is understandable that victims, particularly those of the Brinton Group, 
would be frustrated to see ASIC recovering funds in some instances but not in others. 
Victims were further frustrated that no attempts were made to extradite those 
responsible for the fraud so that they would face criminal or civil charges in 
Australia.
58
 As expressed by Mr Painter: 
I have corresponded with many authorities worldwide in my pursuit of the 
Brinton Group (and others) and there is a common theme that due to the 
cross jurisdictional issues and a lack of desire for the authorities to work 
together in the pursuit of these perpetrators, it seemed to be just too hard for 
the various authorities to pursue prosecution.
59
 
27.59 ASIC also told the committee 'it is very difficult to take effective enforcement 
action in these matters because the acts occurred in a number of different 
jurisdictions'.
60
 
27.60 Victims and ASIC alike appear to be frustrated by the difficulties in pursuing 
those responsible for fraud when multiple jurisdictions are involved. However, given 
the increasing ease with which financial transactions can take place between different 
countries, it is likely more Australians will fall victim to scams such as the Brinton 
Group in the future. Mr Painter sounded this ominous warning: 
…until ASIC or some other Australian authority takes action to pursue the 
perpetrators of cold calling and other scams, Australia will continue to be 
ripe pickings for such criminals.
61
 
Committee view 
27.61 Greater consideration must be paid as to how ASIC can improve its ability 
to assist victims of international fraud by way of fund recovery and extradition. 
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Chapter 28 
Concluding comments 
28.1 Given the important roles that ASIC undertakes, an inquiry into its 
performance is overdue. The committee is pleased that ASIC constructively engaged 
with this inquiry and recognised the value of it, as the following statement by its 
chairman demonstrates: 
…we welcome the inquiry into ASIC's performance. This has been a 
rigorous inquiry and it has allowed many Australians to have their say. It is 
an inquiry that ASIC has taken very seriously, and it is one to which we 
have devoted substantial resources. We are grateful that so many people 
have provided submissions to the inquiry, and we have closely considered 
all of the submissions in an effort, most importantly, to learn as much as we 
can from them.
1
 
28.2 In performing its regulatory roles, ASIC seeks to promote confident and 
informed investors and financial consumers, fair and efficient financial markets, 
and efficient registration and licensing. These are challenging tasks, particularly given 
the complex and difficult environment ASIC operates in. The committee appreciates 
that a regulator like ASIC is always going to disappoint someone. It will never have 
the resources necessary to act on every allegation of misconduct. Nevertheless, it is 
vital that participants in the financial system consider that the same rules will apply to 
everybody. Appropriate regulations enforced by a tough and responsive regulator will 
help promote public and international confidence in investing in Australia. 
28.3 As a final chapter, the committee considered it would be useful to provide 
some additional comments about the recommendations that specifically relate to how 
ASIC operates. The majority of the committee's recommendations are designed 
to help ASIC become a self-evaluating and self-correcting organisation: a harsh critic 
of its own performance with the drive to identify and implement improvements. 
The recommendations recognise the need for ASIC to become a far more proactive 
regulator, ready to act promptly but fairly. With this aim in mind, the 
recommendations are intended to strengthen ASIC in several key ways. 
28.4 A main objective is to improve ASIC's understanding and appreciation of 
Australia's corporate environment and those it regulates, and to ensure that ASIC has 
access to independent, external expertise. ASIC needs to be alert to emerging business 
models or new financial products and to match the inventiveness and resourcefulness 
of those in the industry who seek to circumvent the law. In this regard, the committee 
considers that ASIC should more effectively tap into the experience, knowledge and 
insight of retired and highly respected business people, legal professionals, academics 
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and former senior public servants to help it identify and minimise risks that have the 
potential to cause significant investor or consumer harm.  
28.5 Recommendations are also aimed at encouraging more information to be 
provided to ASIC, and for this information to be utilised more effectively. Building 
the analytical skills within ASIC necessary to discern early warning signs of unhealthy 
trends or troubling behaviour is a key goal. Australia needs a corporate and financial 
services regulator that has the analytical and investigative skills required to identify 
and act on problems early. ASIC should establish an internal system and encourage 
a receptive internal culture that will ensure that misconduct reports or complaints 
indicative of a serious problem lodged with ASIC are elevated to the appropriate level 
and receive due attention. The committee also believes that the corporate 
whistleblowing regime needs to be strengthened to encourage whistleblowers to come 
forward. Informed individuals need to be confident that they can report alleged 
misconduct, potentially unsafe products or dubious practices in Australia's corporate 
world.  
28.6 Given the resource constraints and knowledge gaps that a body like ASIC will 
always encounter, the committee has also designed recommendations intended 
to make the regulatory system more self-enforcing, allowing ASIC to concentrate on 
key priorities and trouble areas. To achieve this, first ASIC needs to work effectively 
with other industry and professional bodies that share ASIC's goals. In particular, 
ASIC needs to ensure it has strong, constructive and cooperative relationships with all 
of the financial system gatekeepers. ASIC could also work with companies 
to strengthen their internal compliance regimes and their systems for reporting non-
compliance to ASIC. Finally, ASIC should be primarily funded through a user-pays 
system of industry levies designed to reflect the cost associated with regulation and 
incentivise sectors to minimise the attention the regulator needs to devote to them. 
Again, more effective self-regulation will allow ASIC to focus on and more 
effectively deal with egregious misconduct.  
28.7 ASIC's communication with members of the community needs to improve. 
In particular, the evidence taken by this committee reveals that ASIC must be more 
responsive and sensitive to the concerns of retail investors and consumers. 
Expectations about what ASIC can do also need to be appropriately managed. 
In this regard, steps to improve the level of financial literacy in Australia will, in the 
long-term, help to limit the number of people that encounter difficulties and turn 
to ASIC. The committee acknowledges ASIC's existing work in this area and urges 
ASIC to intensify its efforts.  
28.8 ASIC's enforcement role is one of its most important functions. ASIC needs 
to be respected and feared. It needs to send a clear and unmistakeable message, 
backed-up and continually reinforced by actions, that ASIC has the necessary 
enforcement tools and resources and is ready to use them to uphold accepted standards 
of conduct and the integrity of the markets. However, the resolution of a particular 
matter through enforcement action is not the end of the process—ASIC needs to 
ensure that a culture of compliance results from the enforcement action. For example, 
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when ASIC accepts an enforceable undertaking, it needs to have a mechanism in place 
that will provide assurances to the public that the desired changes have indeed taken 
place and that the entity has introduced safeguards that would prevent similar 
misconduct from recurring. The transparency associated with enforceable 
undertakings should also be enhanced; in particular, the report of an independent 
expert appointed as a result of an undertaking should be made public. On the other 
hand, when ASIC is unsuccessful in enforcement action it needs to reflect and learn 
what it can from the case.  
28.9 The cases of misconduct in the financial advice industry and ASIC's evidence 
regarding the regulatory gaps in that industry have convinced the committee that 
various changes need to occur. The recommendations seek to improve the overall 
standards in the sector and provide ASIC with greater information and powers 
regarding problem advisers. For example, ASIC should be able to ban someone from 
managing a financial services business if ASIC has already banned them from directly 
providing financial services.  
28.10 The committee also considered ways for ASIC to become more accountable 
and transparent. Increased transparency of its operations and how its functions are 
performed would be appropriate and may avoid accusations of the regulator being 
captured by big business. Some of the changes are straightforward, such as ASIC 
publishing more of its internal policies. ASIC also should keep the business and 
academic worlds better informed about developments and trends in corporate 
Australia by providing and disseminating information it receives from a range of 
sources, as well as ASIC's analysis of this information. 
28.11 Finally, the committee considered the range of tasks ASIC performs. 
It is overburdened and charged with tasks that do not assist its other regulatory roles. 
The committee is of the view that ASIC's registry function should be transferred 
elsewhere to allow ASIC to concentrate on its core functions. 
28.12 The recommendations developed by the committee are intended to address 
gaps in the legislative and regulatory framework and to encourage ASIC to consider 
how its performance can be improved. The committee strongly believes that these 
recommendations will allow ASIC to fulfil its legislative responsibilities and 
obligations more effectively. However, many of the issues with ASIC's performance 
cannot be addressed by anyone other than ASIC. In the committee's opinion, 
ASIC has been in the spotlight far too frequently for the wrong reasons. It is 
acknowledged that not all of the criticisms levelled at ASIC are justified; ASIC is 
required to perform much of its work confidentially and to ensure natural justice. It is 
also constrained by the legislation it administers and the resources given to it for this 
purpose. Nevertheless, the credibility of the regulator is important for encouraging a 
culture of compliance. That ASIC is consistently described as being slow to act or as a 
watchdog with no teeth is troubling. 
28.13 This inquiry has provided many with the opportunity to have their say on 
ASIC's performance. It has made possible many valuable discussions about corporate 
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and financial services regulation in this country. The recommendations developed by 
the committee will lead to a more effective regulator. In addition, the committee 
believes that this inquiry has been a wake-up call for ASIC. The committee looks 
forward to seeing how ASIC changes as a result. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Mark Bishop 
Chair 
  
 
Additional Comments (Dissenting Report) by 
Deputy Chair, Senator David Bushby 
1.1 I recognise that the complaints, misconduct and policy issues raised in the 
course of the inquiry are serious matters of public importance and warrant detailed 
analysis and response.  
1.2 The confidence in Australia's corporate, markets and financial services 
regulator—ASIC—is vital to the economic wellbeing of the nation. ASIC's key role is 
to make certain Australian financial markets are fair and transparent, and that 
Australian investors and consumers are kept well informed so as to support investor 
decision making and to maintain confidence in those markets.  
1.3 The balance for government and parliament is to ensure regulation is 
sufficient to protect consumers and maintain confidence in the market but not so 
onerous as to deter informed risk-taking investment and thereby harm economic 
activity.  
1.4 On balance, I do not agree that the majority report has got this balance right 
and the conclusion drawn cannot be supported in full.  
1.5 Whilst some of the recommendations are sensible—indeed corresponding 
improvements have already been undertaken independently by ASIC or are under 
contemplation—some of the recommendations cannot be supported or require 
significant further consideration.  
1.6 These additional comments (dissenting comments) do not seek to address 
every recommendation in the main report. It will address three central areas where 
I consider that the recommendations of the majority cannot be supported in part, or in 
full, in their current form.  
General recommendations surrounding the operation of ASIC 
1.7 The report makes a number of recommendations regarding the operation of 
ASIC. I believe that these recommendations should be informed by the wider inquiry 
that has been announced by government into the financial market system—the 
Financial System Inquiry (FSI). The FSI will have the resources of government, will 
be able to consider the impact of regulation in a holistic fashion, will be able to look at 
the interaction of regulators and any weaknesses revealed since the last significant 
inquiry in 1997. 
1.8 The FSI terms of reference are comprehensive:  
The Inquiry is charged with examining how the financial system could be 
positioned to best meet Australia's evolving needs and support Australia's 
economic growth.  
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Recommendations will be made that foster an efficient, competitive and 
flexible financial system, consistent with financial stability, prudence, 
public confidence and capacity to meet the needs of users.
1
 
1.9 In particular the terms of reference deal directly with the question of 
regulation:  
2.  The Inquiry will refresh the philosophy, principles and objectives 
underpinning the development of a well-functioning financial system, 
including:  
1. balancing competition, innovation, efficiency, stability and 
consumer protection;  
2. how financial risk is allocated and systemic risk is managed;  
3. assessing the effectiveness and need for financial regulation, 
including its impact on costs, flexibility, innovation, industry and 
among users;  
4. the role of Government; and  
5. the role, objectives, funding and performance of financial 
regulators including an international comparison.
2
 
1.10 In addition it was clear from the evidence given by ASIC that some of the 
changes recommended by the committee majority have already been commenced or 
are being considered.  
1.11 In these circumstances, I believe it is prudent to examine the further changes 
already underway within ASIC in the context of the wider FSI, and for parliament to 
consider changes presented by the government following the FSI.  
Cost recovery charging by ASIC  
1.12 Considerable thought needs to be given to any changes to the manner in 
which ASIC is funded, noting that changes potentially have broader consequences and 
could vary significantly from current practices. Despite this, there are clear advantages 
in considering change as canvassed in the majority report, from two key perspectives. 
1.13 First, enabling ASIC to levy its fees to reflect the effort involved by ASIC in 
performing its regulatory functions is good practice, more equitable and fosters 
appropriate rational responses from regulated entities consistent with regulatory aims. 
1.14 Secondly, if changes to ASIC's funding extended to enabling it to set its fees 
to cover its costs, without the need for it to rely on the government's annual budgetary 
process, it would introduce a degree of independence from government that could also 
deliver various desirable outcomes, helping ensure that the executive of the day could 
                                              
1  Financial System Inquiry, http://fsi.gov.au/terms-of-reference/ (accessed 23 June 2014). 
2  Financial System Inquiry, http://fsi.gov.au/terms-of-reference/ (accessed 23 June 2014). 
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not utilise funding ties to influence corporate regulatory outcomes for political 
reasons. 
1.15 However, for these advantages to be realised, careful consideration is required 
to address a number of challenges. 
1.16 The government—through the parliament—is currently responsible for setting 
the budget for agencies funded through taxes or levies.  
1.17 If the government were simply to adopt a cost recovery model for ASIC, its 
appropriation would continue to be determined by the government and be subject to 
government budget policies and processes, including NPPs, efficiency dividends, and 
gross spending limits.  
1.18 Cost recovery would merely facilitate the way in which revenues are 
determined to match the appropriation.  
1.19 If an agency were possibly able to self-determine its own funding envelope 
through another funding mechanism, it could act on self-interest to expand its own 
regulatory reach and would be less accountable for its level of intrusion into 
community life and the economy. For that reason, any such approach would of 
necessity require appropriate third party assessment and approval of ASIC budgets. 
1.20 Such an approach would also conflict with the long-accepted right of the 
government, acting under the scrutiny of parliament, to determine the scale and scope 
of an agency and its activities, in this case the costs incurred by business as a result of 
interactions with that agency.  
1.21 As such, I consider any movement to a full cost-recovery model should be 
considered as part of the FSI.  
1.22 The funding model of ASIC is in scope for review in the Financial System 
Inquiry.  
Whistleblower protections 
1.23 It is clear that the current protections afforded to private sector whistleblowers 
can be improved.  
1.24 ASIC has stated that it could have responded better to whistleblowers who 
came forward in relation to the Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited matter, 
and has since taken action to update its procedures to improve the way it identifies and 
communicates with potential whistleblowers.  
1.25 The Corporations Act protects employees, officers and contractors where they 
report suspected breaches of the corporations legislation to either ASIC, the 
company's auditor, or internally within the company. 
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1.26 ASIC has undertaken an internal review and updated its existing approach to 
dealing with whistleblowers in order to improve the way it identifies and 
communicates with potential whistleblowers: 
…in particular I would like to mention our plans for dealing with 
whistleblowers. We have been working on dealing with our whistleblowers. 
Changes we are implementing include: establishing whistleblower liaison 
officers within all ASIC teams; staff will soon be receiving training in 
misconduct and breach recording and on awareness, whistleblower 
protections and handling whistleblower complaints; providing better, 
clearer and more regular communication to whistleblowers during 
investigations; and conducting a stocktake of matters involving 
whistleblowers to ensure they are getting appropriate priority.
3
 
* * * 
Yes, we certainly do recognise that whistleblowers may be vulnerable in 
certain situations and that there are some protections for them under the 
law. Our submission advocates an expansion of who qualifies for protection 
as a corporate whistleblower and also when we must produce documents in 
court revealing whistleblowers' identities. We are advocating additional 
protections there, in part because we do recognise the particular difficulties 
that whistleblowers face. We have also just announced some changes to our 
internal processes that are clearly aimed at improving the sort of interaction, 
communication and support that we can provide whistleblowers.
4
 
1.27 ASIC's enhanced approach to whistleblowers encompasses its dealings with 
'insiders' who seek to provide information to ASIC but who are not corporate 
whistleblowers (e.g. because they are no longer an employee of the company involved 
at the time they make the disclosure, or because they do so anonymously).  
1.28 Given that the approach of ASIC has changed, but that specific protections 
may be required, I specifically endorse recommendation 14 of the report, whilst noting 
that recommendations 12, 13, 15, 16 should be considered as part of a government 
initiated review of whistleblower protections.  
Further Inquiry, Judicial Inquiry or Royal Commission 
1.29 There is no doubt that there was a failure of governance when it came to 
operations of certain advisors related to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA). 
1.30 In fact CBA in its evidence clearly made such an admission: 
Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited acknowledges that in the past a 
small number of its Advisers, none of whom remain with CFP, provided 
inappropriate advice to some customers.  
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CFP deeply regrets that some of its customers were impacted in the past by 
poor advice they received from those Advisers.  
CFP has no tolerance for behaviour that prejudices the financial wellbeing 
of its customers.  
CFP acknowledges that a number of customers suffered financial losses as 
a result of inappropriate advice they received from certain Advisers.  
These regrettable events are firmly in the past and CFP has taken decisive 
action to:  
1. Investigate the quality of advice provided to customers; 
2. Compensate customers who were adversely affected commencing in 
2010; 
3. Work closely with the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) to remediate customers;  
4. Have the remediation verified by an independent accounting firm;  
5. Assist in funding independent legal or qualified financial advice for 
affected customers with respect to compensation;  
6. Co-operate with ASIC, which took action to ban seven Advisers;  
7. Enter into an enforceable undertaking with ASIC; and  
8. Fundamentally transform its financial advice business.
5
 
1.31 In response to its acknowledged problems CBA has made significant 
restitution: 
Compensation payments totalling $51 million have been paid to 
1,127 customers. The remaining customers reviewed either received 
appropriate advice or suffered no loss from the inappropriate advice they 
received.
6
 
1.32 Compensation payments totalling $51 million have been paid to 
1,127 customers. The remaining customers reviewed either received appropriate 
advice or suffered no loss from the inappropriate advice they received. 
1.33 The governance failures linked to CBA were exacerbated by the fact that 
ASIC did not apply two important aspects of the compensation arrangements relating 
to Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL) and Financial Wisdom Limited 
(FWL) to all affected clients.  
The specific aspects related to: 
 not all clients being initially consulted regarding compensation; and 
 not all clients being offered $5,000 to obtain independent advice. 
                                              
5  Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group, Submission 261, p. 4. 
6  Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group, Submission 261, p. 9. 
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1.34 As a result, ASIC has announced that it will impose specific license 
conditions on CFPL and FWL to address concerns around these issues. 
1.35 A Royal Commission is primarily intended to undertake a fact-finding 
mission, however, the issues proposed to be examined here have already been 
extensively reviewed—including by ASIC, the CBA, the police and the committee.  
1.36 Although a Royal Commission might recommend improved practices, 
existing institutions have already been at work exploring and driving wide-scale 
reform in the financial sector. ASIC's investigation into CFPL also predates the 
substantial changes to the regulation of financial advice under the Future of Financial 
Advice (FOFA) reforms, which have imposed strong obligations on advisers to 
prioritise their clients' interests over their own and to act in their clients' best interests. 
In addition, ASIC's actions have greatly transformed the practices, culture, compliance 
and quality of advice provided through CFPL as well as delivering $51 million in 
compensation to date, with the potential for additional compensation to over 
4,000 people under the new license conditions. 
1.37 Given these circumstances, and given that the law has changed and will 
possible change again following the FSI, a Royal Commission or any other inquiry 
will incur significant cost to taxpayers without delivering any greater level of 
understanding or financial restitution. A fresh review of files and individual cases 
could protract the emotional strains on victims of malpractice over a longer time 
period, without the advantage of offering additional remedies beyond those that are 
already being worked through. 
1.38 In fact it could raise false hopes that further compensation may become 
available. 
1.39 On this basis I do not support recommendation 7 of the report. 
 
 
 
Senator David Bushby 
Deputy Chair 
  
 
Additional Comments by the Australian Greens 
1.1 The Australian Greens agree with the vast majority of recommendations and 
direction taken by the committee's inquiry into the performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC).  
1.2 It is important to note that the inquiry's recommendations call for an increase 
in activity by ASIC across their roles and responsibilities. This inquiry report comes 
after the recent Federal Budget which cut funding to ASIC. The Government should 
implement most of the recommendations in the report and ensure ASIC is 
appropriately resourced.  
1.3 The Australian Greens are keenly interested in the results of the Government's 
scoping study into privatisation of ASIC's company registry. The Greens will not 
support any registry model which limits transparency and makes it more difficult and 
expensive to search a company’s shareholders and directors and in the case of public 
companies, access financial details in annual returns loans and offer documents. 
1.4 The Australian Greens disagree with recommendation 41 concerning the 
commissioning of an inquiry into the current criminal and civil penalties available 
across the legislation ASIC administers. This inquiry into the performance of ASIC 
has been extensive and it is clear from ASIC's evidence that they believe penalties are 
insufficient. On 20 March 2014, ASIC released a comparison of penalties available to 
ASIC and those available to its foreign counterparts, other Australian regulators and 
across the legislation ASIC administers. It concluded that:  
 while ASIC's maximum criminal penalties are broadly consistent with those 
available in other countries, there are significantly higher prison terms in the 
US, and higher fines in some overseas countries for breaches of continuous 
disclosure obligations and unlicensed conduct—for example, the fine for 
individuals for unlicensed conduct in Australia is $34,000, whereas in 
Hong Kong it is $720,000; in Canada it is $5.25 million; in the United States 
it is $5.6 million; and in the United Kingdom there is no limit on the 
maximum fine; 
 there is a broader range of civil and administrative penalties in other 
countries, and the penalties are higher (see Table 23.1);  
 the maximum civil penalties available to ASIC are lower than those available 
to other Australian regulators and are fixed amounts, not multiples of the 
financial benefits obtained from wrongdoing; and  
 across ASIC's regime there are differences between the types and size of 
penalties for similar wrongdoing (for example, ASIC noted that providing 
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credit without a licence can attract a civil penalty up to ten times greater than 
the criminal fine for providing financial services without a licence).
1
  
Recommendation 1 
1.5 The Australian Greens believe a new inquiry across the current criminal 
and civil penalties is not needed; instead the government should immediately 
consult with ASIC and bring forward legislation that strengthens Australia’s 
civil and criminal penalties which at minimum should bring them into line with 
global benchmarks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Senator Peter Whish-Wilson 
                                              
1  ASIC, 'ASIC reports on penalties for corporate wrongdoing', Media Release, no. 14-055, 
20 March 2014; ASIC, Report 387, pp. 16–17. 
  
 
Appendix 1 
Submissions received 
 
Submission 
Number Submitter 
1  Confidential 
2   Mr Peter Mair 
 response received from NRMA Insurance 
3   Ms Ann Marie Delamere 
 2 supplementary submissions 
4   Confidential 
5  Confidential 
6   Mr and Mrs Neil and Deb Toplis 
 supplementary submission 
7   Mr Timothy Chapleo 
8   Mr and Mrs Graeme and Nat Powell 
9   Mr Ken Powell 
 2 supplementary submissions 
10   Name Withheld 
11   Confidential 
12   Name Withheld 
13   Name Withheld 
14   Name Withheld 
15  Ms Hifumi Robbie 
16   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
17   Name Withheld 
18   Name Withheld 
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19   Name Withheld 
20   Name Withheld 
 3 supplementary submissions 
21   Name Withheld 
22   Name Withheld 
23   Mr Spencer Murray 
 supplementary submission 
24  Mr and Mrs Robert and Belinda Hunter 
25   Name Withheld 
26   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
27   Name Withheld 
28   Name Withheld 
29   Name Withheld 
30   Ms Mary Green 
31   Name Withheld 
32   Name Withheld 
33   Name Withheld 
34   Name Withheld 
35   Name Withheld 
36   Confidential 
37   Name Withheld 
38   Name Withheld 
39   Name Withheld 
40   Name Withheld 
41   Mr Lucas Vogel 
42   Name Withheld 
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43   Name Withheld 
44   Mr and Mrs Alan and Jo-Anne Harding 
45   Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
 8 supplementary submissions 
46   Name Withheld 
47   Name Withheld 
 3 supplementary submissions 
48   Mr Boris Sharff 
49   Mrs Caroline Baker 
 supplementary submission 
50   Mr Mark-Andrew Pearson 
 response received from ING Direct 
51   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
52   Confidential 
53   Confidential 
54   Confidential 
55   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
56   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
57   Confidential 
58   Confidential 
59   Confidential 
60   Name Withheld 
61   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
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62   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
63   Ms Jean Andersen 
64   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
65   Name Withheld 
66   Name Withheld 
67   Confidential 
68   Confidential 
69   Confidential 
70   Confidential 
71   Mr and Ms Dale and Faith Burns 
72   Name Withheld 
73   Name Withheld 
74   Name Withheld 
75   Ms Susan Field 
76   Name Withheld 
77   Name Withheld 
78   Name Withheld 
79   Ms Jenny Christophers 
 supplementary submission 
80   Mr and Ms Greg and Janice Ellen Cadwallader 
81   Name Withheld 
82   Name Withheld 
83   Confidential 
84   Mr and Ms John and Beverley Ellison 
85   Mr Tom Azzi 
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86   Confidential 
87   Mr Sean Mcardle 
88   Name Withheld 
 response received from Ms Denise Brailey 
89   Mr Maxwell Morris 
90   Mr Peter Dunell 
91   Mr Adrian Cox 
 4 supplementary submissions 
92   Mr and Mrs Stuart and Cindy Cortis 
 response received from RHG Home Loans 
93   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
94   Mr Roger Cooper 
95   Mr Martin McParland 
96   Mr Stephen Lake 
97   Mr Paul Penberthy 
98   Burke Bond Financial Pty Ltd 
99  Global Metal Exploration Action Group 
100   Confidential 
101   Name Withheld 
102   Name Withheld 
103   Mr and Mrs Ray and Christine Blackman 
104   Mr Graham Filmer 
 3 supplementary submissions 
105   Mr Dan McLean 
106   Ms Anne Lampe 
107   Mr Ray Bricknell 
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108   Name Withheld 
109   Name Withheld 
110    Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
111   Ms Florence Lunn 
112   Mr H. van de Berg 
113   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
114   Australian National Audit Office 
115   Mr John Donkin 
116   Mr Jason Harris 
117   Association of Financial Advisers 
118   Australian Financial Security Authority 
119   Australian Institute of Company Directors 
120   Consumer Action Law Centre 
121   Professor Justin O'Brien and Dr George Gilligan 
122   ASX Group 
123   Dr Kath Hall 
124   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
125   Community and Public Sector Union 
126   State Super Financial Services Australia Ltd 
127   Mr Frazer McLennan 
128   Dr Stuart Fysh 
 supplementary submission 
129   Mr Justin Brand 
130   Mr Lindsay Johnston 
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131   Mr David White 
132   Mr Peter Leech 
133   Name Withheld 
134   Name Withheld 
135   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
 response received from Redland City Council 
136   Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
137   Governance Institute of Australia 
138   Mr Bill Doherty 
 supplementary submission 
139   Mr Andrew Fetz 
140   Dr Marina Nehme 
141   Name Withheld 
142   Name Withheld 
143   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
144   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
145   Name Withheld 
146   Name Withheld 
147   Mr and Mrs A. and L. Pashley 
148   Dr John Goldberg 
 supplementary submission 
149   Name Withheld 
150   Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of    
Australia 
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151   Australian Shareholders' Association 
152   Dr Suzanne Le Mire, A/Prof David Brown, A/Prof Christopher Symes and 
Ms Karen Gross 
153   Professor Dimity Kingsford Smith 
154   The Treasury 
155   The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
156   Banking and Finance Consumers Support Association (Inc) 
 2 supplementary submissions 
157   Name Withheld 
158   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
159   Name Withheld 
160   Name Withheld 
161   Ms Sylvia Blayse 
162   Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union 
163   BDO Australia 
164   Mr Peter Murray 
165   Blueprint For Free Speech 
166   Mr John Holligan 
167   Mr Ian Painter 
168   Mr Robert Smith Novak 
169   Ms Maggie Rose 
170   Advisers' Committee for Investors 
 supplementary submission 
171   Mr Paul Topping 
172   Mr Ron Jelich 
173   Association of ARP Unitholders Inc. 
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174   Mr Hans-Ulrich Laser 
 supplementary submission 
175   Mr Steven Hancock 
176   Ms Sharon Romano 
177   Ms Joy Prins 
178   Mrs Lyn Hume 
 supplementary submission 
179   Mr Stephen Tyrrell 
180   Ms Kirsty Torrens 
181   Mr Mike Gilligan 
182   Name Withheld 
183   Name Withheld 
184    Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
185   Name Withheld 
186   Name Withheld 
187   Name Withheld 
188   Commonwealth Ombudsman 
189   Professor Robert Baxt AO 
190   Mr Ben Burgess 
 supplementary submission 
191   Name Withheld 
192   Name Withheld 
193   Financial Ombudsman Service 
194   Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc 
195   Mr and Mrs Glenn and Linda Pascoe 
 supplementary submission 
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196   Name Withheld 
197   Mr Bruce Keenan 
198   Mr Robert M Bass 
199   Mr and Ms Michael R and Evelyn M Bass 
200   Maurice Blackburn Pty Limited 
201   Industry Super Australia 
202   Insolvency Practitioners Association  
(now Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association) 
 2 supplementary submissions 
203   Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia 
204   Mr Peter Keenan 
205   Mr Robert Brown 
206   Ms Margery Zillmann 
207   Mr Jeff Beal 
208   Ms Diana Simpkins 
209   CPA Australia 
210   Hon Bob Katter MP 
211   Rule of Law Institute of Australia 
212   Mr Trevor Eriksson 
 supplementary submission 
213   Name Withheld 
 3 supplementary submissions 
214   Ms Kerry Budworth 
215   Mr Ellis Eyre 
216   Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited 
 supplementary submission 
217   Name Withheld 
218   Name Withheld 
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219   Mr Rex van Heythuysen 
220   Ms Julie Wignall 
221   Mr and Mrs Bob and Margaret Waterhouse 
222   Mr Chris Dowling 
223   Laharum Bulk Handling 
224   Ms Michelle Matheson 
225   Mr Mark Booth 
226   Name Withheld 
227   Mr Dennis Fahey 
228   Mr John McClymont 
229   Name Withheld 
230   Welcome Australia Limited 
231   Ms Fiona Howson 
232   Dr Peter Brandson 
 supplementary submission 
233   Ms Maureen Nathan 
234   Financial Planning Association of Australia 
235   Name Withheld 
236   Mr and Mrs Bernie and Bernardine Frawley 
237   Mr Scott Goold 
238   Mr Terry Gammel 
239   Mr Bernard Wood 
 supplementary submission 
240   Ms Dianne Mead 
241   Mr Robert Catena 
242   Name Withheld 
243   Name Withheld 
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244   Mrs Jan Braund 
245   Mr Terence Moore 
 3 supplementary submissions 
246   Dorman Investments Pty Ltd 
247   Mr Francis Colosimo 
 supplementary submission 
248   Ocean Financial Pty Ltd 
249   Mr Dennis Chapman 
250   Dr Barry Landa 
251   Mr Kevin Jenner 
252   Mr Neville Hughes 
253   Name Withheld 
254   Mr and Mrs Rodney and Meryl Jones 
255   Ms Caroline McNally 
256   Mr and Mrs Bruce and Muriel Duncan 
257   Ms Sandy Phillips 
258   Mr and Mrs Ned and Michelle Cvetkovic 
259   Mr Errol Opie 
 supplementary submission 
260   Mr Darren Hithersay 
261   Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group 
 response received from Unhappy Customers Pty Ltd 
262   Mr Terry Murphy 
263   Name Withheld 
264   Mr Mark McIvor 
265   Mr Edmund Schmidt and Ms Cynthia Lawrence 
266   Name Withheld 
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267   Confidential 
268   Confidential 
269   Confidential 
270   Confidential 
271   Confidential 
272   Confidential 
273   Confidential 
274   Mr Jeffrey Knapp 
 5 supplementary submissions 
275   Ms Loraine McElligott 
276   Levitt Robinson Solicitors 
 response received from PPB Advisory 
 response received from ASIC 
 response received from KordaMentha 
 response received from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
277   Mr Phillip Sweeney 
 2 supplementary submissions 
278   Mr Victor Ainslie 
279   Mr David Pemberton 
280   Mr Rob Fowler 
281   Confidential 
282   Mr Niall Coburn 
283   Confidential 
284   Name Withheld 
285   Ms Rosie Cornell 
 supplementary submission 
286   Name Withheld 
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287   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
288   Name Withheld 
289   Name Withheld 
290   Name Withheld 
291   Name Withheld 
292   Mr and Mrs Robbie and Cheral Stimpson 
293   Mr David Bone 
294   Mr Gary White 
 response received from Resi Mortgage Corporation 
 supplementary submission 
295   Dr Evan Jones 
296   Mr James Kwok 
297   Confidential 
298   Confidential 
299   Mr James Howarth 
300   Mr and Mrs Merv and Robyn Blanch 
301   Mr Gus Dalle Cort 
302   Ms M Bartlett 
303   Name Withheld 
304   Mr Luke Quintano 
305   Mr Gerard O'Grady 
306   Name Withheld 
307   Confidential 
308   Confidential 
309   Name Withheld 
310   Confidential 
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311   Confidential 
312   Confidential 
313   Confidential 
314   Confidential 
315   Confidential 
316   Confidential 
317   Confidential 
318   Confidential 
319   Confidential 
320   Confidential 
321   Confidential 
322   Confidential 
323   Confidential 
324   Confidential 
325   Confidential 
326   Confidential 
327   Confidential 
328   Confidential 
329   Confidential 
330   Confidential 
331   Confidential 
332   Confidential 
333   Confidential 
334   Confidential 
335   Confidential 
336  Confidential 
337   Confidential 
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338   Confidential 
339   Confidential 
340   Confidential 
341   Name Withheld 
342   Name Withheld 
343   Professor AJ Brown 
344   Name Withheld 
345   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
346   Mrs M Woolnough 
347   Mr Neville Ledger 
 supplementary submission 
348   Commercial Asset Finance Brokers Association of Australia Limited 
349   Mr Ken Winton 
350   Mr and Mrs Richard and Barbara Wright 
351   Name Withheld 
 2 supplementary submissions 
352   Lord Michael Fraser 
353   Confidential 
354   Ms Dulcie Balliana 
355   Mr Peter Monahan 
356   Ms Evelyn Serridge 
357   Mr Andrew Maher 
358   Mr Douglas Layton 
359   Mr and Mrs Scott and Naomi Baines 
360   Mr Ross Bush 
361   Ms Susan Hoskings 
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362   Mr Ray Baker 
363   Kelgon Development Corporation Pty Ltd 
364   Mr Peter Rigby 
365    Mr Henry di Suvero 
 response received from Sandhurst Trustees 
366   Ms Una Robinson 
367   Mr Simon Grundel 
368   Mr Owen Salmon 
369   Mr Tony Rigg 
370   Mr Gilbert Crawford 
 response received from Mr Jim Downey, JP Downey and Co 
371   Mr Levis Campagnolo 
372   Ms Alana Smith 
373   Name Withheld 
374   Name Withheld 
375   Confidential 
376   Confidential 
377   Confidential 
378   Name Withheld 
 supplementary submission 
379   Name Withheld 
380   Mr Gordon Nelson 
381   Name Withheld 
382   Mr Peter Bates 
383   Ms Kay Gal 
384   Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
385   Mrs Taryn Berry 
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386   Confidential 
387   Mr Emmanuel Cassimatis 
388   Confidential 
389   Name Withheld 
390   Mr and Mrs Michael and Irene Gander 
391   Mr Jim Martinek 
392   Mr Mark Hoddinott 
 response received from PPB Advisory 
393   Mr Robert Bennetts 
394   Ms and Mr Claire and Chris Priestley 
 response received from the National Australia Bank 
395   Ms Merilyn Swan 
396   Mr John Telford 
 response received from Mr Stephen Jones MP 
397   Mr Chris Priestley 
 response received from the National Australia Bank 
 supplementary submission 
398   Name Withheld 
399   Mrs Frith Santalucia 
 supplementary submission 
400   Name Withheld 
401   Name Withheld 
402   Mr A. Walton 
403   Mr Peter Howie 
404   Sub-Sea and Pipeline Protection International 
405   Ms Maria Rigoni 
406   Australian Crime Commission 
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407   Transparency International Australia 
408   Name Withheld 
409   Name Withheld 
410   Mr Phillip Ruge 
411   Mortgage and Finance Association of Australia 
412   Dr Peter Bowden 
 supplementary submission 
413   Name Withheld 
414   Confidential 
415   Confidential 
416   Mr and Mrs Glenn and Sonja Tandy 
417   Name Withheld 
418   Credit Ombudsman Service Limited 
419   Dr Vivienne Brand and Dr Sulette Lombard, Flinders University 
420   Ms Karen Carey 
 response received from KordaMentha 
 response received from ASIC 
421   Mr Jeffrey Morris 
 7 supplementary submissions 
422   Name Withheld 
423   Mr Anthony Brownlee 
424   Mr Christopher Dobbyns 
 response received from David Jones 
425   Ms Muriel McClymont 
426   Mr Andrew Carr 
427   Mr Mustaffa Abu Sedira 
428   Mr Charles Phillott 
Page 484 
 
 
429   Mr Peter Wrobel 
430   Mr Tony Vernuccio 
431   Confidential 
432  Confidential 
433   Confidential 
434   Confidential 
435   Confidential 
436   Confidential 
437   Confidential 
438   Confidential 
439   Confidential 
440   Confidential 
441   Name Withheld 
442   Confidential 
443   Name Withheld 
444   Name Withheld 
445   Name Withheld 
446   Mr Paul Friedberg 
447   OFS Spain Ltd 
448   Financial Page International 
449   Mr Wayne Styles 
450   Confidential 
451   Mr Martin Vink 
452   Name Withheld 
453   Name Withheld 
 response received from Chimaera Capital 
454   Name Withheld 
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455   Mr Michael Linnell 
 response received from KordaMentha 
 response received from BRI Ferrier 
 response received from Chimaera Capital 
 supplementary submission 
456   Mr Patrick Healy 
457   Name Withheld 
458   Associate Professor Michael Legg, Faculty of Law,  
The University of New South Wales 
459   Confidential 
460   Confidential 
461   Mr Yoav Nachmani 
462   Name Withheld 
463   Confidential 
464   Financial Resolutions Australia Pty Ltd 
 supplementary submission 
465   Confidential 
466   Confidential 
467   Confidential 
468   Confidential 
469  Confidential 
470  Confidential 
471  Confidential 
472  Confidential 
473  Confidential 
474  Confidential 
 
  
 
Appendix 2 
Tabled documents and additional information received 
 
1. Additional information: opening statement made by ASIC at a public hearing held in 
Sydney on 19 February 2014. 
2. Additional information: opening statement made by Professor Dimity Kingsford 
Smith at a public hearing held in Sydney on 19 February 2014. 
3. Additional information received from Financial Ombudsman Service Limited on 
27 February 2014, relating to the public hearing held in Sydney on 20 February 2014. 
4. Opening statement tabled by ASIC at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
10 April 2014. 
5. Documents tabled by Ms Merilyn Swan at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
10 April 2014. 
6. Document tabled by Mrs Janice Braund at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
10 April 2014. 
7. Additional information received from ASIC on 30 April 2014, relating to the public 
hearing held in Canberra on 10 April 2014. 
8. Additional information received from Mr Gerard Brody, Chief Executive Officer of 
the Consumer Action Law Centre, on 21 February 2014. 
9. Correction to evidence given at a public hearing held in Canberra on 2 April 2014, 
provided by Mr Jason Harris, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of 
Technology Sydney on 17 April 2014. 
10. Letter received from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Group on 16 May 2014. 
11. Additional information received from the Commonwealth Ombudsman on 20 May 
2014. 
12. Additional information received from the Australian National Audit Office on 
23 May 2014. 
13. Additional information received from ASIC on 3 June 2014. 
14. Additional information received from National Australia Bank on 11 June 2014. 
15. Additional information received from ASIC on 20 June 2014. 
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Answers to questions on notice 
 
1. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Sydney on 
19 February 2014, received from the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia on 
11 March 2014. 
2. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Sydney on 
20 February 2014, received from Credit Ombudsman Service Limited on 3 March 
2014. 
3. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Sydney on 
20 February 2014, received from Financial Ombudsman Service Limited on 6 March 
2014. 
4. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
21 February 2014, received from the Treasury on 18 March 2014. 
5. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Sydney on 
20 February 2014, received from the Corporations Committee of the Business Law 
Section of the Law Council of Australia on 21 March 2014. 
6. Answers to questions on notice asked at a public hearing held in Sydney on 
19 February 2014, received from ASIC on 25 March 2014. 
7. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
21 February 2014, received from Professor Bob Baxt AO on 17 April 2014. 
8. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
2 April 2014, received from Mr Jason Harris, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
University of Technology Sydney on 17 April 2014. 
9. Answers to questions on notice asked at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
10 April 2014, received from the Commonwealth Bank on 24 April 2014. 
10. Answers to written questions on notice and questions on notice asked at a public 
hearing held in Canberra on 10 April 2014, received from ASIC on 19 May 2014. 
11. Answers to questions on notice asked at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
10 April 2014, received from ASIC on 21 May 2014. 
12. Answers to written questions on notice, received from ASIC on 21 May 2014. 
13. Answers to written questions on notice, received from ASIC on 22 May 2014. 
14. Answer to a question on notice asked at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
2 April 2014, received from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on 
22 April 2014. 
15. Answers to written questions on notice, received from ASIC on 2 June 2014. 
16. Answers to written questions on notice, received from ASIC on 2 June 2014. 
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17. Answers to questions on notice asked at a public hearing held in Canberra on 
10 April 2014, received from ASIC on 2 June 2014. 
18. Answers to written questions on notice, received from the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia on 6 June 2014. 
19. Answers to written questions on notice, received from the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia on 6 June 2014. 
 
  
 
Appendix 3 
Public hearings and witnesses 
SYDNEY, 19 FEBRUARY 2014 
ARMOUR, Ms Cathie, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
BACON, Mr John, General Manager Professional Standards, Financial Planning Association 
BINEHAM, Mr Marc, Vice President, Association of Financial Advisers 
BROWN, Associate Prof. David, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide 
DAY, Mr Warren, Senior Executive Leader, Stakeholder Services, and 
Regional Commissioner for Victoria, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
DE GORI, Mr Dante, General Manager Policy and Conduct, Financial Planning Association 
DRUM, Mr Paul, Head of Policy, CPA Australia 
FOX, Mr Brad, Chief Executive Officer, Association of Financial Advisers 
GILLIGAN, Dr George, Private capacity 
KELL, Mr Peter, Deputy Chairman, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
KINGSFORD SMITH, Prof. Dimity, Private capacity 
KIRK, Mr Greg, Senior Executive Leader, Strategy Group, Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 
LE MIRE, Dr Suzanne, Senior Lecturer, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide 
MALLEY, Mr Alex, Chief Executive Officer, CPA Australia 
MAWSON, Mr David, ASIC Workplace Delegate, Community and Public Sector Union 
MEDCRAFT, Mr Greg, Chairman, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
O'BRIEN, Prof. Justin, Private capacity 
PRICE, Mr John, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
RANTALL, Mr Mark, Chief Executive Officer, Financial Planning Association 
SAVUNDRA, Mr Chris, Senior Executive Leader, Markets Enforcement, 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
TANZER, Mr Greg, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
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WATERS, Mr Alistair, Deputy National President, Community and Public Sector Union 
WHITE, Mr Lee, Chief Executive Officer, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia 
SYDNEY, 20 FEBRUARY 2014 
BRAILEY, Ms Denise, President, Banking and Finance Consumers Support Association 
BRODY, Mr Gerard, Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Action Law Centre 
CAMPO, Ms Robbie, Deputy Chief Executive, Industry Super Australia 
COX, Mrs Karen, Coordinator, Consumer Credit Legal Centre Inc. (NSW) 
DAM, Ms Allison, Head of Policy and Compliance, Credit Ombudsman Service 
DYER, Mr Bruce, Member, Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, 
Law Council of Australia 
FIELD, Mr Philip, Lead Ombudsman, Banking and Finance, Financial Ombudsman Service 
GOODISON, Mr Scott, Head of Dispute Resolution, Credit Ombudsman Service 
HAYNES, Mr David, Executive Manager, Policy and Research, 
Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
KEEVES, Mr John, Chairman, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia 
NEAVE, Mr Colin, Commonwealth Ombudsman 
TREGILLIS, Mr Shane, Chief Ombudsman, Financial Ombudsman Service 
VENGA, Mr Raj, Chief Executive Officer and Ombudsman, Credit Ombudsman Service 
VOLPATO, Ms Karen, Senior Policy Adviser, 
Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
WATTS, Mr Richard, Policy and Legal Counsel, Industry Super Australia 
CANBERRA, 21 FEBRUARY 2014 
BAXT, Professor Bob, Private capacity 
BROWN, Ms Diane, Acting General Manager, Corporations and Capital Markets Division,  
Department of the Treasury 
COBURN, Mr Niall, Private capacity 
FRASER, Mr Bede, Acting General Manager, Retail Investor Division, Markets Group,  
Department of the Treasury 
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CANBERRA, 2 APRIL 2014 
DAVIDSON, Mr Graeme, Deputy Director, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
FYSH, Dr Stuart, Private capacity 
HARRIS, Mr Jason, Private capacity  
JENSEN, Mr Rod, Principal Legal Officer, Commercial, 
International and Counter-Terrorism, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
LOMBE, Mr David, President, 
Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 
McCANN, Mr Michael, Deputy President, 
Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 
MURRAY, Mr Michael, Legal Director, 
Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 
WHEELDON, Mr James, Private capacity 
WINTER, Mr John, Chief Executive Officer, 
Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 
CANBERRA, 10 APRIL 2014 
ARMOUR, Ms Cathie, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
BERRILL, Mr John, Lawyer and Principal, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers 
BIRD, Ms Joanna, Senior Executive Leader, Financial Advisers, 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
BOWDEN, Dr Peter, Private capacity  
BRAND, Dr Vivienne, Senior Lecturer, Flinders Law School, Flinders University 
BRAUND, Mrs Janice, Private capacity 
BROWN, Mr Adrian, Senior Executive Leader, Insolvency Practitioners and Liquidators 
BROWN, Professor AJ, Professor of Public Policy and Law, 
Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University 
COHEN, Mr David, General Counsel and Group Executive, Group Corporate Affairs, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
DAY, Mr Warren, Senior Executive Leader, Stakeholder Services, 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
GRATION, Mr Douglas, Director, Governance Institute of Australia 
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KELL, Mr Peter, Deputy Chairman, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
KIRK, Mr Greg, Senior Executive Leader, Deposit Takers, Credit and Insurance Providers 
LOMBARD, Dr Sulette, Senior Lecturer, Flinders Law School, Flinders University 
MEDCRAFT, Mr Greg, Chairman, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
MORRIS, Mr Jeffrey, Private capacity 
MULLALY, Mr Tim, Senior Executive Leader, Financial Services Enforcement, 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
PERKOVIC, Ms Marianne, Executive General Manager, Wealth Management Advice, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
PRICE, Mr John, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
SAVUNDRA, Mr Chris, Senior Executive Leader, Markets Enforcement, 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
SHEEHY, Mr Tim, Chief Executive, Governance Institute of Australia 
SPRING, Ms Annabel, Group Executive, Wealth Management, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
SWAN, Mrs Merilyn, Private capacity 
TANZER, Mr Greg, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
WOLFE, Mr Simon, Head of Research/Legal, Blueprint for Free Speech 
  
 
Appendix 4 
Timeline of ASIC's changing responsibilities 
Date Development 
1991 The Australian Securities Commission (ASC) commenced operation. 
1993 The civil penalty regime for the enforcement of directors' duties is 
introduced. 
1997 The final report of the Financial System Inquiry, chaired by 
Mr Stan Wallis (Wallis inquiry), was released in March. One of the 
recommendations was that a single agency be established to provide 
Commonwealth regulation of corporations, financial market integrity and 
consumer protection. Also in March, the government announced the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP), a policy framework 
intended to reform key areas of corporate regulation. CLERP was 
gradually enacted over several years. 
1998 The ASC becomes ASIC. Consumer protection responsibilities for 
insurance, superannuation and deposit-taking transferred from the ACCC 
to ASIC. Managed investments schemes became regulated by ASIC. 
2002 The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (also known as CLERP 6) 
introduced a new regulatory regime for the provision of financial services. 
ASIC is given the responsibility for overseeing market conduct and 
consumer protection issues relating to credit, such as product disclosure. 
Providers of financial services must obtain an AFS licence issued by 
ASIC. 
2004 Following the Ramsay Report, the collapse of HIH Insurance and the HIH 
Royal Commission, audit reform is introduced by legislation known as 
CLERP 9. Measures that directly relate to ASIC include continuous 
disclosure requirements and the power for ASIC to issue infringement 
notices for alleged contraventions of these requirements, as well as 
whistleblower protections for employees that report breaches to ASIC. 
July 2005 The Choice of Fund reforms commence, requiring employers to offer a 
choice of superannuation fund to all eligible employees. The reforms are 
jointly administered by ASIC, APRA and the ATO. 
March 2008 COAG agrees in principle that the states would transfer responsibility for 
regulating consumer credit to the Commonwealth. 
November 2008 The government announces that, effective 1 January 2010, ASIC will 
require all credit rating agencies to hold an AFS licence. 
May 2010 ASIC assumes responsibility from the states and territories for the 
regulation of trustee companies. 
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June 2010 The Super System Review (Cooper Review) delivers its final report to the 
government. The government's response to the review, the Stronger Super 
reforms, led to responsibilities for ASIC related to the implementation of 
the MySuper default superannuation product and the regulation of self-
managed superannuation fund (SMSF) auditors. 
July 2010 The National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 commences. This Act 
replaces the Uniform Consumer Credit Codes administered by the states 
and territories and makes ASIC the national regulator of consumer credit. 
Entities that engage in credit activity generally need to obtain a credit 
licence from ASIC. 
July 2010 The provisions of the Australian Consumer Law relating to unfair terms in 
consumer contracts for financial products and financial services take 
effect. ASIC is also given new enforcement and consumer redress powers. 
August 2010 ASIC takes over responsibility for the supervision of real-time trading on 
domestic licensed equity, derivatives and futures markets. 
September 2010 The Senate Economics References Committee completes an inquiry into 
liquidators and administrators. The report recommended that ASIC's 
corporate insolvency responsibilities be transferred to a new agency, 
however, the government did not adopt this recommendation. 
March 2011 After being asked by the government to develop it, ASIC releases the 
National Financial Literacy Strategy. 
January 2012 ASIC's register of company charges closes as part of the personal property 
securities reform (a new Personal Property Securities Register commences 
which is administered by the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia). 
May 2012 The administration of business names is transferred from the states and 
territories to ASIC. 
July 2012 The Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms commence, although 
compliance is only mandatory from 1 July 2013. Included in FOFA is a 
prospective ban on conflicted remuneration structures, a statutory 
fiduciary duty that financial advisers must act in the best interests of their 
clients, an opt-in obligation regarding clients' agreement to ongoing fees 
and strengthened enforcement powers for ASIC. 
 
  
 
Appendix 5 
Key enforcement matters 
A5.1 This section contains summaries of selected key enforcement matters that 
ASIC has been involved in or that relate to ASIC's responsibilities.  
A5.2 The summaries are not a detailed critique of the particular cases; rather, they 
are intended to provide basic information on major cases or investigations and to 
highlight the varied nature of misconduct or alleged misconduct ASIC may need to 
pursue. This section is also not an exhaustive historical record of ASIC's enforcement 
activities. With some exceptions, the cases selected generally were finalised in the 
past five years.
1
 During this period, ASIC has had notable successes and certain cases 
it has pursued have resulted in judgments that clarified responsibilities and provided 
greater certainty, particularly regarding directors' duties. However, there are a number 
of matters where ASIC's approach has been widely questioned. 
A5.3 The summaries are predominately based on material already on the public 
record, not evidence received and tested by the committee. Matters that have been 
discussed extensively in the body of the report, such as the Commonwealth Financial 
Planning matter, are not included here. 
James Hardie 
A5.4 ASIC was ultimately successful in the long-running James Hardie civil action; 
a case initiated in the NSW Supreme Court in February 2007 that ultimately ended up 
in the High Court.
2
 It was found that the non-executive directors, and the general 
counsel and company secretary, breached their duty of care and diligence in that they 
knew or should have known that the compensation fund for victims of asbestos-related 
disease did not have sufficient reserves to meet the likely claims.
3
 The High Court 
also vindicated ASIC's conduct of the case as a model litigant after rejecting the NSW 
Court of Appeal's criticism of ASIC for not calling a particular witness. 
                                              
1  Some particularly noteworthy historical cases outside this timeframe include: ASIC's 
investigation into the 2001 collapse of One.Tel and its unsuccessful court proceedings against 
One.Tel's former joint managing director, Mr Jodee Rich, and its former finance director, 
Mr Mark Silbermann; the action against Mr Rodney Adler (a former director of collapsed 
insurer HIH); and ASIC's unsuccessful insider trading case against Citigroup. 
2  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345. ASIC had 
considered criminal proceedings, however, it concluded that there was an insufficient basis to 
commence any criminal proceedings against non-executive directors, and the CDPP decided 
that there was an insufficient basis to commence criminal proceedings against other individuals. 
ASIC, 'James Hardie Group civil action', Media Release, no. 08-201, 5 September 2008. 
3  Market announcements claimed that the compensation fund would be fully funded. 
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A5.5 ASIC's chairman noted in late 2012 that ASIC 'has observed board 
engagement with disclosure has improved' as a result of the widespread publicity 
associated with this case.
4
 
Australian Wheat Board 
A5.6 The judicial inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the 
United Nations (UN) Oil-For-Food Programme (Cole Inquiry) examined transactions 
between the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and the Iraqi Grain Board and how those 
transactions related to UN-imposed sanctions and Australian law. It found that there 
were circumstances where it might be appropriate for authorities to consider criminal 
or civil proceedings against AWB and various persons.
5
 A taskforce consisting of 
ASIC, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Victoria Police was established in 
response to the findings of the Cole Inquiry. The AFP discontinued its investigation 
following legal advice.
6
 ASIC did not pursue criminal proceedings, although it 
instituted six civil proceedings relating to directors' duties.
7
 In a media release 
announcing the proceedings, ASIC advised that civil proceedings were preferred due 
to statute of limitation considerations.
8
  
A5.7 Four of ASIC's proceedings have been concluded. ASIC ultimately settled the 
proceedings against the former managing director of AWB, Mr Andrew Lindberg. 
The Supreme Court of Victoria agreed to a proposed fine of $100,000 and that 
Mr Lindberg be disqualified from managing corporations until 15 September 2014. 
The court also found that AWB's former chief financial officer (CFO), Mr Paul 
                                              
4  ASIC, 'Decision in James Hardie penalty proceedings', Media Release, no. 12-275, 
13 November 2012. 
5  Terence RH Cole, Report of the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the 
UN Oil-for-Food Programme, vol. 1, November 2006, pp. xi, lxxxi. 
6  AFP, 'AWB Task Force investigation', Media Release, 28 August 2009. 
7  ASIC, 'ASIC's response to ABC TV's Four Corners' questions', 30 September 2013, 
http://abc.net.au/4corners/documents/RBA2013/ASIC_response.pdf (accessed 1 October 2013), 
p. 1. 
8  A relevant extract from the media release is as follows: 'Investigations into civil penalty 
proceedings was given more priority by ASIC because of the statute of limitation periods which 
apply to those actions and which do not apply to possible criminal proceedings (which 
investigations by ASIC continue). Commissioner Cole examined 27 contracts between AWB 
and the Iraqi Grain Board (IGB). The Corporations Act limits the time for the commencement 
of civil penalty proceedings to six years. The time limit had expired for 20 of the contracts 
when the Cole Inquiry concluded in November 2006 and two expired in February and June 
2007'. ASIC, 'ASIC launches civil penalty action against former officers of AWB', Media 
Release, no. 07-332, 19 December 2007. 
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Ingleby, had breached his duties.
9
 On 23 December 2013, ASIC announced that it 
discontinued proceedings against two former executives 'after forming the view that it 
was no longer in the public interest to pursue its claims'. Proceedings against the 
former chairman of AWB and another executive are ongoing.
10
 
Centro 
A5.8 The global financial crisis limited the availability of debt funding and led to 
property values coming under pressure. Shopping centre owner and operator Centro 
nearly collapsed in December 2007 after it could not rollover its debt. It subsequently 
emerged that the 2007 annual reports of two Centro companies failed to disclose 
$2 billion of short-term liabilities (those liabilities were instead classified as 
non-current) and guarantees of short-term liabilities of an associated company valued 
at US$1.75 billion.
11
 
A5.9 In October 2009, ASIC instituted civil penalty proceedings against 
then-serving and former directors and a former chief financial officer (CFO). The 
Federal Court found that the directors had breached their duties when they signed off 
on the financial reports.
12
 The managing director and former chief executive officer 
(CEO) was fined $30,000 and the former CFO was disqualified from managing 
corporations for two years.
13
 In November 2012, ASIC accepted an enforceable 
undertaking from the former lead auditor of Centro that prevents the auditor from 
practising until 30 June 2015.
14
 Some financial redress for shareholders was achieved 
as the result of a class action, with a $200 million settlement reached with Centro and 
its auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers.
15
 
                                              
9  ASIC successfully appealed the amount of the penalty imposed on Mr Ingleby by the Supreme 
Court of Victoria. ASIC and Mr Ingleby had recommended penalties of a disqualification of 
15 months and a pecuniary penalty of $40,000, however, Justice Robson set the pecuniary 
penalty at $10,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeal increased the penalty to $40,000. See ASIC, 
'ASIC to appeal permanent stay on second AWB case', Media Release, no. 09-260, 
17 December 2009; and ASIC, 'ASIC appeal upheld', Media Release, no. 13-055, 19 March 
2013. 
10  ASIC, 'Update on ASIC's proceedings against former directors and officers of AWB Limited', 
Media Release, no. 13-363, 23 December 2013. 
11  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291 at 297 [9]. 
12  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291. 
13  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (No 2) (2011) 196 FCR 430 at 433 
[3]–[5]. 
14  ASIC, 'Former Centro auditor suspended', Media Release, no. 12-288, 19 November 2012. 
15  Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd (No 6) [2012] FCA 650 (19 June 2012). 
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A5.10 ASIC considers that the Centro investigation is an example of how ASIC has 
improved the conduct of its investigations as the civil penalty proceedings against 
Centro were initiated within 13 months of the investigation commencing.
16
 
Andrew Forrest and Fortescue 
A5.11 ASIC was ultimately unsuccessful in the case it brought against Andrew 
Forrest and Fortescue Metals Group (Fortescue) related to ASX announcements and 
other statements made in 2004 and 2005 on agreements entered into with three 
state-owned entities of the People's Republic of China. ASIC's case was dismissed at 
trial in 2009. Its appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court was successful in 2011; 
however, in 2012 the High Court upheld the appeals of Fortescue and Mr Forrest. 
A5.12 The High Court criticised how ASIC's case was pleaded. Specifically, the 
court disapproved of how ASIC set out the case it sought to make
17
 and how the 
allegations put by ASIC at trial changed on appeal. A relevant extract of the judgment 
follows: 
The task of the pleader is to allege the facts said to constitute a cause of 
action or causes of action supporting claims for relief. Sometimes that task 
may require facts or characterisations of facts to be pleaded in the 
alternative. It does not extend to planting a forest of forensic contingencies 
and waiting until final address or perhaps even an appeal hearing to map a 
path through it. In this case, there were hundreds, if not thousands, of 
alternative and cumulative combinations of allegations. As Keane CJ 
observed in his judgment in the Full Court: 
'The presentation of a range of alternative arguments is not apt to aid 
comprehension or coherence of analysis and exposition; indeed, this 
approach may distract attention from the central issues.' 
As already noted, ASIC’s allegations were taken, at trial, to be allegations 
of fraud. Yet on appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, and again on 
the appeals to this Court, ASIC advanced its case on the wholly different 
footing that the impugned statements should be found to be misleading or 
deceptive. That is, whereas the case that was presented at trial focused upon 
the honesty of Fortescue, its board and Mr Forrest, the case which ASIC 
mounted on appeal focused on what it was that the impugned statements 
would have conveyed to their intended audience.
18
 
                                              
16  Tony D'Aloisio, 'Responding to the global financial crisis: the ASIC story', address to the 
Trans-Tasman Business Circle, 30 November 2010, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 3 October 
2013), p. 14. 
17  The reasons for judgment stated that ASIC's statement of claim did not identify the case it 
sought to make 'and to do that clearly and distinctly', adding that '[t]his is no pleader's quibble. 
It is a point that reflects fundamental requirements for the fair trial of allegations of 
contravention of law'. Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 
CLR 486 at 502 [25]. 
18  (2012) 247 CLR 486 at 503 [27]–[28]. 
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ABC Learning 
A5.13 Childcare provider ABC Learning Centres Limited entered voluntary 
administration in November 2008. After an ASIC investigation, criminal charges were 
laid against Edmund Groves and Martin Kemp, two former executive directors of 
ABC Learning Centres Ltd, for alleged breaches of their duties as directors.
19
 
Mr Kemp was found not guilty in June 2012.
20
 Following this verdict, the CDPP 
decided not to proceed further with the prosecution against Mr Groves.
21
 More 
recently, a criminal prosecution has commenced against the former CFO for allegedly 
authorising false or misleading information.
22
 ASIC also investigated the auditor of 
ABC Learning and in August 2012 accepted an enforceable undertaking that prevents 
the auditor from practising for five years.
23
 
A5.14 ASIC's investigation was questioned or criticised by various commentators, 
particularly after the charges against the founder of ABC Learning were dropped.
24
 
Collapsed property finance schemes, mortgage funds and debenture issuers 
A5.15 Over the past decade, several high-profile collapses have resulted in 
significant losses for retail investors, leading to criticism of ASIC and the introduction 
of regulatory changes. These collapses include Westpoint (2005), Fincorp (2007), 
Australian Capital Reserve (2007), Provident Capital (2012), Banksia (2012), 
Wickham Securities (2012) and LM Investment Management (2013).  
A5.16 Westpoint in particular was a high-profile collapse that attracted some 
criticism of ASIC.
25
 Westpoint's activities gained ASIC's attention in 2002.
26
 In May 
2004, ASIC instituted proceedings against a Westpoint company to seek a 
determination by the court on whether certain promissory notes offered should have 
                                              
19  ASIC, 'Former ABC directors charged', Media Release, no. 11-16, 28 January 2011. 
20  ASIC, 'Former ABC director found not guilty', Media Release, no. 12-117, 5 June 2012. 
21  ASIC, 'Former ABC directors charged', Media Release, no. 11-16, 28 January 2011. 
22  ASIC, 'Former ABC Learning CFO charged', Media Release, no. 13-104, 10 May 2013. 
23  ASIC, 'Former ABC Learning Centres auditor prevented from auditing companies for five 
years', Media Release, no. 12-186, 8 August 2012. 
24  See, for example, James Thomson, 'ASIC and Eddy Groves: Not as easy as ABC', Business 
Spectator, 10 September 2012, www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2012/9/10/education/ 
asic-and-eddy-groves-not-easy-abc (accessed 9 October 2013); Adam Schwab, 'ASIC nails 
"getaway driver" in ABC Learning debacle' Crikey, 14 August 2012, www.crikey.com.au/ 
2012/08/14/asic-nails-getaway-driver-in-abc-learning-debacle (accessed 9 October 2013); 
Michael Evans, 'ASIC's move as Groves "off the hook"', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 2012, 
p. 1. 
25  Although ASIC defended its actions: see Mr Jeffrey Lucy, Chairman, ASIC, PJCCFS Hansard, 
Statutory oversight of ASIC, 13 June 2006, p. 3. 
26  The Hon Peter Costello, House of Representatives Hansard, 21 May 2007, p. 137. 
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been offered as debentures or financial products under the Corporations Act.
27
 At that 
time, ASIC 'was not aware of the apparently large scale involvement of licensed 
financial planners advising on Westpoint products'. Independently audited statements 
of other Westpoint companies filed with ASIC during 2004 did not raise any 
concerns.
28
 Following Westpoint's collapse, ASIC took representative action against 
KPMG, the directors of nine Westpoint mezzanine companies, seven financial 
planners and State Trustees Limited.
29
 ASIC ultimately settled the cases and obtained 
$97.2 million in compensation.
30
 Criminal proceedings against two former Westpoint 
officers were discontinued.
31
 Ultimately, 31 individuals were either banned by ASIC 
or gave ASIC an undertaking that they would not engage in financial services.
32
 
A5.17 The Westpoint matter led to ASIC imposing a regulatory obligation that 
requires additional disclosure if one of eight benchmarks set by ASIC for unlisted 
notes is not met.
33
 The collapse of Banksia and other debenture issuers led to the 
previous government announcing that ASIC and APRA would consult on further 
reforms, such as capital requirements.
34
 
Opes Prime 
A5.18 Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd was a provider of securities lending facilities 
that was placed in administration in March 2008.
35
 An ASIC investigation following 
the collapse that led to two directors and founders of Opes Prime being jailed 
(although recently another director and founder was found to be not guilty). ASIC also 
helped facilitate a scheme of arrangement that resulted in ANZ and Merrill Lynch, the 
major financiers of Opes Prime, paying $226 million to the Opes Prime liquidators. 
With other assets paid or recovered, approximately $253 million was paid to Opes 
Prime's creditors.
36
 This settlement is the largest compensation outcome achieved by 
                                              
27  ASIC, 'ASIC acts on mezzanine financing', Media Release, no. 04-157, 25 May 2004. 
28  The Hon Peter Costello, House of Representatives Hansard, 21 May 2007, p. 139. 
29  ASIC, 'Actions to obtain compensation for the benefit of investors', https://westpoint.asic.gov. 
au/wstpoint/wstpoint.nsf/byheadline/Summary+of+claims?opendocument (accessed 
2 September 2013). 
30  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 118. 
31  ASIC, 'Statement on Westpoint action', Media Release, no. 13-105, 14 May 2013. 
32  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 27. 
33  This is termed 'if not – why not' disclosure. The requirements are outlined in ASIC's Regulatory 
Guide 69. 
34  The Hon Bill Shorten MP (Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation), 'Roadmap to a 
sustainable future for finance companies', Media Release, no. 93 of 2012 (22 December). 
35  More detail about the collapse, see chapter 4 of Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services, Financial products and services in Australia, November 2009, 
Parliamentary Paper No. 321/2009. 
36  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 106; ASIC, 'Opes Prime schemes of arrangement approved', Media 
Release, 09-135, 4 August 2009. 
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ASIC for consumers.
37
 In a 2009 report, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services (PJCCFS) provided the following helpful 
summary of the settlement: 
The terms of settlement included an agreement by the regulator not to 
pursue ANZ and Merrill Lynch for an alleged contravention of the managed 
investment provisions of the Corporations Act…ASIC also agreed not to 
pursue directors of ANZ for civil penalty and compensation claims under 
section 181 of the Corporations Act. In accepting the scheme of 
arrangement, the Opes Prime liquidators and clients also renounced all 
claims and legal proceedings against Merrill Lynch and ANZ.
38
 
A5.19 This agreement was criticised. For example, in 2010 Fairfax journalist Adele 
Ferguson concluded that following a collapse that 'unleashed havoc on the 
sharemarket, when ANZ and Opes Prime's other financiers, including Merrill Lynch, 
began selling down the broker's $1.4 billion securities lending portfolio to recover 
secured loans', it was not 'a good look' for ASIC to have entered into an enforceable 
undertaking that allowed ANZ to sign a '$226 million cheque in return for legal 
indemnity' before ASIC had completed its criminal investigation into Opes Prime.
39
 
Individuals aggrieved by the Opes Prime collapse also lodged submissions to this 
inquiry.
40
 However, ASIC has previously rejected criticism about its actions relating 
to Opes Prime.
41
 ANZ also told the committee that at no time did it have a relationship 
with Opes Prime's customers, and that while it acknowledges the hardship that Opes 
Prime's collapse caused, it does not believe this hardship resulted from ANZ's 
actions.
42
 
Storm Financial 
A5.20 Storm Financial was a financial advisory firm that collapsed in 2009. Clients, 
many being retirees or nearing retirement, invested through a high-risk model offered 
by Storm but many did not understand the level of risk involved. Approximately 3,000 
investors were arranged by Storm to be double-geared with loans against equity in 
their homes as well as margin loans.
43
 When the share market experience a downturn 
in 2008, many investors received margin calls that they were unable to meet. How 
                                              
37  ASIC, Submission 45.2, p. 24. 
38  PJCCFS, Financial products and services in Australia, November 2009, p. 64 (footnotes 
omitted). 
39  Adele Ferguson, 'An inconvenient deal and a forgotten $226m', Sydney Morning Herald, 
12 January 2010, p. 20.  
40  For example, see Mr Rob Fowler, Submission 280. 
41  See ASIC, Submission 378 to the PJCCFS inquiry into financial products and services in 
Australia, August 2009, p. 3. 
42  ANZ, Submission 216, p. 5. 
43  Australian Government, Compensation arrangements for consumers of financial services: 
Report by Richard St. John, April 2012, p. 55. 
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appropriate the advice the clients received has been the subject of dispute.44 ASIC 
estimates that investors who borrowed from financiers to invest through Storm lost in 
total approximately $830 million.
45
 
A5.21 ASIC commenced an investigation into Storm in December 2008 and 
commenced negotiations on an enforceable undertaking.
46
 Storm was placed into 
administration by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) in January 2009. 
ASIC's legal proceedings against various banks and the directors of Storm (Emmanuel 
and Julie Cassimatis) commenced between November and December 2010. ASIC and 
the CBA settled in September 2012 with the CBA providing up to $136 million in 
compensation for investors in addition to approximately $132 million already 
provided by the CBA.
47
 Compensation proceedings against the Bank of Queensland 
(BoQ), Senrac Pty Limited (Senrac) and Macquarie Bank on behalf of two former 
Storm investors were settled in May 2013. As the time of writing, judgment had not 
been given for the proceedings brought by ASIC against Storm, BoQ and Macquarie 
in relation to the unregistered managed investment scheme. Further, the proceedings 
against the Cassimatises are expected to continue in 2014.
48
 ASIC did, however, 
successfully appeal against court approval of the $82.5 million settlement between 
former Storm Financial investors and Macquarie Bank brought about by a class action 
after ASIC considered 'the differential distribution of the settlement funds resulted in a 
lack of fairness to the majority of the members of the class'.
49
  
A5.22 The collapse of Storm Financial was considered by the PJCCFS as part of its 
2009 inquiry into financial products and services. During that inquiry, ASIC rejected 
criticism of how its investigation of Storm was conducted.
50
 Although the PJCCFS 
noted that ASIC may have recognised earlier that Storm's practices were problematic 
if ASIC's risk-based auditing processes were more effective,
51
 ASIC's performance 
was not a central issue in the PJCCFS's report. Rather, that committee developed 
                                              
44  In its proceedings against the founder, ASIC is alleging that the Storm model provided 'one size 
fits all' financial advice, rather than advice related to each investor's individual financial 
circumstances. ASIC, 'Civil penalty proceedings against the Cassimatises', 
http://storm.asic.gov.au (accessed 18 March 2014). 
45  ASIC, 'ASIC and CBA Storm Financial settlement', 8 March 2013, www.asic.gov.au (accessed 
18 March 2014), p. 2. 
46  ASIC, Submission 378 to the PJCCFS inquiry into financial products and services in Australia, 
August 2009, p. 16. 
47  ASIC, response to Submission 276, received 11 December 2013, p. 2. 
48  See http://storm.asic.gov.au.  
49  See http://storm.asic.gov.au and ASIC, 'ASIC successful in appeal against Storm settlement 
deal', Media Release, no. 13-214, 12 August 2013. 
50  ASIC, Submission 378 to the PJCCFS inquiry into financial products and services in Australia, 
August 2009, p. 3. 
51  PJCCFS, Financial products and services in Australia, November 2009, p. 44. 
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proposals for legislative amendments that led to the previous government's FOFA 
reforms. 
A5.23 This committee has received submissions that have criticised ASIC's 
performance in the context of the Storm Financial matter.
52
 Among these were 
submissions from Levitt Robinson Solicitors, a law firm that instigated class actions 
on behalf of Storm investors, and from Storm Financial's former CEO Mr Emmanuel 
Cassimatis. ASIC addressed the Storm Financial matter in a written response to the 
Levitt Robinson submission.
53
 
Stuart Ariff 
A5.24 Stuart Ariff was an insolvency practitioner who was banned from the 
profession for life in August 2009 and jailed in December 2011 after being convicted 
on 19 criminal charges brought by ASIC. ASIC's actions, however, were subject to 
significant criticism. A key concern was that ASIC only acted once concerns about 
Mr Ariff were raised in the media in 2007.
54
 However, ASIC had received numerous 
complaints from 2005 onwards. This committee, in its 2010 report on liquidators and 
administrators, was sharply critical of ASIC's 'lack of responsiveness': 
The committee queries why both ASIC and the [Insolvency Practitioners 
Association of Australia (IPAA)]…took so long to identify Mr Ariff as a 
practitioner that should be investigated…[T]hese agencies received 
numerous complaints on the matter from several parties, including: 
 Mr Bernard Wood, who complained to ASIC twice in early 2005; 
 Carlovers, which complained to ASIC three times between 2005 and 
2007; 
 the Armidale Dumaresq Council, which received acknowledgement 
of a complaint related to the YCW League Club, but has not heard 
from ASIC since; 
 Mr Ron Williams, who lodged a complaint but was told by ASIC to 
refer the matter to the Office of Fair Trading or get legal advice; and 
 Mr Bill Doherty, who complained to ASIC on three occasions and to 
the IPAA, CPA and [the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia] 'more than 50 times'.
55
 
A5.25 Among other things, the committee recommended that ASIC's corporate 
insolvency responsibilities be transferred to the government agency that regulates 
                                              
52  See Submissions 18, 41, 44, 82, 84, 87, 88, 90, 172, 236, 278 and 301. 
53  ASIC, response to Submission 276, letter dated 11 December 2013. 
54  Senate Economics References Committee, The regulation, registration and remuneration of 
insolvency practitioners in Australia: the case for a new framework, September 2010, 
Parliamentary Paper No. 179/2010, p. 52. 
55  Senate Economics References Committee, The regulation, registration and remuneration of 
insolvency practitioners in Australia, p. 70 (footnotes omitted). 
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personal insolvency practitioners (then known as the Insolvency and Trustee Service 
Australia, but now called the Australian Financial Security Agency). The previous 
government's response to the report did not accept that recommendation; however, it 
did undertake a consultation process on possible reforms.
56
 Following this 
consultation process, an exposure draft of proposed insolvency law amendments was 
released but a bill to give effect to these changes was not introduced into the 
Parliament. 
Trio Capital 
A5.26 Trio Capital was a superannuation fraud that resulted in $176 million in 
superannuation funds being lost or missing.
57
 The PJCCFS, which conducted a 
dedicated inquiry into Trio Capital, was critical of ASIC's (and APRA's) 'slow 
response' to the fraud. The PJCCFS expressed surprise that 'there appears to have been 
very little follow up activity by APRA, ASIC and other authorities such as the AFP, to 
seek to recover outstanding moneys or to bring to justice those who have committed 
crimes which have led to great suffering on the part of Australian investors'.
58
 In 
evidence to this inquiry, a former ASIC described the investigation of Trio Capital as 
'example of what you would not do in an investigation'.
59
 
A5.27 ASIC's enforcement action following the collapse of Trio Capital has resulted 
in 11 people being jailed, banned, disqualified or removed from the industry for a 
combined total of more than 50 years.
60
 However, the PJCCFS considers that ASIC's 
enforcement action targeted a 'local foot soldier', but not those responsible for 
developing and implementing the scheme.
61
 ASIC announced in June 2012 that it had 
formed the view that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Mr Jack Flader, the 
individual who was 'allegedly the ultimate controller of the Trio group', had broken 
Australian law.
62
 ASIC has maintained this position since that announcement; in 
October 2013 ASIC issued a statement announcing that, despite its attempts to obtain 
extra evidence, ASIC was finalising its investigation into Mr Flader because of 
insufficient evidence.
63
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